Alphen, The Netherlands. 10 July. A very senior
British general said of Operation Serval in Mali that France had “set the
standard” for crisis military interventions.
Praise indeed and not easily given. One can always tell when a crisis is
being managed to effect as the press lose interest. The challenge Paris faced when four thousand
French troops arrived in Mali in February was complicated to say the
least. Tuaregs had taken control of
northern Mali and sought separation.
They were supported by a particularly nasty bunch of Islamists (Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Mujao) who had profited (literally) from
the chaos in neighbouring Libya. To make
things worse the Malian Army, or what was left of it, was in meltdown and the
country’s political system with it. Now,
with the Tuaregs having signed a June peace deal, last year’s military coup
leader having apologised and elections planned for 28 July Mali has at least a
chance of a future. How did the French
pull off this genuine military success?
Critically, Operation Serval was built on strategic
unity of effort and purpose underpinned by speed, mass, precision and
sustained political and military momentum. French forces, operating
alongside unexpectedly effective Chadian colleagues, drove back the Tuareg
separatists and their Islamist partners.
The very shock of the French intervention opened-up very deep divisions
between the two insurgent groups.
French commanders proved particularly effective in co-ordinating both logistics and a range of allies and ad hoc partners
under French command. Critically, France
was unequivocally in the lead and for the first time US and other allied forces
operated to effect under French operational command. This success is testament to the years of
joint training and efforts to improve interoperability between French forces
and those of its allies. Indeed,
Operation Serval is now a model for the force generation and command of a
complex coalition, something that far from being a one-off is likely to become the
norm.
French forces were also willing to recognise where
they needed support, particularly for strategic air-lift (Americans, British
and interestingly Russians), air-to-air refuelling and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (the Americans and others).
However, for all the undoubted military success two
other factors proved critical. First,
speed of reaction. Within hours of President Hollande’s
go-decision French aircraft took off from Saint Dizier air base and flew ten
hours to strike key targets in Northern Mali.
These strikes knocked the Islamist/Separatist coalition off-balance from
which they never recovered. These
strikes were followed rapidly by the deployment of particularly effective French
Special Forces. Like the British in
Sierra Leone in 2000 the shock of a front-line Western military force
interceding was sufficient to influence events decisively.
Second, the application of political and military
tools took place against the backdrop of deep French historical knowledge of the
Malian people, the country and the wider Sahel region. Knowledge and contacts were vital factors
in Serval's success.
In other words, France’s strategic 'brand' allied to expert use of force proved decisive. It was not simply ‘what’ was intervening, but ‘who’ was intervening and how. This is something the British political
leadership might wish to contemplate as they replace strategy with austerity as
the key driver of Britain’s defence strategy.
For the moment Britain’s armed forces still have a well-deserved
reputation for excellence but any more cuts will render both them and their
strategic brand broken.
However, perhaps the most decisive factor in Operation
Serval was the joined-upness of a French government in crisis. From President Hollande at the top of the power pyramid through the foreign
and defence ministries and onto the service and intelligence chiefs and down to the force and
operational commanders Serval was well-conceived, soundly planned, expertly generated and
effectively executed.
France was assisted by the strategic and tactical
incompetence of their adversaries, as the British were back in the 1982 Falklands
War against Argentina. And, in reality one
rarely gets the chance to choose one’s crises.
Mali was ‘doable’, whereas Afghanistan and Iraq were at the very limits
of ‘doability’ and Libya on the edge. It
may be that future crises will not be so accommodating to either France or her allies.
Furthermore, with the conclusion of this first crisis phase the political battle for Mali is still to come. The 28 July elections will at best be flawed
even if they go ahead. And of course
Serval has not stabilised the Sahel as a whole, partly because the West thinks
states, Islamists peoples. Therefore,
not too much strategic should be read in to Serval.
Equally, the French military success in Mali should
not be under-estimated. Mali is a big
and desolate place and as an example of both statecraft and military craft
France has every right to be proud of Serval whatever happens next, wherever it
happens.
Chapeau France!
Julian Lindley-French
