Alphen,
Netherlands. 31 January. Today is the
Franco-British pub lunch, sorry, summit at which defence, energy, space and of course Europe will be discussed.
Therefore, in honour of Prime Minister David Cameron’s infliction of an
English pub lunch and a pint of that most venerable of beers Hook Norton on an
unsuspecting French President Hollande today’s blog is devoted to an extract
from my new book Little Britain:
Twenty-First Century Strategy for a Middling European Power (www.amazon.com).
“The
November 2010 Franco-British Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty and air operations
over Libya in 2011 confirmed the importance of the Franco-British strategic
relationship. London and Paris share a
classical state-to-state strategic defence relationship. However, Britain’s strategic relationship
with France is important and complex in equal measure. That said it must be of concern to London
that Paris was less than complementary about the support it received from
Britain for their Mali intervention, even though France seems to have conveniently
forgotten France’s unwillingness to support the British where it mattered in
Afghanistan.
For all those irritations it is
hard to over-state the importance of the relationship. Indeed, if the strategic utility of NATO
depends to a very great extent on Britain’s strategic relationship with the
Americans the future of European defence is dependent on the Franco-British
relationship. A close strategic partnership with France is clearly in the interest
of both countries because of the quality of their respective armed forces. Recent French operations in 2013 have
confirmed that. The challenge Paris
faced when four thousand French troops arrived in Mali in February was
complicated to say the least. Tuaregs
had taken control of northern Mali and sought separation. They were supported by a a particularly nasty
bunch of Islamists (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Mujao) who had
profited (literally) from the chaos in neighbouring Libya. To make things worse the Malian Army, or what
was left of it, was in meltdown and the country’s political system with it….
With the conclusion of the first
phase of the crisis the political battle for Mali is still to be won. And, of course, Serval has not stabilised the
Sahel as a whole, partly because the West thinks states, Islamists think
peoples and not too many strategic implications should be read into
Serval. However, the French military
success in Mali should not be under-estimated.
Mali is a big and desolate place and as an example of statecraft France
has every right to be proud of Serval whatever happens next, wherever it
happens.
The
lesson for Britain is clear. Britain and
France must together work to build on the putative Combined Joint Expeditionary
Force (CJEF) concept and collaborate to being real military substance to both
NATO 2020 and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The need is
pressing. As the failed December 2013 EU
defence summit demonstrated the European defence effort is woefully inadequate
and can only resolved by either structural increases in defence expenditure
(unlikely) and/or much greater unity of strategic effort and purpose leading to
deep defence synergy (necessary). For
some of the smaller NATO and EU members that will mean defence integration that
begins in the tail but reaches towards the teeth end of armed forces
(desperate). Fifteen years on from the
St Malo Declaration Britain again must seek common strategic cause with France.
The
relationship with France will also be vital in rendering NATO fit for
purpose. However, for France to overcome
its latent suspicions of NATO, Paris will expect deeper British political
investment in CSDP. One aspect of that
relationship will be British support for the strengthening of the EU as a
homeland security hub across the European security space. Indeed, if NATO is once again to become the
strategic military sword and shield of the Euro-Atlantic Community, the EU
should transform itself into a security hub better able to provide civilian
protection of the European homeland through improved and enhanced
resiliency. The EU must also provide a
credible political option for leaders so that European forces can be used
effectively under a European flag. This
would better enable political leaders to feel confident in taking pro-active
offensive action together when deemed necessary. The flag a force operates under is almost as
important as the force deployed in a complex place where politics and
insecurity are one and the same”.
As for the pub lunch it is perhaps reflective of the political
problems the relationship faces that today’s summit is the first time that such
an event has taken place in two years.
The strategic logic for co-operation is overwhelming. However, a political gulf still exists
between the two countries over the future orientation and direction of the
European Union. Nothing that takes place
today in an Oxfordshire pub is likely to change that.
Plus ça change, plus la meme chose?
Julian Lindley-French
