In the wake of the failure of the Modernising Defence Programme in this second of my extended summer
food-for-thought essays William Hopkinson and I offer a radical new approach to
the design of a credible and affordable UK security and defence policy. William
was a former Director of Studies and Deputy Director of the Royal Institute
of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Assistant Secretary of State (Policy)
in the Ministry of Defence in London. As you will see such a policy would
require hard facts to be faced and tough choices to be made, for neither of
which the May Government has shown much aptitude. We have, with all due
respect, ventured to cast the advice in the form of a submission from the
Cabinet Secretary.
Minute from Cabinet Secretary to the
Prime Minister, September 2018
Summary: In light of the inability to properly fund the 2015 Strategic Defence
and Security and Review and the failure of the Defence Modernisation Programme
there is an urgent need for the United Kingdom to re-consider security and defence policy in the round. The UK faces adversaries armed with new technologies and ways of
offence that render its current security and defence structures obsolete. We must meet critical threats, on occasion independently, usually in alliance or coalition, across a broad spectrum, but have a host of legacy structures and
systems. We need radical solutions in which security and defence are organised
effectively. We must understand the nature of
contemporary threats and their interaction, the impact of new technologies and propose to establish a credible level of response and recovery in
the event of shock. That will require intelligent but profound choices to be made and will inevitably require a wholesale re-structuring of the Armed Forces driven solely by relevant
considerations rather than resources available due to the current policy
of imposing profound constraints on the public purse.
The Tasking
1. I asked the Cabinet Office for advice
on devising appropriate structures, below government level, to ensure the safety and security of the state and its
members given the rapidly changing and deteriorating strategic environment, the
emergence of new adversaries and threats and the re-emergence of ‘traditional’
adversaries armed with new capabilities and technologies. The result is set out
below.
2. `The areas covered include those commonly embraced by the police,
armed forces and intelligence services but also deal with gaps in current
structures. The responsibilities of and relationships between the structures
and organisations proposed have been considered on their merits, without
constraint from existing practices or legacy equipment.
3.
Britain needs appropriate machinery
to formulate, review and implement national strategy. It lacks an effective
mechanism for the scanning of strategic horizons, the crafting of consequent
objectives, and the making, pursuit and fulfilment of appropriate
strategy. This does not happen in
practice, partly because ministers are unwilling to engage in this way, and
partly because the machinery to formulate coherent strategic advice does not
exist. Given the need to service the voracious twenty-four hour news cycle
ministers regularly confuse the tactical with the strategic. The Prime Minister’s heavyweight engagement is necessary directing and coordinating the three principal departments
Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Exchequer.
4. The government
must be able to defend the home base and its population, and the overseas territories, contribute to the defence of allies,
and project power to realise its legitimate vital interests where and when that is necessary. It must do so against traditional
threats and across a new spectrum that involves and combines hybrid war as well
as the renewed threat of military aggression including through the use of new
technologies such as Artificial Intelligence.
5.
It is vital that not only do our
security structures integrate and work seamlessly but also that all parts of
government, and indeed other public authorities, do the same. The different
parts of government and state machinery must work as a coherent whole. There
will be important interfaces between security organisations and bodies
responsible for public health and national infrastructure. Those bodies will be the subject of separate studies.
6. This minute is essentially about how to meet security needs. Economy and efficiency will be important but for the sake of the study I have assumed that there will be no undue
resource restraint. The UK is around the upper quartile of EU states in GDP per
head and I have further assumed that we will continue to commit circa 9% of
public spending or roughly 3.5% of GDP to security. Given the UK has a circa $3
trillion economy some $100 billion per annum is devoted to security in the
round. If the security afforded by the private sector is included the resources
available to the UK to mount credible and effective deterrence, defence and
recovery is considerable. The missing factor is structure and organisation to
co-ordinate and employ such capability effectively.
The Threats
7.
The UK must be able to respond to
natural disasters, major accidents and malicious attacks, both at home and
abroad. The effects could range from the
undermining of societal cohesion to widespread destruction of population and
infrastructure, even to the undermining of national existence. Attacks may be by state or
non-state actors, or a mixture, and involve high-intensity, cyber and hybrid
warfare.
8.
Hybrid warfare may involve
conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime, terrorist and information
elements that could destabilise, preventing effective governance by an adversary state. It may also include direct military action, major
criminal activity and subversion. The aim of such attacks is to create a political dystopia in which systems of
governance break down, trust between citizens and the state collapses, leading to situation in which a state is
felt by its own people to have no greater legitimacy or capability than aggressor groups. Such efforts at de-legitimation may also
extend to institutions and international organisations, such as the EU and NATO.
9.
Cyber warfare transforms cyberspace into a battlespace. The strategic aim is to ‘turn’ computer systems large and small into a weapon to disrupt and destroy
critical infrastructures and procedures of the state. This can compound social vulnerability and a lack of social cohesion
thus undermining societal resiliency.
Cyber aggression may be the mechanism of choice for an adversary seeking
to escalate a conflict whilst at the same time preventing or delaying
attribution of a hostile act. It also enables terrorists to force multiply and
adversaries to employ such groups remotely as part of a destructive process of
conflict escalation.
10.
In the wake of the Salisbury nerve
agent attack, it is clear Russia now poses the most direct military threat to the
United Kingdom. It has placed increased emphasis on nuclear weapons, and other
forms of unconventional hybrid and hyper warfare capabilities and capacities,
to counter what Moscow believes to be NATO’s conventional military superiority.
Meanwhile, radical Islamist groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, are also
exploring the use of technologies and strategies to penetrate open, western
societies, erode the protection of the home base and undermine the social and political cohesion upon which all security
and defence strategies in democracies are necessarily founded. Also, other illiberal regimes are developing high-end military
capabilities that could place both the UK and its deployed forces under enhanced threat. These efforts could soon be
reinforced by new force multipliers, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing and their integration into the future order of
battle, allied to the development of hypersonic
weaponry. The UK is unlikely to successfully deter or
defend against what can best be described as radical warfare unless it can also demonstrably do so
simultaneously same against hybrid, cyber and hyper warfare.
Capabilities
11.
The range of capabilities required
will involve high-end war-fighting, gendarmerie, border control, crime-fighting, including against financial and cyber-crime. This is not to
say that everything from nuclear deterrence to neighbourhood policing should be
the responsibility of one organisation, only that decisions about organisations
and structures must start from what needs to be done, not what has always been
done. The same is true of intelligence-gathering and analysis, not least as regards what is done for protection
of the home base.
12.
Radical warfare allows no place for silos, a terrain
reservé, or internal jealousies. Nor should we seek to introduce the sort of
structural checks and frictions found in the USA machinery of government. Overcoming existing attitudes, traditional approaches and understandable
loyalties to how things have been will be a challenge that must not be shirked.
At the same time, we must remember that maintaining the morale of those who may
be called upon to hazard their lives in the national interest is vital.
13.
Defence of population involves
deterring and defeating both aggression and serious crime and also dealing with
natural and other disasters. Working with allies and international institutions
involves diplomacy and effective policy coordination as well as the application
of force, all of which place a premium on the maintenance and
enhancement of Britain’s influence, itself underpinned by a credible level of
British force.
14.
The application of force will involve
action by land, sea, and in the air, and in cyber activities and space. It will
need to be integrated with effective presentation and information, both for the
home audience and for others. Countering hostile information and distortion
will be essential. All the above will be necessary not only in dealing with
state actors but also with serious crime, insurgency and with the complexities
of hybrid warfare. The long-standing divisions of capabilities between military
land forces, navies and air forces, and between such armed forces and police does not even meet current
requirements, let alone radical warfare.
15.
Information and knowledge are central
to the mounting of any effective defence in radical warfare: ‘thinking forces’ able to generate,
assess and use information will be critical to both deterrence and
defence. That will necessitate the move
to a much more comprehensive force posture – civilian and military alike. Experience
gained by the Joint Force Command will be relevant though not sufficient.
Intelligence, Cyber and Information
16.
The current top level Intelligence
structures should be maintained, with a Joint Intelligence Committee entirely
free from political appointments or membership. The Defence Intelligence staff
should also continue. A joint Service/Civilian organisation should be charged with
offensive and defensive Cyber warfare, and with out of theatre Information
warfare.
17.
There are three strong arguments for closer integration of armed forces than has
usually been seen: one is so that on operations there is commonality of vision
about the problems and how to tackle them; the second is
the impact of new technologies on force structure; but it is the third that is perhaps most
compelling – the need to avoid three-way squabbles about the division of a now very limited British defence cake. If there are three chiefs of
staff there will be ferocious arguments about splitting the cake three ways; if
there are only two the squabble is reduced to a two way one. A fourth significant argument is to ensure rationalisation in procurement and
logistics.
18.
We need to better understand the
range of technologies and techniques available to adversaries, from the application and exploitation of big data to
exploit divisions with society to the use of unmanned drones and AI-armed with long-range weaponry that could inflict sudden and massive damage. Such understanding requires a culture of worst-case
assessment to be re-established, the engagement of the political leadership in
realistic exercising, and ensuring a continuum of credible effects across
across effective defence, deterrence, consequence management and resiliency of
both people and systems. Consideration must also be given to the impact of such new technologies on
structure and command and control in a crisis when the time for decision-making could be reduced to seconds.
.
19.
The UK is particularly well-placed to
take advantage of new technologies, of which most of the development takes place in the private sector. However, as yet the UK has failed to exploit its extensive private security sector. A partnership would help create capability and be a possible source of regular and
surge capacity. It would also reinforce the ability of government to recover from an attack or a
disaster. However, many companies at the
cutting-edge of innovation have little experience of the defence
sector and it will be important to develop a much broader understanding of
‘defence’ in the business community than hitherto, whilst ensuring that research undertaken in the UK is not stolen via industrial or
other espionage.
20.
The relationship between the state
and its industrial sector in extremis should also be considered. A variant from
well-established policy of STUFT - ships taken up from trade in the
event of conflict could help bring industries relevant to security and defence
rapidly under state control in the event of need. The UK should also consider
assisting such companies to make them more robust against all forms of attack,
including cyber.
21.
One particular lacuna in the UK’s
deterrence posture needs to be addressed
as a matter of urgency. As the conventional forces have declined in comparison with potential and actual adversaries reliance on the nuclear
deterrent has implicitly increased. However, the UK’s nuclear deterrent is a
last resort. The treaty-legal and
illegal development of short and medium range nuclear-tipped missile systems by Russia suggests that should conventional
deterrence fail the UK would face a choice – seek terms or escalate immediately to the level of nuclear Armageddon. Such a situation would afford
ministers little of no option but to effectively submit to an aggressor.
Ground Operations
22.
Military and hard security operations
will generally require engagement on the ground: even pirates usually have a home
port that must be gripped if their activities are to be abolished. The UK needs ground forces (an army) to aid the Civil Power, to
project to protect and defend itself and its allies, and to deter aggression.
These will include Special Operations Forces, forces capable of undertaking gendarmerie roles, and those
capable of high-intensity combat.
23.
Engagement on the ground will usually
require mastery of the air (which may or may not have to be achieved against
opposition) and cyber and information operations. Air support, both kinetic and
for local movement, must, in general, be integral, though elements may need to
be added from naval structures, particularly in littoral operations. The ground
operations in which the UK is likely to be engaged away from the country are
most likely to be in conjunction with allies, although cyber and much information activity by their
nature need not necessarily be carried out in the physical area of actual engagement. Nevertheless,
for these activities, there needs to be the closest liaison between the command
structures of any deployed British forces and those of allies and whatever
organs are conducting the operations.
24.
Ground operations
may range from all-out heavy conventional combat to
relatively peaceful gendarmerie operations, and also humanitarian relief work, sometimes with several operations running concurrently. In particular, keeping
the peace amongst a civilian population during and after combat may require
multiple roles to be played by and in support of the forces on the ground. All
levels will require the use of aviation assets, intelligence-gathering and interpretation, and (except in the case of natural
disasters) concurrent offensive and defensive cyber operations. In all cases,
information activity, in and out of theatre, will be essential.
25.
Given the requirements, land forces will need to be significantly increased in size and improved
in capability.
NATO assumes that the UK will provide two divisions within
60 days of a major emergency being declared. At present, we would struggle to deploy even one such division and be unable to
provide a high-end, manoeuvre force for some time after the commencement of
hostilities. In other words, British land forces could well face a crushing
defeat in the early part of a war, particularly forward deployed forces on NATO’s eastern flank. Even the crudest of analyses suggests
that the British Army needs to be at least twice the current size.
26.
Command must be vested in the lead
ground engagement agency, usually the Army although, exceptionally, another
agency may be appropriate. That force should be responsible for the air assets
involved, whether for movement or reconnaissance/intelligence gathering or kinetic
action. Those assets should, in general, be Army ones in peace as well as in
deployment and manned by Army personnel. An exception may need to be made if
naval assets are assigned to this work, e.g. carrier-borne aircraft. In that case, there will need to be clarity over command
and control for the period of assignation, and over the terms of the
assignation itself.
Constabulary/Gendarmerie
27.
The issue of appropriate national, civilian police structures will be the subject
of a separate submission, which will cover the interface between them and the
armed forces. However, given the
security and defence issues faced by the UK, and their interaction, not the least of which is the growing threat of transnationally-organised criminal gangs, there will
be a need for an armed, military, deployable gendarmerie-type
force. That force may undertake
some of roles normally carried out by Royal Military Police (i.e. the armed forces’ internal police units) but will
have wider responsibilities maintaining order in conflict and post conflict
situations as part of re-energised civil defence and effective
consequence management and recovery. In
peacetime, the numbers required will not be large but there
could be significant requirements for expansion in conflict and humanitarian
crises. The key will probably be to have
the bulk of such a force provided by
reservists, perhaps those not fully fit for high-intensity-combat, with a cadre of regulars, drawn possibly from the
military police.
Air Operations
28.
Air operations are indeed vital but
need to be integrated with others. Extensive experience has shown, contrary to
early hopes, that the air arm alone cannot win wars. The scope for independent
air operations will usually be very limited. Except for the unlikely but not
impossible requirement for some independent strategic strike, ultimately the
nuclear option, air operations need to be closely integrated as a function of
ground or maritime operations, with a particular focus on anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) and rapid supply and re-supply of
forward deployed forces. In the former, they should be no more independent of
the main ground effort than the use of artillery (of which they are in essence
a kind) or of other (tactical) reconnaissance assets. Those undertaking the
missions, whether of combat, reconnaissance or transport, need to be, in understanding, training and tasking, as one with the rest of the forces engaged on the
ground. Similar arguments apply to the involvement of air activities with
maritime, whether for combat, policing, reconnaissance or long-range transport.
The critical factor is the steady
shift away from manned platforms and moves towards automated command structures
informed by unmanned space and air-breathing SIGINT and strike capabilities. If it is ever built the part-manned
6G Tempest fighter would almost certainly mark the last such air defence asset
that carried a human pilot.
Air Defence
29.
Such developments as the Tempest, allied to cyber, AI and other new war-applicable technologies now
bring into question the need for a separate air force. With the Royal Air Force celebrating
its centennial and commemorating those tens of thousands who gave their lives
in the defence of Britain further major reductions to the RAF will come at a
political cost. Opposition to the plans
to close historic RAF Scampton give some idea of the opposition to which such a
significant chance would lead. However,
all of the above can leave no doubt that the UK must forge a new balance
between the future defence roles of the Armed Forces, the ability and
willingness of the country to afford them and the likely profound impact of new
technologies on the structure and method of Britain’s future force. Therefore, we conclude that a separate Air Force is unaffordable and will complicate
unnecessarily structure and command at a time when speed of decision-making and
response will be a vital, if not the vital, element of a credible deterrence
and defence policy.
30.
Furthermore, except for close-in protection of ships and personnel and materiel on the battlefield, air defence must be layered and executed far out and probably at
greater altitudes than could be attained by manned aircraft launched at a
putative enemy close to launching an attack. Stand-off weapons, such as the new Russian Kinzhal missile, which is capable of speeds in excess of Mach
9, and cyber threats to defensive systems make it
necessary to integrate and combine information, AI and missile defence responses to cyber and air-borne
kinetic threats. Such integration and machine-led
reactivity will be essential to the effective air defence of the homeland, as well as for the
successful conduct of expeditionary warfare, including the
movement of force to theatre.
31.
The main protection against air
attacks crossing Europe must involve an effective defence coordinated through NATO along the line of access across the continent, facilitated by enhanced military
mobility via air, sea, rail and road. Many of the necessary systems and
assets will be those of allies, with which British contributions must be able
to integrate seamlessly. For attacks crossing open seas, the assets required will be largely
maritime, both for information gathering and execution. To protect both the homeland, and deployed maritime assets against
such attacks the UK must deploy forces of its own. The same sort of assets will
also contribute to protecting naval forces from surface and subsurface attack.
Given the security requirements, the most effective arrangement will be for extended air defence to be a
naval responsibility.
32.
Therefore, we recommend reverting to a two force, naval and army structure, with the two forces being two halves of a
deep joint force construct. We further considered whether that
approach should be carried a stage further, merging the Army and Navy into one
Defence Force. That has been done by
some smaller nations, in general, who do not seek to play a world-wide role or a
high-end role in conflict. Such attempts at force synergy has not always proved successful and given Britain’s mix of
responsibilities and complex objectives, and the different roles of maritime
and land engagement we do not recommend such a step. Nevertheless, the Army and
Navy must be capable of close, joint operations, and generally, the command
structure will reflect that. To
inculcate the appropriate skills and attitudes the rank structure above Brigadier/Commodore should be both common and joint.
Force Projection
33.
Force projection involves getting to
grips with an opposition, probably but not necessarily at least involving a
state actor, and possibly several hostile elements, some overt and some covert.
Such action is likely to be with others under some international mandate or
agreement. For the UK such contingencies will involve getting there, securing passage by land, air or sea (or
several of them); entry into theatre; and engagement
with the opposition, whilst holding off interference by ground, air or maritime
elements. The first step, after political decision, is integrated planning,
involving diplomacy, information and cyber-defence. The next is securing passage and entry to the theatre of
operations, requiring transport and force protection.
34.
Force projection needs intelligence-gathering, and preparedness for air, land and probably
maritime engagement. Except in the still unlikely but no longer impossible case of all out engagement with a major enemy (the complicating policy factor) where there may be a case for a
strategic strike, once forces are in theatre the focus should be directed by
the ground engagement. Movement to theatre and any forcible entry may require
different arrangements.
Littoral Operations
35.
Except in littoral (brown water)
operations, there will be little direct read-across between maritime and ground
combat (as opposed to logistic) operations. Littoral operations are a
significant aspect of security and of fundamental importance for Britain’s
interests. They can be very complex, not least because of the increasing
urbanisation of conflict. In part, it is because of the change (in simple
terms) from getting forces safely into where they are needed, to their
operating effectively therein, and of switching certain assets from a
maritime role to a ground one. In part, it is because littoral operations may
well involve humanitarian and constabulary roles for which warfighting assets may not be ideal whilst purely civilian assets may not
be appropriate.
36.
Ideally, Britain needs more dedicated assets and personnel, closely linked with the Navy, to cover the whole range of potential in-theatre activity: military, humanitarian and constabulary. Resources are unlikely to permit that, and
some of the skill and assets are likely to be of direct relevance to other land
warfare commitments. Therefore, the best compromise may be a core of naval integrated assets and personnel,
capable of dealing with maritime, ground support and a range of land warfare situations, in particular forcible entry and assault, and
supplement them by attaching elements from a ground warfare force.
Movement
37.
The UK is an island
power, with a long though now attenuated maritime tradition. Force projection will necessitate
movement of forces and equipment from the homeland to the place of deployment. Much of that movement will require sea lift,
certainly for heavy equipment and stores and probably for significant numbers
of personnel. Even movement by air will generally involve overflight of sea to
avoid the political complications of overflying
neutral or hostile states. In the circumstances, the movement of a force into theatre, and their guarding
along the way, will be a critical element of
mission success.
38.
Not all the assets and personnel
involved need be naval, though in general that will make sense. The point is that the direction and
responsibility must be naval. Unless the personnel and assets have other roles,
unrelated to movement and its safeguarding, they should be naval or
maritime-specialised civilian assets and personnel. Effective maritime reconnaissance, strike and
patrol aircraft naval will be of particular importance.
The role of ground support aircraft borne on carriers, of
land-based air defence aircraft protecting maritime assets and of strategic
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering assets receives further consideration
below.
Maritime
39.
As an island, heavily dependent upon
sea-borne trade, and with world-wide interests the UK needs effective maritime armed forces (a Navy). The organisational issue is what capabilities the Navy should require and how far they should be integrated.
Some assets necessary for the effective functioning of a Navy, such as strategic intelligence collection and analysis
can best be run on a national basis; others that have historically been
separated, such as maritime reconnaissance and strike, should be integrated. Therefore, naval assets and responsibilities
should include all maritime and air lift/transport, except tactical battlefield
movement; all long-range air reconnaissance; and all
extended airborne air defence.
40.
Consequently, the UK needs maritime-amphibious forces that can both project power in
strength and extend power in numbers.
The future fleet should be constructed around two large
aircraft-carriers with the UK able to deploy one, possibly two fully-armed and
fully-protected battle groups reinforced by a significant number of Special
Operating Forces and specialised marines. Force protection will be critical and
require the ability to defend against all potential forms of attack. Those
include the use of fast speed boats by terrorists armed with explosives, sea-based
hypersonic missiles capable of up to Mach 9, and underwater weapons using artificially intelligent robotic swarm technologies. Therefore, in addition
to the two capital ships, the UK must have effective anti-submarine and
anti-air capabilities.
41.
The aircraft
carriers would be unsuitable for launching and sustaining ground forces for anything but the most
permissive of operations. Without their heavy equipment, such forces are little
more than light infantry. Moreover, given the risk of shore-based anti-ship
technology, deploying the capital ships into the Littoral would subject the UK’s
main carrier-strike assets to an unacceptably high-level of risk for all but
the most extreme of contingencies. The
UK would, therefore, need landing platform dock (LPD) and/or landing platform
helicopter (LPH) ships.
Strategic Enablers: Space and
Knowledge
42. The essential message of this paper
is that Britain needs to radically re-think its approach to security and
defence, particularly in the face of radical war. The Armed Forces must be
recast into a deep joint force organised around a reformed Army and Navy. However, Britain’s future force will require
two other strategic enablers – space-based capabilities and knowledge.
43. In addition to air-breathing
intelligence assets Britain will need access to or ownership of space-based
SIGINT and military satellite communications (milsatcom) systems able to manage
a high-level of data transfer at a high-level of encryption. The cost of such
bespoke systems under sole national authority will be prohibitive. Traditionally, Britain has offset such costs
via access to US systems or via co-operation with other European powers, such
as the Skynet series of milsatcom satellites. There may be another way to fund
such assets via co-operation with the private sector. Both commercial
space-based SIGINT and satellite communications offer a high degree of both
capability and capacity.
44. Implicit in the joint force construct
is the idea of the ‘thinking force’. Given the complexity of radical war and
other operations mission success will depend on the ability of officers at
every level of the command chain to make reasoned decisions and understand the
strategic as well as the tactical implications of their actions. Such an approach will place an entirely new
meaning on junior officer leadership and Britain’s future leaders (not just
military) need to be far better prepared. Therefore, an enhanced programme of security
and defence education and training will be critical to the realisation of
national policy.
Conclusion
45. The harsh logic of this analysis is
that the UK lacks the right forces and the right organisation of forces to meet
twenty-first century challenges. And, without a clear understanding of
how to apply force against threat is uncertain about the critical security and
defence investments it must make. Government is trapped between the need to
invest in future security and defence and failing to do so for fear of making
ill-informed or mistaken choices. In the absence of coherent policy government
partially invests in an essentially legacy force simply to give the impression
of defence engagement. Heat instead of light.
46. Such drift in policy is becoming
daily more dangerous. Given the vulnerability of British society
and supporting critical infrastructures, the defeat of British forces would
mean the effective and rapid defeat of the UK itself. Such a defeat could be
inflicted by a determined state adversary with a markedly weaker economy than
that of the UK. Grave damage could also be inflicted by non-state actors. Therefore, the intelligent strengthening of forces and radical
improvements to organisation are imperative.
47.
There are many barriers in the way of such a radical programme of reform. There are powerful vested interests deeply-committed to ‘tradition’
and the legacy structures it helps maintain.
Government departments will resists synergies that erode their ability
to shape and implement policy. The cost
associated with the process of transformation (for it is transformation that is
necessary) will be extensive at a time when there are many competing demands on the Exchequer. However, given the current threats,
and the changing nature and scope of those threats, such action is needed if
the UK is to afford credible protection to its citizens
in the twenty-first century, projecting meaningful influence, credible deterrence, effective defence, and necessary coercion at an effective level of capability at an acceptable level of affordability.
Cabinet Secretary
