“An Englishman's self-assurance is
founded on his being a citizen of the best organised state in the world and on
the fact that, as an Englishman, he always knows what to do, and that whatever
he does as an Englishman is unquestionably correct".
War and Peace
Leo Tolstoy
Alphen, Netherlands. Quatorze juillet. Interesting week. On Monday I
drove some 600 kilometres from here to Strasbourg to address senior executives
on matters strategic. On Tuesday I drove some 500 kilometres from Strasbourg to
Brussels to address senior British military commanders. All went well until I
reached Belgium, which was closed for repairs. And then I flew from Brussels to
London, and my own failing state, the fabric of which, both actual and
political, seems these days to be in a permanent state of disrepair. On
Thursday I addressed the Air Power Conference on future war in which I painted
a Monck-esque picture of hybrid, hyper, and kinetic war combined creating chaos
across a Europe made brittle and vulnerable by years of strategic pretence. With politicians all too keen to avoid hard
choices, and senior civil servants all too career keen to protect them from
such choices, neither Britain, nor any other European state is at all serious
about addressing the very real possibility of such a war. Rather, they prefer to
live in the twilight world of an implicit Ten Year Rule in which nothing bad
can happen if it costs too much.
Talking of chaos it is perhaps fitting that I write
this piece on Bastille Day. With Macron and Trump reviewing shiny military
stuff in Paris, on the centennial of the arrival of the Dough Boys in France,
the symbolisms of power and pretence are at their most stark. Issues of war and
peace seen through the lens not of history or strategy, but of ceremony and
appearance. In Europe’s post-strategic
age appearance is all the rage. And yet the symbolism of Macron with Trump also
matters for the British. Britain’s entire security and defence strategy relies
on being close to, and exerting some influence over, the Americans. Make no mistake, Trump is with Macron (rather than May) because the
Trump world-view can be essentially broken down to winners and losers. Right
now, Trump sees Macron (and by extension France) as a ‘winner’, and May (and
Britain) as a ‘real loser’. Result? Britain is failing to exert influence in
Washington, as well as losing influence in Berlin and Paris.
Political London is a mess. The smell is awful. Made worse by the huge posters promoting a new ‘blockbuster’ film “Dunkirk”,
which commemorates another moment of ‘glorious’ British failure. Dunkirk happened because all power is
relative. In 1940 Britain’s army was defeated because an enemy had spent more
and better for a significant period proved it on the beaches of the Pas de Calais.
It happened because at a time of danger a powerful state put sound money before
sound defence? It happened because a powerful state chose to recognise only as
much threat as it thought it could afford? It happened because of the the gap
between what a state said what it must do to secure and defend itself, and what
it was actually prepared to do. A gap that became so wide as to make the
Potemkin preservation of appearance more important than either the protection
of its people, or projection of its influence and effect. That state was Maginot
France. Maginot Britain?
Britain’s credibility and influence is fast
declining. Specifically, and
consequently, Britain is not spending anywhere near well enough on either security
or defence (the two are very different) to meet the risks, threats, and indeed
opportunities as established in Britain’s own National Security Strategy. Rather,
London is retreating into the appeasement of reality, and a kind of defence theatre d'absurde in which a proud but
increasingly cardboard cut-out military desperately tries to close its many
gaps with a ‘can do’ spirit, and by sending one man (or woman) here, a little
force there, armed with a little bit of everything, but not much of anything.
Rule Britannia? I don’t think so. Indeed, I can almost hear Chancellor Phillip
Hammond in the wake of a coming security shock saying “Don’t worry. We were
defeated within our national means”.
Ultimately, the rational for what
passes as current British security and defence policy comes down to an
interpretation of the word 'security' - the first duty of the state. For
Phillip Hammond 'security' is purely financial and economic. Prime Minister May rather confirmed that in
Prime Minister’s Questions when she referred to the national debt
being at a peacetime high. Firstly, she is wrong. Between 1922 and 1955 both Britain’s net public debt was far higher than today. Second, Britain is not at peace.
Britain maybe not at war, but it is certainly no longer at peace.
Consequently, Hammond's economist's 'in
an ideal world, all things being equal' approach to security and defence, in
which all threats must meet his deficit reduction target, is becoming daily
more dangerous. Or, to put it another way, Britain is locked into a race to the
bottom between preparing for either a major economic shock or a major security shock...but not both.
You takes yer pick, you yer makes yer choice. Balance? Forget it! As an informed citizen I am frankly
appalled by my great country’s across the board retreat of late into strategic
pretence, and how such retreat is making Europe and the wider world more, not
less dangerous. You don’t believe me? Look around you.
As I drove back from
Brussels Airport to my home yesterday morning I was thinking of Churchill and
the ‘wilderness years’, and wondering after a week of discussions whether Britain
can escape the political and strategic wilderness in which it is now lost. It would take real leadership and I see
neither the talent nor the capacity for such leadership in London today. Rather,
what Tolstoy wrote of his fellow Russians seems better applied to Britain’s
elite these days. “A Russian
is self-assured simply because he knows nothing and does not want to know
anything, since he does not believe in the possibility of knowing anything
fully.”
War or Peace? Britain must end the
strategic pretence and finally decide what kind of power it seeks to be. Pocket
superpower or yet another weak European? This is a big question for the choice
Britain makes could well help decide whether it is indeed future war or future peace,
future defence and deterrence or future defeat.
