Alphen, Netherlands. 4
August. How can NATO deter Russia? One
hundred years ago today Britain declared war on Wilhelmine Germany for invading
Belgium and breaching Belgian sovereignty guaranteed under the 1839 Treaty of
London. These past few weeks there has
been a lot of politically-correct nonsense about the causes of World War One
with (as usual) Britain’s BBC at the forefront ably supported by Cambridge
professor Christopher Clark and his 2013 book “The Sleepwalkers”. It was nobody’s fault but everybody’s fault
goes the line.
The strategic causes
were in fact fairly straightforward even if today they are politically unpalatable. The war was caused by the aggressive
nationalism and revisionism of Wilhelmine Germany reinforced by the paranoia of
the Juncker elite about the emerging labour movement in Germany and the social
and political change they were demanding.
It was triggered by an opportunistic but failing Austria-Hungary
emboldened by its alliance with Berlin and then magnified by the bloc system put
in place to ‘balance’ Europe. Scroll one
hundred years on and Wilhelmine Germany sounds a bit like Putin’s Russia.
Naturally, the way the
outbreak of World War One is being covered has nothing to do with history. ‘History’
(as so often) is in fact a metaphor for today and the deep divisions within Europe concerning Russia’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.
It would be easy to say (as some leaders are indeed saying) that Europe is
now immune to big war. That is also
utter nonsense. What such leaders are really saying is that for them it is
unthinkable that major war in Europe could happen. Think again.
The proponents of such an argument like to point to Russia’s actions in
Ukraine as somehow a one-off, an enforced adjustment to boundary ‘mistakes’, a
realignment of states with nations. If Ukraine is compensated by Moscow for the
loss of Crimea and gas supplies assured by Russia Europeans can again live
happily ever after. That is to ignore
President Putin’s long retreat into nationalism and revisionism as an illiberal
regime comes under increasing pressure for liberal change.
Like the causes of
World War One the facts of Russian strategy are also strategically-clear but politically unpalatable. Since the $700 billion 2010 Defence Reform
Programme was announced Russia has embarked on a major rearmament effort which
now consumes some 20% of all Russian public expenditure. Russia is also constructing new tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons some of which may be in breach of the keystone 1987
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. In
other words, Russia’s actions are those of a state with a clear if misguided
strategy rather than a state ‘sleepwalking’ into conflict.
The choice for the rest
of Europe is equally clear; deterrence or appeasement? Or, rather what balance to strike between the
two. Last week a high-level report came
out from the European Leadership Network (ELN) written by several former European
foreign and defence ministers. The
report warns against escalating the conflict in Ukraine to create a
twenty-first century ‘doomsday’ scenario whereby systemic war between adversarial
great powers could be inadvertently triggered in Europe as a result of escalation
caused by the actions of smaller third parties.
Recognise it?
Now, hard though it may
seem to the people of Ukraine 2014 is nothing like the powder-keg Wilhelmine
Germany had created at the heart of 1914 Germany. And yet, some of the strategic principles
remain the same. What action to
take? What does escalation actually
mean? Above all, is an accommodation
possible with Moscow and is Moscow in a position to offer compromise given
internal pressures?
Professor Clark would
have it that it was the pre-1914 arms race that created the conditions for
World War One rather than per se the
aggressive politics and militarism of Wilhelmine Germany. That is to ignore the one dynamic strategy that
drove all others. The situation in
Ukraine has been triggered similarly by the aggressive politics and proxy/closet
militarism of Putin’s Russia and Moscow’s correct belief that their fellow Europeans
are now so weak and divided that they can do very little to stop Russia. Even the much-heralded enhanced sanctions
agreed by the EU last week have so many loopholes in them that Russia is already
driving the latest T90S tank through them.
Therefore, in such
circumstances it is vital that European leaders do not confuse legitimate
circumspection with appeasement. Indeed,
de-escalation before escalation looks awfully-like surrender, i.e. the
abandonment of any real determination to demonstrate to Moscow that rapacious
land-grabs that herald a shift in the European balance of power will be
resisted. First European leaders need to
understand and then critically agree why Russia is doing this.
The reasons for Moscow's actions are again strategically
clear but politically unpalatable.
Driven by a deep sense of nationalism allied to manufactured grievance
over EU and NATO enlargement the Kremlin believes that unless it changes the
orientation of states on its borders by extending its sphere of influence
Moscow will be cast to the margins of influence. The method is the use of actual and implied
military intimidation to force Eastern European states to look not just to the
West but again East. Few if any of these
states want to do this beyond being good neighbours of Russia.
Therefore, facing clear
strategic but unpalatable political truths is again the real challenge facing Europe’s
leaders. Are they up to it? Right now
Europe is again dealing with fundamental issues of power and principle, war and
peace even though some leaders would rather not admit it, whilst some are even unable
to recognise it. Rather, they seek
solace in a new kind of appeasement; that somehow Russia can be bought off. This is particularly the case in Berlin which
still carries the yoke of the legacy of both Wilhelmine and Hitlerian Germany even
though neither has much if anything in common with modern Germany.
The problem is that history
in Europe today warps politics and undermines strategy. Appeasement prior to World War Two failed to
prevent war just as much as Professor Clark would claim that pre-World War One
arms races caused war. Today’s Europe is
somehow lost wandering between the two and both strategy and politics reflect
that. However, war is not prevented by
simply refusing to prepare for war.
Tough though that may sound to western European leaders many of my
Russian colleagues would totally understand that.
A March 2014 spat
between Britain’s then former Defence Secretary (now Foreign Secretary) Philip
Hammond and NATO’s then Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) British
General Sir Richard Shirreff highlighted the dangerous division in Europe between
the strategic class and the political class.
Now, I must declare an interest at this point. I was a contemporary of Hammond’s at
University College, Oxford and although I would not claim to know him (few
would) there is a protocol between Old Members of my Oxford College. Equally, I used to support Richard Shirreff
and he is a friend. So, I will be
ruthless in my analysis.
Hammond threatened
Shirreff with disciplinary action because the latter had suggested that
Russia’s actions in Ukraine were a “paradigm shift” and that NATO was not up to
the task of defending Alliance members against Russia. His statement simply reflected a classified
assessment by NATO of NATO that Hammond found politically inconvenient. Last week the House of Commons Defence Select
Committee in a new report effectively agreed with Shirreff saying that “…events in Ukraine
seem to have taken the UK government by surprise”.
On Saturday Prime
Minister Cameron wrote to all other NATO members urging them to “…make clear to
Russia that neither NATO nor its members will be intimidated” and hinted at
possible increases to the British budget.
He also called for a strengthened NATO Response Force (a real NRF would
help) and a reassessment of relations with Russia.
On the face of it Cameron
is doing what all good leaders should do in light of changed circumstances;
adapting. By contrast Hammond’s tetchy response to
Shirreff in March demonstrated a refusal to adapt precisely because if properly
understood Russia’s action would get in the way of his policy priority –
cutting the British defence budget. To
be fair to Hammond fixing the British economy was London’s strategic priority
when he came to office. Equally, Hammond
had to sort out the notoriously incompetent British defence procurement process
and committed Britain to a £160bn military equipment budget.
However, implicit in Hammond’s
public put-down of Shirreff was a refusal to reconsider strategy in light of changed
events precisely because it might interfere with political dogma. Shirreff told me recently that NATO was
unable at present to fulfil its collective defence mission. Today, there are very real questions as to
whether the Alliance could even fulfil its deterrence mission. Not only have NATO’s conventional military
capabilities become hollowed-out to the point of irrelevance the de facto decoupling
of the US from European defence is now fact.
All of this points to a
loss of strategic judgement for the sake of political expediency. Indeed, over the weekend Sir Richard said to me that
his experience had “…been an interesting case where the duty of strategy-makers
to speak truth unto power conflicts with political expediency!” On the one hand, there will be those
in the Clark school of thinking that will point to the argument of General
Moltke and the 1914 German General Staff who believed that unless they attacked
very quickly the forces ranged against Germany would become stronger possibly irresistible. In other words 1914 was the moment to
act. This is a little like Israel’s argument
for acting against it sworn enemy Hamas in Gaza. With only Qatar left able to offer Hamas
support there is no ‘better’ time for Israel to act than now. On the other hand, for Europeans collectively
to do effectively nothing either to counter Russia’s illegal actions or to
respond to Russia’s arms build-up would look dangerously like appeasement, especially
to those driving policy in the Kremlin.
So, what to do? For once Britain does matter precisely
because Britain is a European power (even if my country might soon fall apart). At the September NATO
Summit in Wales Prime Minister Cameron must demonstrate that he is playing strategy
not politics. He must back the words of
his letter of this weekend with action and lead by example. In addition to the committing of 1300 British
troops to more robust and realistic NATO exercises, Cameron must also commit Britain to the 2% GDP NATO
baseline on defence expenditure for at least the next decade. He must also confirm that because of Russia’s
actions British troops will be stationed in Eastern Europe. And, because of the major investment underway
in the Russian Navy (with the assistance of France) Cameron must confirm that the second British
super-carrier HMS Prince of Wales will
join the fleet as planned. Then Moscow might
sit up and take notice that at least one European power is preparing to counter
the high-end military force President Putin seems determined to construct.
Something else must be
done in Wales– a new high-level dialogue with Russia must be started. The ELN report said that crisis management
lessons from the Cold War needed to be re learnt. However, the report actually missed perhaps the
Cold War’s key lesson; a constructive and essential dialogue with an aggressive
state can only be realised from a position of strength. The INF Treaty was realised in 1987 because
many political leaders had resisted popular panic to deploy nuclear forces to
Europe. At the same time they opened the
so-called “Dual-Track” negotiations with Moscow that led to the Treaty and
eventually helped end the Cold War. Dual-Track
at one and the same demonstrated a will to deter in parallel with openness to talk. It is precisely those
qualities which are needed now if the Allies are to convince President Putin
that the costs of his strategy will far outweigh any possible benefits Moscow’s
expansionist/militarist lobby are claiming for it right now.
That is how wars have
been prevented in the past and there is nothing to suggest that today’s Europe
is that much different from August 1914 Europe.
To put it another way, do Europe’s leaders have the political courage to
face an unpalatable and potentially uncomfortable strategic reality or has
political correctness so infected the chancelleries of Europe that
self-delusion is now the order of the day.
God help us all if it is the latter.
NATO needs strategy if it is to avoid sleepwalking into
another European disaster because strategy implies reasoned judgement which in
turn is the foundation of policy. The
need for judgement is above all else THE lesson from August 4, 1914.
Therefore, one hundred
years on from the outbreak of World War One the aim of NATO must not be to
fight Russia but to deter it. For
deterrence to work will, capability and above all unity of effort and purpose
of all the Allies is and will be vital.
The Guns of August? NATO
Needs Strategy not Politics.
