Paris, France. 27
September. Ah, Paris in springtime! Well, it is September but it feels like
spring. I flew in from Rome where I had spoken on the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy, which is the strategy equivalent of talking paint dry. My reason for being in Paris was to talk
grand strategy with senior managers of Thales, a defence-industrial giant. As I spoke I could not but help think of the
test Alan Turing once established for artificial intelligence to pass if it was
successfully to mimic human thought and action.
Europeans need a similar test for the many EU, NATO and national defence
strategies which plaster the walls of Europe’s rickety and ageing grand villa –
do they at least mimic reality?
Defence strategy in
Europe is a sort of ‘Strategic Reverse Half-Nelson’. This is achieved by turning the strategic
telescope around so every threat looks much smaller than it is and then halving
the number by putting the telescope in front of Nelson’s blind eye. To that end, most European states decide first
how much of a military they wish to afford then write strategy to fit. This is not exactly how strategy works.
Technology is the
future of defence strategy. Take the
soon to be ‘flooded’ 65,000 ton British aircraft carriers. The Royal Navy no longer launches ships but
‘floods’ them, which strikes me as somewhat nautically oxymoronic. HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales (good
names eh?) will be in service until 2070 if that is someone else has not
‘flooded’ them both long before! And
that’s my essential point; by 2070 who knows what technologies will be out
there and who will have access to them.
It is therefore vital technological redundancy is central to both strategy
and technology design.
Unfortunately, strategy
is written by liberal arts majors (such as your blogonaut) under the command of
liberal arts politicians. ‘Strategy’
talks much of ‘futures’ together with ‘power’, ‘history’, ‘partners’ and
‘responsibilities’. ‘Change’ is also mentioned a lot. However there is little real understanding of
what really drives change, mainly because change costs money. Therefore, as guidance for planning most
defence strategies are not worth the paper upon which they are written. Indeed, they are invariably about the political moment
not the strategic future.
Just look at some of
Europe’s recent great works of strategic art.
‘Strategy’ for Paris and London goes something like this. “For some
strange reason Johnny Foreigner cannot forgive us for being strong in the past
and being horrid and would love to give us a good kicking. Moreover, given we your leaders have made a complete
mess of your society everyone hates us both at home and abroad. However, we will list all of the things we
should be doing to secure you but as we are basically broke and have no idea
what to do we will also talk a lot about aspiration.
To make you feel better we will however build a few extremely expensive
big, floaty things or even more expensive small, fast flying things and put
lots of flags on them. Sorry”.
For the rest of Europe strategy
goes like something like this. “We have
horrible neighbours who are now our ‘friends’. However, you really cannot trust
these people. We also have formerly
strong allies who once promised to defend us from our horrible neighbours but
did not. Therefore, both our neighbours
and allies must now pay for our defence.
However, as a sign of good faith we will send one doctor to support the strategic
flights of fancy beloved of the formerly strong so long as she is nowhere near
the front line”. And then there is
Germany the strategy of which can be thus summarised: “We upset everyone in the
past but now we are back. However, we really
promise to be very nice this time and we will call ourselves ‘Europe’”.
Strategy in Europe has thus
become the antidote to strategy – a way of avoiding strategic reality by either
pretending the world is not as it is or by recognising only as much threat as
somebody else can afford – the Americans.
Henry Kissinger once
complained that he could never call Europe in an emergency as there was no
telephone number. Today there are a
myriad of telephone numbers but all dear Henry would get if he called is the
same Ansaphone message. “We value your
partnership but we are sorry all of our leaders are busy right now building
‘Europe’. However, do leave your name,
rank and telephone number and we might one day get back to you. Please go on defending us and have a nice day”.
There is some good news. Neither of Britain’s new aircraft carriers will
be called HMS Invincible as this would certainly guarantee their 'flooding'.
Strategy, capability,
technology and affordability are intimately intertwined and defence strategy must
thus be established on a proper understanding of all elements. Too often it is not. Something Alan Turing would have all too
readily understood.
Julian Lindley-French
