“Victory
in this war will belong to the belligerent who is the first to put a cannon on
a vehicle capable of moving on all kinds of terrain”.
Colonel
Jean-Baptiste Estienne, 24 August, 1914
Alphen, Netherlands. 15
September. At 0515 hours on the morning of 15 September, 1916 at Flens
Courcelette in the Somme battlefield the air was rent by a sound new to the
battlefield. The engines of 32, 29 ton British Mark I tanks of the Guards
Division powered up to a crescendo before beginning their lumbering 3mph/4kph
advance towards the German trenches. Seven tanks immediately broke down. The sight of 25 of these ‘monsters’ suddenly appearing out of the
early autumn fog in which the Somme valley was swathed led some German troops to panic. However, as one would expect of the German Army, most did not.
Although the British tanks, supported haphazardly by infantry, made some
limited, initial gains once the shock had worn off the inevitable German counter-attacks
negated much of the early advance.
Equally, for all that the attack
failed to make the hoped for break-through this day a century ago marks the beginning
of a new phase in manoeuvre warfare and the search for the right mix of speed,
armour, firepower and effective strategic and tactical application of the tank that
continues to this day. Indeed, even a quick glance would confirm the link
between the caterpillar-tracked Mark I tank of 1916, and the advanced main
battle tank of today.
One irony of the first
British tanks was that they had been inspired by naval thinking of the time. First
Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was behind the idea of a ‘landship’, and
even to this day ‘tankers’ use nautical terms such as ‘turret’ and ‘hatch’ etc. Indeed, the only reason they are called 'tanks' is that to mask their true purpose the
workers at the agricultural machinery manufacturers in Lincoln where the Mark I
was being developed were told they were ‘water tanks’ destined for Mesopotamia.
The problem with the Mark
I was reliability. It had been originally intended that 59 tanks would take
part in operations on 15 September, but 27 of the tanks were non-operational.
This was mainly due to problems with their experimental 105 bhp
Foster-Daimler-Knight engines. Of the 25 tanks which made it into action they
were divided into ‘male’ tanks, armed with two quick-firing 6 pound Hotchkiss
cannons, and ‘female’ tanks armed with four Vickers .303 calibre machine guns.
Although the first use of
tanks in action by the British undoubtedly came as a complete surprise to the
Germans several countries were developing similar systems at the time. Indeed,
perhaps the first real tank was developed not by the British but by Austria-Hungary,
although Vienna’s ‘tank’ never made it beyond the prototype stage.
It was not until April
1918 that the first tank-on-tank battle took place at the Second Battle of
Villiers-Bretonneux when three British Mark V tanks encountered three enormous
German A7V tanks, each with a crew of 30. In what proved to be perhaps the
slowest battle in modern military history it was eventually the solitary
British ‘male’ tank which successfully struck its German enemy and forced the
A7Vs to withdraw.
However, it was dawn on 8
August, 1918 at the Battle of Amiens that the tank began to be used to real
effect. One of the most innovative of British commanders General Sir Henry
Rawlinson had commanded Fourth Army at the Somme and had seen the potential of
the tank. On what German commander General Erich Ludendorff called ‘the black
day of the German Army” Rawlinson for the first time used air power, infantry
and massed tanks in close order to punch a hole through the defences of
over-extended German forces. What followed thereafter was a fighting German
retreat that would continue to the Armistice in November 1918. The tank had
come of age.
It was German
commanders such as Guderian and Rommel, and Russian thinkers such as Tukhachevsky,
who saw the real potential of the tank during the interbellum and properly exploited Rawlinson’s August 1918
lessons. The result was the Blitzkrieg tactics unleashed by Nazi Germany on Poland
in 1939, France and the Low Countries in 1940, and on the Soviet Union in 1941.
In the inter-war years the British once again retreated behind the wall of the
Royal Navy, whilst the French went down the tactical dead-end of that ultimate
World War One trench, the Maginot Line. The idea of static defence-in-depth had
by and large been abandoned by the Germans as a concept of warfare as early as 1918 with the destruction of the Hindenburg Line.
Perhaps it is best to
leave the last word on the tank action at Flers Courcelette to Winston
Churchill. “My poor ‘land battleships’ have been let off prematurely on a petty
scale…This priceless conception, containing, if used in its integrity and on a
sufficient scale, the certainty of a great and brilliant victory, was revealed
to the Germans for the mere purpose of taking a few ruined villages”.
Julian Lindley-French