“Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few”.
Winston
Churchill
March 21st,
2022
The Few
As of March 18th,
the Ukrainian General Staff claimed to have shot down some 95 Russian aircraft
and 115 helicopters since the start of the invasion. On September 15th,
1940, at the climax of the Battle of Britain, the RAF claimed to have shot down
185 Luftwaffe aircraft for the loss of 25 Spitfires and Hurricanes and 13
pilots killed. In fact, the Luftwaffe had lost 61 aircraft and the RAF 31.
Still, the attrition on Russian airpower is clearly significant. However,
Ukraine has also lost at least 20 aircraft in combat and on the ground. This
matters. According to the IISS Military
Balance at the start of the conflict the Russian Air Force had 1,172 combat
aircraft, whilst Ukraine had 124. This imbalance is why the Poles were so keen
to transfer Mig-29s to the Ukrainians.
Crucially, Russia started this war with 399 attack helicopters, whilst
Ukraine had none.
The March 19th
Intelligence Update from the British Defence Intelligence Agency states, “The
Ukrainian Air Defence and Air Defence Forces are continuing to effectively
defend Ukrainian airspace. Russia has failed to gain control of the air and is
largely relying on stand-off weapons launched from the relative safety of
Russian airspace to strike targets within Ukraine. Gaining control of the air
was one of Russia’s principal objectives for the opening days of the conflict
and their continued failure to do so has significantly blunted their
operational progress”.
When the history comes to
be told of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine one group will
stand out for particular praise, Ukraine’s pilots and its air defenders. Their achievements evoke memories of the
Royal Air Force and “the Few” during the 1940 Battle of Britain. Unlike the RAF,
the Ukrainian pilots do not benefit from the world’s most advanced air defence
system, arguably the best defensive fighter in the Spitfire, or the Channel.
However, this war is yet to become history and given that hard reality there
is an equally hard question Ukraine’s friends must now ask: is Ukraine winning and
how best can NATO and the Allies help?
No Fly Zone?
President Zelensky’s
appeal for a NATO-enforced No Fly Zone over Ukraine makes perfect sense because
Russian forces can just about afford to lose aircraft at the rate they are
losing them. It also raises some uncomfortable questions for NATO.
First, what would it
require to enforce an Allied No Fly Zone against the Russian Air Force so close
to Moscow’s Western, Central and Southern Military Districts and their air
bases? In spite of the degradation of
Russian air power for such a No Fly Zone to work NATO would need to enforce it where
it matters, east of the Dnepr River right up to the Russian border.
Second, what would be the
objective of a NATO air campaign? A specific objective could be to protect the
bulk of Ukraine’s regular army in the Joint Force Operation area so that it can
continue to conduct manoeuvre operations and to prevent it being encircled and
destroyed by a third echelon Russian attack.
Third, what level of NATO
airpower would be required and at what cost? Given the short lines of operation
from Russia’s Western, Central and Southern Military Districts such a campaign
would inevitably bring NATO airpower into direct conflict with Russian air
defences, both air and ground-based. To prevail, NATO would need to deploy its
most advanced air assets, most notably F-35 aircraft and sustain them over the entire
operational area. NATO would also have to accept significant losses, much like
the Luftwaffe operating over southern England in 1940. Given that 70% of
advanced Allied airpower is American it would involve an air campaign between the
United States Air Force and the Russian Air Force with some limited support
from some NATO Allies, most notably the Polish Air Force and the Royal Air
Force. Much of the rest of what might be
termed NATO’s offensive air power would simply be too vulnerable to Russian air
defences.
Fourth, would a No Fly
Zone work? Only if the Americans were willing to deploy a very considerable
bulk of their air power and destroy Russian air bases inside Russia. A No Fly
Zone over Western Ukraine might work, but it would have limited strategic value
and have little effect against Russia’s increasing use of stand-off hypersonic
missiles, such as the Kinzhal (NATO
codename Dagger), although how many
such missiles are operational and whether Russia has really deployed them is
open to debate.
Fifth, would such a No
Fly Zone really lead to World War Three?
The answer to that question is one of strategic judgement and this
unknown. It is unclear how far Putin is
willing to pursue this war of aggression or whether or not he would really be
willing to take on the US and its Allies, even in his own strategic back yard. President
Putin is driven by nineteenth century, Great Power Russian revisionism. So long
as he is in power he will continue to seek to undermine, and if possible
conquer, those countries he believes should be firmly under the Russian yoke. At the very least NATO leaders must end any
delusions they have that somehow Putin can ever be a reliable partner. He must now
be left in no doubt that should he ever contemplate attacking NATO territory it
would really mean war and that he would lose. Russia’s armed forces will learn
from its mistakes in Ukraine precisely because Putin is incapable of learning
from his own geopolitical folly. There must be no complacency amongst the
Allies that the incompetence of the Russian military today means the pressure
will be off NATO and its citizens tomorrow.
Defence or pretence?
This war is not yet another
so-called war of choice. It is the first twenty-first century geopolitical war
by proxy and is as much about Russia’s relationship with democratic Europe as
it is about the future of Ukraine. As such, it poses the Alliance another
fundamental question. Is the reason NATO is reluctant to enforce a No Fly Zone over
Ukraine really about the utility or otherwise of such a campaign, or because
the strategic culture in Western Europe is now so weak that making eastern
European allies live with the risk Putin poses better than confronting Moscow under
virtually any circumstances? If it is the latter then the Alliance is in real trouble.
Last week, President Zelensky
addressed the Bundestag and gave one
of the most succinct and powerful addresses any foreign leader has ever
delivered. In a few short words he
destroyed decades of German foreign, security and defence policy and Berlin’s
belief in Wandel durch Handel (Change
through Trade). Chancellor Scholz’s
decision to create a €100 billion fund to rescue (for that is what it is) the Bundeswehr from its appalling state and
bring German defence expenditure up to the NATO Defence Investment Pledge of 2%
GDP is to be welcomed. However, will Scholz’s defence pledge survive the German
political process? It will take much more than the planned investment to bring
the Bundeswehr up to a level where it
could again take its proper place at the heart of NATO’s land and air
deterrence on the Alliance’s eastern flank.
Whilst Britain has stood
up sending weapons, expertise, cyber support and intelligence, London’s much
vaunted 2021 hike in defence expenditure is already being eaten away by
inflation. Much of Britain’s armed forces remain too small AND hollowed out,
and needs to really begin to match rhetoric with real resources. France? Pre-election President Macron has
been grandstanding as usual by banging on (again) about European Strategic Autonomy which can only happen if Europeans match words with real power. What he should really be concentrating on is fixing the
many problems of the French armed forces, not least the very weak stock of
ammunition and supplies.
Dire straits
As NATO Heads of State
and Government meet in Brussels this week they must for once show real resolve.
The fear of a third massive (possibly
nuclear) war in Europe in just over a century is legitimate, but as President Franklin
D. Roosevelt once said, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself”. This is because such fear not only undermines
NATO deterrence, it also reinforces Putin’s mix of paranoia and false superiority,
not least because he believes Russia’s missile and nuclear superiority in
Europe has made it ‘safe’ for him to attack Ukraine with conventional force. What
is needed now is a process of considered, controlled and limited escalation by
the Alliance to force Putin to the negotiating table.
First, keep the pressure
up on Russia. The Turks suggest there has been some modest progress in the peace
talks they are hosting in Anatolia. If that is the case then it is vital the
Allies keep Ukraine in the fight by giving the Ukrainians all the tools they
need to do the job so that any cease-fire and eventual peace is not dictated solely
on Russian terms.
Second, the Alliance must
apply the principles of the rules-based international order. In the absence of
any cease-fire NATO should bottle up the Russian Black Seas Fleet and prevent
Russian amphibious ships en route to the Black Sea from entering. The 1925 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of
the Straits governs the passage of belligerent warships through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Preferably with the support of NATO Ally Turkey those
members of the Alliance that are signatories of the Convention (Bulgaria,
France, Greece, Romania, Turkey and the United Kingdom) should now give due
notice to Russia that they intend to enforce it. This step should be taken with
the support of the Alliance as a whole.
Third, if Turkey does not
support this move then the Alliance should impose a distant blockade. If Russia
continues its offensive, particularly indiscriminate shelling of civilians, NATO
should also confirm that it will soon move to prevent Russian warships, or
civilian ships carrying materiel for the conduct of the war, from entering the
Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar.
Fourth, NATO must
reinforce the Black Sea Region by moving forces and resources to Bulgaria and
Romania and strengthen its partnership with Georgia to prevent it becoming a
Russian lake.
Fifth, NATO should embark
on a major information offensive into Russia to challenge the state-controlled
media, with a particular focus on the cost of this war to the ordinary Russian
conscript Putin is using as NLAW fodder. This offensive should take place in
conjunction with a warning that any and all Russian cyber-attacks on Allies will
be countered.
Sixth, NATO leaders must take
further measures this week to reinforce deterrence. Putin is driving Russia
into a political, economic and military corner in which his own personal
position could also become increasingly perilous. Whatever happens now Putin’s regime will be
weakened which will make him more not less dangerous. However, the Alliance
must not expect a change of course. Rather, Putin is likely to double down on
the securitisation and militarisation of the Russian state, just like Stalin.
The future? The
forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept must confirm the creation of a powerful
European-led Allied Mobile Heavy Force that can properly support all and any
NATO Allies under threat from Putin.
Such a clear statement of
intent would be a start, just a start. However, it would also send a clear and
unequivocal signal to Putin. Credible
deterrence requires effective risk management.
Appeasement is not deterrence. Therefore,
to honour the sacrifice of Ukraine’s ‘Few’ the assembling NATO Heads of State
and Government must answer the very question Ukraine’s pilots are answering
with their lives: what price are we willing to pay to defend our freedoms? This
is because whatever happens now Ukraine’s ‘Few’ should be remembered, like
their RAF forebears, as warriors who defended not only a country, but freedom
itself.
Julian
Lindley-French
