Alphen, Netherlands. 5
March. The great historian A.J.P. Taylor once said of Winston Churchill, “If he
could not do something effective, he would do something ineffective”. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
clearly has a similar view of President Obama and the latter’s efforts to secure a permanent P5+1 treaty with Iran that would prevent Tehran arming itself with nuclear
weapons. In what was a brazen
intervention into US politics, and a deliberate snub to President Obama, Netanyahu
warned the US Congress Tuesday that any permanent deal with Iran “could pave Iran’s path to the bomb”. Netanyahu’s high-risk gambit was clearly a
brazen attempt to boost his political standing prior to the 17 March Israeli
elections. Equally, his Washington intervention
not only shows the extent to which the world views of Netanyahu and Obama
diverge, but a dangerous fragility in the US-Israeli “strategic partnership”, and at a dangerous moment. Certainly, an imperfect agreement would tip the balance of power in the Middle East at several levels, a prospect that worries the Saudis just as much as the Israelis.
In May 1976, shortly
after President Carter had taken office, senior State Department
official Leslie Gelb wrote that the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles to Europe
would create a Eurostrategic balance and thus have the effect of decoupling the US
strategic arsenal from the defence of Europe.
Consequently, the credibility of the US strategic deterrent would be
reduced and with it US extended deterrence of Soviet aggression. Europeans also worried that as the Americans closed
in on a warhead-limiting SALT 2 treaty with the Soviet Union the US nuclear
deterrent would be further decoupled from the defence of Europe. Such an aim
was clearly part of Soviet strategy at the time and the European Allies were
particularly concerned by Washington negotiating over Europe's security with Moscow, and yet over
their collective heads. Netanyahu’s Washington
speech echoes those concerns.
Netanyahu’s view of
Obama is also reminiscent of then West German Helmut Schmidt’s view of
President Jimmy Carter. A March 1977
editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung said, “Bonn is concerned that Jimmy Carter is a man ruling the
White House whose moral and religious convictions are incompatible with the
demands of world politics”. Contrast
that with what Netanyahu said of the proposed P5+1 treaty, “We’ve been told
that no deal is better than a bad deal. Well this is a bad deal, a very bad
deal. We’re better off without it”.
Netanyahu’s world-view is that one only deals with states such as Iran through strength and enforced denial. Netanyahu’s fear is that as Obama approaches the end of his presidency he will become ever more focused on his legacy. And, that consequently, Obama might agree an imperfect nuclear deal with Iran over Israel’s head from which Iran could defect with relative ease and face little effective sanction.
Netanyahu’s world-view is that one only deals with states such as Iran through strength and enforced denial. Netanyahu’s fear is that as Obama approaches the end of his presidency he will become ever more focused on his legacy. And, that consequently, Obama might agree an imperfect nuclear deal with Iran over Israel’s head from which Iran could defect with relative ease and face little effective sanction.
The Iranian negotiators
seem to be betting on the same outcome. In
the Geneva talks they are negotiating particularly hard (the Iranians are hard
negotiators) over on-site inspections and the extent and scope of the verification
regime at the heart of the proposed treaty.
Their tactic seems to be based on the apparent hope that as time runs
out on the Obama presidency the Americans would concede sufficient ground to
enable Iran to continue clandestine development of an Iranian bomb.
There are of course
differences between Israel in 2015 and Europe in the late 1970s. Back then the Soviet Union threatened the
destruction of Continental North America. Iran
could not possibly hope to strike America with a first generation nuclear
capability. However, given
Iran’s missile arsenal Tehran, at least in theory, could attack America’s allies, either in the region
or in Europe.
Furthermore, Israel has
some 450 nuclear warheads in its arsenal at Dimona as an independent guarantee
against attack. Like the British and French nuclear systems the Israeli nuclear
capability is designed as much to tie the Americans in as keep the Iranians out. And, although the US and Israel do not share the kind of formal
commitments to nuclear deterrence and defence as those between Washington and
its European allies, there is an implicit understanding that the US will afford
Israel extended nuclear deterrence. That
implicit agreement is the ‘strategic’ in the US-Israeli strategic partnership
to which Netanyahu referred.
However, an imperfect P5+1 permanent
treaty could permit Iran to suddenly break-out of its commitment and announce to the world that it did indeed possess the capability to destroy the State of Israel. If that happened much of Israel’s (and indeed
America’s) conventional military capability in the region would be instantly stalemated. Moreover, Tehran would have successfully crafted the
strategic and political space to continue with its hybrid, proxy war against
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and by extension decisively tip the balance of power in
the Middle East.
Therefore, for all Netanyahu’s
politicking in Washington this week he does have a strategic point. A P5+1 treaty with Tehran, and any subsequent
easing of economic sanctions, must be linked to a change in Iran’s regional
strategy. Netanyahu fears that Obama
will focus instead on a narrow, rules-based approach and simply concentrate on the
modalities of the proposed treaty without linking a final agreement to a shift
in Iran’s wider foreign and security policy behaviour.
In 1975 Amos P. Jordan,
the US Principal Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs,
wrote, “The thing that is troubling our European allies in particular is not
our military capability but what they perceive to be shaky coherence and
national unity which may make it impossible to use those military capabilities.
It is the credibility of our commitment, not the existence of our commitments
or the strength of our forces that is the doubt in their minds”. These concerns were also held in Europe. On August 20, 1978, The Economist wrote, “Some Europeans
have always doubted whether the Americans would fight a nuclear war for Europe;
and even the trusters are beginning to think that what might have been true
when the United States had a commanding lead [in nuclear capability] is not necessarily
true now”.
Some say Netanyahu over-played his political hand in Washington this week. Given Israel's precarious strategic situation it is hard if not impossible for an Israeli leader ever to over-play a political hand given the possible alternative. Iran clearly has its own
strategic interests as do all states and they must be respected. Equally, such interests remain driven by Tehran's determination to destroy Israel to confirm Iran's regional-strategic dominance. Therefore, whilst the Obama Administration
has tended to emphasise an America that speaks softly, and not without
effect, Washington must never
forget its big stick. Indeed, when it comes to matters nuclear it is always better
to do something effective than something dangerously ineffective.
Of course, Tel Aviv's ultimate deterrent is that for all the current friction with Washington Israel enjoys something the British, for example, do not enjoy - a real Special Relationship with America. Any decoupling would only ever happen by mistaken strategic calculation and it is that which clearly worries Netanyahu.
Of course, Tel Aviv's ultimate deterrent is that for all the current friction with Washington Israel enjoys something the British, for example, do not enjoy - a real Special Relationship with America. Any decoupling would only ever happen by mistaken strategic calculation and it is that which clearly worries Netanyahu.