Ukraine and a NATO Theory of Victory

 

February 23rd, 2022

“You want decommunisation? Very well, this suits us just fine. But why stop halfway? We are ready to show what real decommunisation would mean for Ukraine. Going back to history, I would like to repeat that the Soviet Union was established in the place of the former Russian Empire in 1922. But practice showed immediately that it was impossible to preserve or govern such a vast and complex territory on the amorphous principles that amounted to confederation. They were far removed from reality and the historical tradition”.

President Vladimir Putin, February 22^nd, 2022

 

The following Lindley-French Analysis is based on my speech yesterday to the RUSI Missile Defence Conference in London.

Putin’s sledgehammer

For President Putin history is a sledgehammer. On December 30^th, 1922 Lenin’s held his first “Council of People’s Commissars,” or Sovnarkom, and created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In December 1922, there were only four Soviet republics represented, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasian Republic. By December 2022, will there be four Russian Federation ‘republics’?  If so, to paraphrase Lenin, what is to be done?

 

In light of the unfolding tragedy in Ukraine there are two strategic questions that need to be answered and a third that must be confronted urgently if NATO operations, capabilities and capacities are to meet the challenge Putin and Russia’s armed forces have thrown down to free Europe.  One only has to look at a map to see the implications for the Allies if Putin should succeed in establishing a Belarus-Ukraine salient in the heart of central Europe.

My contentions are twofold.  First, that Russia is moving to seize all the territory claimed by the Donetsk and Luhansk separatists and given Putin’s very particular interpretation of history could go further. Second, what we are witnessing is a high-end force the spearhead elements of which re in transition towards strategic integrated fighting power.

1.                  As alliances such as NATO update their warfighting concepts, how should these concepts and the national capabilities underpinning them adapt to a changing threat environment?

My focus is NATO 2030 and beyond. My defining message is unapologetically ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’. Let me be blunt: President Putin is trying to drive a T-14 Armata through NATO’s political ends, strategic ways and operational means, given the fast pace of the shifting balance of military power in Europe and the wider world, and whatever the sophistry is employed about Ukraine not being a NATO member. With all due respect to and cognisance of the unfolding tragedy in Ukraine Russia’s invasion is also about the future democratic defence of a Europe in which Russia enjoys missile and nuclear dominance and can establish an effective air and missile defence bubble against much of Europe’s capabilities pretty much, as, when and where Russia chooses.  We, the collective Allied ‘we’, with our talk big, deliver little political and strategic culture, if that is what one can call it, have let him do that.

Therefore, everything I am going to say is set against the true test of the future credible defence of Europe in the face of a determined and clever nationalist autocrat; a demonstrable and communicable NATO theory of victory. A theory of victory is a set of propositions about how and why the behaviour of one belligerent affects the behaviour of others in a desired manner. A credible theory of victory demands a continuity between threat, policy and strategy driving the ends, ways, and means of defence and deterrence.  Do we Europeans even have a theory of victory?  President Putin and General Gerasimov do. Are there any links between ends, ways and means in Europe?

Then bottom-line is that if we do not get our warfighting thus deterrence act together and fast the strategic space for President Putin to exploit with his theory of victory can go far further than Ukraine.  He must be countered and contained. This challenge is set not just in the here and now context of Future War and the Defence of Europe but the now and hereafter.  Specifically, the specific concepts, capabilities, capacities and structures that will be needed when Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, Big Data, hypersonic missiles, swarming, Nano-tech and quantum computing become the very stuff of a not-so-far future integrated strategic warfighting concept. What must NATO have in place to credibly deter and defend in such an eve-of-war battlespace, as well as what level of command and force interoperability and standardisation would be needed to make NATO’s warfighting and deterrence concepts real given the fast changing character of war and the scope and nature of the threats with which we require our Alliance to contend. 

In that light MY essential warfighting concept, and thus what I believe must be NATO’s minimum deterrent, must be designed around a core multidimensional and multi-domain manoeuvre force able to operate across air, sea, land, cyber, information and knowledge based on a sea-bed to space tech-led manoeuvrist approach. Such a force would be an extension, albeit a radical extension, of current NATO warfighting doctrine which is designed to apply critical strength against critical weakness using surprise, deception and applied power.

In a 21^st century high-end All Arms Battlespace Allied forces will soon need to act at machine-led hyper speed of relevance in critical places at critical times, learning and adapting as well as engaging, operating and creating to generate multifarious unexpected problems for an enemy to resolve. The unexpected must be a primary Allied strategic enabler because for far too long President Putin and General Gerasimov have become far too comfortable in their assumptions underpinning their theory of victory.  Relevant and timely Allied fighting power will be crucial fused with real-time information for people trained and equipped to fight and win on a ‘battlefield’ that is very different from the insecure spaces of the past thirty years or so.

 2.                  What areas ought to receive priority with respect to restoring deterrence, and what does a theory of victory against adversary standoff entail?

First, back to basics: deterrence is the use of demonstrably relevant capability and capacity to strategically communicate high threshold cost and risk to an enemy. Or, as Thomas Hobbes famously said, “Covenants without the sword are but words and of no use to any man’. The very concept of who it is that must be deterred demands a profound set of changes to the idea of deterrence that will demand the demonstrable capacity to use first strike in information and cyber war and maintain a second strike capability in conventional and (Heaven forbid) nuclear war. Only then will NATO match the escalation continuum that has been designed by an intelligent aggressor for engagement in ‘perma-war’ across the mosaic of hybrid, cyber and hyper war.  Such a new idea of Allied deterrence will not only need credible conventional and nuclear forces, but also offensive and defensive information effects and cyber effects. People protection and force projection are now two sides of a three sided deterrence, defence and resilience coin.

In NATO’s contemporary, fast approaching and very REAL world the successful deterrence and defence of our defensive Alliance any theory of victory must be specifically designed to complement, counter, confuse and confound that of the enemy if the Alliance is maintain stand-off, which is the essence of deterrence, prior to mutually agreed force reductions. Let me be controversial, NATO could well lose the next big war because it does not yet know how collectively to win, where, with what and with whom. It is working towards such a posture but it needs to go faster and harder. This is not the fault of the Alliance. Rather, most European political leaders and their defence planners in Europe have for too long failed to understand, or are not allowed to understand, the fundamental and evolving character of war and the nature of future conflict against enemies capable of all-domain, trans-regional escalation, nor how to shape the dynamics of such wars to safeguard Allied interests, nor have they been willing to bear the costs required.  Too many Western European leaders in particular, the drivers of European defence, have for too long been locked in denial about the possibility of a major future pan-European war leading to false assumptions and thus higher risk being invested in both policy and planning. For too long, European leaders have only been willing to recognise how much threat they believe they can afford after every other national contingency or policy has been paid for in the endless pursuit of electability and under the ruthless tyranny of the here and now.  Now? Given COVID 19?

Next Steps

Given events in Ukraine the next steps on the road to new Allied theory of victory and with it a transformed Allied deterrence and defence posture must be the re-establishment of a demonstrably credible operational-capability balance in the eyes of any potential enemy. Over the short to medium term if NATO is to develop a relevant warfighting concept it must do it on the run by reinforcing the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. That means the strengthening of the Enhanced Forward Presence; the acceleration and expansion of the NATO Readiness Initiative; and by moving HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), NATO’s most capable non-American deployable corps headquarters from England to near Warsaw reinforced by American, British, German and Polish forces and in support of the EFP forces, HQ Multinational Corps (Northeast) and supported by the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC). 

HQ ARRC must now be designated as the command and development driver for a new European-led first responder, high end multi-domain Allied Mobile Heavy Force (AMHF) heavy enough to fill the 1500 km gap between MNC (NE) the Black Sea and the Baltic States, manoeuvrable enough to both deter a high-end aggressor such as Russia, heavy enough to also support front-line states facing terrorism, as well as capable enough of holding the European theatre across the hybrid, cyber, hyper war spectrum in an emergency if US forces are simultaneously engaged in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere. The AMHF is the centre-piece of the new Alphen Group’s Shadow NATO Strategic Concept and it should be front and centre of the forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept.

The NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) must also become the driver of an effective shared methodology for guiding and coordinating investment choices. The list of strategic tasks is continuing to expand, whilst the number of nations able to undertake them over time and distance and under high-end attack continues to shrink. If not, then all-important NATO high-end force interoperability will become ever harder to maintain and vital future technological coherence as difficult to generate as political cohesion.

Can European Armies organise for the 21^st Century fight, or are the requirements and costs simply beyond them?

THAT is THE multi-billion dollar, euro, pound question. Future high-end force interoperability will be THE sine qua non of NATO. No ifs, no buts.  Ask General Gerasimov.  It will be the very cornerstone of future NATO deterrence and defence, particularly if Putin succeeds in establishing a new Belarus-Ukrainian salient. NATO must thus assume that its forces will need to fight to deter a 190,000 strong force in which quantity is indeed its own quality (like Russia’s 8^th Combined Arms Army) and which is not only lethal but capable of free-thinking. A force steeped in the offensive and built to turn a very particular theory of victory into a real victory with long-range fires, mass, manoeuvrist and multi-domain power are combined to strategic effect in Europe with rapid sensor to shooter/fires capabilities at scale and distance, strong manoeuvre forces and the aggressive use of Special Purpose Forces in the Rear Area.

In any such fight, NATO forces will need a resilient interoperable C2 system, the synchronisation of multi-domain lethal and non-lethal effects combined with aggressive Find and Fires capabilities, allied to the intelligence-led use of Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) via a concept of force convergence. That highlights the importance of speed, simultaneity and a relentless focus on the deep battle as a way of presenting the enemy with multiple dilemmas at such a tempo that it creates decisive advantage and/or windows of opportunity thus enabling the Allied Mobile Heavy Force to be a decisive element in realising NATO’s theory of victory if needs be. Anything less than that is co-operability NOT interoperability and will not withstand the test in a high-end future fight and instead become an open invitation to an intelligent enemy to engage to effect in war at our many seams, both civil and military. 

Ukraine and a NATO Theory of Victory

To conclude, let me quote my friend and fellow member of The Alphen Group, General Sir James Everard. “NATO now recognises the complex nature of modern warfare as a contest where deterrence demands a demonstrable ability to defend, and defence is based on controlling geography and the all the domains of warfare simultaneously (allied of course to the ability to deliver forces). Many allies are also embracing the new methodology during their peace-time activities, with the UK leading the way”.  Amen to that!

Europeans are falling far behind in the battle for strategic thought dominance which is a vital driver of policy, strategy and structure and thus ends, ways and means. That is precisely why they urgently need a new theory of victory. It is high-time that the NATO European Allies faced future war intellectually and politically, which is why General John Allen, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges and I wrote Future War and the Defence of Europe and why General Lord Richards and I will be hosting the high level Future War and Deterrence Conference at Wilton Park in October.

Julian Lindley-French

 

-           

 

 

 

Frozen War: The Whiff of Munich?

 

“It may be that he [Putin] just switches off his tanks and we all go home but there is a whiff of Munich in the air from some in the West”.

Rt. Hon. Ben Wallace MP, UK Secretary of State for Defence

Blitzkriga!

February 15^th, 2022.  This Analysis will consider Putin’s options in the coming days and the geopolitics of the current crisis and endeavour to think beyond convention.  For those in denial about the nature of another major European war let me first offer a vision of the nightmare that might engulf Ukrainians at any moment.

A second Russian invasion of Ukraine (the first was in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea) could come as early as Wednesday according to some Western intelligence sources, although given the very tight nature of high-level Russian command structures it would be interesting to know how such Intel was garnered.  If war does come it will not be the stuff of X-Box or Play Station. For most people war is a very intimate place where geopolitics of those in power meets the personal terror of those they command.  The Russian way of war is particularly brutal and extremely offensive, the twenty-first century equivalent of a medieval chevauchée. It will start with a large-scale ‘Blitzkriga’ long-range missile and air attack designed to cut Kyiv off from its forces, possibly in conjunction with a decapitation strike on President Vlodomir Zelensky and his governing circle.  Strikes will also be made on bridges near Ukraine’s western border just in case the US and its NATO allies try to intervene. Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz) will strike deep into Ukraine at critical infrastructures and against other critical people, sowing confusion and panic. 

Ukrainian soldiers and citizen reservists a few hundred kilometres/miles from where I am writing will die in their tens of thousands during the first wave of strikes in the most brutal way imaginable. Many now waiting in trepidation in dark bunkers, cold slit trenches and foxholes will be blown apart or funnelled into ‘killing zones’.  Everything around them will suddenly erupt, even the ground upon which they stand, nothing will be still.  People and parts of people will fly through air in which super-heated air and cold fear fuse and in which every breath hurts. Wooden planks and metal poles will become projectiles impaling, wounding, and killing. For a moment in time shock will strike and each and all will gasp for lost breath.  The senses will be overwhelmed by violence in which only bloody serendipity will decide who lives and who dies. Some will see their ‘oppos’, the man or (since 2018) woman next to them decapitated, mutilated, or both. Some will simply vanish. If they are ‘lucky’ some will die immediately, whilst some will die slowly trying to reinsert their disembowelled intestines back into their torn bodies. Others will wonder around in shock looking for an arm that has been blown off before they fall. Others will be left screaming as they are blinded in an instant or their legs are reduced to bloody stumps. Many will simply bleed out beyond any help other than the mercy of Morphine, as desperate medics are forced to play instant God deciding who might live and who will die.  Even those lucky enough to survive the initial assault will face the Spetsnaz and GRU (Russian military intelligence) troops and their ghastly array of killing techniques even before the ‘stormtroopers’ of the one hundred or so Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) over-run their positions. Few prisoners will be taken. Some will break, and those who stand will only do so because their fear of failing their comrades is marginally greater than the fear of being torn apart. After the initial shock strike aircraft and armed drones will target any Ukrainian formation of any size that tries to coalesce and counter-attack, cutting them down from multiple directions in a multiplicity of ways.

Those who ‘survive’ the war will never escape it. They will wear their pain as a badge of honour but they will be in pain. They will live out their broken lives haunted by very personal sights of very personal carnage.  Many will often awake deep into the night with the transparent burning flesh of their long-dead comrades forever entombed in their sub-conscience.  Others will be plagued by the never-ending background tinnitus of the battlefield, constant and occasional, near and far, which will play on their forever fried nerves and re-fried visions of death and maiming, ‘living’ over and over and over again that unique experience of hell unleashed in the exploding cauldron of chaos from which there can be no release other than their own eventual demise.   A cauldron in which hours of tense boredom and the dark, fearful humour it sires suddenly be mutilates into an abject fear that rents the soul. When only the ingrained rigour of training enables each of them to put on foot before an another, when every aching sense in one’s aching body is screaming ‘get me out of here’, which afterwards leaves every fibre of every nerve twitching and shaking uncontrollably. Then there is the smell. That life-pervading sickly sweet smell that merges with the strange odour of charred plastic, burning wood and hot concrete dust into AA bouquet of death that pervades the senses creating a permanent barrier of consciousness between the warrior, their loved ones and the society for which they sacrificed.   Just so you know.

Option One: Minsk 2.5

The geopolitics?  If 911 changed the world, a Russian invasion of a central European country will change Europe. In suggesting there was a “whiff of Munich in the air” the British Minister of Defence Ben Wallace was referring to the September 1939 Munich Agreement between Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, the sell-out of Czechoslovakia, and what happened thereafter. In March 1939 Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to march into Prague and seize the rest of Czechoslovakia. At Munich, Hitler had been gifted the Sudeten region and much of the advanced Czech armaments industry.  However, by marching on Prague and breaking the Munich Agreement Hitler crossed a red line, convinced that Britain and France would continue to appease him. In fact, the seizure of Prague was the moment the two Western powers finally realised that war with Nazi Germany was inevitable.

Putin might well be hoping that having already seized much of eastern Ukraine he can engineer some kind of Minsk 2.5 agreement that would not only force Kyiv firmly back within Russia’s sphere of influence, but re-establish the utility of armed coercion in European ‘security’. My personal view is that citing ‘Munich’ is a bit strong and that President Macron, Boris Johnson and Wallace himself are right to be making every effort to avert war for all the reasons stated above. However, Putin must also be left in no doubt that NATO’s unwillingness to fight for non-NATO Ukraine should not be misinterpreted by Putin as proof of NATO’s unwillingness to defend any Allied country. After all, Ukraine has now called for a meeting with Russia and hinted it might formally commit to never joining NATO. 

Minsk 2.5 alone would confirm Putin at home as a ‘Great Russian’ because once again it would demonstrate his capacity to humiliate a feckless West by taking successfully calculated risk.  However, he seems to want something more, a real demonstration of Russian power. Some intelligence reports warn of a pending ‘false flag’ operation whereby Moscow will use maskirovka (deception) to create a casus belli so that the Kremlin can accuse the Ukrainians and no doubt ‘the fascist West’ of committing an atrocity against Russian-speakers in Eastern Ukraine.  It is certainly possible.  Putin really does not care whether the West believes him or not. He is far more concerned with overcoming understandable nervousness both at home and growing resentment in eastern Ukraine.  A lot of Russians still have painful memories of the Russian war in Afghanistan and Putin’s two Chechnya Wars.

Option Two: Invasion

If Putin orders his forces to invade Ukraine the geopolitical precipice upon which free Europe stands will suddenly be all too apparent. Putin is clearly convinced that European leaders will do what they always do at such moments of intense crisis; wring their hands, impose some already planned for sanctions, but do little more.  There will of course be hubble, bubble, toil and trouble in the European body politic and an invasion will force upon European leaders a profound choice, but will they all make the same one?  Some continental Europeans, with France again to the fore, will emphasise the EU route to future geopolitical influence. They will point to the forthcoming EU Strategic Compass.  Sadly, the history of such demarches suggests that the Compass will generate far more political heat than geopolitical light.  There is a revealing clue in the very name Strategic Compass because by pointing in four strategic directions at once (resilience, crisis management, partnerships and capability development) there is a danger it will actually point to no strategic direction at all.

There is an alternative emerging.  Several European countries, with Germany apparently and interestingly to the fore, are calling for the creation of a European Security Council with Britain invited to play a prominent role.  For all the current political turbulence in London Britain has demonstrated once again that it can take action in a crisis, not least because of its intelligence capability.  The Ukraine Crisis is also demonstrating the danger of a Mackinderesque failure by leaders to grasp political geography and the danger that over time the EU’s four major peripheral powers, Britain, Russia, Turkey and the US, come to define themselves at odds with Europe’s continental core. This would be particularly dangerous for European security and defence if some in the EU seeks to imply ‘Europe’ is implicitly anti-American, anti-British and anti-Turkish. Something for President Macron to ponder?

A European Security Council could act as a vital bridge between the EU and NATO and harmonise the American-led deterrence and defence of Europe with the EU-led effort to strengthen European resilience in the face of Russian hybrid and cyber war.  Clearly, for NATO to do its job Mackinder will need to be shackled. As The Alphen Group says in its just launched Shadow NATO Strategic Concept https://www.gmfus.org/news/tag-nato-shadow-strategic-concept-2022-preserving-peace-protecting-people whatever happens in Ukraine these coming days and weeks European security and defence is in urgent need of a profound re-think.

Option Three: Frozen War  

What if President Putin, Generals Shoigu and Gerasimov are telling the truth? Russia has no intention of launching a full-on invasion of Ukraine and that Moscow is simply carrying out ‘drills’.  In that case, Moscow have another option – frozen war. The cleverest strategy Putin might adopt is to not quite invade Ukraine allowing coercion and the threat of invasion to keep Europe politically off-balance and the wider transatlantic alliance divided.   

Putin is no fool and he knows there is no guarantee Russian forces would not become bogged down in a war in Ukraine if Russian forces fail to win quickly and overwhelmingly. Ever since Peter the Great Russian history is replete with examples of tsars (both ‘white’ and ‘red’) who have started wars that do not end well. In any case, even if Russia does not invade Ukraine Putin is well on the way to achieving not just the effective Finlandization of Ukraine, but the psychological Finlandization of much of insecure Europe, with the possible exception of Finland itself.

If Putin could maintain a large rotatable force frozen at high readiness close to Ukraine poised to strike indefinitely the geopolitical benefits would be manifold.  Belarus would have no alternative but to finally accept its fate as a Russian vassal state. Kyiv would face a choice between invasion and accepting a Minsk 3 which would effectively give Moscow a veto over the very existence of the Ukrainian state.  Putin’s logistical lines of supply and re-supply would be shortened increasing the threat his forces already pose to the Suwalki corridor between Belarus and Kaliningrad. The three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, would be left unsure and feeling ever more vulnerable to Russian coercion whatever assurances they were given by the US and the rest of NATO.  

Frozen war would also force risk averse European leaders with their outmoded Bonsai armed forces, COVID economies and fin de siecle populations to choose between expensive and dangerous confrontation and appeasement.  It would reignite the German Question as Germans were once again forced to face possible trauma in the future and the deep, dark traumas of the past.  There is no guarantee that German angst would automatically lead to greater resolve to strengthen NATO.  Frozen wat would also create a new information war designed to stoke a new culture war similar to the public fear which greeted the 1983 deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles and the mass demonstrations in Western Europe it provoked.  Putin is no Gorbachev and the former would like nothing more than to weaken the already frayed political bonds between the US and its Allies, humiliate NATO, and if possible ‘decouple’ the Americans from the defence of Europe.

Helsinki or Yalta?

At the heart of this crisis are two very different Euro-world views. Whilst many Europeans remain implicitly committed to building a Europe whole and free that realises the vision of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, President Putin is equally determined to realise his vision of Yalta reborn in which the strong do what they do, and the weak do as they are told.  The irony (if that is what it is) is that Putin’s Russia is not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s, but rather the illusion of Soviet peak power manipulated and focussed in such a way as to force many utterly risk averse European leaders to comply with Putin’s interests.

The crisis has not only revealed the soft under-belly of European security but also a profound failure of strategic imagination with many commentators suggesting that Putin is going vaguely mad as the only explanation for his actions.  What if the geopolitical benefits of maintaining such coercion outweigh the costs? After all, there is an Olympic-sized game-changer in this crisis - China. The de facto non-aggression pact between Putin and Xi is enabling Russia to station the bulk of its forces (possibly as many now as 150,000 troops) in Russia’s western, central and southern military districts, threatening both Ukraine and much of Europe beyond.  China might also have agreed to cover some or most of Russia’s crisis costs. What if Ukraine is not the real objective at all and that the geopolitical aim is to test Western resolve, European responses and, above all, to pin/fix elite US forces in Europe protecting weak Europeans whilst China increases pressure on Taiwan? Frozen war might be the stuff of grand strategy but then this crisis is grand strategy and if China can help by increasing pressure on US forces in the Indo-Pacific then for Putin and Xi Ukraine might become geopolitics as usual.

Ukraine, Europe and the fall of Singapore

Eighty years ago today British Imperial and Dominion forces surrendered to their Japanese conquerors.  It was perhaps the worst British military defeat in history.  Much has been written about the fall of Singapore and the incompetence that led to it. The real reason was that by 1942 Britain was heavily engaged in multiple theatres from the Atlantic to North Africa and was simply unable to defend the eastern Empire.  Had it not been for the bravery of the British 14^th Army (the Forgotten Army) which was comprised of African, Australian, British, Indian and Australian and New Zealand forces, as well as the British Pacific Fleet of 1944 to 1945, the disaster might have been far worse.

Singapore became a metaphor for decline and marked the real beginning of the end of the British Empire which by 1942 had become a hollowed out façade of power. Ukraine? In late 2011, I sat on a podium next to British Minister of Defence Philip Hammond at the Riga Conference. In my hand was an empty tube of Pringles crisps (chips in American) which I held upside down. The British Government had just slashed the British defence budget right in the middle of a major campaign in Afghanistan in which British forces were engaged in perhaps the most dangerous province, Helmand. The empty tube was to demonstrate the fate of European defence if Western European powers continued to load tasks onto their hard-pressed armed forces whilst slashing their budgets.  Five years ago I made a short movie for the Johann de Witt Conference in Rotterdam to demonstrate to the politicians and others present what a major war in Europe would look like.  Last year, I published a major new Oxford book Future War and the Defence of Europe which warned of just such a crisis.

That Putin is even contemplating such a war – frozen or hot - is due in no small part to the strategic illiteracy of too many Western European leaders. Yes, there was the 2008-2010 financial and economic crisis and, yes, we have just faced the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it is the disastrous pieties of the post-Cold War which for too long Britain, France and Germany have clung to, which has led Europe into this new age of danger which has just dawned.  It is the profoundly mistaken belief to which for too long political leaders have clung that geo-economics will trump the dark side of geopolitics.  That they need recognise only as much threat as they thought they could afford politically or financially. It is the absence of leadership in Europe which has created the opportunity for Putin to impose his fiat on other Europeans. One can only hope that if Russia does force such a dreadful war upon Ukraine it would finally begin the long overdue bonfire of strategic illusions that has underpinned the denial which has afflicted Western Europe and its leaders. 

The West will not intervene with force in Ukraine but Putin must be seen to pay a heavy price and that means real sanctions and the strengthening of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture so that there is no Alliance bluff Putin can also call. If President Putin succeeds in destroying Ukraine do not for a moment think his ambitions will stop there. Ukraine may be not be the whiff of Munich, but it has the scent of Singapore. It is time for democracies to stand firm, and together.

Julian Lindley-French

 

 

 

 

 

       

The TAG Shadow NATO Strategic Concept 2022

https://www.gmfus.org/news/tag-nato-shadow-strategic-concept-2022-preserving-peace-protecting-people

February 3^rd, 2022

The TAG NATO Shadow Strategic Concept 2022

2022 is an inflection point for NATO. It would be easy to think that the future of NATO is all about what is happening today in Ukraine. The current crisis is hugely important but the future of the Alliance is not simply about the future of NATO-Russia relations.  There are other vital questions that must be addressed. What will be NATO’s role in Europe and the wider world? What kind of NATO will needed by 2030 if the Alliance is to continue to credibly preserve peace and protect people? What must NATO and its nations be collectively thinking about going beyond 2030? These are the questions that The Alphen Group (TAG), which I have the honor to chair, set out to answer with the publication today of the TAG Shadow NATO Strategic Concept 2022 (link above) by the German Marshall Fund, the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. 

Strategic Concept 2022 is no ordinary piece of think-tankery. It is also very much a team effort involving all the members of The Alphen Group.  Whilst I acted as lead writer it is really the product of some very serious thinking by some very serious people.  These include Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, a former NATO Deputy Secretary General and US Ambassador to both NATO and Russia; Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Heinrich Brauss, the former NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Policy and Planning; General (Ret.) Sir James Everard, the former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commander of the US Army in Europe; Admiral (Ret.) Giampaolo di Paola, the former Italian Defence Minister, Chief of Defence Staff and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; General the Lord Richards, the former Chief of the British Defence Staff; Ambassador Stefano Stefanini, and the former Italian Permanent Representative to NATO; and Jim Townsend, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasian Affairs at the Pentagon.

NATO tomorrow

Preserving peace and protecting people will demand of the Alliance the credible ability to both deter aggression at the high-end of the conflict spectrum and deal with the continued threat posed by terrorism and the instability it spawns.  Collective defense, crisis management, co-operative security will thus remain the three core missions of the Alliance but in a markedly-changed and changing strategic environment compared with 2010 when the last such strategy was drafted. However, NATO will be unable to project stabilizing influence and deterrence power if its home-base is critically vulnerable to attack and corrosive manipulation.  Therefore, Strategic Concept 2022 establishes the improved resilience of Allied societies as an urgent NATO priority.

Furthermore, Strategic Concept 2022 also envisions NATO is a very different geopolitical context than 2010. The unrelenting rise of China as an economic and putative military superpower is changing the fundamental assumptions Washington must make to realize US security and defense interests. In the past more capable European Allies would have been nice for the US to have, it is now an imperative, if not the greatest single strategic imperative in Strategic Concept 2022. The only way the Americans will be able to maintain their security guarantee to Europe will be if Europeans take on far more strategic responsibility for their own defense.  That is one of the many geopolitical lessons arising from the current Ukraine crisis. The Americans are not only facing the prospect of Russian aggression in Europe, but also a China that is systematically searching for ways and means to weaken America, not least by exploiting the growing over-stretch from to which US forces are increasingly subject the world over. 

Implicit in Strategic Concept 2022 is a new transatlantic security ‘contract’ that reflects the realities of the 2020s, not the 1950s, built on a far more equitable sharing of the burdens of both risk and cost of alliance between the US and its Allies. Specifically, Strategic Concept 2022 calls on Canada and the European Allies to invest sufficient forces and resources by 2030 to collectively meet at least 50 percent of NATO’s Minimum Military Requirements identified by the strategic commanders. These will include fully usable forces required to cover the whole spectrum of operations and missions, as well as the strategic enablers required to conduct multiple demanding large and smaller-scale operations. Such operations will be conducted both alongside US forces in a variety of regions inside and outside SACEUR’s area of responsibility, as well as autonomously when agreed.

NATO the day after tomorrow

2030 is the day after tomorrow in defense planning but what will be change agent to match NATO’s new ends, ways and means? Strategic Concept 2022 calls on the Canadian and European Allies to by 2030 at the latest stand up a new NATO Allied Command Operations Mobile Heavy Force (AMHF). The AMHF will consolidate all Allied rapid response forces into a single pool of forces supported by the requisite force and command structures. Critically, the AMHF will act as a high-end, first responder Allied Future Force designed to act from seabed to space and across the multi-domains of air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge. The AMHF will be sufficiently robust and responsive, and held at a sufficiently high level of readiness, to meet any and all threats to the territory of the Euro-Atlantic area in the first instance, and have sufficient capacity to also support those frontline nations facing transnational threats such as terrorism. The AMHF will thus build on the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the enhanced NATO Response Force, as well as those very high readiness forces that will emerge from the vital NATO Readiness Initiative.

The AMHF will enable the Allies maintain a high degree of affordable interoperability with fast-evolving US forces. As such, the AMHF will act as the single most important force integrator as well as the guardian of high-end force interoperability vital to NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. It will also be the synergizing change agent for the introduction into the Allied Order of Battle of artificial intelligence, super/quantum computing, big data, machine learning, drone swarming, and autonomous capabilities (for example, manned-unmanned teaming, decoys, relays, and networked autonomous systems), hypersonic weapon systems to enable an allied capability to engage in hyper-fast warfare.

The AMHF will be flexible and deployable in several guises and under more than one flag, including as a NATO-enabled European coalition (both EU allies and partners) or as a framework for coalitions of the willing and able. Above all, the AMHF will be proof of a transformed NATO by giving shape, purpose and meaning to greater European strategic responsibility. Such responsibility, and the autonomy it eventually fosters will be a function of power not words and reflect the relative military capability and capacity of America’s Allies inside NATO. It must be seen clearly as such. Reinforced by new ‘enablers’, such as combat support and combat service support, and transformative and integrative professional military education the AMHF will be designed to exploit NATO’s richest resource – its free citizens.

NATO the day after 2030

Joe Robinson, CEO of Defence Improbable, in an excellent opinion piece entitled China is stealing a march in the metaverse arms race, offered a sobering vision of the future: “The metaverse for war is not science fiction. These capabilities exist to today. I know this because my company builds some of the foundational technologies”.  Strategic Concept 2022 looks out to 2030 because strategy in democracies is the art of the politically possible.  However, Joe’s message is compelling. NATO MUST look now beyond 2030 to a world in which warfare will take place across a new spectrum of hybrid war, cyber war and super-fast hyper war and be conducted at speeds beyond human command imagination. A world in which adversaries will seek to systematically exploit every vulnerability of open, democratic societies by inflicting perma-war across 5Ds of disinformation, deception, disruption, destabilization, and applied complex strategic coercion through the implied threat of destruction. Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, data harvesting, machine learning and Big Data applications will (and are) be the harbingers of such warfare, as well as its multipliers.  

Therefore, NATO must begin thinking now outside of its very well-established boxes. The Alliance will need to enter a new world, a virtual, immersive, secure world in which NATO can test planning and policy, craft responses, identify vulnerabilities and reinforce them, and systematically explore the vulnerabilities of adversaries.    Such a response will stretch NATO’s leaders conceptually and demand a new vision of defense education and information that stretches from leader to defender to create an entirely new concept of deterrence that also stretches across the meta-sphere from information warfare to cyber warfare to the most exotic reaches of seabed to space hyper warfare.

Fast information and knowledge will not only be vital it must be at the cutting edge of Allied preparedness and readiness, it will be at the very heart of credible deterrence and defense. To do that the Alliance will also need new defenders and create for a place for them, people who are creative, constructive disruptors who do not necessarily fit the traditional policy or military mold.  In short, to prevail NATO must become a new strategic nexus where political leaders and military commanders meet academia and the games industry on an equal innovative footing if the Alliance is to match the speed of relevance in any future war and thus maintain credible deterrence. Such civil-military fusion will be as vital as Allied military-military fusion and will need to be driven by entirely new ideas of standardization, innovation and interoperability. Much of NATO’s future technology and expertise will come from the commercial sector and be driven by it. For Europe and its analogue defense and technological base that will mean nothing less than a digital and digitizing revolution and a complete rethink about just who or what is in the defense sector of the future. Less metal bashers, more systems integrators. 

In our latest Oxford University book, Future War and the Defence of Europe, General (Ret.) John R. Allen, Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Ben Hodges and I write “Critically, much stronger strategic public private partnerships need to be forged both to prepare for shock across the spectrum of adverse events and to recover from them. One consequence of globalization has been the progressive decoupling of Western states from Western corporations with the very idea of the multinational corporation as the antithesis of the Western nation-state.  A far stronger partnership between the public and private sectors IN states and across states will now be crucial, and not just to limit the effects of systemic shock”. Amen to that!

NATO now

Finally, what of Ukraine and Afghanistan now? Sadly, there is not much NATO can any longer do for the brave people of Afghanistan other than learn the lessons of a failed campaign and the need for more robust political cohesion, more intelligent use of military force, greater civil-military integration and deeper strategic patience. Ukraine is another matter. Strategic Concept 2022 is clear: the Alliance must launch a Ukrainian Deterrence Initiative (UDI) as an extension of the Alliance’s Enhanced Opportunity Partner program. Under the UDI, the allies must do all they can to assist Ukraine to defend itself, dissuade Russia from launching further aggression, and thus increase Kyiv’s leverage in pursuit of a political settlement to the conflict in Donbas. The UDI must include the provision of military equipment and training, as well as efforts to enhance Ukraine’s resilience against cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic warfare, and political subversion. The UDI will also establish a function-driven form of partnership, making it a formal Alliance responsibility to help train Ukrainian armed forces and to facilitate their acquisition of modern defensive weapons backed by common funding. Similar support should be offered to Georgia.

Ukraine is a test of collective resolve. For several Allies who are not on the outer boundaries of either NATO or the EU, and who face debt-ridden post COVID economies, the conceit of many Europeans over Ukraine is very similar to that of Neville Chamberlain about another ‘artificial’ (as he saw post-Versailles Czechoslovakia) country: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”. Like Chamberlain, many Allies fail to realize the price they could pay in the longer run by holding on to cherished delusions over the shorter-term. At least Baldwin and Chamberlain rearmed from 1934 onwards as an insurance policy. NATO?

The TAG NATO Shadow Strategic Concept 2022. The Alphen Group commends our report to you.

Julian Lindley-French

 

 

 

VSF 2022: Ukraine Guidance

January 20^th, 2022. Yesterday, I had the honour of addressing the excellent Vilnius Security Forum to consider Ukraine and the “most probable and dangerous course of action”. My approach was to prepare guidance to ministers focussed on the military-strategic and politico-strategic implications of Russian aggression and available policy options to the Euro-Atlantic community over the short-term (now), medium-term (2025) and the longer-term (2030).  The guidance below is based on my Vilnius remarks. Next Tuesday The Alphen Group’s new Shadow NATO Strategic Concept will be presented to NATO senior staff in Brussels (it will be publicly-launched by the German Marshall Fund, the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Feb 3^rd.). Many of the recommendations in the Shadow Strategic Concept are relevant to generating the proportionate but clear NATO-centric response that are needed now and in the aftermath of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

PART ONE: ASSESSMENT

Russia’s immediate aim is to consolidate its 2014 invasion of Ukraine and thus force Kiev into compliance with Moscow’s European strategy by whatever coercive means necessary, including the possible use of large-scale military forces. All the evidence suggests some form of invasion is imminent. On January 18^th the US and UK confirmed that all the necessary Russian forces were in position to launch an invasion of Ukraine, including all the necessary Battalion Tactical Groups, enablers, combat support and combat support services.   A Russian attack would be likely to take place along the Chernihiv-Mariupol Axis and designed to ‘slice’ much of eastern Ukraine away from the rest of the country.  Russia would probably justify its invasion as a humanitarian act to protect Ukraine’s Russian-speaking minority. The occupied area would become a Russian ‘protectorate’ before it is eventually offered the status of a Russian province by the Duma.  If successful, such a strategy would give Russia complete control of the Sea of Azov, enable it to seize the port of Mariupol and provide a secure land bridge between Crimea, Sevastopol and Russia. 

There is still time using diplomatic channels for the Western Allies to convince the Russian leadership that the complex strategic coercion it is applying against Ukraine, and by extension Allies and partners, is bound to fail.  However, such an approach would require Euro-Atlantic solidarity and whilst there might be some scope for a good cop (France, Germany and Italy), bad cop (US, Poland, UK) stratagem, it is more likely Moscow would see that as weakness. In that light, President Macron’s suggestion that the EU should seek a separate security pact with Russia is more likely to divide the EU than open up a new political path for Putin to withdraw his forces from Ukraine’s borders without losing face. Given the gravity of the situation any agreed policy must thus be both bilateral and NATO-focussed based on a determination that the free nations and peoples of the Euro-Atlantic area remain committed to a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Russian Federation built on the principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. However, any such dialogue with Russia must also send a clear message to Moscow that the Alliance will always maintain a force posture to ensure credible defence and deterrence for all of the Alliance, and that Russian aggression and the illegal use of force will have profound consequences for Russia.  

 PART TWO: MILITARY-STRATEGIC SITUATION

 On paper Ukrainian forces could put up a good fight in the event of another Russian invasion of their country, but in reality they are hopelessly out-matched. There are an estimated 130,000 Russian troops deployed along the Ukrainian border from near Hornyel in Belarus to the Crimea.  There are also some 32,000 Russian and separatist troops in occupied eastern Ukraine, as well as 80,000 deep strike formations and reserves held back from the border on a jump-off line running north-south centred on Voronezh.  Crucially, elite Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) have now been deployed along the border, supported by field hospitals and other combat support and combat support services.  At present there are 50 BTGs in situ. These are Putin’s shock-troops and are organised into 168 BTGs and have a ‘grab and hold’ function and are designed to link up with Spetsnaz forces and thus act as a link between Special Operating Forces and the bulk of the Russian Army.

 Ukraine has 209,000 active duty troops against 900,000 Russian, although not all Russian troops are facing Ukraine, whilst Ukraine has 900,000 reserves against some 2,000,000 Russian reserves.  Ukraine also has 858 tanks against Russia’s 2,840 tanks and 1,818 artillery pieces against Russia’s 4,684. However, whilst Ukrainian forces would continue to fight doggedly and with great courage the relatively flattering force comparison is in many ways false. The training, quality and equipment of Russian elite formations facing Ukraine is far superior. This is because Russia spends $43.2 billion (and probably far more) on defence compared with Ukraine’s annual defence outlay of circa $4.3 billion. Consequently, Russia has 1,160 modern combat aircraft plus other sophisticated drone, missile and other remote and increasingly autonomous ‘kill box’ technologies against Ukraine’s 125 ageing aircraft. By way of further comparison, Russia also has 15 mainly advanced frigates in the Russian Navy compared with Ukraine’s 1 ageing frigate.

The US and other Allies have offset that balance by offering equipment and training to Ukrainian forces, but only to a limited extent. The US has provided $2.5 billion of military assistance to Ukraine since 2014. That has been spent mainly on defensive systems such as small arms and munitions and more advanced systems such as Javelin anti-tank missiles and given two refitted former US Coast Guard patrol boats to the Ukrainians. This week the UK delivered light anti-tank weapons to Kiev. Washington is also considering supplying Soviet-made mi-17 helicopter gunships that served with the Afghan National Army.

Russia’s possible military objectives

 It is not possible to read President Putin’s mind, but it is possible to assess Russia’s military strength and posture. There would appear to be two possible objectives and an alternative: 

 1.                  The US believes the strategic objective could be Kiev and the toppling of the Zelensky government, the release of former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko from prison where he is awaiting trial for treason, and Zelensky’s replacement with a puppet government, possibly led by Poroshenko. 

2.                  Kiev is a feint designed to pin the bulk of Ukrainian forces down defending the seat of Ukrainian government. Any attack on Kiev could involve Russian forces in urban warfare for an extended period.  Memories of Russian atrocities in Grozny would be rekindled both in Russia and beyond. 

 

3.                  Russia could conduct an extensive cyber war against Ukraine, starve the country of energy and blockade Ukrainian ports.

 PART THREE: POLITICO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

 Politico-strategic implications

The future political and strategic orientation of Ukraine has profound implications for the future security of Europe, most notably Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  There are three possible options:

 - Ukraine decides to move towards the EU and NATO; 

 - Ukraine remains determinedly neutral in much the same way as Switzerland, but not in the manner of Ireland, Sweden or Finland; or

3.      - Russia succeeds in installing a puppet government in Kiev and Ukraine tips decisively towards Moscow, in the manner of Belarus.

The third implication is clearly Moscow’s strategic desire. It is in that light the Russian ‘offer’ of a new European security treaty must be seen.  There are three possible interpretations of Moscow’s unacceptable demands therein none of which are mutually exclusive. First, they are designed to test the resolve and cohesion of the Alliance. Second, the willingness of the Americans to negotiate with Russia over the heads of their European allies and Ukrainian partners about their respective critical interests, and thus re-establish a Cold War precedent.  Third, they are designed to fail and thus provide Moscow with a casus belli.  

The latter implication should not be dismissed.  The timing of Russia’s aggressive military force posture, which was rehearsed in spring 2021, is also designed to exploit the Berlin government’s closure of last six relatively modern nuclear power plants and the operational readiness of the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline, as well as the French presidential elections and the French presidency of the EU.  It is Germany’s (and much of Europe’s) growing dependence on Russian energy that is perhaps the single most important external factor shaping Moscow’s actions.  However, given Berlin’s centrality to Russia’s European strategy it is also reasonable to assume Moscow will not invade Ukraine before the forthcoming ‘reset’ meeting between President Putin and Chancellor Schölz.  

Putin intends to enter the Schölz meeting from which he regards as a position of overwhelming military strength. Putin also knows that NATO forces would be very unlikely to intervene in Ukraine beyond supplying Ukrainian defence forces with equipment or training.  NATO also lacks the political cohesion and the military capability in theatre to mount what would need to be the biggest military rescue operation in Europe since 1945. 

Politico-strategic consequences

The merest glance of a map demonstrates that the politico-strategic consequences of a successful Russian invasion would not just be profound for Ukraine, but for wider European security.  If Ukraine were reduced to a Russian puppet state Moscow would have created a strategic salient right into the heart of free Europe.  A successful Russian invasion and occupation of a very significant part of Ukraine would also be a big step towards the creation of a de facto buffer between Russia and NATO and the effective ‘Finlandisation’ of EU and NATO states from the Black Sea to an increasingly militarised Arctic. 

The security of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be profoundly weakened, not least because it would appear both the EU and NATO are incapable of influencing fundamental security challenges in Europe.  Russia’s ability to exert complex strategic coercion grey zone warfare would also be markedly strengthened and Russia’s use of hybrid warfare against allies on NATO’s eastern flank would doubtless intensify. 5D warfare against the Baltic States combining deception, disruption, disinformation, destabilisation and coercion through implied or actual Russian military action could become sufficiently acute that it in effect forces the three Baltic States into Russia’s sphere of influence, irrespective of their formal affiliations and memberships.

Whilst the US may respond by deploying two or three more Brigade Combat Teams to Europe the Biden administration is unlikely to do more.  This would be partly due to the worsening over-stretch of US armed forces caused by the seemingly inexorable rise of blue water China in the Indo-Pacific but Russian aggression in Ukraine would also test the willingness of the American people to again confront Russia in Europe at a time when Washington faces a host of domestic challenges. If the Americans fail to meet the challenge, a future Russian invasion of the Baltic States would suddenly become far more feasible, not least because it is clear Germany is not going to confront Russia beyond the demonstrably short-term, non-military, and symbolic. 

Policy options

Policy options must be considered over the short, medium and longer-term. This week, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt. Hon. Ben Wallace, established the principles upon which any response must be based.  Russia is conflating it aggression against Ukraine with demand for constraints on the future force posture of NATO. In fact, these are two separate policy-strategic Russian aims which must be seen as such. The Secretary of State also established the non-negotiable principles for a considered, proportionate and measured response to this grave crisis that Russia has chosen to create. First, NATO is a defensive Alliance. Second, all the free states of Europe joined the Alliance freely, which is a fundamental principle that must be defended. The people of Vilnius have the same rights to freedom, security and defence as, say, the people of Viereck in Germany, or Vancouver in Canada. Third, NATO is not encircling Russia as the Kremlin claims.  Russian militarisation of the Arctic, its threats to undersea communications, its growing interference in the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, its abandonment of international treaties and norms, and its deployment of advanced, destabilising weapon systems demonstrate it is Moscow that is not only seeking to further dismember Ukraine but to destabilise free Europe, and decouple Europeans from their American and Canadian allies.

Short-term (pre-invasion and upon invasion)

Prior to an invasion (if possible) the deployment of more equipment and ‘trainers’ to Ukraine by NATO nations would be a clear deterrent.  NATO should at least formally launch a Ukrainian Deterrence Initiative to better equip Ukrainian forces over the medium-term and make the Ukrainian government and society more resilient in the face of Russia’s relentless information and cyber-attacks.

The only realistic diplomatic option in the wake of a Russian invasion would be to demand the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, but in return accept Ukrainian neutrality as a reality, perhaps as part of a Franco-German brokered Minsk 3 Accord (Minsk 2 is dead).  The political result would be a Ukraine that would look much like Austria during the Cold War and reflect a pragmatic approach much like the US withdrawal of Thor missiles from Turkey six months after the November 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Even with that pragmatic approach there would also need to be an array of tough sanctions applied against Russia immediately, including an end to Nordstream 2 with Germany compensated by imports of US gas. Russia will have war-gamed such sanctions and will be betting that individual countries will dilute them, not least France, Italy and Germany.  

If Russia invades Ukraine the balance of military power in Europe will be changed.  NATO must respond immediately to demonstrate to Moscow that such actions will always trigger a defensive reaction. One option would be to deploy HQ, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQARRC) from England to near Warsaw. Such a deployment would send a clear signal that NATO will defend itself and reinforce the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Tailored Forward Presence in Bulgaria and Romania.

Medium-term (2025)

Over the medium-term (2025) NATO would need to complete and then reinforce the NATO Readiness Initiative allied to enhanced military mobility so that the bulk of Allied forces can move far more quickly to where they are needed. NATO should also move to expand the concept of deterrence across the spectrum of hybrid, cyber, conventional and nuclear threat and help the nations reinforce their resilience against 5D warfare across the bandwidth of hybrid, cyber and hyperwar – deception, disruption, disinformation, destabilisation and coercion through implied or actual Russian military action.

Longer-term (2030)

Over the longer-term a new European energy mix is needed that eases dependence on Russian energy.  However, it is hard power that the Putin regime most respects. Therefore, by 2030 at the latest, an Allied Command Operations Mobile Heavy Force (AMHF) should be deployed.  This would be a mainly European force with European enablers that would act as future core of NATO deterrence in Europe.

The AMHF would consolidate all Allied Rapid Response Forces into a single pool of forces and act as a high-end, first responder in all and any emergency.  The AMHF would be sufficiently capable to meet the array of future war threats Europeans will face as emerging and disruptive technologies enter Europe’s contested space. The AMHF would also be sufficiently capable to operate from seabed to space and across the multiple domains of the future battlespace air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge armed with the emerging intelligent technologies that will shape the character of future war.

Comment

For all and any of the above to be realised European political leaders would need to end what for the past thirty years has passed for lamentable and utterly incompetent security and defence policies. The very policies that have brought Europe to the point where in 2022 Russia is considering undertaking a full-scale invasion of a European country. No more self-deceit.

Julian Lindley-French