Alphen, Netherlands. 13
March. Four events this past month have
highlighted the rapidly shifting balance of military power in the world. Yesterday General Sir Peter Wall, Head of the British
Army, warned that “moral disarmament” would be exploited by Britain’s enemies and
that he could not rule out future “force-on-force” conflicts. In fact, Britain is morally and actually disarming along with much of
Europe. According
to US think-tank CSIS cuts to European defence budgets between 2001 and 2013
represented a per annum compound reduction of 1.8% per annum or about 20% over
the period.
Last
month American Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced further
cuts to the US armed forces. Hagel said
it was “time to face reality”, as he followed Britain in announcing a 15%
reduction in the size of the US Army, as well as other cuts.
Russia’s
February 2014 invasion of Ukraine-Crimea should have reminded
Europeans of the inextricable link between military power and political ambition, particularly for the non-democracies. Indeed, what was thought unthinkable in Europe even a
month ago is very clearly thinkable in the Kremlin.
In the immediate aftermath
of Russia’s bungled 2008 invasion of Georgia the Kremlin ordered a major review
of the Russian Armed Forces. It was not a pretty picture. On 31st December 2010 Moscow launched
a massive military equipment programme for the ten year period 2011-2020 that
was to cost some $775bn. The investment
envisioned annual average growth in the Russian economy of around 6.5%. In the event Russia is likely to grow more
modestly over the period at between 4-5% per annum. Such growth will still result in some $700bn of
military investments by 2020 or an increase in defence expenditure from the
current $90.7bn per annum to around $122bn.
Affordability is a (not
THE) key criteria for military expenditure.
Contrast the Russian figures with France. In 2012 the CIA estimated the relative
purchasing power of the Russian economy to be some $2.6tr whilst France was
valued at $2.3tr. If Moscow is right and
the economy does indeed grow at 4-5% per annum up to 2020 the Russian economy would then be worth some $3.5tr. Given the
Eurozone crisis the best that can be hoped for France (and many European
economies) is 1-2% growth per annum (if lucky). Even at 2% growth per annum the
French economy will only be worth some $2.5bn by 2020.
Last week Beijing announced that the 2014 Chinese defence budget will
increase by 12.7% to $132bn per annum.
Beijing has been growing the defence budget by at least 11% per annum
since 1989. If China continues to grow the
military by about 12% per annum, which is implied in the China’s 2013 Defence
White Paper then by 2020 China will be spending $230bn on defence.
Whilst such expenditure
will not match the planned US c$560bn of expenditures in 2020 taken together the
combined Chinese and Russian expenditures on their respective armed forces will
total some $350bn. Many of those forces will be modern. And, whilst the Pentagon’s January 2012 “Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices” paper points the way to a future US force that
will be cutting edge most European armed forces will remain at best only partially
modernised. This will mean that each euro/pound
spent will in effect generate far less capability than Europe’s American,
Chinese and Russian counterparts. Given that Britain and
France represent some 50% of all European defence expenditure and much of the c200bn spent each year by Europeans on defence is wasted the
Euro-strategic balance is shifting markedly and rapidly.
The world strategic balance is also shifting.
Read between the lines of both Chinese and Russian military strategies
and their aim is clear; to complicate America’s strategic calculation by
forcing the US to stretch its armed forces the world over. With most Europeans wilfully refusing to help
resolve Washington’s deepening and acute strategic dilemma $560bn will by 2020 be worth far
less dollar for dollar and Chinese and Russian investments worth more.
Sadly, autocratic regimes are
being emboldened the world over by the West’s moral and actual disarmament in
what is fast becoming a new Tepid War. The
signals being sent of US retrenchment and European disarmament have clearly encouraged
Moscow, Beijing and others to up the military ante. Only the most strategically-illiterate of
political leaders could now discount the established link between military
power and policy goals. And yet in Europe illiteracy rules the day; hard power thinking offends the high priests of soft power.
Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine-Crimea and China’s serial hiking of defence spending really should mark
the end of the fantasy that the ideal of a new liberal world order is shared by all. It is power that is shaping the twenty-first century not values. And, if values are to mean anything they must be backed by power.
It is indeed time to
face reality.
Julian Lindley-French
