hms iron duke

hms iron duke

Wednesday 3 April 2024

The TAG NATO Transatlantic Compact 2024


March 28, 2024 




This letter to Allied governments proposes a Transatlantic Compact to stimulate and facilitate reconfirmation of the Alliance’s critical importance to the security of all the Allies while guiding the way for NATO transformation. It is also a substantive roadmap with specific capacity benchmarks and metrics that calls upon the Allies to focus at the 75th Anniversary Summit in Washington on the requirements necessitated by the new Russian threat and to accelerate progress towards fulfilling NATO Agenda 2030 and a more balanced and effective Alliance defense and deterrence. The accompanying annex, which is an integral part of this agenda, outlines key deliverables, benchmarks, and metrics for the recommended actions.


As the NATO Allies approach the 75th anniversary of the Alliance in Washington in July, they will reflect on today's challenges and rededicate the Alliance to its enduring purpose and necessary response to a more dangerous threat environment.

Beyond assistance to Ukraine, two converging challenges require extraordinary responses at the Summit. One is the indisputable new threat posed by Russia as demonstrated by its aggression against Ukraine and President Putin’s assertion that this war is against the West, not just Ukraine. Therefore, the Allies must remain committed to the Harmel Principles that call for Alliance policies that ensure defense and deterrence, but also leave room for confidence-building and cooperation when adversaries demonstrate that they are willing. Such a commitment is necessary for international peace and internal Alliance consensus. But given recent Russian aggressions against Ukraine and the West, the Allies must now renounce the NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA), which Moscow’s belligerence has made obsolete. A new basis for cooperation can always be reestablished with a future Russian leadership that seeks a more collaborative relationship.

The second challenge is an internal one that has confronted the Allies for many decades, to better redistribute both contributions and leadership responsibilities between the United States and the European Allies and Canada in line with NATO Agenda 2030 to rebalance the Alliance and help ensure, in a lasting way, that it can successfully meet urgent present and future security demands. Failing to respond effectively to these two challenges will invite further Russian belligerence and, possibly aggression against which the Allies will have no sufficient response and will thus risk deepening Euro-Atlantic divisions over burden and responsibility sharing.

More equitable burden-sharing will not lead to an autonomous European ‘pillar’ outside NATO, but rather promote greater European strategic responsibility inside the framework of the transatlantic Alliance more broadly. This approach would involve North American as well as European Allies and, among the latter, both EU and non-EU Allies, working together toward the goal of a more balanced Alliance, while preserving the unity and diversity of Allies. It would reflect the continuing necessity of American contributions to deterrence and defense and of the transatlantic link. It will not, nor should it, inhibit the members of the European Union from developing security cooperation among themselves, particularly in defense industrial areas, which will enhance European capabilities and cooperation in NATO.

The Alliance consensus is that Russia will be an adversary for the long-term which compels the Alliance to deal with a post-Ukraine war world to facilitate negotiating with Russia on a new European security architecture that reflects contemporary Euro-strategic reality. Maintaining and strengthening Alliance unity, including a strong transatlantic link, thus remains the priority. The Allies must commit themselves to helping Ukraine defeat Russian aggression as a critical requirement for the future of transatlantic security. They must also set a clear path to NATO membership and commit to helping Ukraine manage the requirements that lie ahead on that path.

 The Transatlantic Compact 2024

 The Transatlantic Compact calls for:

Using the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) and the consolidation of all Allied rapid response forces into one single pool of forces to lead in time to the creation of a European-led Allied heavy mobile force supported by the requisite force structure.

Much more intense cooperation between NATO and the European Union to better enable a pan- spectrum response to the challenges posed by Russian aggression against Ukraine and the consequent threat to the West. The two organizations working together reinforce deterrence and Euro-Atlantic security.

Enhancing the Alliance’s capacity to contribute to the prevention of crises and the resolution of conflicts, as well as to the strengthening of international security, through maintaining a credible rapid intervention capacity and strengthening its partnerships and other cooperative security instruments.

Further strengthening NATO’s operational capacity by combining credible and effective multi- domain conventional forces, missile defenses, nuclear deterrence, space support, cyber defenses, and protection against multi-form hybrid threats. The credibility and effectiveness of this comprehensive posture will depend, in part, on the commitments and efforts of every Ally and on achieving a high degree of unity across the Alliance.

European Allies and Canada assuming a significantly greater responsibility, financially, militarily, and politically for delivering this composite, combined capacity, with the United States assisting in these endeavors, while Washington continues to play its enduring and irreplaceable leadership role in and through NATO.

The Roadmap

The proposed roadmap provides a broad outline of immediate Allied commitments matched by actions to reinforce and accelerate NATO Agenda 2030. It includes measures to:

Establish a larger, stronger European role and contribution, alongside and in partnership with the essential, enduring role and contributions of North American Allies.

Use the creation of the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) to reinforce NATO’s defense and deterrence through full implementation of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), the Military Strategy and the NATO Force Model thus strengthening NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and operational capacity.

Further enable European conventional forces and capabilities through enhanced sustainment of forces and improved infrastructure, including enhanced military mobility, in the direction of a much stronger European collective operational capacity for all NATO core tasks.

 Set new input and output goals for Allied defense efforts by strengthening the Vilnius Summit defense spending commitments.

Promote greater complementarity between European and US security assistance contributions to Ukraine as part of a rebalanced Alliance.

Make new commitments and plans for improving standardization and interoperability from the low to high ends of the conflict spectrum, particularly among the European members of the Alliance, but also with North American forces.

More effectively develop, share, and integrate modern technology into NATO defense and deterrence systems, by better exploiting the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA).

 Revitalize defense industrial bases on both sides of the Atlantic to better respond to current and future defense and deterrence requirements by expanding the European Defense Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), create a shadow factory scheme with companies which can reinforce the defense supply chain, and make it easier and cheaper for Allies to buy capabilities off the shelf (COTS).

Broaden and modernize NATO’s ability to defend against hybrid threats by developing information and cyber capabilities that strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrence through their threat to Russian resources, forces, and capabilities.

Further enable European nuclear forces, missile defenses, cyber and space capabilities, and begin broader and deeper nuclear consultation and cooperation between France, UK, and US, on the one hand, and non-nuclear Allies, on the other.

Critically Reinforcing NATO’s Conventional Deterrent

Reinforcing NATO’s conventional deterrent must be a dynamic and continuous process of adaptation because Russia will present a direct and increasing threat to NATO Allies within 3-5 years. NATO should be working now to deploy forward defenses more robust than brigades. Renouncing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, as suggested above, would also have the benefit of removing the self-imposed restrictions on deploying larger than brigade sized units permanently to the East.

The strengthening of deterrence across the conventional and nuclear domains, while respecting the clear separation between them, calls for extending NATO’s long-standing nuclear sharing arrangements to the conventional domain by sharing both the political risks and operational burdens across the Alliance through the creation of an airborne conventional deep strike capability. Today’s NATO Force Model is driving the development of the new standing Allied Reaction Force. Each of the improvements noted in this letter will also require additional investment in capabilities and capacity by non-US Allies and only the Alliance can provide the necessary balance between capability, capacity and affordability through efficiency and enhanced effectiveness.

Fulfilling the commitments to defense investment and force levels that Allies made at the Madrid and Vilnius Summit are simply the latest iteration of a process that is as old as NATO, and which is vital if a strong European Pillar with a strong Canada inside a credibly strong NATO is to be realized. The ARF will be at NATO’s future core and provide the framework for a European-led high-end, first responder force in an era in which Allies must expect that territorial aggression in Europe will coincide with aggression elsewhere in the world that will demand US attention and forces. US forces are sufficiently capable of meeting several high-end contingencies simultaneously but the premise upon which all future NATO military strategy must be established is that European members of NATO should AS THEIR MINIMUM CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT be to be able to defend Europe at any time and in any circumstances when the bulk of US forces could be engaged globally.

In time, a European-led division-strength, air, sea, and land force that helps take the Allied Response Force to a new level of capability will enhance deterrence by denial, raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe, ease pressure on US forces and resources. It will also provide a high-end focal point for the transformative NATO Force Model and future readiness initiatives. An Allied Heavy Mobile Force (AHMF) would be a high-end, first responder dedicated conventional deep strike capability shared among Allies, and which is the natural consequence of current force planning. The AHMF would be drawn from the Warfighting Corps proposed herein at be at the core of a future NATO Warfighting Cornerstone Concept. It would be critical to establishing a clear link between NATO's conventional deterrence posture and operational capacity by harnessing additional European conventional forces though a deeper reform of the NATO Force Structure; the strengthening of European operational enablers including deep fires, air defenses, and the realization of substantially improved force movement capabilities, sustainability, survivability, and resilience.

 Recommended specific steps:

 Europeans and Canadians must actively work with the US to overcome the critical shortfall in enabler by establishing a Minimum Enabling Capability for the Alliance. The NATO Response Force, to be replaced in July 2024 by the standing Allied Response Force, was an otherwise brilliant concept but it had the unintended consequence in that the rotational leadership principle encouraged a division of already limited capabilities among European Allies. While the United States has been building up the US Army’s V Corps stationed in Germany and Poland, European Allies have exhausted themselves trying to build up ten army corps concurrently. Whereas the US Army’s V Corps has the enablers it would need to fight a high intensity war, none of the European corps do, with the partial exception of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

To accelerate the process of force transformation one option could be to re-deploy HQ ARRC from the UK to Poland to become HQ ARF to reinforce HQ Multinational Division (Northeast) to work alongside Polish forces and US V Corps to create on ‘unblinking eye. This British-led headquarters would still be able to move rapidly anywhere in SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility. By becoming HQ ARF, it would also function as a rapid reaction force that could move rapidly from a low-end to a high-end conflict, undertake the full spectrum of missions, act as a rapid deployable strategic reserve, and reinforce deterrence with its presence in Central Europe not in the Western England. With a focus on NATO’s northern, eastern, and south-eastern flanks it would also offer support to Allies on the southern flank if called upon.

In time the ARF must aspire to become a high- end, first responder Allied Future Force able to act from seabed to space and across the multi- domains of air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge. The ARF must also become sufficiently robust and responsive, and held at a sufficient level of readiness, to meet all threats to the territory of the Euro- Atlantic Area in the first instance and have sufficient capacity to support those front-line nations facing transnational threats, such as terrorism.

 Europeans must also spend more on defense and better consolidate their dispersed capabilities multinationally, through greater pooling of resources and assets. Critical requirements are deep fires, battlefield air defense, combat engineers, wet gap bridging, movement control, medical support, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and electronic warfare. Similarly, instead of having six half-empty Joint Force Air Components (JFAC), European Allies must commit to building three, fully structured, fully capable Composite Air Strike Forces, each with the full complement of fighters, fighter-bombers, tactical reconnaissance, electronic combat, airlift, tanker, early warning and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) aircraft. These three multinational CASFs would work together with USEUCOM’s 3rd Air Force, thereby providing the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) with four potent, full spectrum air packages.

The same template must also apply to navies with the activation of European Standing Fleets in the Atlantic and Mediterranean operating alongside and together with the US Navy’s 2nd and 6th Fleets. This will include NATO cross-attachment of European surface ships, submarines, amphibious forces, and maritime patrol aircraft to USN naval task groups and similar US Navy assets being cross- attached to European naval task groups.

 NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) must be extended to allow earlier intercepts, including "left of launch", including the possible deployment of the OTH-R system to NATO’s eastern flank. The war in Ukraine has shown that, however capable Patriot, SAMP-T, and other air defense systems, relying on point defenses alone will not protect critical permanent (non-mobile) headquarters, facilities, and assets when confronted with swarms of incoming ballistic and cruise missiles and drones. NATO’s premier Aegis-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, currently focused on Iranian missile threats, should thus be optimized to create a "360 degree" capability against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles. This would require not only a policy decision, but also deployment of a TPY-2 advanced mobile radar in Poland or Bulgaria.

The 67%/50% Rules

Many European Allies and Canada have consistently failed to meet the criteria of the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 3 which specifies that “…separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, [Allies] will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” The recommendations in this Compact, if implemented, will bring noncompliant Allies back in line with their commitments in the Treaty.

To realize their minimum capability requirements non-US NATO Allies must collectively provide by 2030 at least 50% of all NDPP designated capabilities. The NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) has a cardinal rule that no single ally should provide more than 50% of any agreed Capability Target. Compliance with that rule has failed in far too many "strategic enabler" domains, with the United States providing 70, 80 or even 90% in various categories. Over the longer term, (2040) European Allies and Canada should aim to deliver two thirds (67%) of NATO’s combined operational capacity for collective defense, as measured in rapidly usable forces, enablers, and other capabilities to execute advance plans across SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility.

In addition to the 50% rule, the Compact must include new and elevated input objectives. Most Allies have met the current objective of spending at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense and some have exceeded that goal, but non-US Allies have the financial ability to do more. At the same time, it would also be wise to include measures that enhance security in addition to defense spending as part of the new set of goals, with systems in place that would enable them to increase both investment and outputs rapidly in an emergency. Allies should aim to spend at least 3% of their GDP on traditional defense, whilst enhancing security in all its forms. They must meet these goals no later than 2030.

When the European Allies accomplish the objectives described in this proposal, NATO civilian and military leadership roles and structure can then be reorganized to reflect the greater share of burdens that they carry, and the greater influence within the Alliance they will generate.

Improving standardization and interoperability

Greater affordability and interoperability will only be realized through enhanced unity of purpose, greater efficiency of effort, and thus standardization wherever possible. European Allies must overcome long-standing political and financial obstacles to standardization and interoperability. When multiple Allies buy the same equipment, even if it is from a non-EU source, interoperability can be enhanced. But the longer-term solution is for the European Union NATO members, along with the United Kingdom, to work out co-production and sharing arrangements to better produce and field rapidly on a multi-national basis equipment for multiple Allies that would enhance both interoperability and affordability.

 The NATO Standardization Organization (NSO) must be strengthened to improve its ability to influence and facilitate national decisions that affect interoperability. NATO abdicated its unique role in promoting interoperability, notably through standardization. The various NATO military headquarters routinely circumvent persistent materiel standardization shortfalls by encouraging Allies to standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures. Military and defense procurement executives also frequently talk past each other, and industry. Unfortunately, while the NATO Standardization Organization promotes interoperability, national and commercial interests regularly take precedent.

To improve the prospects for better standardization and interoperability, European and North American Allies must agree that before decisions on major equipment purchases are made, they will pose and answer a seminal question for the Alliance: “how will this choice affect NATO standardization and interoperability?”

Corrosion, Coercion and Resilience

NATO will continue to be a nuclear Alliance and the enduring U.S. extended deterrent will be the core of NATO deterrence. NATO’s nuclear deterrent posture must also reflect and forge stronger complementarity between conventional and nuclear forces, promote greater conventional deep strike capabilities on a multinational basis, and favor greater British and French nuclear cooperation. The contributing role of other Allies, particularly in hosting and supporting nuclear capabilities, should be acknowledged, and updated to reflect new strategic realities. NATO also needs a new consensus on the means and ways to adapt nuclear deterrence to new requirements, particularly Next Generation Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA).

With Russia expanding and diversifying its theater and tactical nuclear capabilities, including moving some systems into Belarus, NATO nuclear sharing, including stationing of nuclear delivery systems, must be broadened to include Allies that have joined NATO since 1999. Renunciation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, recommended above, will also remove NATO’s self-imposed three “no’s”. In December 1996 NATO stated that it has "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, including nuclear weapons storage sites, even though NATO nations have since 2014 repeatedly agreed in their Summit communiques that Russia is in violation of its obligations under the Founding Act.

 If Allies cannot protect their own people, it will be hard for them to project power. Looking to the future the Alliance needs to get ‘Quantum-ready’. Modern conflicts are not simply fought with military systems on the battlefield but increasingly in the algorithms matrix. Allies must also enhance their cooperation in countering disinformation, cyber and other hybrid threats and prepare to take advantage of the coming revolution in computer technology. NATO’s vital role will be to coordinate Allied efforts to deal with and develop hybrid capabilities that add up to more than the sum of their parts. Corrosion will be as dangerous as coercion. It is easy for authoritarian regimes, like Russia, to control information and messaging. All NATO democracies must be alert to threats adversaries pose to democratic cohesion using modern means of communication, disinformation, and malicious applications of artificial intelligence. The Allies must enhance their cooperation in dealing with such aspects of the threat posed by their adversaries.

Finally, the Allies must address a variety of measures to fortify the resilience of their military forces and societies. Allies must make access to, use and protection of space-based assets much more robust, including through expanded cooperation among Allies and within NATO. Greater effort must also be devoted to protecting NATO and nationally owned and operated communications networks and information services, as well as critical military and civilian infrastructure, against cyber and physical threats.

Greater effort must also be devoted to enhancing the survivability and endurance of Allied forces and the resilience of Allied societies, against lethal and non-lethal threats, including through the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening the dispersal and hardening of military infrastructure, logistical sustainability, defense industrial innovation, mobilization and production, wartime supply chains, and civil-military cooperation.

Technological innovation and the sharing of scientific research, notably in the fields of artificial intelligence and quantum computing, machine-learning, Big Data, Nanotechnologies, industrial development, production and cooperation, the pursuit of standardization of materiel to attain higher level of interoperability among Allied forces, are all important tools to attain the objectives outlined above.


The Transatlantic Alliance is composed of democratic, sovereign nations. They each decide through national processes how and when their forces might be engaged on behalf of their NATO commitments. While NATO should remain the privileged framework for common resolve and, when necessary, collective action, each Ally is free to engage its forces under the United Nations or European Union flags, or in coalition of the willing frameworks. Under whatever flag an action takes place all Allies will benefit from a transformed and rebalanced Alliance, not only to address cogent and pressing threats to the North Atlantic Treaty area, but beyond, including in the Indo-Pacific region. Capable and skilled Allied forces and capabilities not only help protect and promote transatlantic security worldwide, but they also make the world a safer place.

The convergence of the renewed threat from Russia and the urgent requirement for the European Allies to take on more responsibility for the defense of their continent suggests that the Alliance must move quickly and decisively to seize the momentum of the moment. A new Transatlantic Compact would thus provide the pathway toward a future in which the NATO Allies will be demonstrably and affordably sustain their ‘do no harm’ commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Such renewed commitment, reinforced energy and restored will is the foundation of an Alliance that continues to serve the vital interests of North American and European interests well into the future.

Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances of our highest consideration,



Strengthening NATO: A Roadmap Towards a Rebalanced Alliance

For non-US Allies to collectively assume a greater share of the responsibility to assure, deter and defend the Alliance they must comply with four framing guidelines related to the overall operational capacity sought, individual capabilities underpinning that capacity, and the necessary supporting defense investment effort:

To rebalance the Alliance, European Allies must by 2030 provide collectively two thirds (67%) or more of NATO’s overall required operational capacity, as measured in rapidly usable forces, enablers and other capabilities needed to execute advance plans across SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility.

No Ally must be expected to contribute more than 50% of any individual NATO capability area, as pursued through the NATO Defense Planning Process. Non-US Allies must aim at gradually filling collectively two thirds (67%) or more of any given capability area, recognizing that progress will be easier and faster in some areas than in others.

Allies must invest at least 3% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defense to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order. In addition, Allies shall invest at least 20% of their defense budgets on major equipment, including related Research and Development.

Non-US Allies must assume collectively and individually a greater share of the financial and military assistance to Ukraine.

The non-US component of NATO’s combined operational capacity will be four fully- capable, fully-enabled, fully-ready War Fighting Corps (WFC) from which the division- strength Allied Heavy Mobile Force will be drawn: These four WFCs will be sourced from the eight Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters currently in the NATO Force Structure with eight corps partnering together, in four pairs of two, with one each from northern Europe and southern Europe. The current eight corps HQs can continue but must be fully prepared to generate the four WFCs on short notice in times of tension or war. Each of the four corps pairings will work with the corps framework and contributing nations to source all the required combat, combat support and combat service support units. In due course, SACEUR will certify to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that this is indeed the case. No shortfalls or gaps will be tolerated.

Two fully capable, fully- enabled, fully ready “Shield” Corps (Multi-National Corps, Northeast in Poland, and Multi- National Corps, Southeast in Romania) will be supported by the Allied Reaction Force and its successors.

In a major pre-war emergency these two corps would constitute NATO’s first line of land defense and would play a key role in protecting forward-located Allies, delivering on the NATO commitment not to yield Allied territory, and buy time and maneuver space for the four Warfighting Corps. A special effort will also be made by non-US Allies, with the assistance of the United States, to strengthen the operational capacity and credibility of these two fighting formations, including the provision of combat support and combat service support units, to ensure that they can deter by denial incursions into and respond in full to major aggression against the Alliance and thus defend successfully.

Non-US Allies will also field three fully-capable, fully-enabled, fully-ready Composite Air Strike Forces (CASF). These three CASFs will be available at short notice and sourced from the current six European JFACC Headquarters in the NATO Force Structure working together, in pairs, to source the three non-US CASFs at short notice. Each CASF will include the full complement of defensive and offensive aircraft. At the proper time, SACEUR will certify to the NAC that this is indeed the case. No shortfalls or gaps will be tolerated.

Non-US Allies will provide two fully capable, fully-enabled, fully-ready Non-US Standing Fleets, Atlantic (European Canadian Standing Fleet Atlantic ECSFLant) and Mediterranean (ECSFMed). The two fleets will be sourced from the current six European Maritime Force (MARFOR) Headquarters. MARFORs will source the naval task groups in such a way that the two Standing Fleets will always have a minimum operational capacity that can be augmented at short notice. The core of the two Fleets will be the aircraft and helicopter carriers operated by France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, with their complement of surface escorts (Anti-Air Warfare destroyers and Anti- Submarine Warfare frigates), attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft contributed by these Allies or by other European Allies. At the right time, SACEUR would certify to the NAC that the two Standing Fleets are up and running. No gaps or shortfalls would be permitted.

For its part, the United States will commit to NATO permanently stationed in Europe, under the command of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) a fully-capable, fully-enabled and fully-ready WFC (US Army’s V Corps); a fully-capable, fully-enabled and fully-ready CASF (US Air Force’s 3rd Air Force); and a fully-capable, fully-enabled and fully-ready US Navy 6th Fleet and  its  NATO  component  (STRIKFORNATO)  for  Allied  multi-carrier operations, and complemented by US Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces. These forces will at the very least meet the same NATO standards as their European counterparts to ensure critical interoperability at the high end of warfighting when both command and forces are under intense pressure.

The four non-US WFCs, two “Shield Corps”, three CASFs and two ESFs will work together with USEUCOM’s V Corps, 3rd Air Force and 6th Fleet. For example, in the maritime domain, the foreseen Non-US Standing Fleets, Atlantic, and Mediterranean, will operate alongside and together with the 6th Fleet, including through cross-attachment, but under NATO command and control, all tasked surface ships, submarines, amphibious forces and maritime patrol aircraft. This new level of complementarity between European and US forces in a rebalanced Alliance would help ensure the required level of compatibility and interoperability in tactics, materiel, and procedures, and provide SACEUR with five fully capable war fighting corps, four CASF air packages and three fleets.

Within this framework, Canada shall commit forces that meet the same standards as other Allied forces and that represent an equitable contribution to a rebalanced Alliance, alongside the contributions of European Allies and the United States.

The Allied Reaction Force will be an important component of further Allied force development and the strengthening and re-balancing of the Alliance’s conventional forces. Mobile Force, which will at some point emerge from the NATO Response. The ARF will be a high readiness, highly mobile and responsive force capable of deploying rapidly throughout SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility to reinforce forward defenses, prevent a fait accompli by an adversary, and demonstrate unity. The baseline and enabling mechanism to reform the NATO Force Structure will be the new NATO Force Model agreed at the Madrid and Vilnius Summits, updated, and adapted over time, as necessary, to attain the outcome being sought through this Compact.

In addition to conventional forces, the foreseen re-balancing of the Alliance will include steps in every other domain of Allied military capacity (missile defenses; nuclear; space and cyber domains) and supporting civil measures (resilience; civil-military cooperation). To this end, non-US Allies shall endeavor to stand- up joint commands and organizations that have the mandate and skill set to plan and conduct multi-domain operations.

NATO’s missile defenses will be reoriented and strengthened to address all missile threats to the territories and populations of European Allies, on a 360- degree basis, including early warning, tracking and interception capabilities. Strong consideration will be given to deploying a second TPY-2 radar in NATO Europe, in addition to the one already operational in Turkey, as well as to advance planning for the use of NATO’s Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Airborne Ground Surveillance (AGS) Forces in a missile defense role, both to help identify adversary launch sites and to vector Allied deep strike fighters. Further consideration should also be given to deploying the Over the Horizon Relocatable (OTH-R) early warning system to NATO’s eastern flank.

NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture will be strengthened and expanded, including by facilitating broad participation by all nuclear and non-nuclear Allies. This strengthening of the Alliance’s nuclear posture will involve expanding NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements to include Allies which joined NATO since 1999, as well as a deepening of nuclear cooperation between France and the United Kingdom, around the British and French ballistic missile submarine components, as well as France’s airborne component, based on the 2010 Lancaster House treaties.

The strengthening of deterrence across the conventional and nuclear domains, while respecting the clear separation between them, must include replicating NATO’s long-standing nuclear sharing arrangements in the conventional domain, by procuring a dedicated airborne conventional deep strike capability in addition to aircraft assigned to the dual-use role that will be widely shared among Allies. This airborne conventional deep strike capability will be associated with specially trained fighter squadrons associated with the foreseen Composite Air Strike Forces.

Allies will strengthen access to, use and protection of space-based assets, including through expanded cooperation among Allies and within NATO in the sharing of early warning, communications, and navigation information and in the development of space technologies and protection techniques.

Allies will devote greater effort to protecting NATO and nationally owned and operated communications networks and information services, as well as critical military and civilian infrastructure, against cyber and physical threats, notably through       enhanced survivability measures, including hardening and dispersal.

A strengthened ability by the Alliance to assure, deter and defend credibly and effectively will also require a greater effort to enhance the endurance of Allied forces and the resilience of Allied societies against lethal and non-lethal threats, including through the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening the logistical sustainability of forces; defense industrial Technological innovation and the sharing of scientific research, notably in the fields of artificial intelligence, Big Data and machine learning, and quantum computing, industrial development, production and cooperation, the pursuit of standardization of materiel to attain higher level of interoperability among Allied forces, are all important tools to attain the objectives outlined above and rebalance the Alliance.

To these ends, greater reliance shall be placed on well-proven NATO institutional arrangements, revised as necessary to reflect the assumption collectively by European Allies of a greater share of common responsibilities, including the NATO Command Structure, the NATO Defense Planning Process, NATO common budgets, the NATO Science and Technology Strategy, the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, and other such processes.

Where applicable, multilateral, and regional groupings of Allies, as well as NATO- EU cooperation, shall be pursued actively to enhance the contribution of European Allies collectively to Euro-Atlantic security. European Allies shall deliver on the objectives and undertakings as part of a reinforced and accelerated NATO Agenda 2030 as agreed at the 2024 NATO Washington Summit.


Professor Julian Lindley-French (Chairman), Diego A. Ruiz Palmer and Stanley R. Sloan (Lead Writers)

Dr Franco Algieri

General (Ret.) John R. Allen

Anne C. Bader

Michal Baranowski

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Arne Bard Dalhaug

Paul Beaver

Dr Jordan Becker

Robert Bell

Iona Bennett

Dr James Bergeron

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Rob Bertholee

Dr Hans Binnendijk

Brigadier General (Ret) Robbie Boyd

Professor Yves Boyer

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jan Broeks

Dr John Bruni

Ian Brzezinski

Ambassador (Ret.) Kerry Buck

General (Ret.) Vincenzo Camporini

Ambassador (Ret.) Ivo Daalder

Professor Marta Dassu

Major General (Ret.) Gordon Davis

Slawomir Debski

Judy Dempsey

General (Ret.) Sir James Everard

Keir Giles

Dr Camille Grand

Kate Hansen Bundt

Air Marshal (Ret.) Sir Christopher Harper

LTG (Ret) Giles Hill

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ben Hodges

James Holland

Dr Rich Hooker

Professor Jaap De Hoop Scheffer

Ambassador (Ret.) Robert Hunter

Giedrimas Jeglinskas

Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp

Dr Sarah Kirchberger

Thomas Kleine Brockhoff

Ambassador (Ret.) Imants Liegis

Edward Lucas

Professor Neil MacFarlane

Dr Claudia Major

Dr K.J. McInnis

Brigadier General (Ret.) Rainer Meyer zum Felder

Professor Andrew Michta

Ambassador (Ret.) Alessandro Minuto Rizzo

General (Ret.) John (Mick) Nicholson

Professor Zaneta Ozolina

Admiral (Ret.) Giampaolo di Paola

Air Chief Marshal (Ret.) Lord Stuart Peach

Eric Povel

Trygve Refvem

General (Ret.) Lord David Richards

Professor Peter Roberts

Colin Robertson

Professor Sten Rynning

Professor Paul Schulte

Dr Alexandra Schwarzkopf

Professor Simon Serfaty

Dr Hanna Shelest

General (Ret.) Sir Richard Shirreff

General (Ret.) Sir Rupert Smith

Ambassador (Ret.) Carsten Sondergaard

Professor Emeritus Georges Henri Soutou

Ambassador (Ret.) Stefano Stefanini

Patrick Turner

Jim Townsend

Dr Harlan Ullman

Ambassador (Ret.) Alexander Vershbow

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Rick Waddell

Peter Watkins

Anna Wieslander

Professor Rob De Wijk

Professor Tomonori Yoshizaki