“A
bluff taken seriously is more useful than a serious threat interpreted as a
bluff”.
Dr
Henry Kissinger
Headline: In
spite of some modest easing of rhetoric overnight by the Supreme Leader of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) Kim Jong-un, the causes
of a crisis with its roots back in 1945 have not been addressed. The paradox of
the latest Korean Peninsula Crisis is that it is clearly in the interests of
China, the ROK, the United States, and other powerful regional actors such as
Japan, to maintain strategic and political stability on the peninsula and
across the wider region. However, the leadership of North Korea believes it can
only survive if it promotes instability by threatening ever more devastating
forms of warfare. The strategic context
and military-technological character of the crisis are turning a twentieth-century
rupture into a twenty-first century world crisis that will continue unless the
DPRK changes policy and/or people.
Relative power of key players (all
figures from the CIA The World Factbook
website unless otherwise stated):
China:
estimated 2016 gross domestic product (GDP) $21.14 trillion, which makes the
Chinese economy the world’s biggest using purchasing power parity. Estimated
2016 population: 1,373,541,278. Official defence expenditure amounts to 1.9%,
although the US suggests that in 2016 China spent the PPP equivalent of c$140bn
(SIPRI). China is an advanced nuclear power with intercontinental ballistic
missiles, both land and sea-based, that is also developing significant military
power projection capabilities.
Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea): whilst figures
are hard to obtain the CIA estimates the North Korean economy to be worth some
$40 billion per annum. This makes the DPRK one of the very poorest countries in
the world. Estimated 2016 population:
25,115,311. Effective estimates of actual North Korean defence expenditure are
also hard to find. However, whilst the official budget for 2017 was set at
15.8% GDP, the Korean Times suggests
the armed forces have consumed 25% of GDP for several years and that defence
expenditure is set to increase. $10 billion spent each year by a militarised
state on a militarised low-income economy explains the size if not the
effectiveness of DPRK armed forces. US Defense Intelligence Agency estimates
that the DPRK is on the cusp of becoming an operational nuclear power with some
limited intercontinental ballistic missile capacity.
Republic
of Korea (South Korea): the South Korean economy in 2016 was
estimated at $1.934 trillion, making it the world’s fourteenth largest economy
using PPP. Estimated 2016 population: 50,924,172. South Korea spends around 2%
GDP per annum on defence giving Seoul the world’s 40th largest defence budget.
In 2015 the ROK spent some $36.4 billion on its armed forces (Trading
Economics). The ROK is a non-nuclear
power, with no intercontinental ballistic missiles.
United
States: the US economy in 2016 was estimated at $18.56
trillion, making it the world’s ninth largest by PPP. Estimated 2016
population: 323,995,528. Estimated defence expenditure in 2016 was 3.29% GDP or
$611.2 billion (SIPRI). The US is the world’s leading military power with
Advanced nuclear systems intercontinental ballistic missiles, both land and
sea-based. However, unlike any other power US forces are spread the world-over.
Background to the crisis: The current crisis is set
against the backdrop of history and, on the face of it at least, the latest
crisis on the Korean Peninsula would appear to reflect and repeat history. On
the one side there is a small Communist state (DPRK or North Korea), backed by
a powerful Communist neighbour (China). On the other side there is a more
powerful but still modest capitalist liberal democracy (ROK or South Korea),
backed by the world’s most powerful such state (US). Equally, there are limits
to the extent history can be used to understand current events.
The origins of the Korean
Peninsula Crisis can be traced back to a 1945 agreement between the US and
Stalin’s USSR by which American forces would liberate Korea from the Japanese
as far north as the 38th Parallel, and Soviet forces would complete
the liberation to the Chinese border. On 26 June, 1950 the Korean People’s Army
(KPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Korean War began. In July
1950, following the June invasion and the swift retreat of South Korean forces,
the US and other Western countries operating under a UN mandate and under the
command of General Douglas F MacArthur, began to engage the KPA and eventually
pushed them all the way back up the Korean Peninsula to close to the Chinese
border.
On 25 October, 1951 Chinese
(PRC) forces suddenly entered the DPRK and defeated ROK forces decisively at
Puchkin, and on 1 November defeated US forces at Unsan. In April 1952 PRC forces attacked UN forces as
part of a major push south down the Peninsular in an effort to take the ROK
capital, Seoul. Chinese forces were held back at great cost at the Battle of
Imjin River by the British Army’s Gloucestershire Regiment (‘the Glorious
Glosters’) and by the British-Belgian 29th Infantry Brigade. The
Chinese thrust was blunted and UN forces were able to regroup to halt the
Chinese advance. The war became a stalemate and on 27 July 1953 the Korean
Armistice Agreement was signed and the Demilitarized Zone created on the 38th
Parallel. The war has never formally
been ended.
Assessment: The
2017 conflict and the 1950-1953 war share several of the same strategic
rationales. In 1953 China did not want a US-friendly state on its border, and sought
a buffer between ROK and China. The US and Japan did not want a Communist
regime so close to Japan at a time when the Cold War was gathering pace and
anti-Communism was at its peak in Washington. Significantly, the regime in
Pyongyang at the time was Stalinist not Maoist, meaning it looked towards
Moscow rather than Peking (as Beijing was then known in the West) for
protection. However, by boycotting its permanent seat Moscow enabled the US to
get a resolution through the UN Security Council. Moscow also indicated it
would not intervene against such a UN force in Korea, leading some in the
Truman administration to fear Moscow was in fact seeking to weaken the US
defence of Europe.
There are several
important differences between 1951 and 2017. In 1951 China under Mao Zedong was
a large but essentially weak and volatile strategic actor the main weapon which
was manpower. 2017 China an emerging nuclear superpower. North Korea was a Stalinist dictatorship in
1951 with more links to Moscow than Peking, which had a powerful conventional force
but no nuclear weapons. The DPRK is now
believed by the US Defense Intelligence Agency to have a first generation
nuclear warhead similar in punch to the atomic bombs which were dropped by the
US in August 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and which were the equivalent of
12-15,000 tons of TNT. The DIA believes
DPRK has successfully miniaturised the warheads to fit atop a viable Hwasong series intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). The Hwasong 12, 13 & 14 missile systems all seem
to have ICBM capability with ranges anywhere from 6000-12000 kms. Whilst in theory
such systems could reach continental North America, they do not as yet pose an
existential threat to the US. However, a nuclear-armed DPRK poses an
increasingly serious danger, most notably to Japan, and US forces in Guam and
on Okinawa.
Analysis: DPRK
aims appear to be twofold; to force the neighbours and outside powers to
continue to buy off Pyongyang with ‘free’ exports, and to maintain discipline
over a militarised society. Even if this current crisis is resolved, the US and
the ROK assure the DPRK that they do not seek regime change in Pyongyang, and
China acts as a de facto security guarantor
for the DPRK, future crises will inevitably occur unless the regime changes
policy tack fundamentally, or is changed. Nor can sudden change in the DPRK be ruled
out. Analysis of economic data suggests that the DPRK is no longer economically
viable without significant resource injections from abroad. There is also some limited evidence that
North Korea is becoming socially, and possibly politically, unviable as well.
The DPRK has repeatedly
tried to 'globalise' the conflict because it needs the US to be an enemy for the
regime of Kim Jong-un to survive. However, the cost of regime survival is
increasing. At the end of the Cold War
in 1989 Russia withdrew the protection of its nuclear umbrella from DPRK. Since
then Pyongyang has invested huge amounts of its very limited resources to
develop nuclear weapons, with tacit support from Pakistan and some suggestion
that Ukraine has provided some key missile components. Successive US
Administrations and the Group of Six (G6) states of which it is a part, and
which includes China, have failed to prevent DPRK efforts to acquire such
weapons. DPRK conventional forces also pose a profound to the ROK, most notably
the 20 million people in Seoul and its environs, which is only 30 miles/50 km
from the 38th Parallel. If any pre-emptive military action is taken to
prevent Pyongyang from resorting to nuclear force it is likely that China is
the only power truly in a position to undertake such action.
Beijing seems sensitive
to American concerns. Unusually Beijing supported the US and UK drafted United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2237 (UNSCR 2237) imposing more economic sanctions on the
DPRK. China has in the past two days appeared to have begun to impose economic
sanctions on North Korea in critical areas such as iron, lead, coal and fish
products. These actions clearly indicate that Beijing does not approve of the
actions of Kim Jung-un’s regime. The Chinese
have also ordered the People’s Liberation Army to prepare to move to the border
with North Korea.
However, the crisis
cannot be disentangled from the growing strategic tensions between China and
the United States in East Asia, and the wider Asia-Pacific grand strategic
region. Over the past fortnight
Washington has sought again to exercise freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea which Beijing claims for its own. And, on Monday, the American again
attacked China for stealing intellectual property. In other words, the 2017
Korean Peninsula Crisis has all the makings of a classic great power stand-off,
tinged with nuclear weapons, and if not now, certainly in the none-too-distant
future. This is precisely what Pyongyang
would like to see happen.
US
Options: US strategy is essentially designed to convince
Beijing that Washington sees the threat to the US and its allies in the region
as so severe that Beijing must take action. In return, China must be assured that the ROK
and US will not seek to enforce the unification of the Korean peninsula, and thus
remove a buffer between Chinese and US forces.
Given the nature of the
crisis, and the complexities and difficulties enshrined within it, the balance
of US efforts should remain focused on a diplomatic solution. The US achieved
some diplomatic success at the United Nations with the July adoption of UNSC Resolution
2371, which seeks to cut 33% of the remaining exports of North Korea.
Beyond deterring
Pyongyang, and assuring the defence of the ROK, Japan, and of course the US
territory Guam, none of the offensive military options open to the Americans
are very attractive. Subject to the agreement of ROK President Moon Jae-in, the
US could send more THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) anti-missile
systems to both the ROK and Japan. However, the number of THAAD systems is
limited, and such a system could do nothing to prevent mass artillery strikes
by DPRK forces on Seoul. It takes 45 seconds for an artillery shell fired from
one of the several thousand guns dug into south facing slopes of mountains just
north of the 38th Parallel to strike Seoul.
What
Role Europe? Beyond imploring Beijing to help resolve
the crisis America’s European allies could have an important role to play.
First, Europeans must give unequivocal backing to the US in the face of any
threat to the American and South Korean peoples. Second, Europeans must
strengthen sanctions against DPRK if the regime does not change tack. For
example, the Netherlands still exports some €2m worth of goods and services to
DPRK. Third, six EU member-states have embassies in Pyongyang, including
Britain and Germany. There should be a
concerted European effort to establish back-channel diplomatic engagement with
Pyongyang.
Conclusion:
Effective crisis management by China and the United States – the two key
players – will require consistent and considered policy, balanced and clear
messaging, constant contact, and the separation of other issues of mutual
contention from the Korean Peninsula Crisis.
Pyongyang appears to be
engaging in but the latest round of force blackmail, this time with a very
nuclear edge, to gain more resources and thus more time for the regime. The
DPRK has repeatedly used this stratagem in the past with some success. It is
clear that Supreme Leader Kim Jung-Un is prepared to to the brink of war, but it
is as yet unclear if he really would fight such a war, as it would almost
certainly lead to his own demise. This is especially the case given that China
has indicated to the DPRK that Beijing would not support Pyongyang in a nuclear
war with the Americans.
Above all, the US needs
to be clear about the outcomes it seeks. At present Washington appears to want
to both deter the DPRK, and compel Pyongyang to de-nuclearise at the same time.
US strategy is thus insufficiently clear.
This lack of clarity over desired outcomes impacts upon the
Administration’s crisis messaging. Discipline is vital with all the key US actors
involved from the President down engaging in and committing to a series of
carefully calibrated messaging. Here the new White House Chief of Staff Kelly
and National Security Advisor McMaster have a vital role to play in imposing
discipline and thus separating crisis management from White House ideology.
The American message must
be consistent; the US does not necessarily regard the DPRK as an enemy, and
will not start hostilities, but any hostile military action taken by Pyongyang
will inevitably lead to the collapse of the regime.
Julian Lindley-French
