Riga, Latvia. 24 September. Power
and freedom speak with a clarity and eloquence that is matched only by history
here in Latvia. Tonight I will address NATO commanders with a speech entitled
“Countering Strategic Maskirovka”. I coined the term Strategic Maskirovka
because it seemed to me terms such as hybrid or ambiguous warfare are far too limited
and too military to describe contemporary Russian ambition, strategy and
actions. Rather, Moscow has adapted its
traditional art of military deception (maskirovka) into a strategic campaign
from the head of state down in a bid to exploit the many divisions within
Europe and the wider West and offset Russia’s many weaknesses. Strange then
that in the past fortnight Russia suggests it is open to partnership in the
struggle against ISIS and despatched upwards of fifty combat aircraft to Syria
to reinforce the point. What is Moscow up to?
In fact, Russia’s actions over
the past fortnight or so all conform to the tenets and goals of strategic
maskirovka, including the forced removal of a hard-line separatist leader from
‘office’ in eastern Ukraine. The aims implicit
in Russian strategy can be thus summarised: the creation of a contested but de
facto ‘buffer zone’ to Russia’s south and east, and acceptance of a special
sphere of Russian interest incorporating EU-NATO ‘neighbourhood’ state such as
Latvia; to keep Europe and the wider West strategically-divided and politically
off-balance, to establish de facto legitimacy for Russia’s conquest of Crimea
and much of eastern Ukraine; and to use the threat of ISIS to establish a
transactional strategic relationship with the US over the heads of the EU, NATO
and most Europeans.
Any such ‘partnership’ would be fraught
with dangers. Russia’s aim is to blur the distinction between influence, co-operation
and competition by exploiting ‘strategic ambiguity; i.e. the refusal of many
European leaders to face up to the reality of Kremlin’s strategy and actions. The
very act of deception is an eloquent statement of influence designed to force
leaders who want to look west to look instead east. This goal is both implicit
and explicit in recent ‘snap’ military exercises around this region all of
which imply the political circumcision of the Baltic States from the rest of Europe, and the nuclear intimidation of allies who might seek to come to their rescue; a strategic an end in and of itself.
That is why Russian offer of
partnership against ISIS must be treated with extreme caution, especially so as
its come at a moment when the Obama Administration’s strategy is on the brink
of failure. Critically, implicit in any mil-mil talks over Syria and the defeat
of ISIS would be a de facto acceptance that Russia is an indispensable partner,
not just in the Middle East but also here in Europe, and in effect reward
Moscow the special status it craves. It
is that prospect of an enhanced Russian role that led hard reality Israeli
Premier Benjamin Netanyahu to hot-foot it to Moscow this week to seek
assurances that Russia would not support Assad and by extension the Iranians so
they could intensify their attacks on the Jewish State.
Like it or not Putin has in the
short-term out-manoeuvred the West and succeeded in giving the impression
Russia is far more powerful than it actually is, another goal of Moscow’s ‘strategic
ambiguity’. That is why negotiating with President Putin from a position of his
strength is dangerous. Sadly, someone,
somewhere in DC, Brussels or Berlin is today suggesting that a deal with Moscow
over Syria could help President Putin realise his prejudice about the West is
utterly misplaced and thus lead him to return to the path of partnership. Apart from the sobering consequence of the
oil shock on the Russian economy I see absolutely no evidence of such a shift in
President Putin’s prejudice or Russian strategy.
That is why NATO exercises here
in Latvia such as Steadfast Pyramid and Pinnacle are so important. They demonstrate
not just a commitment to collective defence and strategic reassurance, but also
a form of forward deterrence. Dishonourable it may be but if Russia succeeds in
establishing a transactional relationship with the West then part of that
transaction must be the integrity and freedom to choose allegiances of states
like Latvia. If that means NATO troops being stationed here permanently to
ensure transactions are honoured so be it.
Which brings me full circle to
countering Strategic Maskirovka.
Maskirovka lives in the dirt down underneath the broken floorboards of
international relations, amidst the dust and cob-webs of de-stabilisation, deception
and disinformation. Now, I am no naïve when it comes to international relations
and sometimes dirty deals must be done. However, such deals should at least be
thought through because the implications to say the least are profound.
Right now President Putin and his Kremlin team
believe they are winning this sordid little ‘war’ they are waging with the West
and any such deal would confirm him in his prejudice that we are weak. However,
Putin also needs something from this deal – to come in from the cold. Therefore,
any form of co-operation in the Middle East must only be countenanced in return
for clear evidence of Russian withdrawal from eastern Ukraine and an end to
pressure on Latvia and the other Baltic States. Crimea? Done deal I am afraid.
Latvia’s freedom is Europe’s freedom. Fail here and President Putin could
succeed in his efforts to replace the rules-based community concept of
international relations so beloved of Europeans with his hard-edged dark power
politics. Any deal that permits Putin to believe de facto or otherwise he is a vital broker in Western security after
all that Moscow has done over the past twenty-four months would come dangerously
close to appeasement and must be resisted at all costs. Rather, Europeans and
North Americans must together ask why they have failed so badly in Syria and
move to correct that failure before many more die and possibly millions more
decide to move the Middle East to Europe.
Russia: the indispensable power? Prefer
not.