Alphen, Netherlands. 3
November. On 30 January, 1902 faced with
global over-stretch the British forged the Anglo-Japanese Treaty with the
Empire of Japan. To conceive of such a
treaty London had to a) take a global view; b) recognise its own growing weakness; and c) understand the need for capable allies that could ease
pressure on British strategy world-wide.
With cuts planned between 2014 and 2020 greater than Europe’s entire
annual defence investment and set against the huge defence investments being
made by the illiberal powers America’s claim to be the only military power present in
strength in every region of the world looks increasingly threadbare. In other words, American strategy does not add
up and the Americans need a rethink.
Amidst the deep, rich black
seams of Summit blah, blah that emerged from the September NATO Summit like so
much Welsh coal dust on the west wind one phrase stuck out. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel talked of
a “core coalition” to take on Islamic
State (IS) comprising the US, UK, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, Turkey,
Italy, Poland and Denmark (most notably in that order). It was nothing less than a reconceptualisation
of US strategy in a world in which the West is no longer a place but an idea.
However, the implications of such a coalition-led US strategy for America’s four cornerstone military allies Australia, Britain, France
and Japan are enormous. Implicit in shifting
US strategy is a witting or unwitting assumption that the changing correlation of
emerging force will progressively work against Washington and by extension its
allies. Indeed, whilst the US will
remain the world’s leading military power the ability of illiberal powers to complicate
US strategic calculation will increase.
Therefore, given the importance of allies and partners US strategy must
be recast on on four interlocking principles.
1. For Washington to prevail in the multi-dimensional, multi-spectral
security environment of the twenty-first century the US must be at the core of
a world-wide security web of democracies and states with shared mutual interests.
2. Much like Churchill’s 1945 vision of
British strategy US strategy must leverage three concentric circles of power;
NATO, Asia-Pacific allies, and partners across Asia and the Middle-East. 3. US Strategy
must establish force generation and command and control principles built on NATO
Standards that forge allies and partners into effective coalitions. 4. Like the British of 1902 US Strategy must
encourage its four core allies to generate ‘Mini-Me’ command and control hubs
individually and in tandem and/or in partnership with each other.
US European Command (EUCOM) must be the pivot of interlocking
core and broad coalitions because it has
such experience of working with allies and partners and can act as an
effective broker, experimenter and mentor for both allies and partners alike. Indeed,
EUCOM’s commander (COMEUCOM) who also doubles up as NATO’s Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), has a vital role to play as the lynch pin between
allied and partner forces, on the one hand, and other US Combatant Commands
worldwide. Unfortunately, EUCOM is increasingly
the poor sister of its COCOM counterparts, most notably Central Command
(CENTCOM) because Washington places capability before strategy.
Critically, a unifying force concept is needed that could promote all-important unity of
effort and drive forward both core and broad coalitions. Specifically, in the context of coalitions the US and its core allies need
a Four-Forces-in-One Concept that would make the most out of the little bit of everything not
much of anything forces they all possess.
Take the British Future
Force as an example which today reflects neither strategy nor affordability but a strange amalgam of the two. Coalitions focused
on the US are at the very heart of British security and defence strategy. However, to be central to a US-friendly network
of sufficiently-capable modular, adaptable and agile coalitions London will need a Hub Force strong enough to command
coalitions, agile and expandable over time and built around and upon command
assets across the six domains of conflict.
A Core Force agile enough to
work across government with other departments and civilian agencies, adapted
and adaptive to lessons from the campaign in Afghanistan. An Integrated
Force to provide planning and to promote ownership of planning for complex
contingencies and consequence management both at home and with allies and
partners. Finally, an Effect Force able and geared to take on
robust forced entry missions as and when required either in lead or as part of of
US-led coalitions.
Whilst the the
Americans still possess the only truly strategic force i.e. a force that can do
everything, all-of-the-time, everywhere sort of, that force today faces many of
the same challenges the British faced in the late nineteenth century. Still immensely strong on paper like the British a century ago the US faces emerging
challenges to its home-base, threats to its world-wide lines of communications and to its key allies
and partners from threats that merge security and defence, civilian and
military, national and international.
In a sense history is coming
full circle for the Americans. Like
the British a century ago the US will needs allies and partners more not less. Of late poor American leadership and the lack
of any clear US idea of the role and utility of allies has seen its vital
alliances and partnerships lose cohesion.
That must stop. The West needs
clear American strategic vision and a clear idea of the vital role of allied
and partner armed forces in American strategy in a world that is undoubtedly safer when the US and the
World-wide Western Security Web is strong.
Julian Lindley-French
