Alphen, Netherlands. 7
August. On Monday Russia began a major exercise on its Ukrainian border involving
over one hundred aircraft designed nominally to improve the ability of the
Russian air force to react to events. The
exercise took place as Ukrainian forces advanced on the separatist-held city of
Donetsk. The true purpose of this
exercise is clear; to intimidate Kiev into halting its offensive. On Tuesday Moscow called for an emergency
meeting of the UN Security Council to demand a cease-fire in Ukraine and a “humanitarian
mission” which Russia would lead. Yesterday,
in a sign of what might be to come, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu told
Russian troops massing on the Ukraine border to “expect the unexpected”. In other words, Russian action maybe imminent
if Kiev does not agree to a cease-fire that confirms de facto Russian control
over significant parts of Eastern Ukraine.
However, what of the future and what does it say about the twenty-first
century Russian way of war?
“Expect the unexpected”
is as succinct as any a description of hybrid warfare. Put simply, hybrid warfare is the conduct of
military and other operations that involve conventional forces, irregular forces,
intelligence, information warfare and cyber warfare to keep an opponent
off-balance both politically and militarily. Such warfare is backed up by a deep knowledge
of the strengths and weaknesses of an opponent and a willingness and ability to
maintain focus on the political objective by being agile and flexible in the
face of events. New Russian thinking
emerged in the wake of the 2010 Defence Modernization Programme driven in part by
a deep analysis undertaken by Moscow’s Frunze Military Academy of the political
top to military bottom conduct of operations undertaken by US and Allied forces
over the past twenty-five years.
Today, Russian forces
are designed to exploit hybrid warfare.
Indeed, the strong presence of Russian military intelligence (GRU) and
Special Forces in ‘support’ of the separatists has seen an adaptation of
Western ideas of hybrid warfare into a new, more robust ambiguous warfare. Russia’s use of ambiguous warfare is the tailored
use of force nominally in support of proxies with a particular focus on exploiting
the political weaknesses of an opponent.
In this case the ‘weakness’ in question are European politicians in
denial about President Putin’s determination to ensure the Russian-speaking
parts of Ukraine become Russian.
So-called ‘snap
exercises’ have taken place around Russia’s European border in 2014 all of
which have been designed to use Russian military force to exploit and
consolidate instability created by the use of proxies in large Russian-speaking
populations beyond Russia’s borders. This
is by no means the fault of Russian-speaking citizens of other countries but rather
in line with President Putin’s 1 July statement to Russian diplomats at which
he said that Moscow will ‘protect’ those who regard themselves as Russian,
including a new concept of “self-defence” and a specifically Russian
interpretation of international law.
Critically, the elite
Special Forces, Intelligence Forces and the heavier but highly mobile new force
in the Western Military District are under the direct control of President
Putin who keeps them at a very state of readiness to act. They can be used in a range of ways from providing
a base for insurgent operations, acting as a dagger to impose a diplomatic
solution Moscow seeks or as a self-sustaining force that can assault an
objective or simply move in under the guise of humanitarian relief to secure an
objective.
President Putin would
prefer that his political objectives in Eastern Ukraine are achieved with as
little bloodshed as possible much like the operation to seize Crimea. Too much death would exacerbate the consequences
Moscow would face. He also understands
that whilst Ukrainian forces maybe advancing in the rural areas around Donetsk
they would find it hard to prevail in a street-by-street battle. Indeed, such a battle would likely turn the
city into a grotesque parody of Grozny, the shattered capital of Chechnya levelled
by the Russians in the 1990s.
NATO’s Deputy Supreme
Allied Commander Europe General Sir Richard Shirreff, who in many ways
pioneered NATO’s concept of hybrid warfare, has warned against politicians that
“lack muscle memory”, i.e. prefer to avoid the nasty end of politics. President Putin has correctly understood that
one of his greatest strengths is the denial amongst other European leaders
about the scope and nature of his ambitions and his determination to use force
to prevail if needs be.
However, there are signs
of change. Russia and Ukraine will now
dominate the September NATO Wales Summit.
On 2 August British Prime Minister David Cameron wrote to NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen calling for a NATO force that would
counter the new Russian force. This new
force would be modelled on the old ACE Mobile Force and would require of all
the Allies significant new investment in mobile, high end forces held at high
readiness and able to deploy at short notice.
To be effective such a force would need a new high level command
structure reinforced by real knowledge about evolving political situations.
The British could take
the lead by re-instating the Advanced Research and Assessment Group which I
once supported. ARAG was closed down in
2010 because its strategic analysis proved politically inconvenient for ministers
and senior civil servants. It is
precisely the culture now well-established in Europe whereby sound strategy is
sacrificed for short-term politics that President Putin has properly understood
and nimbly exploited.
Expect the unexpected!
Julian Lindley-French
