The
ends of British strategy require the generation of the maximum possible capacity
and capability to achieve maximum possible influence as part of an overarching
British strategic concept as enunciated and elaborated by British security
policy. This of course begs several very
large questions. Capacity and capability should certainly be geared to the ends
sought. To that end strategy must also
strike a balance between effectiveness and economy – cheese pairing simply
leads to a waste of reduced resources.
One of the many nonsenses of official Britain today is the oft-heard notion
that in the absence of overt threat there is nothing to plan for. Friction is the stuff of today’s world and
strategy informed by sound strategic judgement is more not less important.
Up
to World War Two, British strategy traditionally combined a well-honed policy
mix of power, pragmatism, national cohesion and power projection. Britain was for a long time a key enabler of
sound and balanced strategic engagement, even in the midst of previous domestic
crises. The system worked. British society can still produce the
creative strategic talent to prosper in the world of the twenty-first
century. However, to do so, Britain’s
leaders must first break out of London’s dangerous short-term mind-set if the
country is to properly conceive strategy and policy relevant to the challenges
posed by the twenty-first century.
That
will not be easy. General Sir Nick
Houghton warned in a December 2013 speech of what he called “a creeping
aversion to risk in the employment of our [British] armed forces”. He said such aversion had “…multiple origins
– politics, society, the media and the Armed Forces themselves”. With the connivance of a risk-averse
political leadership much of British society has been lulled into a strange
almost child-like state; at one and the same time uncertain and uneasy and yet
in many ways disengaged from their own security. In the absence of an elite consensus on
strategy there is no honest debate with the people about the aims, costs and
responsibilities of security, which is dangerous in a democracy and
particularly so given Britain’s many challenges.
Sound
national strategy can only be fashioned via a partnership between government
and people. Such a partnership must be
informed and with government unwilling or unable to trust the people with the
fact and extent of Britain’s many challenges that partnership today has
weakened to the point of fracture. The
result is a dangerous paradox; by attempting to maintain the illusion of
security, it is only a matter of time before the fact of its absence results in
the kind of shock which could see the partnership between political class and
people broken beyond repair.
Furthermore,
if London is to shape the choices of others, a conscious national effort will
need to be made and that will mean a Britain with the necessary power to be
attractive as a partner. The need for
partnership is important because Britain will continue to bear a great burden
of strategic security responsibility for the foreseeable future - too powerful
to hide, and yet too weak to lead – the worst of all strategic positions for
any country to occupy in international relations. Therefore, London has no alternative but to
properly organise and aggregate British influence at home and abroad. However, generating influence will demand of
London a clear idea of the ends of British strategy, allied to a sober debate
with the British people about the dangerous world into which Britain is
moving.
The
world in which Britain must compete is one in which there are powerful,
undemocratic states emerging, the leaders of which are legitimised not by
democracy but rather by the maintenance of economic growth. Being the proxy target of choice for those
angry with the United States, Britain must also cope with a world of mass
movements in which the technologies of mass destruction are becoming ever more
accessible to ever smaller and more dangerous groups. Indeed, in many respects, this age will be
defined by mass disruption and haunted by the possibility of mass
destruction. The crafting of British
strategy worthy of the name will thus only be possible through a clear, elite
understanding of the realities that must be confronted, the necessary
end-states sought, and the costs and impositions the British people must
expect. In other words, what Britain
needs is a far better understanding of the what, the why, the where, the when
and the how of British interests, i.e. a distinctively British strategic
concept.
