hms iron duke

hms iron duke

Saturday, 2 April 2022

Falklands 40


Dear Friend and Colleague, below is the speech I had the honour to give at the Falklands 30th Command Dinner ten years ago. I say 'gave' because by the time I stood up (sort of) to speak it had been a long evening...  Still, the words still resonate!

 The Falklands Thirty Years on – British Élan and the Aura of Power

By

Julian Lindley-French

Field Marshal Bramall, Chief of the Defence Staff, Admirals Band, West and Woodward, Commodore Clapp, Lord Sterling, Major-General Thompson, distinguished guests and, above all, honoured veterans of the 1982 Falklands Campaign - there is no greater honour for me than to stand and address you on what was achieved all those years ago – the defence of freedom through the use of legitimate military power under Baroness Thatcher’s resolute leadership that has sustained Britain for these thirty years past.  Sadly, it is an aura of power that in spite of the heroic efforts of colleagues in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and host of other places could fade if real national strategy does not replace London’s ‘only recognise as much threat as we can afford’ view of the world and with it a dangerous loss of national influence.  What was done back in 1982 is thus as relevant to today’s Britain as past Britain.

As Europe crumbles and America stumbles we are faced as a country with a choice: to retreat into irrelevance and put up with whatever an unjust world throws at us; or to galvanise ourselves as we did in 1982 and set out to help shape the world for the better.  “For God’s sake, act like Britain”, former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk once demanded of then British Foreign Secretary George Brown.  In 1982 we did just that and acted  ‘like Britain’ - the Britain that millions of us out there still believe in, desperately hoping that today’s political leaders across the political spectrum can rise above the daily grind of party game and blame to which we are subject.

Let me start by paying tribute to the 255 British servicemen who did not return and the 775 were wounded. I would also like to pay my respects to the 3 civilians who lost their lives together with the 679 Argentinian servicemen killed and the 1657 wounded. This was not a cost-free conflict.  They never are.  Equally, I can still remember the words of Major-General Jeremy Moore, Commander, Land Forces, South Atlantic as though they were yesterday.  Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the Union Jack once again flies over Stanley. God save the Queen". 

My theme tonight will be élan, British élan - defined as the determined pursuit of a strategic goal with a style and assurance that is itself power.  Élan is something more than men and kit.  It is a strategic brand that can change things even before a bullet is fired.  It is influence.  1982 saw a Britain that had retreated into a muddled foreign and security policy with strategy made elsewhere.  1982 saw a country in conflict with itself with many of the same doubts and tensions as today.  And yet somehow we defied an all-pervading sense of decline and showed that Britain could still hack it. 

Thirty years ago through your efforts, your valour and sacrifice you achieved four invaluable victories.  First, you defended a fundamental principle which was far bigger than the islands or the Islanders – the right of self-determination and the use of great power to that end.  Second, you reminded ally and adversary alike that the spirit of Britain pertained and that our old great country still understood how to exercise strategic influence fashioned as it was from a high-level of unity of effort and purpose.   Indeed, implicit in victory was courageous political leadership, deft and determined diplomacy and the creative and sustained application of legitimate military power.  Third, you reminded a tired and fractious British people at the end of a long, tired and fractious decade that Britain was more than a place, it was an idea in which still to believe.  No post-imperial basket-case but a powerful modern country that could when push came to shove distinguish between values and interests; principles and parochialism. 

Above all, you showed the world what my good friend Gwyn Prins called, ‘the aura of power’, that uniquely British blend of purpose, principle and pragmatism that made this country great and still can. 

Let me take my key elements in turn.  First, the defence of principle.  Major Norman and the heroic April 2 defence by the Royal Marines of Naval Party 8091 had shown the way, supported by the naval hydrographers and the Falklands Islands Defence Force.  I was under no illusions about what was coming. As an historian, I was hardened against the ‘all over by Christmas push over’ talk that so often happens at such moments as the more enthusiastic and romantic tip over into jingoism.  That said, I believed passionately in the right of our cause.  The Islands had been occupied illegally by a brutal dictatorship that had murdered thousands of its own.  That could not be allowed to stand. The Falklands would be lost and Britain would be finished.  Second, fighting power and fighting spirit.  Yes, the campaign was as Admiral Lewin said, “a damned close run thing”.  Admiral Woodward had a dangerous balancing act to perform.  Hermes and Invincible were not fleet carriers, and there were not enough Sea Harriers for an effective CAP of either the task force or the land force.  Sheffield and Coventry were lost providing the radar screen for a Task Force that lacked sufficient airborne early-warning.  Ardent and Antelope were sunk protecting the landing force at San Carlos that was too small according to military doctrine. The burning of the Atlantic Conveyor meant that many of the vital helicopters were lost and already absurdly long supply chains suddenly became even longer.  Atlantic Conveyor, was also a symbol of the doughty volunteers of the Merchant Navy, many not of these islands. 

But, from the moment Chris Parry forced the Santa Fe to surrender by helicopter at Gritviken and Vulcan 607 holed Port Stanley airfield, Chris Wreford Brown and the crew of HMS Conqueror did what was tragically necessary to protect the Task Force,  the constant brave vigil of the ships and Sea Harriers, from 2 Para’s inspirational battle at Goose Green and the fighting yomp of the Royals, to the heroic efforts of the chopper pilots to re-supply 5 Brigade’s stoic recovery from the tragedy of the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram at Bluff Cove/Fitzroy, to the poor bloody infantry struggles of 3 Para and, of course, 42 and 45 Commandos on Mount Harriet, through to the Guards and Ghurkhas at Tumbledown and Mount Longdon, the will of the Argentinians was broken by something more than mere force.  It was will that paved the way to the 14 June victory – a powerful mix of leadership and strategy, force and resource, flexibility and creativity that convinced the enemy that defeat was not when, but if.  That is élan.

There have been other examples.  The 1991 Gulf War, the Balkans Tragedy, the decisive 2000 rescuing of the people of Sierra Leone from pending slaughter, operations in Southern Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and more recently Libya all had elements of élan.  The manner in which then Brigadier Richards led Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000 had all the hallmarks of British élan.  Indeed, the way then Captain Zambellas took HMS Chatham up-river was reminiscent of HMS Warspite at Narvik in 1940.  As BBC journalist Allan Little wrote, “It was an astonishing thing to witness: the fortunes of a whole country transformed in the space of a few days by a single, decisive intervention”.

Gwyn Prins told me that when he was in the Advisory Group to former Soviet President Gorbachev back in 1990 Gorbachev told him that the Falklands action that was an important factor in convincing him that the Soviet Union could never win the Cold War.  Sad then that a senior Russian recently remarked, “the things we once admired about Britain are today the things that you despise”. 

Would a British Government today have the courage to instruct a Chris Wreford-Brown in Conqueror to sink Belgrano?  Tragic it may have been, but this was war.  As Clausewitz said, “an offensive war requires a quick, irresistible decision”.  As the fleet left Portsmouth an American friend said to me, “No-one else can do this.  The sight of Britain galvanising itself, the white ensign to the fore, is a sight like no other”.

Third, the impact on the British people.  1982 was no Elizabethan golden age.  Like now it was tough.  Economic decline had to be arrested, like now.  The country reeked of national decline.  Tough decisions had to be taken, like now.  The armed forces had for years been dragged through the streets and mud of Northern Ireland and had drifted to the margins of politics, like now.  As a country we were slowly drifting into strategic oblivion having become all too used to the excuses of politicians as to why our national voice no longer counted for much.  All seemed reduced to a question of pounds and pence.  Pride in ourselves as a country seemed of another age.

You reminded us all that there was another Britain. Under Prime Minister Thatcher’s courageous leadership you showed a tired and cynical, some would say, defeatist political and bureaucratic elite all too willing and able to find ten reasons why action was impossible, that Britain could again matter.  That is not to make a party political point - Tony Blair also understood that Britain could and should be a force for good.  That Britain’s place in the world need not be some tawdry accommodation between the American world view and the French and German European view.  In short, you bought us thirty years of strategic credibility. 

What now? With Argentina again on the make both the principle and place you freed thirty years ago must once again be defended.  But there is a bigger national, strategic picture that needs to honour your sacrifice and your victory.  Leadership today will mean forging a very new idea; an all-national unity of effort and purpose.  Furthermore, as we move towards a 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review the ‘strategic’ will need to be put back into the ‘strategic’.  For our armed forces that will mean a shift from a Europe-plus focus back again to a global role alongside our increasingly maritime strategic American allies, albeit one which balances strategic, austerity and influence.  This can only be done through the creation of a truly joined-up force in which no one service owns land, sea or air and which is part of a truly joined-up security policy, led in turn by a national strategy worthy of the name. As someone vaguely famous for a moment once famously said, “Gentlemen, the money has run out.  Now is the time to think”.

At the heart of British strategic influence MUST be state-of-the art armed forces that are projectable, deployable and sustainable built around a tight concept of fighting power for which the British armed forces are renowned, and which you demonstrated with such élan. Thankfully, such unity of effort and purpose does now exist at the highest levels of the services backed up by the vision to make it happen.  However, such unity needs to be invested in and preserved at all costs at what is a pivotal moment so that we can re-grip the bigger picture. Believe me the big strategic picture this century paints will be enormous and then some.

British defence strategy will also require some very clever decisions over the future force.  Sound strategy always requires compromise – only the truly powerful have no need of strategy.  BOTH aircraft carriers will be essential, as will a critical mass of Astutes, Type 45s, Typhoons et al.  Our entire front-line Army will need to become the equivalent of the elite Paras and Marines of 1982, reinforceable by truly capable reserves.  Our air force will need a global reach concept alongside the army and navy.  To that end, I am encouraged to believe that 2015 might indeed see the beginning of a return to sound principles of British defence strategy based on a simple principle – Britain, Europe and the wider world is a safer place when we as a country retain the military power to lead.  Not to dominate, but to lead.  To realise such a vision there will be no room for political complacency, nor indeed yet more short-term political compromise which sacrifices the medium-to-long term balance of the armed forces for short-term expediency.  Now is the decisive moment – the schwerpunkt.

Clever decisions will need to be reinforced by tough choices.  The first step will be to make a decision once and for all about those two carriers and stick to it.  Whether they have ‘cats and traps’ or not misses the essential point; the two ships will be central to our strategic brand for much of this blue water century and cost must be offset against value and seen as such across a forty to fifty year service life.  Nuclear forces – can we really fund them from the defence budget without leaving the conventional force wholly unbalanced?

Above all, we must hold our nerve; all the basic components are in place for a powerful modern navy, army and air force - our future force. 

One thing I can tell you – this century ain’t going to get any easier and like it or not whatever happens to Britain there is no hiding place for us.

To conclude, what was achieved thirty years ago was not simply to rescue the Falkland Islanders from a brutal dictatorship; through your élan you also saved Britain from a visionless self and made a proud people proud.  We are still Britain.  We are still Great Britain if we so choose.  Long may it be so.

Why does this all matter?  It matters because influence is the key to security and British influence still matters and must matter in a dangerous world.  You showed us the way.

Thank you all.  Thank you very much indeed. I honour you all.  I salute you all.

Julian Lindley-French

Monday, 28 March 2022

Putin: War by All and Other Means


 “If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient - at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve”.

Carl von Clausewitz

Tsar Vladimir Vladimirovich

March 28th, 2022. Putin is Russia. Putin faces an existentialist threat from enemies within and without Russia. Ergo, Russia faces an existentialist threat. To survive Putin and thus Russia must wage war because war is the only way Putin and Russia can survive. War must thus be permanent. That circular argument pretty much sums up how Putin sees himself and the Russia if which he is the dynasty-lite Tsar, an increasingly bizarre mix of Romanov and Stalin. Putin believes HIS Russia is facing an existential threat from systemic change in which Russia simply cannot compete. A Russia that could well become little more than a long railway line for the trans-shipment of goods from China to Europe, effectively enslaved by both.

The problem for Putin now is that he has called his own bluff through the spectacular incompetence of the Russian armed forces.  In Future War and the Defence of Europe John Allen, Ben Hodges and I suggest that the Russian Army could cause mayhem for thirty days or so before they ran into trouble.  They have certainly caused mayhem and it lasted thirty days but not even I expected them to run out of steam so close to the Russian border.

Putin on War

Does that mean the war will soon end? No. There may be a cease-fire but such a temporary cessation of hostilities does not mean the war will be over.  This is because Putin’s real war is not with Ukraine, it is with NATO and the West. Indeed, many commentators in the West simply fail to realise that in Putin’s zero sum view of the world all wars are existential, however small, and the West is a permanent threat. This is not because the West poses any military threat to Russia. It does not.  It is because the West is not Putin’s Russia and offers its people so much more than Putin can ever offer his.  That is why for Putin the war in Ukraine is the first geopolitical proxy war of the twenty-first century; a war that is being fought in Ukraine about the future of Europe and Russia.

For over a decade Putin has not only seem himself as indispensable to Russia, but the very embodiment of Russia. In such circumstances, Putin/Russia has no option but to strike hard, fast and early and continuously to prevent or at least delay the decline from real world power that is the real cause of this ghastly European war.  Therefore, the Ukrainian impasse is likely just the beginning, or rather the continuation of a long war that will be fought directly and indirectly across the 5Ds of applied Russian complex strategic coercion – deception (Maskirovka), disinformation, destabilisation, disruption, and actual or implied destruction.

For Putin the war in Ukraine is not simply to save his very traditional view of the traditional Russian nation-state, but the very idea that the nation-state is THE primary political unit in international relations.  He believes he is confronting three ‘threats’ separate but inter-linked threats to autocracy posed by democratisation, institutionalisation and globalisation, none of which Putin’s Russia is well-equipped to master. Putin’s answer is to do the only thing that the security state he has created knows what to do, or at least thinks it does, fight. 

Carl von Putin?

Perhaps the most famous quote from Clausewitz’s “On War” is that “war is a continuation of politics by other means”.  However, to properly understand what Clausewitz meant one also has by that one also has to understand his concept of strategy and “the use of engagement to attain the object of war”.  Thereafter, one can only understand his concept of ‘engagement’ if one also understands his idea that war is the application of all means and materiel by what for Clausewitz was still a relatively new political artifice: the nation-state.  In the world of the twenty-first century there is no greater early nineteenth century entity than the Russian nation state under President Putin.  Suffusing and permeating Putin’s reactive nationalistic ideology, such as it is, is a romantic and archaic notion of the Russian nation and its state. War, for Putin, is thus an extension of a primary trinity between the Russian state, the Russian nation (the people), and the Russian Army, all of which come together in him.

The destruction of the men, materiel and, above all, prestige of the Russian Army in Ukraine means that his primary tool for buttressing both the Russian State and his own power internationally has failed, whatever how happens in Ukraine.  Caught in a trap of his own making Putin has never been so dangerous to Russians, Ukrainians, Europe and the wider West. Therefore, in the absence of any cease-first and despite the Russian Army having now reached its culminating point it will not stop fighting. Rather, the nature of the fight will likely morph into the long, ghastly, grinding meat-machine that Russia has traditionally adopted when its forces have ground to a halt. 

War by all and other means

Putin will also apply all 5Ds of what he sees a perma-war; if Russia cannot have the spoils of war, then its enemies will be denied the spoils of Russia’s failure. Like Dante’s Alighieri’s Divine Comedy, Putin’s distinctly non-divine tragedy will go through several ever decreasing circles of coercion on the downward descent to Putin’s Hell. The first circle or target will, of course, be Ukraine. The many thousands now dying in Ukraine will have gone to their doom simply so that Russia can pretty much end up right where it started – fuelling a frozen insurgency in eastern and southern Ukraine. Cease-fire or no Russia will increase efforts to destabilise the Zelensky regime, disrupt the functioning of the Ukrainian state, spread disinformation at home and abroad, and systematically apply deception to discredit the Ukrainian political class. Putin will apply the same complex strategic coercion against a second circle of neighbours, the Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and much of the Black Sea Region. The third circle will be the rest of democratic Europe which Putin will continue to seek to divide from each other, and decouple from the United States.

This is because Putin’s view of himself and Russia’s place in the world is vastly different from Russia’s reality. During the 2021 Moscow Victory Day Parade some Russian soldiers were dressed in the Red Army uniform of May 1945 to mark victory in the Great Patriotic War. However, the parade also marked the 800th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Nevsky, the thirteenth century ruler/saint of the so-called Kievan Rus who defeated Swedish and German knights and in Putin’s mind laid the foundation for Putin’s reborn Novorossiya.  President Putin casts himself in Nevsky’s heroic mould and in his ‘splendid’ autocratic isolation Vladimir Vladimirovich may well have convinced himself he is Nevsky re-born.

Intelligent power

Europeans and the wider West need to understand Putin’s imperative if they are to craft both a short-term response and a longer-term strategy based on the intelligent use of power. The invasion of Ukraine is for Putin simply the latest iteration of a systemic struggle in which he sees Russia engaged. To disabuse him of any chance of success Western leaders must collectively understand that setbacks in Ukraine will not dissuade him of his ‘crusade’, because as long as he is in power that is all that matters to him. 

Over the short-term, the West must collectively keep Ukraine in the fight be supplying all the weapons and support Kyiv needs, increase pressure on Russia to end their aggression, stop it from spreading further, and then properly learn the lessons so that they are ready for Putin’s next act of aggression.  The latter requirement is vital.  If Syria was a preparation for Ukraine then given Putin’s world-view it is reasonable to assume Ukraine could well be preparation for some further demarche downstream either in the Black Sea Region or the Baltic.  The month of fighting in Ukraine has revealed a whole host of weaknesses in Russian fighting power which suggest that General Gerasimov and his efforts to modernise the Russian armed forces has been less successful than many in the West assumed. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov back in the 1980s would recognise much of the Russian Order of Battle today, particularly the poor quality of junior officer leadership and the patent lack of tactical initiative and innovations all too apparent. The joint force ‘jointness’ between air and land forces has been at times appalling, military intelligence has been weak, and much of Russia’s arsenal either old or very poor build quality. However, if Russian history is anything to go by heads will roll and lessons will be learnt.

No time for NATO complacency

One of the many paradoxes of Putin and his war in Ukraine is that whilst he is at some level the very latter day embodiment of a Clausewitzian prince (albeit without the Enlightenment), he is not a very good Clausewitzian.  Even a cursory glance of On War should have suggested to Putin that his so-called ‘force ratios’ were never likely to be enough to conquer and occupy much of Ukraine. However, given the nature of the man, his view of the world and the Clausewitzian nineteenth century state he leads with its latter day Boyars and the poor Muzhiks he uses as cannon-fodder, this is no time for NATO or its leaders to pat themselves on the back and take the complacent view that Russia no longer poses a threat.  He does. Putin simply cannot help himself.

Julian Lindley-French  

 

Thursday, 24 March 2022

Where is the Russian Army?


by 

Ben Hodges, R. D. Hooker Jr., Julian Lindley-French

“Russian forces have almost certainly suffered thousands of casualties during their invasion of Ukraine. Russia is likely now looking to mobilise its reservists and conscript manpower, as well as private military companies and foreign mercenaries, to replace those considerable losses. It is unclear how these groups will integrate into the Russian ground forces in Ukraine and the impact it will have on combat effectiveness”.

British Defence Intelligence Update, March 24th

March 24th, 2022

Russia’s Grouchy conundrum

The deployed Russian Army in Ukraine is some 190,000 strong, so where are the remaining 800,000 or so active and reserve personnel?

In June 1815, on the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, and shortly after the holding Battle of Les Quatres Bras, Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy was ordered by Napoleon to take a third of the French Army and prevent the Prussians from joining up with their British allies.  Even though he could hear the guns of Waterloo, and in spite of fierce protestations from General Gérard, Grouchy refused to march to join forces with Napoleon who at one point during the battle was heard to shout, “Où est Grouchy?” There is little doubt that had the lost army intervened between Wellington and Blucher the result of the Battle of Waterloo would have been very different. As the NATO Emergency Summit gets underway in Brussels and his military campaign in Ukraine falters Putin might well be asking: where is the Russian Army?

Estimates vary as to the size of the Russian Army but Global Firepower suggests there are 850,000 regular soldiers and some 250,000 reservists. However, these figures are a bit misleading because they suggest there is much that has not been committed.  The Russian Army is just under 200,000 active soldiers, along with 15,000 naval infantry.  Although it is far leaner than western armies, there being roughly one support soldier for every combat soldier, the actual fighting force is around 100,000 at most. Other force components, such as the 340,000 strong National Guard is not really intended for front-line combat service.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that available Russian ground forces as close to being totally committed.

Culminated

The culminating point of the force Putin sent into Ukraine a month ago has almost certainly been reached with its capacity for offensive operations en masse much reduced. Almost the entire force of 190,000 personnel that was ordered into Ukraine is now engaged in the campaign.  The Ukrainians claim to have killed 12,814 Russian soldiers as of March 22nd, with over 40,000 wounded, whilst NATO estimates that 8,000 to 15,000 have been killed.  Ukraine also claims 5,000 mercenaries have been killed. Russia has also lost 1,400 armored vehicles, 1,470 tanks, 96 aircraft and 118 helicopters. Whilst these figures must be treated with caution they give some indication as to Russian losses. Even though US intelligence estimates the force still retains some 90% of its fighting power, the force has clearly been badly mauled.  This failure partly explains the switch to the use of long range fires against civilian populations in places like Mariupol, as well as the recruitment of Chechens and Syrians to bolster Russian ranks.     

What is left? Critically, almost every Russian Army unit, together with the Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (VDV) Division (elite airborne force), have been deployed to Ukraine. There is little information about the specific divisions and regiments that remain in Russia, and what force numbers still remain available for forward deployment. Any such analysis is complicated by the Russian practice of deploying forward Battalion Tactical Groups or BTGs. When Ukrainian sources report that a Russian division is active on a given axis, it is almost always simply one or two BTGs from that division, and not the entire formation.

This is important. A Battalion Tactical Group [batalonnaya takticheskaya gruppa] is a highly deployable, albeit temporary, formation designed to undertake specific operational tasks. A BTG tends to be a reinforced battalion reinforced by the required support needed to complete its tasks. As such BTGs are drawn from an array of larger formations and tend to be the best trained and equipped, with each having a complement of between 700 to 800 personnel, with some as large as 900 strong. As of August 2021, the Russian Army had 168 BTGs of which 83 are believed to be engaged on operations in Ukraine. On March 21st, the US Department of Defense estimated that the Russians have already committed some 75% of their BTGs together with 60% of their air power. 

 The missing army?

 The Russian General Staff is also drawing in forces from across Russia, including the Far East and Georgia. This suggests that almost all of Russia’s available active duty combat power is now committed to the fight in Ukraine.  Moreover, only a portion of any army is real combat power. The rest is made up of combat support and combat support services.  One reason for Russia’s apparent chronic logistical problems could be that rear echelon forces are being hastily inserted into the fight in a desperate attempt to maintain momentum.

One answer to the conundrum is force rotation. As the campaign switches from fast offensive maneuver to force attrition the regular Russian Army will need to be rotated over time and through a very large operational area. Normally, that would require a third of the force to be engaged, a third resting, and a third working up, roughly 600,000 personnel. However, with the overwhelming bulk of the fighting army in Ukraine there are simply not enough other full strength units to rotate in and replace depleted or tired units.  In such circumstances, the Russians must pause, reorganize, refit and retrain with reservists and conscripts but ‘growing’ the army by any appreciable amount will take time.

Another problem seems to be the stalled professionalization and modernization of the Russian Army.  An analysis of recent operations, such as those in Syria, together with recent exercises such as Zapad 21 and Vostok 18, indicate the same repeated use of the same high-quality but relatively small spearhead units.  Thus, whilst the Russian Army might seem impressive on paper, its performance in the field is far less impressive.   This is exactly the same problem that was faced by the British Army during World War Two which relied heavily on a few elite formations to spearhead offensives, such as the British Eighth Army.  As those formations tired or were worn down by losses the entire offensive slowed with them.

Lost in Ukraine

The extent of the conundrum General Gerasimov and the Russian General Staff now faces is all too apparent when the extent of the force already deployed to Ukraine is analyzed.  All 12 army headquarters have been committed (1 Guards Tank Army, 2nd Combined Arms Army (2CAA), 5CAA, 6CAA, 8CAA, 20CAA, 29CAA, 35CAA,36CAA, 41CAA, 49CAA, 58CAA).  Moreover, virtually all the subordinate maneuver divisions and brigades are also in Ukraine, except that is for the curious case of the main force of the 5th Combined Arms Army (without its headquarters) in the Eastern Military District.  There is no evidence either that its 4 maneuver brigades (70th Motor Rifles, 60MR, 59MR, 57MR) have been engaged.

  

All 4 divisions and 3 brigades of the Russian airborne/air assault forces are also in Ukraine, together with all 5 naval infantry brigades and the 14th and 22nd Army Corps, together with 5 of the 7 Spetsnaz (Special Operating Forces or SOF) brigades are in Ukraine. The 14th Spetsnaz is based in Russia’s Far East, whilst the 16th Spetsnaz, which is based some 220 miles/320 kms south-east of Moscow, have either not been committed, or at least not yet identified in Ukraine. One reason could be the need to protect Putin and the seat of government in Moscow in the event of any coup attempt.  The 11th Army Corps in Kaliningrad (18th Motor Rifles Division, 7th Motor Rifle Regiment) remains in garrison, as does the 68th Army Corps on Sakhalin Island (18th Machine Gun Division, 39th Motor Rifle Brigade). 

 

Therefore, Russia does not have many more regular formations Moscow can insert into to the Order of Battle.  There are small formations in Transnistria, Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but they are not big enough to make a great deal of difference should they be switched to Ukraine.

Conundrum solved?

Having reached their culminating point Russian ground forces have two options. First, go over to the defense and try and retain the ground they hold, whilst at the same time reorganizing, refitting and absorbing replacements and new conscripts. Second, use the time to build up for another human-grinding Russian offensive.

It is the latter option which the UK Defence Intelligence Agency thinks likely. April 1st marks the start of the new recruiting season for conscripts and it is clear from the narrative Moscow is peddling that the Russian people are being prepared for a longer war than anticipated.  However, given Russia’s grievous losses and the poor training and equipment of the conscripts any reconstituted units will be far less capable than those that began the campaign.  That is why the strategy is likely to rely increasingly on indiscriminate air attacks and long range artillery and missile strikes to hammer cities and wear the will of the Ukrainian people to resist. It is also why the Ukrainians are seeking anti-air and counter-fires systems from NATO and other partners. Tragically, this next phase could become even uglier if recent tragedies in Grozny and Aleppo are any indication.  Apart from pondering the mobilization of reserves, and an even greater use of conscripts, Moscow is also considering the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, and even tactical nuclear systems.

 In other words, President Putin may well be facing his Waterloo in Ukraine, but at what appalling cost to Russians and Ukrainians alike? There is no Grouchy, no lost army that can join the fight quickly only far more ground grinding death to mark Putin’s folly!  To give some idea of the scale of the force committed by Russia to the war in Ukraine this article concludes by simply laying out the estimated Order of Battle of Russian forces in Ukraine.

 Russian Army

 1st Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel)

2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel (Guards) Sergey Viktorovich Medvedev)

1st Guards Tank Regiment

1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment

4th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Yevgeny Nikolayevich Zhuravlyov)

423rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment

47th Guards Tank Division

26th Tank Regiment

27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergey Igorevich Safonov)

96th Reconnaissance Brigade (Colonel Valery Vdovichenko)

45th Separate Engineering Brigade (Colonel Nikolai Ovcharenko †)

2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Vladimirovich Kolotovkin)

15th Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Sergeevich Marushkin)

21st Guards Motor Rifle Brigade

30th Motor Rifle Brigade

5th Combined Arms Army (Major General Aleksey Podivilov

6th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Vladislav Nikolayevich Yershov)

25th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Andrei Nikolaevich Arkhipov)

138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergei Maksimov)

8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Nikolayevich Mordvichev †)

20th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Aleksei Gorobets)

33rd Motor Rifle Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Agarkov †)

150th Motor Rifle Division (Major General Oleg Mityaev †)

102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment

20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Sergeevich Ivanaev)

3rd Motor Rifle Division (Major General Aleksei Vyacheslavovich Avdeyev)

252nd Motor Rifle Regiment (Colonel Igor Nikolaev †)

144th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Major General Vitaly Sleptsov)

29th Combined Arms Army (Major General Andrei Borisovich Kolesnikov †)

36th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel (Guards) Andrei Vladimirovich Voronkov)

200th Artillery Brigade

35th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Aleksandr Semyonovich Sanchik)

38th Motor Rifle Brigade

64th Motor Rifle Brigade

69th Fortress Brigade

107th Rocket Brigade

165th Artillery Brigade

36th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Valery Solodchuk)

5th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel (Guards) Andrei Viktorovich Kondrov)

37th Motor Rifle Brigade

103rd Rocket Brigade

41st Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Sergey Ryzhkov [ru], Deputy Commander Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky †)

35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Major General Vitaly Gerasimov †)

55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade

74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Alekseyevich Yershov)

120th Artillery Brigade

119th Missile Brigade

90th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Ramil Rakhmatulovich Ibatullin)

6th Tank Regiment (Colonel Andrei Zakharov †)

49th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Jakov Vladimirovich Rezantsev)

205th Motor Rifle Brigade

58th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Mikhail Stepanovich Zusko)

19th Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Uskov)

42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division

14th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Dmitry Vladimirovich Krayev)

200th Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Denis Yuryevich Kurilo)

22nd Army Corps (Major General Denis Lyamin)

126th Coastal Defense Brigade (Colonel Sergey Storozhenko)

127th Reconnaissance Brigade

12th Guards Engineer Brigade (Colonel Sergei Porokhnya †)

Special Operation Forces (SSO) (Major General Valery Flyustikov)

Russian Navy (Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov)

 Black Sea Fleet (Admiral Igor Osipov, Deputy Commander First Rank Captain Andrei Paliy †)

Northern Fleet (Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev)

Russian Coastal Troops

Russian Naval Infantry (Lieutenant General Alexander Kolpachenko)

40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Petukh)

61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet, Colonel Kirill Nikolaevich Nikulin)

155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet)

336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Igor N. Kalmykov)

810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Aleksei Berngard)

 Russian Aerospace Forces (General of the Army Sergey Surovikin)

 Russian Air Force (Lieutenant General Sergey Dronov)

4th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilyevich Gostev)

3rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment[37]

31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Khasanov †)

11th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Vladimir Kravchenko)

23rd Fighter Aviation Regiment

14th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment

18th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment

120th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (Colonel Ruslan Rudnev †) 

 Russian Airborne Forces (Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov)

 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division (Colonel Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kornev)

108th Guards Kuban Cossack Air Assault Regiment

247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (Colonel Konstantin Zizevski †)

76th Guards Air Assault Division (Major General Alexey Naumets)

124th Tank Battalion

104th Guards Air Assault Regiment

234th Guards Air Assault Regiment

237th Guards Air Assault Regiment

98th Guards Airborne Division (Colonel Sergey Volyk)

217th Guards Airborne Regiment

331st Guards Airborne Regiment (Colonel Sergei Sukharev †)

106th Guards Airborne Division (Guards Colonel Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Selivyorstov)

51st Guards Airborne Regiment

137th Guards Airborne Regiment

1182nd Guards Artillery Regiment

45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Vadim Pankov)

11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Colonel Denis Nikolayevich Shishov, Deputy Commander Lieutenant Colonel Denis Glebov †)

31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Colonel Sergei Karasev †)

5th Air Assault Company (Captain Eduard Gelmiyarov †)

83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade

GU (formerly GRU) (Admiral Igor Kostyukov)

2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Konstantin Bushuev)

3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Albert Ibragimovich Omarov)

10th Spetsnaz Brigade

22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei Nikolayevich Savchenko)

24th Spetsnaz Brigade

Ben Hodges, R. D. Hooker Jr., Julian Lindley-French

LTG (Ret.) Ben Hodges is the former Commander, US Army Europe, Dr R. D. Hooker Jr. was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council. Julian Lindley-French was Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy. They are all members of The Alphen Group.