Alphen, Netherlands. 17
July. This month’s first delivery to Turkey of the advanced Russian S-400 air
defence missile system is to some a sign that Ankara is leaving the Western
Alliance. Washington has even threatened sanctions under the Countering
American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). In fact, Turkey is not in
Russia’s pocket, as one headline suggested, but Ankara has been alienated from
the West. Here is why.
A few years ago I visited
Gallipoli as the head of a delegation. It was humbling to see so many Turkish families
paying respects to the ancestors who had given their lives defending the
peninsula from Allied forces in 1915. On the summit of the ridge that dominates
Gallipoli, I stood where Kemal Ataturk had commanded Turkish forces, before he
became leader of the Turkish Republic and set his country on a path of
reconciliation and alignment with his erstwhile Western enemies. Indeed, as
part of that same visit I had the great honour of laying a wreath at the tomb
of the great Turk in Ankara. Departing Turkey I came away with a sense of how
Turks view their country and their place in the world. It is that view which, I
believe, informs contemporary Turkish policy.
Much has been made of
Ankara’s decision. Moscow likes to portray the decision to acquire Russian
S-400 air defence missiles, and jointly develop the new S-500 system, as
evidence that President Erdogan is aligning himself with President Putin. Washington
is even threatening to withhold delivery of advanced F35 fighters to Turkey for
fear that Moscow may be right. Rather, both Moscow and Washington simply fail
to understand either Turkey or President Erdogan.
President Erdogan, like
many Turks, has become increasingly frustrated with his Western allies. The refugee crisis that resulted from the war
over Turkey’s border with Syria placed the country under intense pressure with
over three million people having arrived seeking shelter. Ankara’s view is that Turkey’s European
allies made little effort to assist, preferring instead to blame the Turks for
allowing huge numbers of refugees to illegally enter the European Union via
Greece.
The sense of alienation
from ‘Europe’ Turks felt over the refugees was compounded by the final realisation
by Ankara that Turkey would never be offered full membership of the EU. The accession
process began as early as 1987, with negotiations for full EU membership starting
in 2005, albeit painfully slowly. In 2016, Chancellor Merkel agreed a new deal
with President Erdogan that would have seen control of migrant flows into
Europe in return for visa-free travel for Turks across Europe. The Turks
believe they have kept their side of the bargain, whilst the EU has not. In
February 2019, the European Parliament voted to suspend all accession talks
with Turkey, partly in response the draconian wave of arrests that followed the
failed July 2016 coup.
There are additional
factors that fuel Turkey’s sense of grievance. US support for Kurdish forces in
the struggle against Daesh in Syria triggered deep concerns in Ankara that
Washington would eventually back the creation of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Syria adjacent to Turkey’s
border. The very idea is utterly inimical to Turks. President Erdogan was also
offended by what he saw as tacit European support for the coup attempt by
‘liberal’ army officers.
The all-too-evident
distaste of Chancellor Merkel and President Macron for President Erdogan is
also a factor. They, like several other liberal
Western European leaders, view Erdogan as a reactionary determined to reverse
the separation of Mosque and state started by Ataturk. They also regret that he does not behave like
a Western European liberal. The point they seem to forget is precisely that:
President Erdogan is NOT a Western European liberal and shares few of the same
values.
Which brings me to why
Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 does not mean Ankara is now a Russian ally. President
Erdogan is a traditional Turkish leader of a country faced with Russia to the
north, Iran to the east Syria, Lebanon and Israel to the south, with the
Balkans to contend with to the west. Shorn of what he any longer regards as
reliable Western allies Erdogan is behaving like a classical Turkish or Ottoman
leader of old. He also understands all
too well his country’s strengths and its weaknesses. Turkey’s strength is that
it sits at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, the West and the Middle
East, and (critically and decisively) between Russia, the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean. Turkey’s weakness is precisely all of the above. President Erdogan is thus simply doing what
generations of Turkish leaders have done in ages past; focus exclusively on
what he regards as Turkey’s vital interests and states in need of Turkish
support work for the ‘privilege’. In other words, President Erdogan is a classical
Turkish strategic horse-trader willing to deal with anyone who can offer a good
deal to Turkey…and him.
Some months ago, I had
dinner in Izmir with a friend of mine, who is also a confidante of President
Erdogan. He assured me that Turkey was not withdrawing from the West, but
rather taking steps ensure its own security. The purchase of one system, my
friend assured me, was not proof that Turkey was ‘defecting’ to the Russian
camp, on intent on stymieing NATO. Rather, Turkey lived in a turbulent
neighbourhood, the Russian air defence system was value-for-money, and
relatively good relations with Moscow made strategic sense given where Turkey
sits on the strategic map.
The big strategic question
Americans and Europeans should thus ask themselves is not what Turkey can do
for them, but how important Turkey is to their security, and what price are
they willing to pay to keep Turkey onside? There is a particular urgency about
this question for Europeans. Europe is in
headlong retreat from power-realism whilst insisting on a rules-based system in
a world where those with real power prefer Realpolitik.
Dealing with President Erdogan is thus a test-case for how Europeans maintain a
vital partnership with a leader with whom it shares few values. To succeed, ‘Europe’ will need to stop
lecturing Ankara and start dealing with it. There is a deal to be done. The S-400
deployment does not mean Turkey is in Russia’s ‘pocket’. The only ‘pocket’ in
which Turkey is ‘in’, under President Erdogan, is decidedly Turkish, and tailored exclusively in Ankara.
Julian Lindley-French
