hms iron duke

hms iron duke

Friday 13 February 2015

Muninsk?


Alphen, Netherlands. 13 February. “Peace in our time”. Those hollow words came to define British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and the appeasement of Nazi Germany in the wake of the signing of the Munich Pact on 29 September, 1939.  A day after the signing of yet another Minsk agreement it looks on the face of it as if the illiberal Realpolitik have once again trumped liberal naivety in an effort to bring ‘peace’ to Ukraine.  Indeed, several commentators have alluded to the similarities between the Munich Pact and the Minsk Agreement.  So, are there similarities and differences between Munich and Minsk?

First, I must issue a disclaimer.  I am an Oxford historian who has studied the causes of World War Two in great depth.  In spite of Russia’s blatant aggression in Ukraine I am still not prepared to equate modern Russia with Nazi Germany or President Putin with Adolf Hitler.  This blog as ever is about hard analysis not gratuitous offence. Given the heroic struggle of the Russian people during The Great Patriotic War and indeed my respect for them I am simply not prepared to cross that all-too-easy line simply to make a point.  However, there are some political similarities between Munich and Minsk that cannot be ignored:  

1.               Munich and Minsk both resulted from aggression against a third state by rapidly rearming, illiberal great powers dissatisfied by their place in the European order facing liberal powers weakened by economic crisis.  In Germany’s case it was the rejection of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and in Russia’s case it is rejection of the post-Cold War European order.

2.               Munich and Minsk both rewarded aggression by in effect confirming the ‘principle’ that might is right.  Russia in effect now controls much of Eastern Ukraine just as 1938 Germany gained control over the Sudeten territory of a then Czechoslovakia that it was going to occupy in any case.  Neither conflict would have existed but for great power aggression.

3.               Munich and Minsk both established a de facto principle linking ‘sovereignty’ to ethnicity. Indeed, by confirming the ceasefire line as in effect the extent of respective ethnicity-based sovereignty Russia may well have re-established a dangerous precedent for interference in any state where sizeable Russian minorities exist.  Prior to the September 1939 invasion of Poland that is exactly the principle 1938 Germany used to justify expansionism.

4.               Munich and Minsk both revealed the weakness and division of the liberal powers and who then strove to mask that weakness by wrapping the respective agreements in a veil of empty legalism, such as international commissions and meaningless plebiscites. By so doing the liberal powers conferred some sense of legitimacy upon naked power.

5.               Munich and Minsk both ignored previous breaches of international law in the hope that a line in the sand could be drawn and that no further expansion would be sought.  Munich ignored both Germany’s 1936 occupation of the Saarland and the 1938 occupation of Austria.  Minsk ignored Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea and thus confirmed it.

6.               Munich and Minsk both reflected a culture of appeasement in that the liberal negotiating powers Germany and France rejected out-of-hand any military ‘solution’.  No-one sensible is suggesting a force-on-force conflict between Russian and Western forces over Ukraine, but to reject a role for military force when such force is central to the strategy of the adversary smacks all-too-readily of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.  There may be no military ‘solution’ per se but that must no mean that the credible ability to apply force if needs be and in some form has no utility in the process towards a secure solution.  It is that point which most clearly divides the US from Germany and France.

However, there are also very profound differences between Munich and Minsk: 

1.               Munich and Minsk both involved a weak France. However, in 1938 Germany was the aggressor, revisionist power whereas in 2015 Germany is the status quo lead power.  Britain was in the ‘lead’ in 1938, whereas in 2015 Britain is a foreign policy irrelevance, a small power, domestically-divided with small leaders stuck at the edge of influence. 

2.               Munich did not involve either the European Union which did not then exist, or the United States, which was then an isolationist power.  The involvement of both means the liberal powers now have many more coercive tools at their disposal short of war to persuade Russia to honour agreements.  No such tools existed for Britain and France in 1938.

3.               Munich also took place in a Europe in which there was no NATO, no ultimate and credible guarantee against further aggression.

Therefore, on balance one should be careful about glibly citing historical comparisons because the Europe of 2015 is very different from the Europe of 1938.  Equally, one should be equally aware of the consequences of failure.  In March 1939 German forces occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia and thus made World War Two inevitable.  Were Russia to move on the rest of Ukraine Europe would be but one step from war and any historian knows what that could mean.

Seventy years ago today some 722 Royal Air Force Lancaster bomber crews were being briefed.  Several hours later they took off from bases across Eastern England in two enormous “bomber streams”. Over the next two days the German city of Dresden was systematically-reduced to rubble and twenty-five thousand of its citizens lay dead.  The true appeasement is to lack the imagination to realise the implications of what is happening in Ukraine.

Muninsk?


Julian Lindley-French

Wednesday 11 February 2015

Little Britain Buffoonery

Alphen, Netherlands. 11 February. Due to a not untypical piece of technical buffoonery on my part my new paperback/Kindle edition Little Britain will be delayed a week or so.  To those of you who have been burning down Amazon's virtual barricade to get hold of a copy I apologise.  All I can say is that the book is brilliant and the wait will be worth it - really! Modesty prevents my saying more.

All best,

Julian

Monday 9 February 2015

Little Britain 2015: New Paperback/Kindle book by Julian Lindley-French (www.amazon.co.uk)


Geneva, Switzerland. 9 February. Britain is still a major power but behaves ever more like a small one, bereft of leadership, statecraft or strategic direction.  However, all is not lost!  That is the core message of my new paperback (217 pages) Little Britain 2015 (very reasonably priced) which examines the causes of Britain’s precipitous and exaggerated strategic decline and what London must do about it.  The book is a new version of my 2014 e-book of the same name. However, I have re-written and updated the work to focus specifically on the challenges and choices Britain faces in 2015 as a new National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) are being drafted.  As such this book considers the hard strategic choices all European states must face in a dangerous world.

In 2010 then British Foreign Secretary William Hague stated there will be no strategic shrinkage.  Britain has been shrinking strategically ever since threatening its continued role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and undermining British influence with key allies and partners and in the EU, NATO and beyond.  It is a retreat from influence that is all too apparent in Britain’s complete absence from the Ukraine crisis as France, Germany and the US take the lead.

However, it is not Britain's fate to decline inexorably as Britain is still one of the world’s top economies and one of its leading military powers.  Critically, unless London’s High Establishment – both political and bureaucratic – face the world as it is and not as they would like it to be 2015 could mark the true end of Britain as a world power after some four hundred years.  Sadly, much of Britain’s decline is self-inflicted, reflective of a culture of declinism and defeatism that has taken hold at the top of power in London.

London’s divided High Establishment has abandoned firm strategic principles for a form of strategic political correctness as short-term politics routinely trumps long-term strategic principles.  This retreat from strategic judgement has been reinforced by an obsession with austerity and cutting the deficit at whatever cost to foreign and defence policy, a lack of social cohesion, as well as uncertainty about US leadership, the future of the EU and Britain’s place therein. However, the main cause of decline is a timid, strategically-illiterate political class no longer committed to any level of strategic ambition about Britain’s role in the world.  And, a Whitehall bureaucracy that has become increasingly politicised and lacking all-important strategic unity of effort and purpose.

The politicisation of London’s High Establishment is evident in the ideological struggle between hard and soft power and the consequent loss of all-important balance between the two as London retreats ever deeper into political spin to mask actual weakness.  Sadly, the entire process of British statecraft has become an unworkable and messy compromise. One camp believes that Britain can still play a role in the world and that all British influence must necessarily be established on credible armed forces and a tight whole-of-government strategy and policy machine. Another camp is comprised of soft power ideologues who believe that Britain’s strategic day is done and that in the absence of national strategic principles and real political leadership a capable British military simply leads Britain into other people’s dangerous adventures.

Little Britain 2015 rejects defeatism and argues that it is not too late for Britain to regain strategic poise.  Indeed, Britain’s demise is by no means assured if only the High Establishment can wake up and get its act together.  To do that the book considers the 2015 National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review in the round and the positive view of Britain’s role in the contemporary world that both reviews must espouse.  

Little Britain 2015 then offers a series of solutions to take Britain out of its strategic malaise.  First, Britain needs a National Security Strategy that can properly assess Britain’s place in the world and what is needed to defend and protect Britain’s critical national interests and exert influence over the grand alliances critical to the British way of strategy.  Second, the National Security Council must be much strengthened so that it can help properly forge a real whole-of-government approach to national strategy and security and thus ensure balance is restored between the protection of society and the projection of British power and influence.  Third, London must re-establish a proper security dialogue with the British people and stop treating citizens like children. Fourth, Britain must create a radical future British military force powerful and agile enough to support the US and act as a high-end core within NATO and the EU and configured to lead coalitions of allies and partners the world over.

This is not just a book about Britain.  It is a book about the choices all democracies must make as Russia and Islamic State bring the strategic foreplay of the twenty-first century to a shattering end.  Strategic engagement or strategic pretence; that is the choice Britain faces.  If it is the latter then Britain, Europe and the wider West will become victims of change rather than the masters of it. Now is the time to act!

The book is currently available at www.amazon.co.uk. Enjoy the read!

Julian Lindley-French

Friday 6 February 2015

NATO: Paying the Price of Defence Pretence


Alphen, Netherlands. 6 February.  On Tuesday a senior Russian from Moscow’s Academy of Sciences told me somewhat chillingly that Ukraine should “…focus on the future and not on territory”.  That was as clear a statement as yet of Russian strategy; to confirm the gains made in eastern Ukraine and avoid any debate over the status of Crimea.  As Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande (Prime Minister Cameron???) jet to Moscow I think the phrase President Putin will be preparing will be succinct: fait accompli!  "We hold what we have".  Forget all the talk about implementing last September’s Minsk Agreement the current pro-Russian offensive is all about Russian strategy and the central role Moscow now accords its developing military capability in creating an unstable ‘buffer zone’ around and along Russia’s western borders.  So, what is NATO going to do about it?

The same day as my Russian colleague proposed his fait accompli in Ukraine I put a direct question to NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow; what if forward deterrence failed, the unthinkable happened and Russian military adventurism entered the Baltic States?  The reason for my question was not that I am expecting a Russian military incursion into the Baltic States tomorrow.  However, I am worried.  The Putin regime is fast becoming increasingly idiosyncratic, opportunistic and unstable.  Moreover, with the US increasingly over-stretched the correlation of forces between NATO and Russian forces could reach a point in which Russia calculates that short of a nuclear war on European soil there is nothing NATO could do to prevent such an incursion. The start of wars are always all about 'the moment'.  At such a moment a Moscow faced with growing popular discontent at home may, just may, be tempted to attack.

Yesterday in Brussels Alliance Defence Ministers met to discuss precisely this scenario and how best to strengthen NATO collective defence.  NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the decision to enhance the NATO Response Force and confirm the so-called Spearhead Force would “ensure that we have the right forces, in the right place at the right time”. Really?

According to US think-tank CSIS between 2001 and 2011 NATO Europeans cut their respective armed forces on average by 18%. Between 2012 and 2014 twelve of the world’s top twenty defence cutters were in NATO Europe.  Driven by sequestration by 2020 the US plans to cut its armed forces by a sum greater than Europe’s entire defence investment. And yet according to the Washington Post an increasingly militarised Russia plans to inject some $775bn into creating the more professionalised armed forces apparent in Ukraine.  Notably, Russia is investing particularly heavily in SAS-type Special Operations Forces (Little Green Men) that can underpin the kind of disinformation-led hybrid/ambiguous warfare all-too-apparent in Ukraine.

Cue Brussels. The problem with yesterday’s declaration by NATO defence ministers is that I have heard it all before; it is defence pretence.  Yes, at the NATO Wales Summit the nations agreed to stop cutting defence budgets and start moving towards meeting the NATO guideline of 2% GDP on defence within a decade).  Frankly (and I have been digging), even that extremely limited commitment is not worth the rather cheap toilet paper my Dutch wife insists on buying and upon which such a ‘commitment’ seems to have been written.

When in doubt pretend!  That seems to be the mantra of many European leaders when it comes to defence.  For years I was told defence was not being cut when it patently was.  Now I am being told Europeans are spending more on defence when they are patently not.  It is something straight out of Monty Python - "run away".

Take my own country Britain.  Yesterday, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon made much of the fact that Britain will take a lead by committing 1000 troops to the new Spearhead Force alongside France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain.  The same day the House of Commons Defence Select Committee slammed the Ministry of Defence for its “strikingly modest” contribution of the British armed forces to the fight against Islamic State.  This week it has also emerged that plans are afoot to cut and to partially merge the very spearhead formations NATO’s new force will be reliant upon – 3 Commando Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade – under the guise of a ‘new’ joint rapid reaction force.  Critically, the all-important ‘enablers’ (the key structures and kit that gets a force into action and supports it) will also be cut.  If true this is madness and will critically undermine not only Britain’s defence but NATO too at this pivotal moment in European history and stability.

The second, paperback edition of my book Little Britain? Twenty-First Century Strategy for a Middling European Power, which considers British national and defence strategy in the round, is out next week (www.amazon.com).  In the book I call for a radical British future force that will look much like the US Marines Corps.  A core force that is able to lead and support Alliance coalitions built on firm principles of ‘deep jointness’ between the Navy, Army and Air Force.  However, a central contention of the book is that to create such a core force the British must turn all of its now very small army and marines into a spearhead force not turn the spearhead force into a kind of peacekeeping militia simply to save money.

The reason for this nonsense is that British and other European leaders still see the defence budget as a welfare reserve to be raided whenever long-term strategy is to be sacrificed for short-term politics. Sadly, this obsession with cutting armed forces at whastever the cost can take place only because leaders like David Cameron steadfastly refuse to look at what is happening in the world, most notably what is happening on Europe’s borders some two hours flying time from London.

The bottom-line is this; NATO cannot go on creating ever more acronyms with ever less forces.  The irony of the ‘new’ force NATO is proposing is that it looks very much like the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) proposed amidst much fanfare back at the December 1999 EU Helsinki Summit.  Some sixteen years on that force still exists only as a political fantasy within the Brussels beltway and which if called upon might just make Antwerp within sixty days. Creating such as force as policy is not the same as creating such a force as fact.  Too often European leaders are happy to make grand declarations and then simply not follow through. 

Europe and the world is getting far too dangerous for defence pretence.  Worse, such political folly is actively destabilising Europe for it is encouraging Russian adventurism.  It is time to end defence pretence, before defence pretence ends NATO.

Julian Lindley-French   


Wednesday 4 February 2015

The West’s Existential Fight for Survival


Leangkollen, Norway. 4 February. Norway is a small country with a big internationalist vision. The past two days I have spent in debate with senior Norwegian and other leaders and thinkers at the outstanding Leangkollen conference which is this year celebrating its fiftieth anniversary.  There were many messages from the conference of which perhaps the most succinctly honest and elegant (not to mention typically Norwegian) under-statement came from Norway’s Prime Minister Erna Solberg. “Globalisation brings its own set of challenges”, she said.  Doesn’t it just!  The West is facing an existential fight for its survival…but simply does not realise it.

My job is to look beyond the headlines at the drivers of big change.  Naturally, much of the conference was focused on the here and now; Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and Islamic States barbarous attacks on civilisation, decency and humanity.  However, in many ways the threats to Europe’s eastern and southern flanks are symptomatic of much deeper structural shifts underway that within a decade will overturn all the assumptions about security and stability Western leaders rather complacently cling to.

My task at the conference was to consider what ‘we’ might expect in the future.  That question assumes of course there is a ‘we’ given the talk these days of division in the West.  There are profound divisions in Europe and between Europeans spiced with divisions between Europeans and North Americans. And, it is certainly true that the West is as fractious as at any time in its seventy-four year contemporary history.  However, it is important not to mistake the fractiousness of a pluralistic, democratic community with real schism.  The paradox of globalisation is that the much of the change it drives is also making societies across the West look ever more alike, facing the same problems and similar interests. 

The real problem for the West concerns how to generate sufficient, shared vision not only to see the scale of the challenges posed by globalisation and what one speaker called their “negative interdependence”, but to craft cohesive policy thereafter and then implement it.  ‘Policy’ derives from the (appropriately) Greek word ‘apodeixis’ meaning to set forth, which makes policy and power indivisible.  Unfortunately, for too long Europe has seen policy and power as distinct, even adversarial in favour of community.  The Russians are fast reminding the rest of Europe that policy without power is but prattle.  Indeed, as The Economist pointed out recently “European power has disappeared down the rabbit hole of European integration”.  Today, ‘Europe’ is far less than the sum of its parts.

Such a retreat from realism must stop. NATO Deputy Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow said that Russia’s aggression is a “…game changer in European security”.  It certainly is, although in so many more ways than the immediate challenge suggests. Indeed, Moscow’s actions represent the first real proof of what happens when the liberal powers deliberately and wantonly weaken themselves in the face of growing illiberal power.  This challenge takes many forms.  Russia’s challenge is that of an increasingly idiosyncratic, militarised and opportunistic Russian state led by a President who is prone to adventurism and surrounded by the necessary coterie of yes men all too willing to confirm him in his dangerous folly.  President Putin is carving Ukraine up simply because he believes that he can.  However, for all that there is still hope that rationalism and realism will ultimately temper President Putin’s nationalist illiberalism, but it will take a show of real Western strength, unity and resolve.

Islamic State offers no such prospect.  The brutal burning-to-death of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasabeh demonstrated all-too-graphically that the fight with Islamic State is a fight to the death with extreme illiberalism.  It is a form of extremism that is likely to be exacerbated in the coming years by the dark side of globalisation; energy insecurity, cyber vulnerability; the proliferation of ageing but dangerous technologies, terrorism, food and water stress, population expansion, mass movement, poverty and the very distinct form of geopolitics that is emerging from the interaction of global stresses. 

IS is a form of anti-state extremism that is also eating away at many states from within and without, not least Russia. Indeed, given the apparently ‘British’ identity of the psychopath responsible for so many hostage deaths at the hands of IS it is an illiberal threat that now extends into European societies. The inability/refusal of liberal European elites to deal with illiberal extremists within their own societies explains not only why divisions exist within the West but also why the threat posed is so dangerous. Quite simply, too many elected leaders are in denial.

Taken together all these dangers could ultimately pose an existential threat to the West.  And yes, institutions such as the EU and NATO are important in helping the state combat such threats. However, they will only succeed if they are imbued with the political courage to confront such threats, reinforced by political leaders able and willing to tell their peoples hard truths, and underpinned by real strategy.
 
To that end, it is high-time European leaders begin to reinvest in their armed forces.  If acted upon the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit will come to be seen as line in the sand of decline.  However, for years leaders told me often to my face that Europeans were not actually cutting defence when they were (they called it ‘reform’).  Today, they tell me that are reinvesting in defence when many of them are not.

But, even strong armed forces important though they are will be only one pillar of strategy.  The Millennium Development Goals are running their course.  There is some talk of replacing them with Sustainable Development Goals.  Such goals will be important if the drivers of dangerous change are to be halted and the consequent illiberalism challenged and defeated. 

There may be no Hitler or Stalin on the immediate horizon of the emerging strategic landscape (although such a challenge may emerge quickly).  However, hidden in that landscape is any number of threats and risks that could in time threaten the existence of the idea the West has become and in time the place.  Faced with such challenges if the West is to defend itself and assert the values it holds dear – freedom, liberty, democracy and the rule of just law – then it must think anew about its security and the solidarity and unity of effort and purpose needed if the West is to prevail.

Make no mistake; the West is facing an existential struggle for its survival in the twenty-first century and must awaken to both the fact and the challenge.


Julian Lindley-French 

Friday 30 January 2015

Churchill: With Us But Not Of Us


Alphen, Netherlands. 30 January. It is not often I can say where I was standing exactly fifty years ago but today is one of those days.  At 2pm on a freezing 30 January, 1965 aged seven I was standing with my parents and a multitude of other Britons alongside the Waterloo to Reading railway line at Feltham in the county of Middlesex. We were awaiting the arrival of Winston Churchill’s funeral train as it made its laurel-laden way towards the great man’s final resting place at Bladon in Oxfordshire close to the mighty Blenheim Palace, his ancestral home.  Having left Waterloo Station at 1.30pm half-an-hour later Feltham Station’s massive wooden level crossing gates began to swing shut on their iron-fisted hinges.  In the distance came the doleful, respectful sound of a steam whistle. In no time at all Battle of Britain class steam locomotive No 34051 Winston Churchill flashed by in charge of six Pullman coaches the second of which contained Churchill’s coffin draped appropriately in the Union flag.  Even today I can still remember “V for Victory” made out on the front of the locomotive and the people all around me dipping their heads in deep, reverential, albeit momentary respect.

Fifty years on from Churchill’s passing what if anything remains of his legacy?  Certainly, the country and indeed the Europe he helped free from the threat of Nazi tyranny would be unrecognisable to him. He would probably have been grateful for the adulation he still receives in many quarters but equally wary of it.  Churchill became progressively aware of his own failings and was haunted by the 1915 disaster at Gallipoli when his massive gambit to end World War One by removing Turkey from the war ended disastrously in the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

And yet it was precisely the kind of big thinking that made him a successful war leader.  He was able to imagine the most grand strategic of grand strategic pictures and act on the decisions he believed necessary.  He could be ruthless when he believed demonstrations of power were necessary. For example, there is no evidence he objected to the February 1945 obliteration of Dresden by 800 RAF  and RCAF Lancasters.  Given the attack’s proximity to the Yalta Conference it is likely Churchill wanted to demonstrate the power of RAF Bomber Command to Stalin.

Equally, that very ruthlessness was applied to his own analysis of Britain, however hard the conclusions for a patriotic Englishman and imperialist.  In February 1946 Churchill even admitted to US President Truman that Britain’s day was done and that had he been born then he would have preferred to have been born American.  Through his mother he was already half-American.

Churchill was also capable of real political vision. In September 1946 in a speech to the University of Zurich Churchill called for the creation of a “kind of United States of Europe”.  Euro-federalists have suggested Churchill would have been a fan of the EU and a European super-state.  Far from it!  What he foresaw was what he said, a united STATES of Europe.  In May 1953 Churchill rejected British membership of the first attempt to create a European Army.  “We are with Europe, but not of it”, and, “We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a federal European system”. That said, today’s Europe would have thrilled him even if Russia’s aggression against Ukraine would no doubt have elicited a very Churchillian growl.

Churchill was ultimately a political realist.  Even in 1940 he knew Britain possessed the finest air defence system in the world, the world’s pre-eminent navy and an empire that promised almost boundless reserves.  However, he also knew the war would end Britain as a major world power even if victorious.  And, as World War Two dragged on he saw at first hand Britain’s steady marginalisation at the hands of Roosevelt’s America and Stalin’s USSR.  It pained him deeply and led at times to errors of judgement of which he was more than capable.  The infamous “Naughty Note” scribbled during a meeting with Stalin in Moscow in late 1944 imagined the respective influence of the West and the Soviets in post-war Central and Eastern Europe.  It was wrong and he knew it even as he scribed the note,

In fact Churchill had no illusions about Stalin and wanted to constrain the Soviets.  That it proved futile became obvious at the February 1945 Yalta conference at which Churchill fought for hour after hour for a free Poland only to be over-ruled by an ailing Roosevelt who really cared little for the fate of Central and Eastern Europe and simply wanted to “bring the boys home”.  Then US Chief of Staff George C. Marshall acknowledged after the Summit that Churchill was right.  It is therefore scandalous that Britain and Churchill should be blamed by so many for Yalta even today.  

Eventually, Churchill won the argument.  Less than a year later on 5 March, 1946 Churchill made his famous “Sinews of Peace” speech during which he warned of the “Iron Curtain” that was descending across Europe. Together with George Kennan’s analyses from Washington’s Moscow embassy that speech marked the start of the Cold War for it helped confirm in the American mind the need for a new defensive alliance in Europe.  In 1949 NATO was created.

Above all, Churchill was a politician who led by example and had the personal courage to lead from the front.  He had fought on the North-West Frontier at the height of Empire, taken part in the last great cavalry charge of the British Army at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, been captured (and escaped from) the Boers in the South African War, and commanded a battalion in the Flanders trenches during World War One.  He can even claim to have invented the tank.

That courage was apparent even as ‘PM’. Churchill flew to Egypt on the eve of the Battle of El Alamein in 1942 to speak to the commanders and troops and only King George VI prevented him from landing with the troops on D-Day. His 1945 trip to Greece undoubtedly stopped the Communists from gaining power in Athens (which is not without some irony today).

However, it was his inspirational war leadership of the British people for which he is most remembered and rightly so.  Back in the dark days of 1940 victory over Nazi tyranny seemed impossible but he alone convinced the British to fight on.  His former political adversary Labour’s Barbara Castle said quite simply that Britain’s defiance was Churchill’s defiance. It was that defiance that stopped the rot and slowly at first created the political platform upon which the Grand Alliance that defeated Hitler was eventually stood up.

And yet Churchill’s relationship with the British people was a bit like his view of Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe; he was with ‘us’ but not of ‘us’. Direct descendant of the First Duke of Marlborough, conqueror of Louis XIV’s French at the Battle of Blenheim in 1704 Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill was very much a product of the high Victorian age and his high Victorian class.  Born in Blenheim Palace in 1874 he was a scion of an aristocratic class in its last great age that simply assumed the right to rule. 

However, unlike many of his peers he could recognise change and adapt to it.  With studied practice he became a modern politician with a common touch, able to relate to and inspire ordinary people.  Indeed, it was his very (many) human foibles and peccadilloes that made his so appealing to so many.

Had World War Two not happened Winston Churchill would have counted for no more than a grumpy footnote in history.  However, World War Two did happen and cometh the hour the man came.  Passing before me on that grey, bitterly cold January day fifty years ago was not just another great man, but a pillar of civilisation and I was honoured to have been there, even if I little understood it at the time.


Julian Lindley-French 

Wednesday 28 January 2015

EUCAP NESTOR: Closing the Strategy-Reality-Delivery Gap


Alphen, Netherlands. 28 January. Every now and then I get off my lofty strategic perch and venture down into the weeds of delivery for it is there that the gap between strategy, reality and delivery is at its most stark.

Take the EU’s mission in Somalia EUCAP NESTOR. EUCAP NESTOR was established in 2011 as part of a maritime security capacity-building and counter-piracy effort in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean.  The current focus is on re-energising the mission in Somali, including Somaliland.  The approach is twofold: establish a series of field offices across the region to promote dialogue with and support for local communities; and establish effective co-ordination with other members of the “EU family”, UN agencies and states with bilateral missions, such as China, France, Turkey, UK and US).

Here the problems begin.  Implicit in the presence of so many actors is the friction of the new geopolitics. In other words, the mission lacks strategic unity of effort and purpose with too many different actors wanting to do different things for different reasons.  And this is not just between China and the rest of the West.  There are also profound divisions between all the states present and between the institutions, and non-governmental actors, often about who gets the biggest slice of the funding pie. 

According to my friend much of the problem is in Brussels.  It concerns primarily the lack of consistent strategy and support for those in the field. This is a problem I saw for myself in Afghanistan and NATO’s stabilisation and reconstruction strategy.  Too often good practice and sound strategy in the field is sacrificed for politics in capitals which in turn undermines the ability of the people on the ground to ensure efficient and effective delivery.  This is particularly counter-productive given the very complex political and clan environment in which such efforts be definition take place.

Therefore, if the goals of stable governance, sustained development and legitimate security and stability are to be realised the following strategy must be applied: ‘commitment’ must be measured in terms of funds delivered not funds pledged; ‘success’ must be measured by demonstrable outcomes not inputs; funds should be applied logically across the realm of nation and capacity-building, and the temptation to shift funds into one area or another simply to generate a headline avoided; both long-term presence and indeed consistency of application is vital; a proper balance of effort must be established (in the gobbledygook of aid speak) between so-called ‘Supported Implementers’ and ‘Supporting Implementers’, particularly those able to provide and deliver vital ‘niche expertise’; and the effort must develop a coherent identity with a spokesman able to speak with one voice on behalf of the majority of implementers to the recipients of aid.

Critical to progress is minimisation of the inevitable politics with a focus instead on sound project management.  In Somaliland that means bringing front and centre the reasonably well-developed National Vision and Development Plan and Somaliland Special Arrangement.  Thereafter, all efforts must be linked to the national vision and then planned and phased into a coherent sequence. This will ensure that all the initiatives can be digested and mastered by key personnel from the region and the effectiveness of said initiatives properly measured and assessed against the backdrop of sustainable strategy.

Therefore, for EUCAP NESTOR to work Brussels must also take a longer-view.  According to my friend Brussels too often seeks to measure inputs rather than outcomes by focusing on the quantity of those who are in receipt of EU aid and assistance rather than the quality of outcomes generated by the knowledge and capabilities generated. For example, when training is conducted the EU measures progress by the number who attend but avoids any real attempt to measure whether that knowledge is applied and to what effect. 

Much of this will look like capacity-building 101 for many practitioners.  Unfortunately, it is precisely because political and bureaucratic leaders repeatedly fail to heed such lessons that taxpayer’s money is wasted.  Indeed, too often such programmes generate more heat than light with the gap between strategy and delivery growing to the point of political failure.

However, the vital need is effective delivery.   The EU needs a far more agile funding system to enable practitioners to adapt their projects to local circumstances. Moreover, so that a box can be ticked back in Brussels too often people are despatched to the region who lack the appropriate skills, knowledge, commitment and experience to do whatever is necessary to succeed. 

EUCAP NESTOR will not of course ‘fail’. Some phoney narrative will be crafted back in Brussels to demonstrate what an outstanding success the effort has been for the EU and the people of Europe when in fact very little has changed on the ground for the better.  If and when that happens Somalia will continue to fall into the abyss and and very quickly yet another ungoverned space will pose a very real threat to Europe and the wider West.

As my brave and hard-working practitioner friend put it: “The centre stage in Somalia is not big enough for all the prima donnas”. It is too dangerous and too important for that.


Julian Lindley-French