December 20th, 2021
“Today we actually find
ourselves in such a situation when we have reached the brink and our proposals,
which we have formulated, they are absolutely substantive, absolutely
accurately describe without any half-tones how we see our national interests,
and we also describe how we seemingly military safety in Europe. Today we have come to such a moment of
truth in our relations with NATO, when it is necessary to decide in
principle. We have taken this step and proceed from the fact that it will no
longer be possible to brush it off or blabber it out…If this does not work out,
then we will also switch to this mode of creating counter-threats. But then it will be too late to ask us why we
made such decisions”.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko,
December 18th, 2021
Putin’s sphere of
fear
This is a
Christmas essay I would have preferred not to have written. The current crisis
in Europe’s east is the most dangerous since the end of the Cold War. So let me
take a punt. President Putin will send more Russian troops into Ukraine during
the Christmas period, whilst Europe slumbers and the Omicron panic is at full spate.
That is what the Soviets did in December 1979 when they invaded
Afghanistan, what Putin did in August 2008 during Europe’s summer break, and
what Anwar Sadat and the Arab Coalition did in 1973 when he launched the Yom
Kippur War on Israel’s Day of Atonement.
Putin’s strategy bears a marked similarity to Sadat’s Operation Badr before which Egyptian and
Syrian forces had repeatedly feigned preparations for an attack to lull Israel
into a false sense of security. The geopolitical choreography between China’s
President Xi and Putin is also the ghost of Stalin past come back to haunt the
West.
Putin’s strident demands
that the US sign a treaty over the heads of its European Allies to roll back
the Alliance’s presence in former Warsaw Pact countries to pre-1997 has two
interpretations both of which are unacceptable. First, Moscow is (again)
seeking to establish a precedent by which Russia is permitted to negotiate directly
with Washington about Europe in the absence of Europeans. Second, it is simply a gambit to justify military
action in which case the NATO Allies should simply not respond. Putin is clearly seeking to split the
Alliance and again raise the prospect of decoupling of the US from its European
Allies, much like Brezhnev’s 1977 demarche when the Soviet Union deployed
Europe-busting theatre-range SS20s nuclear-tipped missiles. To repeat, given
that the West simply cannot accept what are outrageous demands then they are
either a first bid in an effort to force a weak West to accept a de facto Russian sphere of fear over
Central and Eastern Europe, or rather like Hitler’s demands of Poland on the
eve of World War Two, designed to be rejected thus providing the Kremlin with a
casus belli for an attack on Ukraine.
Some in the West
claim NATO’s original sin was to enlarge in the first place. This reveals a profound misunderstanding of
the geopolitical stakes. The clash between the West and the Soviet Union was
essentially about sovereign choice. The
right of free peoples to choose their allegiances and alliances. Putin is seeking to again deny that to fellow
Europeans and, make no mistake, not just in Ukraine. The original sinners also suggest
that all powerful states have spheres of influence. That is entirely correct. However, it is the nature of each sphere
which is the core of contention now. The
likes of the US and Germany do not force those in their respective spheres into
servitude. Rather, the only demand of
Allies they make is they uphold the values of liberal democracy and take part
on collective defence. Putin’s Russia
seeks the return of the NKVD/KGB/FSB state in a new sphere of fear. Just look at Russia itself. The West must
resist. As for those who suggest the
West broke a promise when NATO enlarged they are simply victims of Russian
propaganda. Read President Gorbachev’s interviews about the events of 1989 to
1991 and no such undertaking was ever agreed. As for the stationing of NATO
forces on the territory of former Warsaw Pact the most that ever existed was a
tacit agreement not to so but only so long as Russia remained co-operative and
constructive. Indeed, the NATO-Russia
Founding Act was meant to codify such a mutually beneficial relationship but
Moscow has chosen to destroy it. In other words, it is precisely the actions of
President Putin which are destroying a secure Europe and precisely why Russia
must not be permitted a de facto veto
over the Alliance, its policies and its actions.
Putin’s power play
President Putin has adopted a classic Russian strategy by
probing and seeking to exploit weaknesses and divisions amongst his
enemies. He is not short of
options. Consequently, this Kremlin-engineered
crisis has thus far seen three of four phases and is the first real test of the
Gerasimov Doctrine (and it is a doctrine – a way of doing military-strategic
business) of escalating non-linear warfare reinforced by offensive manoeuvre. The first phase was back in the spring when
the Union State with Belarus and Black Seas Fleet enabled Russia to
threaten Ukraine from three of its four distinct sides. This phase was supported by a false
historical narrative about the legitimacy of Russia’s claims built on the myths
surrounding the Kievan Rus and Grigory
Potemkin’s creation of Sevastopol. Putin
hoped the mere looming presence of Russian forces would be enough to force
President Vlodomir Zelensky and the Ukrainians into compliance with Russian
demands that Ukraine remain firmly in Russia’s sphere of fear. This phase secured
at least some of its objectives because in June Putin secured a Geneva summit
with US President Joe Biden that was full of political symbolism.
Phase two began in October in the wake of Moscow’s taking of
full control over Minsk, an engineered migrant crisis on the Belarus border
with both Poland and Lithuania, allied to the steady build-up of crack Russian
units along the Belarus and Russian borders with Ukraine. Phase three is now underway, the threat of an
invasion of Ukraine allied to a widening of the crisis to overtly include
wholly unwarranted allegations about NATO’s defensive posture across much of
free Central and Eastern Europe. As UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said
on December 8th, “NATO is a defensive alliance that only borders
with 6 percent of Russia’s borders. Russia is being the aggressor. No-one is
trying to surround Russia. No-one should be suckered by the phoney narrative coming
out of Moscow about provocation”. Phase four? The attack on Ukraine.
What is the military situation?
The
Americans estimate the Russians could undertake a major offensive into Ukraine
in the latter half of January. If Russian objectives are more limited than a
full-blown invasion, which is likely, Putin could move tomorrow. As of December 20th
there are some 90,000 Russian troops close to the Ukrainian border stretching
from Rostov in the south into Belarus in the north, with spearhead elements of
both Western and Central Military Districts now in place. There are also 80,000 deep strike formations
and reserves held back from the border on a jump-off line running north-south centred
on Voronezh. Crucially, elite Battalion Tactical
Groups (BTG) have now been deployed along the border, supported by field
hospitals and other combat support and combat support services. At present there
are 50 BTGs in situ. These are Putin’s shock-troops and are organised into 168
BTGs and have a ‘grab and hold’ function and are designed to link up with
Spetsnaz forces and thus act as a link between Special Operating Forces and the
bulk of the Russian Army. They are not unlike General Ludendorff’s tactical
units deployed during the March 1918 Operation
Michael. Five years ago only 66 BTGs existed.
The
Russian Army has also deployed rocket artillery, self-propelled artillery, and the tanks of
the usually Moscow-based First Guards Tank Army, as well as two tactical air groups and short-range
ballistic missiles brought in from across Russia to within range of Ukraine. There
are a further 50 BTGs also believed to be moving into place, whilst much of Russia’s
heavy weaponry that was deployed during the spring crisis was never withdrawn.
At the time, the Russian Army deployed an estimated 110,000 troops, tanks and
other offensive systems not far from the border. Much of the Russian force, together
with its strategy and tactics, has also been tested during the Zapad 21 and Vostok 18 exercises. Opposing them are some 100,000 Ukrainian
regulars and reservists. The Regulars
are better-equipped and trained than they were in 2014 when Russia seized
Ukraine, having benefitted from training by US, UK and other Western Allies, but
they are spread thinly trying to cover Russian forces along a long front.
If Putin launches an offensive the 41st Combined
Arms Army will be critical. It is
normally based in Novosibirsk almost 2,500 kilometres from Ukraine but has
remain forward deployed at the Pogonovo training area south of Voronezh since
April. Elements of the 41st CAA have
also been observed at Yelnya close to Belarus.
The 41st CAA comprises motorised infantry, main
battle tanks, rocket artillery and Iskander
short-range ballistic missiles organised around seven BTGs. Crucially, the main battle tanks, rocket
artillery and motorised infantry of the First Guards Tank Army have also been
observed close to Pogonovo. Motor rifle
brigades from the 49th CAA have also been observed moving towards
Crimea, whilst elements of the 58th CAA are now
present in Western Crimea.
As
part of phase three of the crisis Moscow is demanding ‘legal guarantees’ that
Kiev will never join NATO and, with echoes of the November 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis, never host Allied missile systems. What is particularly concerning is
that Putin cannot keep his troops at such a high state of readiness
indefinitely. By February, at the latest,
Putin will either have to attack or withdraw, which without significant political
and strategic gains would look like a defeat.
One reason Putin is demanding major concessions from the Alliance is to
provide political top cover for any such withdrawal. A further concern is that
the 2015 peace agreement which established the so-called ‘line of demarcation’
between Kiev’s forces and Russian-speaking separatists appears close to collapse.
For all of its
impressive combat power there are also some constraints with which the Russian
Army must contend. An excellent November
2021 piece by Alexander Vershinin entitled Feeding
the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli,
claims that whilst the Russian Army is schooled in offensive doctrine (proval blitzkriga) and has the requisite
combat power it lacks critical logistics.
This means the Russian Army would probably need both logistics and
operational pauses to achieve even a limited objective, although several senior
Allied commanders with direct experience of NATO’s eastern flank disagree. They
argue that Russia would not have invested in the current force at great expense
if it was unable to use it. That would
be like the Mercedes or Red Bull Formula One teams having to go to
Kwik Fit every time they needed to
change tyres during a race. One problem
is the constant application of Western thinking and practice to the Russian military
doctrine. Russia is not, for the moment,
going to attack the Baltic States or the Suwalki Corridor but Ukraine, with
everything in its operational and strategic favour. Russian military
intelligence (GRU) and Spetsnaz have constructed a detailed operational picture
of Ukraine over several years, with the latter now in place to cause mayhem
behind the lines if ordered. Whilst Vershinin is right about a sustained land
offensive against NATO territory his assumptions about Russian operations in Ukraine
are misplaced given the likely objectives. In recent years Moscow has
modernised relevant infrastructures to enable discreet and rapid mobilisation
and reinforcement on Russia’s western border and the improved use of civilian
assets to reinforce military logistics power.
What are Russia’s
war aims?
A December article in Defense
News by Hans Binnendijk and Barry Pavel suggests Putin has four options: occupy
the whole of Ukraine, seize all of Ukraine’s coastline from Donetsk to Moldova,
seize part of Ukraine’s coastline from Donetsk to Crimea along the Sea of Azov;
or simply annex the Donbas region which Russia already occupies. Again, at some point Putin is going to do
something, not least because repeatedly mobilising large forces is
prohibitively expensive, and because having worked up the Russian people to
believe something is coming not to act might appear as weakness, the very thing
which he believes is Europe’s curse. It
may not be this Christmas or early in 2022 but Putin is first and foremost a
Russian nationalist inspired by a lop-sided view of Russia, its greatness and
its history, He also seems determined to
consolidate his 2014 seizure of Crimea for a mix of reasons – grand strategic,
regional-strategic, political-domestic, and personal legacy. Given the forces deployed and the balance
Russia will still need to strike between risks and benefit option two – seizure
of Ukraine’s entire coastline from Donetsk to Moldova - would seem the likely
objective. If successful, such a campaign would leave a rump Ukraine dependent
on the rest of Europe and thus Europe's problem, and minimize risk of direct operational
contact with NATO forces. It would also establish a further clear buffer
between Russia and NATO forces, imply threat to the Baltic States, and also
further extend Russia's sphere of fear into the Black Sea Region.
Thereafter, in another ghost of Stalin past, Putin might well
expel all non-native Russian speakers from the zone of occupation exacerbating
the existing migration crisis on the Belarus border with Poland and Lithuania
as part of an ongoing ‘perma-war’ hybrid campaign, whilst undertaking a series
of targeted fake news and coercive cyber-attacks on European capitals and
critical infrastructure. In other words,
escalating a ‘deep grey’ crisis just enough to de-escalate the chance of a
cohesive Western response beyond the sanctions he has already prepared for. He would then make the remaining population in
the zone of occupation Russian citizens and formally annex the conquered
territory into the Russian Federation.
What does Putin
want?
As any negotiator
knows the framing of discussions shapes the outcomes of negotiations because
concessions are already hard-wired into the assumptions behind them. Last week
President Biden suggested that he wanted to convene talks to “…discuss the
future of Russia’s concerns relative to NATO writ large’. Moscow has ‘responded’ by proposing two
treaties, probably prepared when the campaign was being designed earlier this
year, that make a series of implausible demands that transform the crisis from
one between two non-NATO states into one that is essentially about NATO.
Putin has already succeeded
in establishing a dangerous precedent when President Biden effectively conceded
that a threat against a non-NATO member might lead by obvious implication to
limits on the security NATO can provide to its Eastern European members. Putin
has also succeeded already in sowing a seed of doubt about American resolve in
the mind of Allies because the security of the Baltic States would not be
strengthened by such discussions. One of Moscow’s objectives is also to prevent
the Alliance strengthening deterrence and defence by doing what is required to
counter the very real Russian threat. Putin has identified a ‘deterrence hole’
in the Alliance force posture between Western Poland and the Baltic States and Bulgaria
and Romania which he would like to make larger.
NATO membership
should be based on the fundamental principle that a citizen of Riga enjoys the
same level of security and defence as a citizen of Berlin or Paris. Therefore,
the US and its Allies must never accept the principle that Moscow has the right
to discuss the planning and deployment of Allied forces whilst it egregiously
breaks international treaties and acts coercively. Any such concession would come close to
conceding some form of Russian veto over NATO policy. One can only hope that the planned talks do
not follow the same pattern as the Doha talks with the Taliban and the
subsequent sell-out of Afghanistan to which they led. Putin clearly hopes so.
Why now?
There are several
reasons why Putin has chosen this moment to threaten Ukraine and the wider
West. First, it is getting colder. Germany needs gas after Berlin’s nonsensical
decision to abandon nuclear power and commit to carbon-zero climate change
goals before having established a new energy mix that avoids overt reliance on
Putin’s Russia for energy. It is strategic illiteracy at its worse. The same
goes for other parts of Europe. One of the many paradoxes of this crisis is
that it is European energy reliance on Russia that is paying for much of Moscow’s
capacity to coerce. Ideally, Nordstream 2, the direct and
just-completed gas pipeline between Russia and Germany should now be scrapped.
Berlin’s new Scholz government has hinted at such action if Putin attacks
Ukraine. However, Putin and his team will have war-gamed such threats and are
clearly betting that any such sanctions would not last long because the German
people need heat. Putin can also blame the
West for any suffering he has imposed on the Russian people as a consequence of
his actions.
Second, Ukraine remains
corrupt and divided, mainly thanks to Russian help and Putin is still gambling
that the Zelensky regime might collapse like a pack of cards so he can install
a Lukashenka-like puppet regime in Kiev.
Crucially, China has also come out in support of the Russians, which
begs a further question – what does Beijing want in return? At the very least the current crisis might
well herald what might happen in reverse if China invades Taiwan. Clearly, it
is in the interests of both Beijing and Moscow to exacerbate pressures on an already
over-stretched US military and to keep Europe permanently politically
off-balance.
Third, there is
Omicron and a divided Europe that is once again in disarray over the COVID
pandemic. It is a Europe that is also as
wary of US as at any time since the Cold War given the recent debacle in
Afghanistan and as unsure about Biden’s grip as Putin is. A Europe led by a
Germany in which leaders have too often abandoned the responsibility of
leadership by citing evidence such Pew research that surprise, surprise tells
them their people do not like bad things.
There are also
specifically Russian factors. Putin has
been modernising his armed forces at great expense since the 2008 Georgia
fiasco. His modernised military is now
close to peak efficiency and is very expensive to maintain. Putin may well feel
he faces a use it or lose it dilemma if the post-COVID Russian economy weakens
significantly. Putin is also
unchallenged in Russia with his 2021 change to the Russian constitution
ensuring he will be effectively President-for-Life (or at least until 2036).
Putin is also 69 years old and clearly seeking to secure a place in the Pantheon
of what he regards as Russian ‘greats’. There are also no major elections
forthcoming (for what they are worth in Russia) and he has crushed the
opposition movement, most notably that of brave Alexander Navalny. Finally, Putin is surrounded by ‘yes men’
which creates a dangerous dynamic for any unchallenged leader. His cronies, and the Siloviki who support him, are no doubt competing with each other to
reinforce Putin’s prejudices simply to survive in the ‘medieval’ court that is
Putin’s Kremlin. It is precisely why Western leaders should never look at Putin’s
actions through their liberal eyes.
How should the
West respond?
Western leaders should be reminded of Thomas Hobbes’s dictum that, “Covenants,
without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.” The Russian ultimatum to the US concerning NATO is straight
out of the Soviet playbook with no such ultimatum having been made since the
height of the Cold War and the Berlin crises of both 1958 and 1961. Much will
depend on President Biden. In June 1961,
President John F. Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev during
which the Russian thought he had identified a weakness he could exploit. He was wrong. Kennedy stood firm. Biden?
The West’s aims must be fourfold. First, to de-escalate the immediate
threat. Second, to preserve the rights of Kiev as any European sovereign state to
choose its own alliances. Third, to convince Russia that the use of such
coercion will not work and will be prohibitively expensive strategically,
politically and economically. Fourth, convince Moscow that if it chooses not to
be a friend then its only real option is to become a transactional partner in a
peaceful Europe.
Ukraine? The
former US Ambassador to Moscow and NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow
recently called on NATO to launch a Ukrainian
Deterrence Initiative (UDI) as an extension of the Alliance’s Enhanced
Opportunity Partner (EOP) programme. Under UDI, the Allies would do all they
can to assist Ukraine to defend itself, dissuade Russia from launching further
aggression, and thus increase Kiev’s leverage in pursuit of a political
settlement to the conflict in Donbas. Such a demarche would include the
provision of more military equipment and further training, as well as efforts
to enhance Ukraine’s resilience against cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic
warfare, and political subversion. UDI could also establish a function-driven
form of partnership with NATO, making it a formal Alliance responsibility to
help train Ukrainian armed forces and to facilitate their acquisition of modern
defensive weapons backed by common funding.
To conclude, the West must not sacrifice the
longer-term for false security in the near term. Western leaders cannot and must not avoid the
fundamental principle/tension in this crisis between the democratic belief in
sovereign freedom and Russia’s determination to re-assert a sphere of fear around
its borders. If North Americans and Europeans are weak now they could well pay
a terrible price in future, particularly those living east of the Oder-Neisse
line. As such they might well remember the words of Thucydides in The Melian Dialogue. “The
strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what
they have to accept”. We are better than
that!
Happy Christmas!
Julian Lindley-French