Alphen, Netherlands. 18
May. This weekend chickens began coming
home to roost. A Libyan ‘minister’
warned that not only was ISIS using the Mediterranean migrant crisis to smuggle
its fighters into Europe, the militants were profiting from the trade. And, the EU moved to establish a mission that
would interdict the traffickers close to the Libyan coast and perhaps within
Libya. Today, news comes that the Iraqi
city of Ramadi has fallen to ISIS. The
Middle East is as unstable and dangerous as at any time since the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war. Worse, the threat such instability
poses to the region and beyond is growing, symptomatic and axiomatic of a new
systemic struggle. As such the defeat of
ISIS will require far more than its military eclipse.
Now, few who know me
would call me naïve and yet I know what I am about to venture will seem
precisely that. For all the excellent
work being done to counter ISIS I am struck by the absence of a political
strategy for the Middle East. ISIS is as much a symptom of several interlocking
conflicts that are feeding off each other as the cause and will only been seen
off in time by a new settlement in the Middle East that will itself demand the
kind of political ambition and vision that none of the key leaders seem to
have, be they in the region or without. Nothing less than the re-establishment of
strong, legitimate states across the region will suffice; states that able and
willing to meet the needs of a burgeoning but deeply divided people.
Something more clearly must
be done. The first phase of the mission
of the sixty-nation “Global Coalition to Counter ISIL” to “blunt ISIL’s
strategic, tactical and operational momentum in Iraq” has met with some limited
success. However, there appears little
or no consideration concerning the political objective vital to the achievement
of a more stable Middle East. Worse, Saudi-led
Gulf Co-operation Council air-strikes in Yemen are indicative of an emerging
regional-systemic struggle in which the fundamentalist threat posed by ISIS is
merging with the struggle for regional supremacy between Iran and a host of
other actors.
There is a very real
danger that the current struggle between Middle Eastern (and increasingly
European) states and anti-state elements could be but the curtain-raiser to a
wider Middle East war between states, fuelled and intensified by mistrust
between elites and peoples, the mutual hatred of Shia and Sunni factions, Iran
and many Arab states and possibly between Israel and an Iran-inspired,
proxy-led coalition. Such a war would have profound consequence for the region
and the world. For example, Europe is
particularly vulnerable to loss of energy supplies from the region and to the
further de-stabilisation of its societies by AQ/ISIS-inspired Islamic
fundamentalism. Moreover, key Western allies such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon are
facing profound risks from the current instability that show no signs of
abating.
An important first step
is to understand the cause of the current conflicts. Arab elites talk much nonsense
about the brief colonial period as a way to avoid the consequences of their misgovernment. However, Europeans must bear some
responsibility. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in May 1916 the
Anglo-French Sykes-Picod agreement was struck.
Under the terms of this agreement the Middle East was carved up to serve
British and French interests via a series of ‘protectorates’ none of which was
strong enough to dominate the region, but all of which inherited ancient
disputes and grievances. During the
period of de-colonisation in the 1950s and early 1960s it appeared that Arab
nationalism would become the expression of an emerging ‘Arab nation’. However, defeats by Israel in 1967 and 1973
and the perception on the Arab Street that Arab governments were in the pocket
of a West was inimical to Arab interests enabled the steady rise of Islamic
fundamentalism and the creed of the Caliphate as an alternative to the ‘failed’
state. The rise of fundamentalism was
further enabled by the kingdom of Saudi Arabia which sought to buy AQ elements
off by funding Salafi jihadism both in the region and beyond. The collapse of
Syria and the Shia-Sunni divide in Iraq created the conditions for Islamic
fundamentalism to mutate into ISIS which now poses a threat to all the states
in the region and many beyond.
Achieving a new
political settlement will require Herculean leadership and strategic patience, neither of which the West and its leaders possess in abundance. Morevore, there would be many barriers in the way of any such strategy towards such an end: There is no
grand strategic political vision for the region; little or no strategic unity
of effort and purpose between the US and its European allies; little or no
political ownership of any such strategy at the highest levels in the region,
the White House and/or European chancelleries; and whilst there is some focus
on the ‘tactical’ challenges posed by ISIS (such as trafficking), there is
little or no political desire to consider the bigger strategic picture. Worse, behind the headlines there is a
profound lack of willingness by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to
properly engage political capital, strategy thinking and/or invest in a stable
Middle East.
Therefore, what ‘strategy’
exists is essentially a ‘containment’ strategy.
Indeed, in spite of air strikes ISIS is being made to appear stronger
than it is and thus able to exploit divisions by choosing when, where and how
to act. Sadly, it is inadequate ‘strategy’
made worse by elite European ‘political correctness’ concerning the defence of Europe’s
legitimate interests in the region. The
situation is further complicated by the new geopolitics and the growing tensions
between China, Russia and the West preventing the drafting of political
strategy in the UN Security Council.
However, for all the
above the status quo is not an option. Therefore, the West must act. If not the current struggle will see one or a
combination of the following outcomes: some form of Caliphate in parts of the
region which will lead to a protracted struggle (possible and extremely
dangerous); some form of hybrid Caliphate and/or
hybrid states all of which embrace Islamic fundamentalism (extremely
dangerous); states propped up by the West (Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, PA) the elites of which are despised by their populations
subject to AQ, ISILSpropaganda and a range of Iranian-inspired proxies (very
plausible, simply postpones collapse of state structure); and/or a general Middle Eastern war which pits
Iran against the Gulf States, but which also includes Israel in de facto
support of the Gulf States (increasingly likely and very dangerous).
The strategic aim must
be re-furbish the state in the Middle East, with the focus some form of
political stability in the Levant.
Thankfully, most people do not want to live under a Caliphate and
loyalty to the state (if not elites) remains strong.
Therefore, the Global
Coalition needs a new political mandate that would see the following: re-doubled efforts to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian struggle via some form of two-state solution (yes, I know); Iran locked out of much of the Middle East
through the blunting of its proxies and a carrot-and-stick approach to dealing
with Tehran that combines containment and encouragement (the Nuclear Framework
Agreement is a first step); the reinforcement of friendly Middle
Eastern states with aid and development and support for security sector reform (Egypt,
Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, PA) and with political support (Gulf States) as a bulwark
against a general collapse; the discreet promotion of political
reforms; support for the Arab League to create/install
a new regime in Damascus; and enhanced support for an enhanced Arab League to
defeat of ISIS. The proposed Rapid
Reaction Force is a good first step but an overt and early victory is needed.
As I said at the top of this blog many of my
proposals will seem utterly naïve to seasoned Middle East watchers. However, it is precisely the ambition implicit
in such a strategy that will be needed if the Middle East and much of North
Africa is not pose a growing threat to itself and all of
us. Efforts thus far have simply
not been up to the strategic challenge. Critically, the scenarios and the challenges outlined above capture both
the scope and the nature of the current struggle and if not properly gripped
and quickly will lead inevitably to a general Middle Eastern war. The most that can be hoped for from current
‘political’ strategy is a Middle East that remains inherently instable. Given the proliferation of dangerous
technologies the prospect that such a struggle will be increasingly shaped by enemies
– state and non-state – means the current policy of containment will in time be
doomed to fail.
The bottom-line is this; all of the conflicts in the Middle East and their consequences are joined up. it is about time that the response of the 'international community' (however so defined) is also better joined up.
The bottom-line is this; all of the conflicts in the Middle East and their consequences are joined up. it is about time that the response of the 'international community' (however so defined) is also better joined up.
Machiavelli once said: “All
courses of action are risky. So prudence
is not in avoiding danger (it is impossible) but calculating risk and acting
decisively. Make mistakes of ambition,
not mistakes of sloth. Develop the strength to do things, not the strength to
suffer”.
Julian Lindley-French