Somewhere in Deepest
England. 20 March. Russia has used force
in twenty-first century Europe to militarily occupy a significant and strategic
portion of a neighbouring sovereign state...and it is about to get away with it.
It does not matter that a majority of Crimeans may have wanted to rejoin Russia. In taking Crimea Russia has made a mockery of several treaties, badly undermined Europe’s security architecture and reopened questions about the relationship between might and right in Europe that were thought to be the stuff of history. What must be done?
I have just
been attending a high-level meeting to consider NATO's strategic narrative and the agenda for the 2014 NATO
Summit in Wales. My colleagues and I
talked against the background of a faint but constant drum-beat as Russia
consolidated its Crimean land grab. One
must be conceptually clear at such moments; there are few if any short-term
actions NATO and its members can take to get Crimea back to Ukraine, but there
should be both a decisive response and medium-to-long term consequences for Russia.
First, the West must
escalate not de-escalate. Therefore, the
desire to rationalise away what President Putin has done must be pushed away. This is a strategic power struggle between
Russia and the West about influence along the entirety of Moscow’s western and
southern borders. As such Russia’s
action has potentially the most profound of consequences for Europe and
beyond.
Second, the invasion of
Crimea should not be seen as an event but rather part of Russian strategy. At the meeting one of my colleagues said that Russia will pay a high financial price to maintain Crimea. Moscow could not give a jot. Russia’s invasion is about history and
strategy. As such Putin’s masterstroke
has been to destabilise every former Soviet republic with one act. He has also reinvigorated Russia’s sphere of
influence and greatly damaged the strategic credibility of the West of which
NATO is a central pillar. He has also
ended any pretence to further EU and NATO enlargement and with it the idea of a
Europe whole and free.
Third, President Putin has
also come out of the power closet with a bang and in so doing redefined the
meaning of ‘legitimacy’ in Russia. Any
hope that Russia would at some point morph into a liberal European style
parliamentary democracy is now gone.
Russia is now a fully-blown aggressive revisionist power on Europe’s
border with a classically Russian strong man at the helm who is wrapping
himself in the Russian flag to justify power and position. That might not work for more urbane Muscovites
but it goes down a hoot in much of rural Russia.
This precisely the kind
of moment NATO is for. So, what can be
done?
- NATO leaders must move quickly to place military forces in the Baltic States. This will reassure them and assure their security under Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington.
- A Western military tripwire must be established along NATO’s border with Russia to complicate Moscow’s regional-strategic calculation.
- The US must quickly bring back two additional Brigade Combat Teams to Europe to reinforce the existing force.
- Exercises must begin for the rapid reinforcement of NATO forces in Eastern Europe in the event of a crisis as part of a new Forward Deployment strategy.
- NATO must end its reluctance to base Allied forces in Eastern Europe out of fear it might be seen by Moscow as provocative. Russia is the provocateur.
- The NATO-Russia Council must be suspended;
- The modernisation of Article 5 collective defence must now be urgently reconsidered to include cyber and missile defence.
The invasion also
completely resets the challenge NATO will face at the Wales summit in September
which must now send a stiff message. High-level
political guidance must be given to the NATO Secretary-General to undertake a
broad sweep of the new strategic landscape, Russia’s place in it and thereafter
begin the necessary planning.
Specifically, the
Alliance must be tasked with considering all the necessary means to counter
Russian intimidation and possible aggression and include within that wider
consideration of Russia’s influence, not least in the Mediterranean and the
Middle East. Sadly, Russia will end the
weak co-operation of late over Syria and Iran but that was probably intended by
Moscow in any case. Critically, the
summit should re-establish the symbolic commitment of all NATO nations to spend
at least 2% of GDP on defence.
What will happen? Sadly, NATO is split right down the middle
between Central and Eastern European members rightly alarmed by the invasion
and Western Europeans fast rationalising Russia’s action away. It is that which Putin has understood and it
is precisely the seams and grey areas of Alliance resolve that he has
brilliantly exploited with speed and to effect.
Crimea is gone and the
fate of Eastern Ukraine probably lies in the resolve and will of Western
capitals. Thus far there has been no
will and little resolve, particularly in Western Europe. Indeed, Ukraine could face a dark fate if
Europeans in particular continue to show the almost derisory and utterly
spineless response they have shown thus far.
If all of the above
sounds assertive and uncomfortable…it is.
This is not yet a new Cold War but it is certainly the start of a Cold
Peace. It is time for the West to stand
up and stand together. Failure to act and NATO's strategic narrative may well have been written by Hans Christian Andersen.
Julian Lindley-French