Alphen,
Netherlands. 5 September. Is the Anglo-American special relationship
dead? In the wake of Parliament’s 29
August decision to block the use of British forces in any US-led strike on
Syria British officers were ejected from planning meetings at US Central
Command (CENTCOM). At this week’s G20
meeting in St Petersberg President Obama will pointedly have a private meeting
with France’s President Hollande, but not with David Cameron.
To understand the
special relationship it is necessary to go back to its origins. Not surprisingly it was the product of
Winston Churchill’s fertile and febrile strategic imagination. In a famous March 1946 speech in Fulton,
Missouri entitled “Sinews of Peace” Churchill said, “Neither the sure
prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained
without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking
peoples ...a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire
and the United States”. At the time Churchill
was set on re-casting the victorious Anglo-American alliance of World War Two
to confront Soviet expansionism.
That was then this is
now. Britain is no longer an imperial
power but still retains one of the world’s leading economies and one of the world’s most capable armed forces, albeit one in which
the link between capability and capacity is now dangerously tenuous. The relationship also tends
to vary depending upon who is in charge in London and Washington and the extent
to which British leaders determine they must align the British interest with
the American.
Equally, there are
indeed areas of co-operation between the countries that can be said to be
‘special’ by international standards. The
co-operation between American and British Intelligence is certainly ‘special’
as Edward Snowden has revealed. Moreover
British Intelligence has been particularly effective in Syria which may explain
Obama’s muted response to Parliament’s nay say.
However, the true foundation
of the special relationship is first and foremost the relationship between the
armed forces of the two countries. As
retired US Army Four Star General Jack Keane said this week of the proposed Syria
operation, "We operate side by side with the UK and we know who our
closest ally is. We certainly would much rather do this with the UK side by
side, that's how the military feels,[and] I really think the leaders of the
country feel”.
Giving evidence before
the Senate over the summer the new US Ambassador to the Court of St James said,
"We are committed to working with that strong relationship [with Britain]
to ensure that they [the British armed forces] remain full-spectrum capable,
that they remain operable with us and also that they are able to continue to
lead missions on behalf of NATO. It is
an area of critical concern."
My own conversations
with American leaders underline the damage that was done to Britain’s influence
in Washington by London’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The damage was not simply a question of the
cuts per se but the way London failed to manage American
expectations. Some of that damage has
since been offset by the large equipment programme announced for the
British armed forces. Sensible people in
DC also understand that the British Government had to close a £38bn ($59bn)
funding gap in Britain’s defence budget at a time when failing banks had
brought Britain’s economy to its knees.
However, Washington
does not do sentimentality. A close
friend of mine who is a very senior American said to me recently that the
relationship works so long as Britain does not test it. Critically, there are no blocks of hyphenated
British-Americans with a US vote, in the same way there are Jewish-Americans
and Polish-Americans. Therefore as Churchill fades into the far-past it is
British power that will define the scope and extent of British influence in
Washington and the Americans will measure that power as being first and
foremost military.
Therefore London has
some ground to catch-up which will not have been helped by this week’s
Parliamentary vote. Moreover, the Anglo-American
relationship has been diluted in the American political mind over the years by
a rather sordid and sorry mix of over-needy British politicians desperate for
American presidential blessing, London’s retreat from big thinking about
strategy and massive cuts to Britain’s armed forces. For all that America and Britain still enjoy
the closest strategic relationship of any two sovereign states on the
planet. And, the relationship is not a beauty contest. If America operates with others from time to time as it will London needs to be mature about it.
However, if SDSR 2015 does
not re-set the British armed forces back onto a path towards an ability to lead coalitions then
not only will the special relationship wane further in the American mind but the value of NATO with it.
Indeed, British military capability is a key factor in keeping NATO relevant in Washington. Therefore, SDSR 2015 must be strategically substantive and sold well in
Washington. One of the big mistakes the
British made in 2010 was to under-estimate the influence of DC think-tanks over
both White House and Pentagon thinking.
The special relationship is not dead but if SDSR 2015 fails in
the American political mind Britain will simply become yet another of those
pesky European allies forever demanding, offering little by way of return and
all too willing to fight to the last American.
There is nothing special about that.
Julian Lindley-French
