“The model is known as ‘ends,
ways and means’, where ENDS=WAYS + MEANS. Ends are defined as the strategic outcomes
or end-states desired. Ways are defined as the methods, tactics, and
procedures, practices, and strategies to achieve the ends. Means are defined as
the resources required to achieve the ends, such as troops, weapons systems,
money, political will, and time. The model is really an equation that balances
what you want with what you are willing and able to pay for it, or what you can
get for what you are willing and able to pay”.
Brigadier-General
(Ret.d) Denis Laich
Another bloody British defence review?
Alphen, Netherlands. March
5, 2020. They’re off! Another British defence review feeding frenzy is
underway. The 2020 Integrated Review is nothing less than an attempt to
consider in the round Britain’s entire foreign, security, defence and
development approach. Nominally led by civil servant Sir Alex Ellis, but
greatly influenced by Dominic Cummings, the eminence
grise of the Johnson administration, it is also charged with considering
Britain’s future security and defence in the wake of Britain’s withdrawal from
the EU, far better value-for-money defence procurement, as well as how to best
afford the new defence technologies that are entering the multi-domain
battlespace. Implicit in the review is the re-positing of British strategic
ambition not just to realign the ends, ways and means central to effective
defence policy, but also to make a clear statement about the place of
contemporary Britain in the world.
Having just this week completed a major new book for Oxford
on Future War and the Defence of Europe,
which I have co-written with two US generals John Allen and Ben Hodges, it is
clear that the ambition implicit in the review (and correctly so) will be no
mean feat if the Government successfully pulls it off. Sir Max Hastings, writing in The Times, expressed some cynicism about
the entire process. It is cynicism I share.
First, if the Integrated Review is simply a rerun of Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2010, which was a defence cull presented as strategic
efficiency, or Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, which was an
unfunded set of aspirations that made worse the already dangerous imbalance
between ends, ways and means from which Britain’s armed forces suffer, then it
will be yet another exercise in defence-strategic pretence. Second, and no
disrespect intended to anyone, for all Downing Street’s talk of a radical
approach there is little or no evidence thereof in the method of the review. Critically, there are no ‘red teams’ of
acknowledged experts to challenge Establishment thinking. Indeed, I would be
much more reassured if real experts, such as Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Professor
Paul Cornish, and Professor Andrew Dorman had a formal role in support of the
review.
The most important question
the review must answer is clear: what is Britain’s place in the world? The answer to that question will underpin all
the assumptions about Britain’s relative power upon which any such review must
draw. It is also relatively easy to measure. According to the International
Monetary Fund Britain in 2019 enjoyed the seventh biggest economy in the world
by nominal GDP, but only the ninth biggest economy by power purchasing parity. According
to Globalfirepower.com Britain has nominally the fifth biggest defence budget
in the world, but only the eighth largest when one considers military power
purchasing parity. In other words,
Britain remains a very significant regional-strategic European power, and a
power of some weight in the wider world. However, Britain is no longer a world
power, let alone a ‘pocket superpower’, a phrase I rather mischievously
invented years ago in a piece I wrote for the International Herald Tribune.
Britain’s defence-strategic assumptions
Given Britain’s relative weight of power what are the defence strategic
assumptions that should underpin the review?
First, whilst the United States will remain Britain’s closest security
and defence ally, the Americans might, in
extremis, no longer be able to defend either Britain or the Europe of which
it is firmly a part without the British doing far more for their own defence
and Europe through an adapted NATO. This is not because the Americans are
withdrawing from Europe but rather the worsening global over-stretch from which
US Armed Forces suffer.
Second, Britain will need to rely more on European allies, even as it
leaves the EU, albeit through NATO. At the very least, and to demonstrate
Britain is seriously committed to equitable transatlantic burden-sharing,
London must be seen to be defence serious.
For example, Britain could seek to co-pioneer with France and Germany a
high-end, twenty-first century ‘heavy’ fast, first responder European force
able to deter and defend in and around the European theatre and across multiple
domains.
Third, only Britain and France retain any globally-relevant defence-strategic
weight in Europe. Therefore, Britain should join with France in promoting
greater European defence-strategic responsibility, partly by buying into
autonomous European strategic enablers. Much will depend on the strength of the
Franco-British alliance ten years on from the 2010 Lancaster House Agreement.
However, whilst Paris seems to keen shore up its defence-strategic relationship
with Britain, it is also seeking to inflict real damage on the British economy
as punishment for Brexit. In other words, Paris cannot both secure a good
defence relationship with Britain without a good trade relationship because for
London both are equally strategic.
Fourth, Britain will face both peer strategic competitors and
sophisticated non-state actors employing complex strategic coercion against
Britain and its people. Therefore, Britain
must balance both credible defence and deterrence with effective engagement. The
mosaic of new threats Britain must confront in an information-digital age will
range across 5Ds of disinformation, deception, destabilisation, disruption, and
implied and actual destruction. It will also be a form of warfare in peacetime.
Confronting, scaling and adapting to meet such threats will also require a much
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between civilian-led security
and military-led defence, as well as a far more profound, efficient and
intimate partnership between them.
Fifth, for a power such as Britain defence has at least two strategic roles
to play: defence and deterrence as a public good per se, and defence as a lever of influence over allies. Britain might be able to generate the
high-end capabilities to undertake such roles, but it is unlikely to ever have
the capacity to sustain them over time and distance. Such tension could well be further exacerbated
given the balance Britain might well have to strike between deterring/fighting
a short, high-intensity conflict (possibly in mega-urban environments) and
engaging in a long, low-intensity conflict.
Sixth, in the third decade of
the twenty-first century credible deterrence will demand of Britain’s armed
forces the proven capacity to operate simultaneously across the multi-domain
battlespace of air, sea, land, cyber and space.
British forces will also need to far better exploit information and
knowledge to strategic advantage. This pre-supposes not only a deeply joint/integrated
force (something the new UK Strategic Command at least implies), but also a
British ability to influence combined forces, either in a NATO context or via
coalitions of the willing. Specifically, Britain will need the command resources
and structures to enable it to act as an alternative command hub if the Americans
are busy elsewhere. Such unity of effort
and purpose will only be fashioned if the Service Chiefs of the Navy, Army and
RAF speak with one voice to ministers. Sadly, all the signs are that even with
the modest increase in UK defence expenditure that is being signalled, the
Service Chiefs are again fighting each other over where those resources should
be invested. That must stop!
Seventh, technology will
drive defence strategy to an unprecedented extent over the next defence
planning cycle. Defence futurists tend
to exaggerate the speed with which new technologies are entering the
battlespace. For example, whilst
super-computing is playing an ever more influential role in warfighting it will
be a decade and more before the kind of quantum-computing able to drive really artificially
intelligent swarms of drones is likely to be realised. However, such
technologies (and many more) are coming and must be factored in, alongside the
increasingly ‘kinetic’ impact of offensive cyber. Hypersonic weaponry is
already a fact.
Eighth, where one stands
depends on where one sits. Britain is an island off the coast of northwest
Europe. Therefore, it makes little or no sense for Britain to make a huge
investment in a continental land strategy. That is the job for the Germans,
French, Poles and others. Rather, Britain can add real value in pioneering
multi-domain power projection relevant to high-end European defence and
transatlantic burden-sharing, particularly for maritime, amphibious, air
operations. Such a concept would necessarily be centred on a new and much broader
concept of Air Power that would also include information power, cyber power,
space power, as well as strike and air defence. Much of Britain’s future power projection,
upon which almost all forms of future defence will rely, will also require a
very tight technical relationship between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air
Force. Such a vision in no way downplays
the vital role of the future British Army. Edward Grey (not Lord Fisher),
Britain’s Foreign Secretary at the outbreak of World War One, once suggested
the British Army should be a projectile fired by the Royal Navy. It should be very
rapidly power-projectable alongside the Royal Marines. Indeed, Britain has an
opportunity to lead the way to show how mid-sized powers can project military force.
Ironically, with two new British heavy aircraft carriers just commissioned, and
if they are properly protected, the Royal Navy is on track to develop into just
such a force.
The true cost of
defence-strategic pretence
Of course, there is always an
alternative. Britain could continue to
do what it has been doing for more than a decade: muddle along in a
defence-strategic fog, continue to draw down what is left of its small force in
continental Europe, engage in a bit of strategic dabbling in places like Libya
or Syria, but do nothing like enough to make any real difference, and possibly
make things worse, and/or simply hide behind its nuclear deterrent. Time after time I have heard leaders of other
countries complain about Britain’s creeping propensity for strategic and
defence pretence. Too often, British prime ministers, with David Cameron to the
fore, have been obsessed with giving the impression Britain does more than it
actually does, which has not only really annoyed Washington at times, but is
unfair to the superb British servicemen and women too often asked to closed the
yawning gulf between strategic and political reality.
The greatest danger is that Britain’s
leaders come themselves to believe this nonsense. One only has to read q February 2020 National
Audit Office report to realise there is a very real danger of this
happening. Entitled, “The Equipment Plan
2019-2029” the report is blunt: “We…consider that aspects of the Department’s
[Ministry of Defence] affordability assessment continue to be over-optimistic”. Worse, the funding shortfall for new
equipment quite probably far higher than the £13 billion worst-case estimate of
the MoD. Is this the real price of defence strategic pretence? For that to change London will finally have
to recognise that far from being a cost, effective defence of the realm has a
very high value, both politically and strategically.
Ends, ways and has-beens?
In conclusion, the real choice implicit in
the Integrated Review is essentially simple: given Britain’s relative weight in
the world are the British willing and able to play a serious role with allies
and partners commensurate with such power? Or, is the Integrated Review going
to be yet another British exercise in dressing short-term parochial politics up
as long-term defence strategy? If the latter then the real victims will be the ‘new
few’; that ever smaller band of brave British and Commonwealth brothers and sisters
in British uniform who again find themselves on the front-line of danger on our
behalf, ill-protected, under-equipped and even more under-funded, and forced to
act as a political and strategic fig-leaf for free-riding British politicians cynically
masking their strategic illiteracy by routinely calling them the ‘best forces in
the world’, even as they deny them the resources they need to do the jobs they
must do.
One final thing: the Integrated Review
will also reveal the extent to which the London Establishment actually believes
in Britain, as a strategic brand, as a power, even as a country. If the Integrated Review is, indeed, to be
another monumental exercise in defence-strategic pretence then it will simply
reveal to the rest of us that they don’t, in which case why the hell should the
rest of us? There can be no place for nostalgia or sentimentality in Britain’s
Integrated Review, not in this world. Equally, there can be no place for
self-delusion or London’s continued appeasement of an increasingly dangerous
reality. The people of Britain, and the
people who serve her, deserve better than that, Mr Johnson and Mr Cummings.
Ends,
ways and has-beens? Only if London do deems it. You see, Britain is not simply
a power, with its experience, Britain is an expert power, but only if London
has the intelligence to use it! Critically, such intelligence will also demand
of London the one thing that has been lacking for far too long – sound strategic
judgement.
Julian
Lindley-French