F-35 or F-All!

The F-35, history and technology blindness

Alphen, Netherlands, May 4^th.  Should the Americans and the Allies abandon the F-35 Lightning 2?  That would seem to be the preference for some behind a sustained campaign against the aircraft in Washington and elsewhere.  If successful, any such decision would have enormous consequences, not least for the new British aircraft carriers that were designed around them. HMS Queen Elizabeth, will soon depart Britain for a globe-trotting mission at the heart of the new British-led Carrier Strike Group for which with the F-35 and its strike power is pivotal. 

On the afternoon of May 31^st, 1916 the epic Battle of Jutland began with an exchange of salvoes between Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet, supported (or not) by the mighty Queen Elizabeth class Super-Dreadnoughts of the Fifth Battle Squadron, and Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper’s German battlecruisers.  On paper it should have been a one-sided fight because the British battlecruisers were faster and their main armament heavier than their German counterparts. This should have enabled the British to stand off at distance and pummel the German ships from beyond the range of latter’s guns.  Instead, Beatty closed the range either because he did not trust or understand the technological advantage his firepower afforded him or because he was suffused with too much of the Nelsonian ‘get close to the enemy’. The result of Beatty’s technology blindness was a disaster as his tactical mistake, compounded by excellent German gunnery and the British admiral’s preference for rate of fire rather than accuracy of fire, quickly led to the loss of HMS Indefatigable and HMS Queen Mary both of which exploded with the loss of over 2300 men.

There is something of the ‘rate of fire’ versus ‘accuracy of fire’ argument in the F-35 debate.  Some of those who want to abandon the F-35 argue that it is not a fighter and that it would not be very good in a classical dogfight against Chinese or Russian fighters.  They are right. It probably would not be that good in such a scenario, but the entire ethos of its design concept is to ensure such a dogfight would never take place.  When fully developed its array of sensors and network-enabling command hub systems will afford an F-35 pilot far greater situational awareness and thus survivability against most adversaries. In time, its increasingly intelligent weapons array would also enable it to afflict both direct and indirect ‘fires’ on an adversary at great distance.  The greatest threat to an F-35 is far more likely to come from equivalent platforms, such as the Chinese J-20 or the Russian Sukhoi Su-57. Critically, the F-35 will soon be the only Allied aircraft capable of penetrating advanced Russian air defences supported by the S-400 ground to air missile system.   

The problem with the F-35

For all of the above I am no apologist for the F-35. A recent report by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) has highlighted the appalling cost inefficiency of the F-35 development programme.  Much of this has been caused by running the development programme in parallel with the acquisition programme for a system that is at the very cutting edge of technology.  In fact, the causes of such problems also run deep within the DNA of most such ‘big ticket’ military technology programmes.  Too often both governments and defence contractors in democracies conspire to hoodwink parliaments and publics about the true cost of any such programme because if they were honest about the true cost many democracies would still be equipped with bows and arrows (I exaggerate for effect).  Such programmes have to be ‘sold’ politically which invariably leads to claims by their promoters they will cost half as much as they really do, take half the eventual time, create twice as many hi-tech jobs in hard-pressed places, and deliver twice the capability.  It was ever thus.  The Panavia Tornado back in the 1970s, the Eurofighter Typhoon in the 1980s (and many years beyond), and the Airbus A400 M today are all cases in point.  It will also be the case when France, Germany and Spain eventually overcome their absurd (but all too indicative) row over intellectual property rights for their proposed Future Combat Air System or FCAS, which if it ever enters service will not do so until the 2040s at the earliest.  And, much the same will no doubt be said for the alternative (absurdly) British-Swedish-Italian FCAS programme. Europe – from F-All to FCAS?

So, yes, the costs per F-35 platform are eye watering, as is the cost per flight hour given the maintenance required.  And yes, the current on board armament is limited compared with some non-stealth 4G fighters.  However, the F-35 is at the very beginning of a development programme which will gather pace over the next decade to such an extent that in fairly short order each aircraft will become a command hub in and of itself for a whole array of both space-based and air-breathing AI-enabled sensors, data links and weapons systems.  In other words, the F-35 is a putative force super-multiplier and must thus be seen as the transition between increasingly obsolete 4G analogue platforms flown by fast jet pilots today, and digital centric 6G and 7G future systems of the late 2030s and 2040s.  Given that context the real waste of taxpayer’s money would be to have invested in such a programme, and then procured a significant number of aircraft, only then refuse to pay for the software and hardware updates that will realise its full potential.  That would be akin to buying the latest and most advanced lap-top designed for super-computing, even quantum computing with upgrades, and then installing it with unsupported Windows XP. 

The F-18 fallacy and the future defence of Europe

What is the alternative and at what cost?  There have been calls in some countries to extend the in-life service of existing platforms such as the F-18 Super Hornet.  This would be a particularly dangerous false economy.  At the heart of my latest 2021 book, Future War and the Defence of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press), is a vision of the future battlespace in which Britain’s aircraft carriers might (hopefully not) have to engage.  Only a fully worked up F-35 with all the supporting electronics, digital ‘blocks’ and weapons systems could possibly survive long enough to complete the suite of critical missions that would be required in such a ‘space’.  An F-18 or some similar 4G system?  They would be like the TBF-1 Avenger torpedo aircraft that attacked the Imperial Japanese Navy on June 4^th, 1942 at the outset of the Battle of Midway.  They were hopelessly obsolete aircraft crewed by very brave, doomed aviators who for all their bravery could inflict no serious direct damage on the enemy.

The simple fact is that critics of F-35 simply cannot offer a serious alternative to F-35 for any country that might have to contemplate fighting high-end warfare. This is not least because much of the cost of F-35 has already been ‘sunk’ and to change course now would be absurdly expensive.  Yes, the Americans might go for a mix of assets because they have the scope and size of force to invest in such ‘redundant’ solutions, although my sense is that when they properly consider their options they too will abandon the idea.  The paradox of smaller allies that operate the F-35, such as the British, is that given the investment they have already made after a wobble or two they will eventually recognise that they have little or no alternative but to see the F-35 through its life-cycle.  The British might possibly reduce the number of planned F-35s from the original target of 138 to say 60 or 70 aircraft (48 have been purchased thus far) i.e. spread the cost across the life-cycle, push for reduced maintenance costs, and offset some of the upgrade costs by reducing the planned number of aircraft.  

F-35 and the future battlespace

Some years ago I stood on the flight deck of the now scrapped 20,000 ton aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious alongside the then Chief of the British Defence Staff and First Sea Lord looking up (and it was up) at a life-size mock-up of an F-35.  Compared to the Royal Navy’s FA2 Sea Harriers of the time the F-35 was enormous and explains why HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales both displace over 70,000 tons fully-loaded. As the F-35 was being explained to me it became evident that not only would the aircraft afford both the ‘RN’ and the Royal Air Force a step change in capability, but that to realise its full operating capability would take many years of continuous software and hardware development and that any such process would be expensive. 

Therefore, having invested in the F-35 all the countries operating it need to understand how best to use them if capability and affordability are to be assured.  If, like Beatty there is a failure on the part of leaders and commanders to properly understand the technological advantage the F-35 affords them over other systems, or if they lack of trust in it due to tech blindness, then like Beatty the forces under their command will doubtless suffer a high attrition rate if they are forced to ‘dogfight’ in a role for which they are not designed. For all of its many undoubted problems the F-35 and the technology-enabling capability it represents IS the future of both air combat and strike and at least until the 2040s when NextGen Future Combat Air Systems are eventually (eventually!!!) deployed. 

The simple fact is that for most countries invested in the F-35, and given the 5G developments taking place elsewhere, it really is a case of F-35 or F-All!

Julian Lindley-French