“So long as Russian forces are illegally occupying Ukrainian territory any weapons the West provides to assist in our legitimate defence are by definition defensive”
Dmitro Kuleba, Foreign
Minister of Ukraine
April 3rd, 2022
Sitrep April 5th
Russia will soon launch a renewed spring land
offensive in Ukraine. Russia’s military aims would now appear to be
threefold. First, to destroy or wear
down the main body of Ukrainian regular forces in the Joint Force Operating
Area and expand their control over the whole of the Donbas, including the
Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Second, to secure the land bridge between Russian
controlled Ukraine in the east and Crimea, Moldova and Transnistria. Third, to
deny Ukraine all and any access to the Black Sea by taking the port of Odesa.
If Russia succeeds the implications for both Ukraine and the Black Sea Region
will be profound.
Russian forces
are re-positioning, re-organising and re-suppling in their Western, Central and
Southern Military Districts during an enforced operational pause following the
failure of phase one and the conquest of Kyiv.
Russian forces have been forced to make such a choice because given the
force ratios they generated initially they were highly unlikely to have seized
Kyiv and much of the rest of Ukraine east of the Dnepr River, and successfully
occupy it thereafter, unless Ukrainian forces had collapsed. They did not,
putting up stout, clever and carefully-tailored resistance reinforced by
advanced light Western weapons systems.
What specific ends
does Russia now seek? In my LINDLEY-FRENCH ANALYSIS of December 20th,
2021, I stated that given the forces deployed and
the balance Russia will still need to strike between risks, costs and benefits
seizure of Ukraine’s entire coastline from Donetsk to Moldova would seem the
likely objective. If successful, the campaign would leave a rump Ukraine
dependent on the rest of Europe and thus Europe's problem, minimize risk
of direct operational contact during with NATO forces, and be close enough
to Russia to ensure its much degraded echelons can prevail. If achieved,
Russia would establish another buffer zone between Russia and NATO forces,
increase the implied threat to the Baltic States, and further extend Russia's
sphere of influence into the wider Black Sea Region. With the continuing
attacks on Mariupol and the opening of an offensive against Odesa that plan is
now beginning to unfold.
Cease-fire or more fire?
It would also appear Russia has abandoned any
pretense to seek an early political settlement. The discovery of tortured and
murdered civilians in Bucha, Irpin and Hostomel makes it hard to imagine that
any ceasefire, let alone an interim political settlement, can now be agreed between
Russia and Ukraine. Thus, if the Russian political aim is to establish a
negotiating position on the ground then such war crimes are not only disgusting,
they are self-defeating. Naturally,
Moscow denies any involvement in the murder of civilians, but satellite imagery
provided by Maxar, together with video footage obtained by the New York Times, clearly
shows that 11 of the bodies in Bucha were of people killed in situ between
March 9th and 11th when the town was under Russian
control.
The gap between Russian campaign objectives and
campaign performance continues to remain wide meaning the war could
increasingly become a bloody stalemate unless there is a decisive external
intervention. Russian targeting has been appalling, as has the organisation,
replenishment and thus the utility and agility of much of the Russian force. What reinforcements Moscow has brought, such
a 1500 strong force from Georgia, is unlikely to make much difference to their
fighting power. They have also merged and re-organised Battalion Tactical
Groups to offset losses, albeit at the expense of both the experience and
combat power of their once feared ‘BTGs’. Russia’s elite airborne and armoured
formations have suffered particularly heavy losses, whilst Russian infantry has
shown that it is not at all well-trained, particularly for operations in urban
environments, which is why they have resorted to indiscriminate missile and
artillery attacks. Russian forces had clearly not planned for such significant
losses of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and air assets, which has thrown
them on the defensive.
The Russians also failed to plan for carefully
targeted and well-executed Ukrainian attacks on their rear echelons, or the
ability of Ukrainians to use drones to gain some semblance of local air
superiority. The Ukrainians have also critically and cleverly exploited the
weaknesses of Russian infantry, their poor training and low morale. However,
the Ukrainians have also suffered losses and urgently need to reinforce their
own forces and replenish their arsenals with advanced Western equipment, both
light and heavy. If not, they could be
slowly worn down, however well they fight.
What are the options open to Ukraine’s Western partners?
Options, pros and cons
Options depend on aims and aims
depend on ambition, capability and capacity. Prior to the discovery of war
crimes the West seemed content to simply keep the Ukrainians in the fight so
that they could negotiate a ceasefire from at least some position of strength.
Now, it will be extremely hard for the Ukrainians to negotiate with the
Russians. What other options are there?
Sanctions: On Wednesday, EU ambassadors will meet to discuss
imposing tougher sanctions on Russia. These are likely to include tougher sanctions
against targeted individuals, as well as more restrictions on exports to
Russia, together with a ban on Russian ships using EU ports. Interestingly, the
EU also now seems willing to discuss sanctions on importing Russian
coal, oil and gas. Berlin has even indicated it could stop importing
Russian oil and gas in the wake of the atrocities. Enrico Letta, the
former Italian prime minister and a
key player in supporting Prime Minister Mario Draghi and the
national unity government, even called for a complete oil and gas
embargo. However, there are also signs of divisions within the EU and remains
to be seen if the tough rhetoric is more than that. Russia is also successfully
circumventing many of the existing sanctions, with the help of China and
others. Sanctions also take time and given that the living standards of the
Russian people has already declined some 30% since 2013, with no signs of the
regime crumbling, sanctions alone are unlikely to force Russia to change
direction.
Lethal Aid: The provision of Western lethal aid to Ukraine, is being
co-ordinated to a significant degree by the British who on March 31st
hosted the Second International Donor Conference in London. Britain’s own efforts
are a case in point of what is needed if the strategic aim is to move from
keeping Ukraine in the fight to some form of Ukrainian ‘victory’. Since 2014,
Britain has trained over
20,000 Ukrainian personnel and has provided extensive lethal aid to Ukraine,
including over 4,000 NLAWs and Javelin anti-tank systems, and is in the process
of sending its latest Starstreak air defence systems, as well as 6,000 more
anti-tank high explosive missiles, as well as body armour, helmets, boots,
ration packs, rangefinders and communications equipment. Vital though such aid
has been it is not enough to help Ukraine prevail given the nature of the
current and coming fight. That is why Britain, along with its 35 partners, are
actively considering sending tanks, artillery and anti-ship missile systems to
counter the threat posed by Russian forces in the east and south, including the
Russian Black Seas Fleet and additional amphibious units which are now threatening
Odesa. More lethal aid in conjunction with tougher sanctions would increase the
pressure on the Kremlin without putting Western forces in direct conflict with
Russian forces. Could sanctions and the level of lethal aid envisaged tip the
balance in the coming fight? Unlikely.
No Fly Zone: Some are proposing a Western or NATO No Fly Zone which
would afford Ukrainian forces a much higher level of force protection against
Russian air and missile power. However, to be effective an ‘NFZ’ must be
imposed both over the fight and the lines of supply and re-supply. Much of the
next phase of the Russian campaign will take place close to the Russian border
and air defence hubs. Therefore, if NATO, for example, were to try and enforce
such a Zone, it would be less a No Fly Zone and more a major air campaign that
would inevitably lead to direct contact and conflict between NATO air forces
and the Russian Air Force, with all the dangerous capacity for rapid escalation
such a conflict would entail. Most European air forces also simply lack the
capability to undertake such a deployed forward air campaign over hostile air
space, and the one or two that do, such as Britain’s Royal Air Force, lack the
capacity to sustain it. Therefore, any such campaign would need to be
overwhelmingly American. It would also
offer Putin the opportunity to claim that he was right all along: NATO is not a
defensive alliance and poses an existential threat to Russia. Therefore, whilst
a No Fly Zone would undoubtedly improve the tactical position of Ukrainian
forces it would come with a host of strategic risks.
Direct Allied action: The most unlikely scenario is that NATO would
move to act directly in support of Ukrainian forces across the full bandwidth
of the conflict. It is very hard to see any such proposal making it to the
North Atlantic Council, let alone being approved. If such a decision were ever
to be approved what options would be open to SACEUR. One such option could be
to use American and British nuclear submarines to launch distant cruise missile
strikes from the Eastern Mediterranean against Russian naval and amphibious
forces threatening Odesa. Possible, but
highly unlikely given current circumstances and Alliance politics.
What other options exists? As I
proposed in a previous Analysis NATO, or more precisely the Americans and the
British, could increase further their intelligence support for the Ukrainians.
Another option could be to impose a blockade of the Black Sea by enforcing the
Montreux Convention, either by closing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, or via
a distant Alliance blockade in the Mediterranean. Bottling up Russian naval
forces in the Black Sea would have significant consequences for Russian naval
operations elsewhere, not least in the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic, Arctic and
the Pacific. Other options include
increasing cyber and more electronic warfare support for the Ukrainians, both
offensive and counter-measures.
What it likely to be agreed to by
Western nations are a mix of increased stand-off short-of-direct engagement measures
to support the Ukrainians, including marginally tougher sanctions, some more
lethal aid, and greater covert combat support, but no direct confrontation with
Russian forces in or near Ukraine unless they step over onto Alliance territory. Paradoxically, such a confrontation might
only be triggered if Russia were to use chemical, biological or even tactical
nuclear weapons if, for example, its efforts to seize Odesa failed and thus to cut
Ukraine off completely from the sea. Denying Odesa to Ukraine rather than
taking the port could be just as attractive to Russia.
Or, it might have the opposite
effect. Any such action would certainly split the Alliance. Why not more? There
is the obvious fear in Europe of another major European war and with it the
threat of potential nuclear annihilation. There is also another reason. In the
event of some form of political settlement Ukraine wants security guarantees from
its Western partners that most are simply not willing to give. The Ukrainians are also only likely to want
to work with the Americans, British, Poles and a few others. The French and the
Germans are seen by Kyiv as appeasers of Putin at best, collaborators at worst.
The Russian Order of Battle, April 4th
It is precisely for these reasons Russia has switched from conquest to confrontation and even terrorism. They have the forces for it. In addition to the mercenaries of The Wagner Group and the Chechen fighters of the Kadyrovtsy force, there are also believed to be African, Arab, Azeri, South Ossetian and Libyan mercenaries fighting alongside Russian forces.
o Ministry of Defence (General
of the Army Sergey Shoygu)
§ Russian Armed Forces (General of the
Army Valery Gerasimov)
§ Russian Ground Forces (General of the
Army Oleg Salyukov)
§ 1st Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant
General Sergey
Aleksandrovich Kisel [dismissed]; unnamed deputy commander
[dismissed])
§ 2nd Guards Motor Rifle
Division (Colonel (Guards) Sergey Viktorovich Medvedev)
§ 4th Guards Tank Division (Colonel
Yevgeny Nikolayevich Zhuravlyov)
§ 27th Guards Motor Rifle
Brigade (Colonel Sergey Igorevich Safonov)
§ 96th Reconnaissance Brigade (Colonel
Valery Vdovichenko)
§ 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Major
General Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Gurov)
§ 15th Motor
Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Sergeevich Marushkin)
§ 21st Guards Motor Rifle
Brigade
§ 30th Motor Rifle Brigade
§ 5th Combined Arms Army (Major
General Aleksey
Podivilov)
§ 57th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade
§ 6th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Vladislav Nikolayevich Yershov [dismissed & arrested])
§ 25th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel
Andrei Nikolaevich Arkhipov)
§ 138th Guards
Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergei Maksimov)
§ 8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Andrey Nikolayevich Mordvichev)
§ 20th Guards
Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Aleksei Gorobets)
§ 150th Motor Rifle Division (Major
General Oleg Mityaev †)
§ 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Andrey Sergeevich Ivanaev)
§ 144th Guards
Motor Rifle Division
§ 29th Combined Arms Army (Major
General Andrei Borisovich Kolesnikov †)
§ 36th Guards Motor Rifle
Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel (Guards) Andrei Vladimirovich
Voronkov)
§ 200th Artillery Brigade
§ 35th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Aleksandr Semyonovich Sanchik, Deputy Commander Major General Sergei
Nyrkov [wounded, not returning to active duty])
§ 38th Motor Rifle Brigade
§ 165th Artillery Brigade
§ 36th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Valery Solodchuk, Deputy
Commander Major General Andrei Anatolyevich Seritskiy, seriously wounded)
§ 5th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel (Guards)
Andrei Viktorovich Kondrov)
§ 37th Guards Motor Rifle
Brigade (Colonel Yuri Medvedev †)
§ 103rd Rocket Brigade
§ 41st Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Sergey
Ryzhkov, Deputy Commander Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky †)
§ 35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Major
General Vitaly Gerasimov †)
§ 55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade
§ 74th Guards Motor Rifle
Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Alekseyevich Yershov)
§ 120th Artillery Brigade
§ 119th Missile Brigade
§ 90th Guards
Tank Division (Colonel Ramil Rakhmatulovich Ibatullin)
§ 49th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Yakov Vladimirovich Rezantsev †)
§ 34th Motor Rifle Brigade (Mountain)
§ 205th Motor Rifle Brigade (Lt. Colonel
Eduard Yuryevich Shandura)
§ 227th Artillery Brigade (Colonel Aleksei
Viktorovich Repin)
§ 90th Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade
§ 66th Headquarters Brigade
§ 32nd Engineer-Sapper Regiment
§ 58th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant
General Mikhail Stepanovich Zusko [dismissed and arrested])
§ 19th Motor Rifle Division (Colonel
Dmitri Ivanovich Uskov)
§ 42nd Guards
Motor Rifle Division
§ 136th Guards
Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Roman Geradotovich Demurchiev)
§ 291th Artillery Brigade (Lieutenant
Colonel Aleksandr Mikhailovich Tikhonov)
§ 11th Army
Corps (Major General Andrey Ruzinsky)
§ 18th Guards
Motor Rifle Division
§ 14th Army
Corps (Lieutenant General Dmitry Vladimirovich Krayev)
§ 200th Motor
Rifle Brigade (Colonel Denis Yuryevich Kurilo †)
§ 22nd Army
Corps (Major General Denis Lyamin)
§ 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade
(Colonel Sergey Storozhenko)
§ 127th Reconnaissance Brigade
§ 12th Guards Engineering Brigade (Central
Military District, Colonel Sergei Porokhnya †)
§ 45th Guards Engineering Brigade (Western
Military District, Colonel Nikolai Ovcharenko †)
§ 439th Guards Reactive Artillery Brigade
(Southern Military District)
§ Special
Operation Forces (SSO) (Major General Valery
Flyustikov)
§ Russian Navy (Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov)
§ Black Sea Fleet (Admiral Igor Osipov, Deputy Commander First Rank
Captain Andrei Paliy †)
§ Moskva
§ Northern Fleet (Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev)
§ Russian Naval Infantry (Lieutenant
General Alexander
Kolpachenko)
§ 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific
Fleet, Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Petukh)
§ 61st Naval
Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet, Colonel Kirill Nikolaevich
Nikulin)
§ 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet)
§ 336th Guards
Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Igor N.
Kalmykov)
§ 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade
(Black Sea Fleet, Colonel Aleksei Nikolaevich Sharov †, Deputy Commander
Colonel Aleksei Berngard)
§ 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla)
§ Russian Aerospace Forces (General of
the Army Sergey Surovikin)
§ Russian Air Force (Lieutenant
General Sergey Dronov)
§ 4th Air and
Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilyevich
Gostev)
§ 1st Guards Composite Aviation Division
§ 6th Air and
Air Defence Forces Army (Major General Oleg Makovetskiy)
§ 105th Guards
Mixed Aviation Division (Colonel Sergei Prokofyev)
§ 11th Air and
Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Vladimir
Kravchenko)
§ 303rd Composite Aviation Division
§ 14th Air and
Air Defence Forces Army (Major General Vladimir Sergeyevich
Melnikov)
§ 41st Air Defence Division
§ Russian Airborne Forces (Colonel
General Andrey Serdyukov)
§ 7th Guards
Mountain Air Assault Division
§ 76th Guards
Air Assault Division (Major General Alexey Naumets)
§ 98th Guards Airborne Division (Guards
Colonel Viktor Igoryevich Gunaza [dismissed] by end of March)
§ 106th Guards Airborne Division (Guards
Colonel Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Selivyorstov)
§ 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel
Vadim Pankov)
§ 11th Guards Air Assault
Brigade (Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Denis Viktorovich
Glebov †)
§ 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade
§ 83rd Guards Air Assault
Brigade (Guards Colonel Aleksandr Kornev, Deputy Commander Lt.
Col. Vitaliy Nikolaevich Slabtsov †)
§ GRU (Admiral Igor Kostyukov)
§ 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel
Konstantin Bushuev)
§ 3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel
Albert Ibragimovich Omarov)
§ 10th Spetsnaz Brigade
§ 22nd Guards
Spetsnaz Brigade
§ 24th Spetsnaz Brigade
§ Russian National Guard (General of
the Army Viktor Zolotov; Deputy Commander
Lieutenant General Roman Gavrilov [dismissed and arrested])
§ 604th Special Purpose Center (Colonel
Alexey Stromakov)
§ Kadyrovtsy (Head: Ramzan Kadyrov)
§ OMON
§ SOBR
o Ministry of
Internal Affairs (Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev)
o Federal Security Service (General of
the Army Alexander Bortnikov)
§ Border
Service of the Federal Security Service
o Foreign
Intelligence Service (Director: Sergey Naryshkin)
o Russian Irregular forces
§ Union of Donbas Volunteers
o Mercenaries
§ Wagner Group (Leader: Lieutenant
Colonel Dmitry Utkin)
§ Arab and African mercenaries
§ South Ossetian and Abkhazian mercenaries
§ Serb, Azeri and Libyan mercenaries
·
Donetsk People's Republic (Supreme
C-in-C: Denis Pushilin)
o Donetsk People's Militia (Major
General Denis
Sinenkov)
§ Sparta Battalion (Colonel Vladimir Zhoga †)
§ 100th Brigade
§ Mariupol-Khingan Naval Infantry
·
Luhansk People's Republic (Supreme
C-in-C: Leonid Pasechnik)
o Luhansk People's Militia (Colonel Yan
Leshchenko)
Assessment
There is another factor that
should be considered looking at the Russian Order of Battle: just how long can
Russia maintain this level of operations? Two weeks ago, Lieutenant-General
(Ret.) Ben Hodges and I wrote a piece entitled Kulminatsionny Moment? We argued that the Russian Army was at the
limit of its offensive potential. Whilst the Russian General Staff is trying to
re-organise to maintain some level of offensive momentum, the conventional combat
power available to it is clearly diminishing. In our book, Future War and the Defence of Europe, we also suggest that Russia
could cause mayhem near its borders for thirty days and then begin to run out
of steam. To be honest, we did not realise it would be so close to Russia’s
borders, that much of the mayhem would be self-inflicted and that it would run
out of steam and much else so quickly.
Which leads to me to yet another
paradox of the Russian campaign in Ukraine. Moscow is clearly now preparing its
people for a longer war with an army clearly unable and not particularly
willing to fight it. Some reports
suggest that President Putin wants to declare victory by the May 9th
Victory Day commemorations. However, given the changing nature of the conflict
if he is ever to declare ‘victory’ it will probably need to be closer to the 80th
anniversary of the start of the Battle of Stalingrad on August 2nd and only after many more conscripts have
been killed and wounded. What happened in Stalingrad was not conquest by either
side, but annihilation of a people and a city and on the Soviet side it was
carried out in the name of de-Nazification.
Therefore, if the West wants to
make a real difference it will at the very least need to demonstrate a
determination to prevent Russia from claiming victory, and if possible help
Ukraine win. The question then is what would victory look like for Ukraine and
how could the West best help achieve it? Short of all-out NATO intervention it is
very unlikely that Russian forces can be forced out of their pre-February 24th
positions, let alone back to the pre-2014 position. The closer Russian forces
are to their own border the more difficult they will be to dislodge from a
battlespace they have had eight years to prepare.
The most that can be reasonably
expected given the correlation of forces is a return to pre-February 24th
positions, the blocking of a secure land bridge between Russia, Crimea and
Moldova and Transnistria, the holding of Mariupol and the denial of Odesa, as
well as the preservation of the bulk of Ukraine’s regular forces. To be blunt,
it is hard to see this war ending in any peace agreement anytime soon. It is
going to be a long haul. Much more likely is some form of frozen conflict akin
to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement after which the preservation of
Ukraine’s fighting power will be crucial.
Putin is conducting an
incompetent, cack-handed and brutal war in Ukraine, but then again history
would suggest that is precisely the Russian way of war, now made worse by the
forever stench of terrible war crimes.
Julian Lindley-French
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