Putin: War by All and Other Means

 “If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient - at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve”.

Carl von Clausewitz

Tsar Vladimir Vladimirovich

March 28th, 2022. Putin is Russia. Putin faces an existentialist threat from enemies within and without Russia. Ergo, Russia faces an existentialist threat. To survive Putin and thus Russia must wage war because war is the only way Putin and Russia can survive. War must thus be permanent. That circular argument pretty much sums up how Putin sees himself and the Russia if which he is the dynasty-lite Tsar, an increasingly bizarre mix of Romanov and Stalin. Putin believes HIS Russia is facing an existential threat from systemic change in which Russia simply cannot compete. A Russia that could well become little more than a long railway line for the trans-shipment of goods from China to Europe, effectively enslaved by both.

The problem for Putin now is that he has called his own bluff through the spectacular incompetence of the Russian armed forces.  In Future War and the Defence of Europe John Allen, Ben Hodges and I suggest that the Russian Army could cause mayhem for thirty days or so before they ran into trouble.  They have certainly caused mayhem and it lasted thirty days but not even I expected them to run out of steam so close to the Russian border.

Putin on War

Does that mean the war will soon end? No. There may be a cease-fire but such a temporary cessation of hostilities does not mean the war will be over.  This is because Putin’s real war is not with Ukraine, it is with NATO and the West. Indeed, many commentators in the West simply fail to realise that in Putin’s zero sum view of the world all wars are existential, however small, and the West is a permanent threat. This is not because the West poses any military threat to Russia. It does not.  It is because the West is not Putin’s Russia and offers its people so much more than Putin can ever offer his.  That is why for Putin the war in Ukraine is the first geopolitical proxy war of the twenty-first century; a war that is being fought in Ukraine about the future of Europe and Russia.

For over a decade Putin has not only seem himself as indispensable to Russia, but the very embodiment of Russia. In such circumstances, Putin/Russia has no option but to strike hard, fast and early and continuously to prevent or at least delay the decline from real world power that is the real cause of this ghastly European war.  Therefore, the Ukrainian impasse is likely just the beginning, or rather the continuation of a long war that will be fought directly and indirectly across the 5Ds of applied Russian complex strategic coercion – deception (Maskirovka), disinformation, destabilisation, disruption, and actual or implied destruction.

For Putin the war in Ukraine is not simply to save his very traditional view of the traditional Russian nation-state, but the very idea that the nation-state is THE primary political unit in international relations.  He believes he is confronting three ‘threats’ separate but inter-linked threats to autocracy posed by democratisation, institutionalisation and globalisation, none of which Putin’s Russia is well-equipped to master. Putin’s answer is to do the only thing that the security state he has created knows what to do, or at least thinks it does, fight. 

Carl von Putin?

Perhaps the most famous quote from Clausewitz’s “On War” is that “war is a continuation of politics by other means”.  However, to properly understand what Clausewitz meant one also has by that one also has to understand his concept of strategy and “the use of engagement to attain the object of war”.  Thereafter, one can only understand his concept of ‘engagement’ if one also understands his idea that war is the application of all means and materiel by what for Clausewitz was still a relatively new political artifice: the nation-state.  In the world of the twenty-first century there is no greater early nineteenth century entity than the Russian nation state under President Putin.  Suffusing and permeating Putin’s reactive nationalistic ideology, such as it is, is a romantic and archaic notion of the Russian nation and its state. War, for Putin, is thus an extension of a primary trinity between the Russian state, the Russian nation (the people), and the Russian Army, all of which come together in him.

The destruction of the men, materiel and, above all, prestige of the Russian Army in Ukraine means that his primary tool for buttressing both the Russian State and his own power internationally has failed, whatever how happens in Ukraine.  Caught in a trap of his own making Putin has never been so dangerous to Russians, Ukrainians, Europe and the wider West. Therefore, in the absence of any cease-first and despite the Russian Army having now reached its culminating point it will not stop fighting. Rather, the nature of the fight will likely morph into the long, ghastly, grinding meat-machine that Russia has traditionally adopted when its forces have ground to a halt. 

War by all and other means

Putin will also apply all 5Ds of what he sees a perma-war; if Russia cannot have the spoils of war, then its enemies will be denied the spoils of Russia’s failure. Like Dante’s Alighieri’s Divine Comedy, Putin’s distinctly non-divine tragedy will go through several ever decreasing circles of coercion on the downward descent to Putin’s Hell. The first circle or target will, of course, be Ukraine. The many thousands now dying in Ukraine will have gone to their doom simply so that Russia can pretty much end up right where it started – fuelling a frozen insurgency in eastern and southern Ukraine. Cease-fire or no Russia will increase efforts to destabilise the Zelensky regime, disrupt the functioning of the Ukrainian state, spread disinformation at home and abroad, and systematically apply deception to discredit the Ukrainian political class. Putin will apply the same complex strategic coercion against a second circle of neighbours, the Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and much of the Black Sea Region. The third circle will be the rest of democratic Europe which Putin will continue to seek to divide from each other, and decouple from the United States.

This is because Putin’s view of himself and Russia’s place in the world is vastly different from Russia’s reality. During the 2021 Moscow Victory Day Parade some Russian soldiers were dressed in the Red Army uniform of May 1945 to mark victory in the Great Patriotic War. However, the parade also marked the 800^th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Nevsky, the thirteenth century ruler/saint of the so-called Kievan Rus who defeated Swedish and German knights and in Putin’s mind laid the foundation for Putin’s reborn Novorossiya.  President Putin casts himself in Nevsky’s heroic mould and in his ‘splendid’ autocratic isolation Vladimir Vladimirovich may well have convinced himself he is Nevsky re-born.

Intelligent power

Europeans and the wider West need to understand Putin’s imperative if they are to craft both a short-term response and a longer-term strategy based on the intelligent use of power. The invasion of Ukraine is for Putin simply the latest iteration of a systemic struggle in which he sees Russia engaged. To disabuse him of any chance of success Western leaders must collectively understand that setbacks in Ukraine will not dissuade him of his ‘crusade’, because as long as he is in power that is all that matters to him. 

Over the short-term, the West must collectively keep Ukraine in the fight be supplying all the weapons and support Kyiv needs, increase pressure on Russia to end their aggression, stop it from spreading further, and then properly learn the lessons so that they are ready for Putin’s next act of aggression.  The latter requirement is vital.  If Syria was a preparation for Ukraine then given Putin’s world-view it is reasonable to assume Ukraine could well be preparation for some further demarche downstream either in the Black Sea Region or the Baltic.  The month of fighting in Ukraine has revealed a whole host of weaknesses in Russian fighting power which suggest that General Gerasimov and his efforts to modernise the Russian armed forces has been less successful than many in the West assumed. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov back in the 1980s would recognise much of the Russian Order of Battle today, particularly the poor quality of junior officer leadership and the patent lack of tactical initiative and innovations all too apparent. The joint force ‘jointness’ between air and land forces has been at times appalling, military intelligence has been weak, and much of Russia’s arsenal either old or very poor build quality. However, if Russian history is anything to go by heads will roll and lessons will be learnt.

No time for NATO complacency

One of the many paradoxes of Putin and his war in Ukraine is that whilst he is at some level the very latter day embodiment of a Clausewitzian prince (albeit without the Enlightenment), he is not a very good Clausewitzian.  Even a cursory glance of On War should have suggested to Putin that his so-called ‘force ratios’ were never likely to be enough to conquer and occupy much of Ukraine. However, given the nature of the man, his view of the world and the Clausewitzian nineteenth century state he leads with its latter day Boyars and the poor Muzhiks he uses as cannon-fodder, this is no time for NATO or its leaders to pat themselves on the back and take the complacent view that Russia no longer poses a threat.  He does. Putin simply cannot help himself.

Julian Lindley-French  

 

Where is the Russian Army?

by 

Ben Hodges, R. D. Hooker Jr., Julian Lindley-French

“Russian forces have almost certainly suffered thousands of casualties during their invasion of Ukraine. Russia is likely now looking to mobilise its reservists and conscript manpower, as well as private military companies and foreign mercenaries, to replace those considerable losses. It is unclear how these groups will integrate into the Russian ground forces in Ukraine and the impact it will have on combat effectiveness”.

British Defence Intelligence Update, March 24th

March 24^th, 2022

Russia’s Grouchy conundrum

The deployed Russian Army in Ukraine is some 190,000 strong, so where are the remaining 800,000 or so active and reserve personnel?

In June 1815, on the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, and shortly after the holding Battle of Les Quatres Bras, Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy was ordered by Napoleon to take a third of the French Army and prevent the Prussians from joining up with their British allies.  Even though he could hear the guns of Waterloo, and in spite of fierce protestations from General Gérard, Grouchy refused to march to join forces with Napoleon who at one point during the battle was heard to shout, “Où est Grouchy?” There is little doubt that had the lost army intervened between Wellington and Blucher the result of the Battle of Waterloo would have been very different. As the NATO Emergency Summit gets underway in Brussels and his military campaign in Ukraine falters Putin might well be asking: where is the Russian Army?

Estimates vary as to the size of the Russian Army but Global Firepower suggests there are 850,000 regular soldiers and some 250,000 reservists. However, these figures are a bit misleading because they suggest there is much that has not been committed.  The Russian Army is just under 200,000 active soldiers, along with 15,000 naval infantry.  Although it is far leaner than western armies, there being roughly one support soldier for every combat soldier, the actual fighting force is around 100,000 at most. Other force components, such as the 340,000 strong National Guard is not really intended for front-line combat service.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that available Russian ground forces as close to being totally committed.

Culminated

The culminating point of the force Putin sent into Ukraine a month ago has almost certainly been reached with its capacity for offensive operations en masse much reduced. Almost the entire force of 190,000 personnel that was ordered into Ukraine is now engaged in the campaign.  The Ukrainians claim to have killed 12,814 Russian soldiers as of March 22^nd, with over 40,000 wounded, whilst NATO estimates that 8,000 to 15,000 have been killed.  Ukraine also claims 5,000 mercenaries have been killed. Russia has also lost 1,400 armored vehicles, 1,470 tanks, 96 aircraft and 118 helicopters. Whilst these figures must be treated with caution they give some indication as to Russian losses. Even though US intelligence estimates the force still retains some 90% of its fighting power, the force has clearly been badly mauled.  This failure partly explains the switch to the use of long range fires against civilian populations in places like Mariupol, as well as the recruitment of Chechens and Syrians to bolster Russian ranks.     

What is left? Critically, almost every Russian Army unit, together with the Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (VDV) Division (elite airborne force), have been deployed to Ukraine. There is little information about the specific divisions and regiments that remain in Russia, and what force numbers still remain available for forward deployment. Any such analysis is complicated by the Russian practice of deploying forward Battalion Tactical Groups or BTGs. When Ukrainian sources report that a Russian division is active on a given axis, it is almost always simply one or two BTGs from that division, and not the entire formation.

This is important. A Battalion Tactical Group [batalonnaya takticheskaya gruppa] is a highly deployable, albeit temporary, formation designed to undertake specific operational tasks. A BTG tends to be a reinforced battalion reinforced by the required support needed to complete its tasks. As such BTGs are drawn from an array of larger formations and tend to be the best trained and equipped, with each having a complement of between 700 to 800 personnel, with some as large as 900 strong. As of August 2021, the Russian Army had 168 BTGs of which 83 are believed to be engaged on operations in Ukraine. On March 21^st, the US Department of Defense estimated that the Russians have already committed some 75% of their BTGs together with 60% of their air power. 

 The missing army?

 The Russian General Staff is also drawing in forces from across Russia, including the Far East and Georgia. This suggests that almost all of Russia’s available active duty combat power is now committed to the fight in Ukraine.  Moreover, only a portion of any army is real combat power. The rest is made up of combat support and combat support services.  One reason for Russia’s apparent chronic logistical problems could be that rear echelon forces are being hastily inserted into the fight in a desperate attempt to maintain momentum.

One answer to the conundrum is force rotation. As the campaign switches from fast offensive maneuver to force attrition the regular Russian Army will need to be rotated over time and through a very large operational area. Normally, that would require a third of the force to be engaged, a third resting, and a third working up, roughly 600,000 personnel. However, with the overwhelming bulk of the fighting army in Ukraine there are simply not enough other full strength units to rotate in and replace depleted or tired units.  In such circumstances, the Russians must pause, reorganize, refit and retrain with reservists and conscripts but ‘growing’ the army by any appreciable amount will take time.

Another problem seems to be the stalled professionalization and modernization of the Russian Army.  An analysis of recent operations, such as those in Syria, together with recent exercises such as Zapad 21 and Vostok 18, indicate the same repeated use of the same high-quality but relatively small spearhead units.  Thus, whilst the Russian Army might seem impressive on paper, its performance in the field is far less impressive.   This is exactly the same problem that was faced by the British Army during World War Two which relied heavily on a few elite formations to spearhead offensives, such as the British Eighth Army.  As those formations tired or were worn down by losses the entire offensive slowed with them.

Lost in Ukraine

The extent of the conundrum General Gerasimov and the Russian General Staff now faces is all too apparent when the extent of the force already deployed to Ukraine is analyzed.  All 12 army headquarters have been committed (1 Guards Tank Army, 2nd Combined Arms Army (2CAA), 5CAA, 6CAA, 8CAA, 20CAA, 29CAA, 35CAA,36CAA, 41CAA, 49CAA, 58CAA).  Moreover, virtually all the subordinate maneuver divisions and brigades are also in Ukraine, except that is for the curious case of the main force of the 5^th Combined Arms Army (without its headquarters) in the Eastern Military District.  There is no evidence either that its 4 maneuver brigades (70^th Motor Rifles, 60MR, 59MR, 57MR) have been engaged.

  

All 4 divisions and 3 brigades of the Russian airborne/air assault forces are also in Ukraine, together with all 5 naval infantry brigades and the 14^th and 22^nd Army Corps, together with 5 of the 7 Spetsnaz (Special Operating Forces or SOF) brigades are in Ukraine. The 14^th Spetsnaz is based in Russia’s Far East, whilst the 16^th Spetsnaz, which is based some 220 miles/320 kms south-east of Moscow, have either not been committed, or at least not yet identified in Ukraine. One reason could be the need to protect Putin and the seat of government in Moscow in the event of any coup attempt.  The 11^th Army Corps in Kaliningrad (18^th Motor Rifles Division, 7^th Motor Rifle Regiment) remains in garrison, as does the 68^th Army Corps on Sakhalin Island (18^th Machine Gun Division, 39^th Motor Rifle Brigade). 

 

Therefore, Russia does not have many more regular formations Moscow can insert into to the Order of Battle.  There are small formations in Transnistria, Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but they are not big enough to make a great deal of difference should they be switched to Ukraine.

Conundrum solved?

Having reached their culminating point Russian ground forces have two options. First, go over to the defense and try and retain the ground they hold, whilst at the same time reorganizing, refitting and absorbing replacements and new conscripts. Second, use the time to build up for another human-grinding Russian offensive.

It is the latter option which the UK Defence Intelligence Agency thinks likely. April 1^st marks the start of the new recruiting season for conscripts and it is clear from the narrative Moscow is peddling that the Russian people are being prepared for a longer war than anticipated.  However, given Russia’s grievous losses and the poor training and equipment of the conscripts any reconstituted units will be far less capable than those that began the campaign.  That is why the strategy is likely to rely increasingly on indiscriminate air attacks and long range artillery and missile strikes to hammer cities and wear the will of the Ukrainian people to resist. It is also why the Ukrainians are seeking anti-air and counter-fires systems from NATO and other partners. Tragically, this next phase could become even uglier if recent tragedies in Grozny and Aleppo are any indication.  Apart from pondering the mobilization of reserves, and an even greater use of conscripts, Moscow is also considering the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, and even tactical nuclear systems.

 In other words, President Putin may well be facing his Waterloo in Ukraine, but at what appalling cost to Russians and Ukrainians alike? There is no Grouchy, no lost army that can join the fight quickly only far more ground grinding death to mark Putin’s folly!  To give some idea of the scale of the force committed by Russia to the war in Ukraine this article concludes by simply laying out the estimated Order of Battle of Russian forces in Ukraine.

 Russian Army

 1st Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel)

2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel (Guards) Sergey Viktorovich Medvedev)

1st Guards Tank Regiment

1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment

4th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Yevgeny Nikolayevich Zhuravlyov)

423rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment

47th Guards Tank Division

26th Tank Regiment

27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergey Igorevich Safonov)

96th Reconnaissance Brigade (Colonel Valery Vdovichenko)

45th Separate Engineering Brigade (Colonel Nikolai Ovcharenko †)

2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Vladimirovich Kolotovkin)

15th Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Sergeevich Marushkin)

21st Guards Motor Rifle Brigade

30th Motor Rifle Brigade

5th Combined Arms Army (Major General Aleksey Podivilov

6th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Vladislav Nikolayevich Yershov)

25th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Andrei Nikolaevich Arkhipov)

138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergei Maksimov)

8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Nikolayevich Mordvichev †)

20th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Aleksei Gorobets)

33rd Motor Rifle Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Agarkov †)

150th Motor Rifle Division (Major General Oleg Mityaev †)

102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment

20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Sergeevich Ivanaev)

3rd Motor Rifle Division (Major General Aleksei Vyacheslavovich Avdeyev)

252nd Motor Rifle Regiment (Colonel Igor Nikolaev †)

144th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Major General Vitaly Sleptsov)

29th Combined Arms Army (Major General Andrei Borisovich Kolesnikov †)

36th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel (Guards) Andrei Vladimirovich Voronkov)

200th Artillery Brigade

35th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Aleksandr Semyonovich Sanchik)

38th Motor Rifle Brigade

64th Motor Rifle Brigade

69th Fortress Brigade

107th Rocket Brigade

165th Artillery Brigade

36th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Valery Solodchuk)

5th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel (Guards) Andrei Viktorovich Kondrov)

37th Motor Rifle Brigade

103rd Rocket Brigade

41st Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Sergey Ryzhkov [ru], Deputy Commander Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky †)

35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Major General Vitaly Gerasimov †)

55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade

74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Alekseyevich Yershov)

120th Artillery Brigade

119th Missile Brigade

90th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Ramil Rakhmatulovich Ibatullin)

6th Tank Regiment (Colonel Andrei Zakharov †)

49th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Jakov Vladimirovich Rezantsev)

205th Motor Rifle Brigade

58th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Mikhail Stepanovich Zusko)

19th Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Uskov)

42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division

14th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Dmitry Vladimirovich Krayev)

200th Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Denis Yuryevich Kurilo)

22nd Army Corps (Major General Denis Lyamin)

126th Coastal Defense Brigade (Colonel Sergey Storozhenko)

127th Reconnaissance Brigade

12th Guards Engineer Brigade (Colonel Sergei Porokhnya †)

Special Operation Forces (SSO) (Major General Valery Flyustikov)

Russian Navy (Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov)

 Black Sea Fleet (Admiral Igor Osipov, Deputy Commander First Rank Captain Andrei Paliy †)

Northern Fleet (Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev)

Russian Coastal Troops

Russian Naval Infantry (Lieutenant General Alexander Kolpachenko)

40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Petukh)

61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet, Colonel Kirill Nikolaevich Nikulin)

155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet)

336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Igor N. Kalmykov)

810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Aleksei Berngard)

 Russian Aerospace Forces (General of the Army Sergey Surovikin)

 Russian Air Force (Lieutenant General Sergey Dronov)

4th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilyevich Gostev)

3rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment^[37]

31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Khasanov †)

11th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Vladimir Kravchenko)

23rd Fighter Aviation Regiment

14th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment

18th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment

120th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (Colonel Ruslan Rudnev †) 

 Russian Airborne Forces (Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov)

 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division (Colonel Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kornev)

108th Guards Kuban Cossack Air Assault Regiment

247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (Colonel Konstantin Zizevski †)

76th Guards Air Assault Division (Major General Alexey Naumets)

124th Tank Battalion

104th Guards Air Assault Regiment

234th Guards Air Assault Regiment

237th Guards Air Assault Regiment

98th Guards Airborne Division (Colonel Sergey Volyk)

217th Guards Airborne Regiment

331st Guards Airborne Regiment (Colonel Sergei Sukharev †)

106th Guards Airborne Division (Guards Colonel Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Selivyorstov)

51st Guards Airborne Regiment

137th Guards Airborne Regiment

1182nd Guards Artillery Regiment

45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Vadim Pankov)

11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Colonel Denis Nikolayevich Shishov, Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel Denis Glebov †)

31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Colonel Sergei Karasev †)

5th Air Assault Company (Captain Eduard Gelmiyarov †)

83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade

GU (formerly GRU) (Admiral Igor Kostyukov)

2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Konstantin Bushuev)

3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Albert Ibragimovich Omarov)

10th Spetsnaz Brigade

22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei Nikolayevich Savchenko)

24th Spetsnaz Brigade

Ben Hodges, R. D. Hooker Jr., Julian Lindley-French

LTG (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander, US Army Europe, Dr R. D. Hooker Jr. was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council. Julian Lindley-French was Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy. They are all members of The Alphen Group.

 

NATO: Time for Resolve

 “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few”.

Winston Churchill

March 21^st, 2022

The Few

As of March 18^th, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed to have shot down some 95 Russian aircraft and 115 helicopters since the start of the invasion. On September 15^th, 1940, at the climax of the Battle of Britain, the RAF claimed to have shot down 185 Luftwaffe aircraft for the loss of 25 Spitfires and Hurricanes and 13 pilots killed. In fact, the Luftwaffe had lost 61 aircraft and the RAF 31. Still, the attrition on Russian airpower is clearly significant. However, Ukraine has also lost at least 20 aircraft in combat and on the ground. This matters. According to the IISS Military Balance at the start of the conflict the Russian Air Force had 1,172 combat aircraft, whilst Ukraine had 124. This imbalance is why the Poles were so keen to transfer Mig-29s to the Ukrainians.  Crucially, Russia started this war with 399 attack helicopters, whilst Ukraine had none.

The March 19^th Intelligence Update from the British Defence Intelligence Agency states, “The Ukrainian Air Defence and Air Defence Forces are continuing to effectively defend Ukrainian airspace. Russia has failed to gain control of the air and is largely relying on stand-off weapons launched from the relative safety of Russian airspace to strike targets within Ukraine. Gaining control of the air was one of Russia’s principal objectives for the opening days of the conflict and their continued failure to do so has significantly blunted their operational progress”.

When the history comes to be told of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine one group will stand out for particular praise, Ukraine’s pilots and its air defenders.  Their achievements evoke memories of the Royal Air Force and “the Few” during the 1940 Battle of Britain. Unlike the RAF, the Ukrainian pilots do not benefit from the world’s most advanced air defence system, arguably the best defensive fighter in the Spitfire, or the Channel.  However, this war is yet to become history and given that hard reality there is an equally hard question Ukraine’s friends must now ask: is Ukraine winning and how best can NATO and the Allies help?

No Fly Zone?

President Zelensky’s appeal for a NATO-enforced No Fly Zone over Ukraine makes perfect sense because Russian forces can just about afford to lose aircraft at the rate they are losing them. It also raises some uncomfortable questions for NATO. 

First, what would it require to enforce an Allied No Fly Zone against the Russian Air Force so close to Moscow’s Western, Central and Southern Military Districts and their air bases?  In spite of the degradation of Russian air power for such a No Fly Zone to work NATO would need to enforce it where it matters, east of the Dnepr River right up to the Russian border.

Second, what would be the objective of a NATO air campaign? A specific objective could be to protect the bulk of Ukraine’s regular army in the Joint Force Operation area so that it can continue to conduct manoeuvre operations and to prevent it being encircled and destroyed by a third echelon Russian attack. 

Third, what level of NATO airpower would be required and at what cost? Given the short lines of operation from Russia’s Western, Central and Southern Military Districts such a campaign would inevitably bring NATO airpower into direct conflict with Russian air defences, both air and ground-based. To prevail, NATO would need to deploy its most advanced air assets, most notably F-35 aircraft and sustain them over the entire operational area. NATO would also have to accept significant losses, much like the Luftwaffe operating over southern England in 1940. Given that 70% of advanced Allied airpower is American it would involve an air campaign between the United States Air Force and the Russian Air Force with some limited support from some NATO Allies, most notably the Polish Air Force and the Royal Air Force.  Much of the rest of what might be termed NATO’s offensive air power would simply be too vulnerable to Russian air defences.   

Fourth, would a No Fly Zone work? Only if the Americans were willing to deploy a very considerable bulk of their air power and destroy Russian air bases inside Russia. A No Fly Zone over Western Ukraine might work, but it would have limited strategic value and have little effect against Russia’s increasing use of stand-off hypersonic missiles, such as the Kinzhal (NATO codename Dagger), although how many such missiles are operational and whether Russia has really deployed them is open to debate.

Fifth, would such a No Fly Zone really lead to World War Three?  The answer to that question is one of strategic judgement and this unknown.  It is unclear how far Putin is willing to pursue this war of aggression or whether or not he would really be willing to take on the US and its Allies, even in his own strategic back yard. President Putin is driven by nineteenth century, Great Power Russian revisionism. So long as he is in power he will continue to seek to undermine, and if possible conquer, those countries he believes should be firmly under the Russian yoke.  At the very least NATO leaders must end any delusions they have that somehow Putin can ever be a reliable partner. He must now be left in no doubt that should he ever contemplate attacking NATO territory it would really mean war and that he would lose. Russia’s armed forces will learn from its mistakes in Ukraine precisely because Putin is incapable of learning from his own geopolitical folly. There must be no complacency amongst the Allies that the incompetence of the Russian military today means the pressure will be off NATO and its citizens tomorrow.

Defence or pretence?

This war is not yet another so-called war of choice. It is the first twenty-first century geopolitical war by proxy and is as much about Russia’s relationship with democratic Europe as it is about the future of Ukraine. As such, it poses the Alliance another fundamental question. Is the reason NATO is reluctant to enforce a No Fly Zone over Ukraine really about the utility or otherwise of such a campaign, or because the strategic culture in Western Europe is now so weak that making eastern European allies live with the risk Putin poses better than confronting Moscow under virtually any circumstances? If it is the latter then the Alliance is in real trouble.

Last week, President Zelensky addressed the Bundestag and gave one of the most succinct and powerful addresses any foreign leader has ever delivered.  In a few short words he destroyed decades of German foreign, security and defence policy and Berlin’s belief in Wandel durch Handel (Change through Trade).  Chancellor Scholz’s decision to create a €100 billion fund to rescue (for that is what it is) the Bundeswehr from its appalling state and bring German defence expenditure up to the NATO Defence Investment Pledge of 2% GDP is to be welcomed. However, will Scholz’s defence pledge survive the German political process? It will take much more than the planned investment to bring the Bundeswehr up to a level where it could again take its proper place at the heart of NATO’s land and air deterrence on the Alliance’s eastern flank. 

Whilst Britain has stood up sending weapons, expertise, cyber support and intelligence, London’s much vaunted 2021 hike in defence expenditure is already being eaten away by inflation. Much of Britain’s armed forces remain too small AND hollowed out, and needs to really begin to match rhetoric with real resources.  France? Pre-election President Macron has been grandstanding as usual by banging on (again) about European Strategic Autonomy which can only happen if Europeans match words with real power. What he should really be concentrating on is fixing the many problems of the French armed forces, not least the very weak stock of ammunition and supplies.

Dire straits

As NATO Heads of State and Government meet in Brussels this week they must for once show real resolve.  The fear of a third massive (possibly nuclear) war in Europe in just over a century is legitimate, but as President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself”.  This is because such fear not only undermines NATO deterrence, it also reinforces Putin’s mix of paranoia and false superiority, not least because he believes Russia’s missile and nuclear superiority in Europe has made it ‘safe’ for him to attack Ukraine with conventional force.   What is needed now is a process of considered, controlled and limited escalation by the Alliance to force Putin to the negotiating table.   

First, keep the pressure up on Russia. The Turks suggest there has been some modest progress in the peace talks they are hosting in Anatolia. If that is the case then it is vital the Allies keep Ukraine in the fight by giving the Ukrainians all the tools they need to do the job so that any cease-fire and eventual peace is not dictated solely on Russian terms.

Second, the Alliance must apply the principles of the rules-based international order. In the absence of any cease-fire NATO should bottle up the Russian Black Seas Fleet and prevent Russian amphibious ships en route to the Black Sea from entering. The 1925 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits governs the passage of belligerent warships through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Preferably with the support of NATO Ally Turkey those members of the Alliance that are signatories of the Convention (Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey and the United Kingdom) should now give due notice to Russia that they intend to enforce it. This step should be taken with the support of the Alliance as a whole.  

Third, if Turkey does not support this move then the Alliance should impose a distant blockade. If Russia continues its offensive, particularly indiscriminate shelling of civilians, NATO should also confirm that it will soon move to prevent Russian warships, or civilian ships carrying materiel for the conduct of the war, from entering the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar.

Fourth, NATO must reinforce the Black Sea Region by moving forces and resources to Bulgaria and Romania and strengthen its partnership with Georgia to prevent it becoming a Russian lake.

Fifth, NATO should embark on a major information offensive into Russia to challenge the state-controlled media, with a particular focus on the cost of this war to the ordinary Russian conscript Putin is using as NLAW fodder. This offensive should take place in conjunction with a warning that any and all Russian cyber-attacks on Allies will be countered.

Sixth, NATO leaders must take further measures this week to reinforce deterrence. Putin is driving Russia into a political, economic and military corner in which his own personal position could also become increasingly perilous.  Whatever happens now Putin’s regime will be weakened which will make him more not less dangerous. However, the Alliance must not expect a change of course. Rather, Putin is likely to double down on the securitisation and militarisation of the Russian state, just like Stalin.  

The future? The forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept must confirm the creation of a powerful European-led Allied Mobile Heavy Force that can properly support all and any NATO Allies under threat from Putin.

Such a clear statement of intent would be a start, just a start. However, it would also send a clear and unequivocal signal to Putin.  Credible deterrence requires effective risk management.  Appeasement is not deterrence.  Therefore, to honour the sacrifice of Ukraine’s ‘Few’ the assembling NATO Heads of State and Government must answer the very question Ukraine’s pilots are answering with their lives: what price are we willing to pay to defend our freedoms? This is because whatever happens now Ukraine’s ‘Few’ should be remembered, like their RAF forebears, as warriors who defended not only a country, but freedom itself.

Julian Lindley-French