Ukraine: What next?

“So long as Russian forces are illegally occupying Ukrainian territory any weapons the West provides to assist in our legitimate defence are by definition defensive”

Dmitro Kuleba, Foreign Minister of Ukraine

April 3^rd, 2022

Sitrep April 5th

Russia will soon launch a renewed spring land offensive in Ukraine. Russia’s military aims would now appear to be threefold.  First, to destroy or wear down the main body of Ukrainian regular forces in the Joint Force Operating Area and expand their control over the whole of the Donbas, including the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Second, to secure the land bridge between Russian controlled Ukraine in the east and Crimea, Moldova and Transnistria. Third, to deny Ukraine all and any access to the Black Sea by taking the port of Odesa. If Russia succeeds the implications for both Ukraine and the Black Sea Region will be profound.  

Russian forces are re-positioning, re-organising and re-suppling in their Western, Central and Southern Military Districts during an enforced operational pause following the failure of phase one and the conquest of Kyiv.  Russian forces have been forced to make such a choice because given the force ratios they generated initially they were highly unlikely to have seized Kyiv and much of the rest of Ukraine east of the Dnepr River, and successfully occupy it thereafter, unless Ukrainian forces had collapsed. They did not, putting up stout, clever and carefully-tailored resistance reinforced by advanced light Western weapons systems.

What specific ends does Russia now seek? In my LINDLEY-FRENCH ANALYSIS of December 20^th, 2021, I stated that given the forces deployed and the balance Russia will still need to strike between risks, costs and benefits seizure of Ukraine’s entire coastline from Donetsk to Moldova would seem the likely objective. If successful, the campaign would leave a rump Ukraine dependent on the rest of Europe and thus Europe's problem, minimize risk of direct operational contact during with NATO forces, and be close enough to Russia to ensure its much degraded echelons can prevail.  If achieved, Russia would establish another buffer zone between Russia and NATO forces, increase the implied threat to the Baltic States, and further extend Russia's sphere of influence into the wider Black Sea Region. With the continuing attacks on Mariupol and the opening of an offensive against Odesa that plan is now beginning to unfold.

Cease-fire or more fire?

It would also appear Russia has abandoned any pretense to seek an early political settlement. The discovery of tortured and murdered civilians in Bucha, Irpin and Hostomel makes it hard to imagine that any ceasefire, let alone an interim political settlement, can now be agreed between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, if the Russian political aim is to establish a negotiating position on the ground then such war crimes are not only disgusting, they are self-defeating.  Naturally, Moscow denies any involvement in the murder of civilians, but satellite imagery provided by Maxar, together with video footage obtained by the New York Times, clearly shows that 11 of the bodies in Bucha were of people killed in situ between March 9^th and 11^th when the town was under Russian control.

The gap between Russian campaign objectives and campaign performance continues to remain wide meaning the war could increasingly become a bloody stalemate unless there is a decisive external intervention. Russian targeting has been appalling, as has the organisation, replenishment and thus the utility and agility of much of the Russian force.  What reinforcements Moscow has brought, such a 1500 strong force from Georgia, is unlikely to make much difference to their fighting power. They have also merged and re-organised Battalion Tactical Groups to offset losses, albeit at the expense of both the experience and combat power of their once feared ‘BTGs’. Russia’s elite airborne and armoured formations have suffered particularly heavy losses, whilst Russian infantry has shown that it is not at all well-trained, particularly for operations in urban environments, which is why they have resorted to indiscriminate missile and artillery attacks. Russian forces had clearly not planned for such significant losses of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and air assets, which has thrown them on the defensive.

The Russians also failed to plan for carefully targeted and well-executed Ukrainian attacks on their rear echelons, or the ability of Ukrainians to use drones to gain some semblance of local air superiority. The Ukrainians have also critically and cleverly exploited the weaknesses of Russian infantry, their poor training and low morale. However, the Ukrainians have also suffered losses and urgently need to reinforce their own forces and replenish their arsenals with advanced Western equipment, both light and heavy.  If not, they could be slowly worn down, however well they fight.  What are the options open to Ukraine’s Western partners?

Options, pros and cons

Options depend on aims and aims depend on ambition, capability and capacity. Prior to the discovery of war crimes the West seemed content to simply keep the Ukrainians in the fight so that they could negotiate a ceasefire from at least some position of strength. Now, it will be extremely hard for the Ukrainians to negotiate with the Russians. What other options are there?

Sanctions: On Wednesday, EU ambassadors will meet to discuss imposing tougher sanctions on Russia.  These are likely to include tougher sanctions against targeted individuals, as well as more restrictions on exports to Russia, together with a ban on Russian ships using EU ports. Interestingly, the EU also now seems willing to discuss sanctions on importing Russian coal, oil and gas. Berlin has even indicated it could stop importing Russian oil and gas in the wake of the atrocities. Enrico Letta, the former Italian prime minister and a key player in supporting Prime Minister Mario Draghi and the national unity government, even called for a complete oil and gas embargo. However, there are also signs of divisions within the EU and remains to be seen if the tough rhetoric is more than that. Russia is also successfully circumventing many of the existing sanctions, with the help of China and others. Sanctions also take time and given that the living standards of the Russian people has already declined some 30% since 2013, with no signs of the regime crumbling, sanctions alone are unlikely to force Russia to change direction. 

Lethal Aid: The provision of Western lethal aid to Ukraine, is being co-ordinated to a significant degree by the British who on March 31^st hosted the Second International Donor Conference in London. Britain’s own efforts are a case in point of what is needed if the strategic aim is to move from keeping Ukraine in the fight to some form of Ukrainian ‘victory’. Since 2014, Britain has trained over 20,000 Ukrainian personnel and has provided extensive lethal aid to Ukraine, including over 4,000 NLAWs and Javelin anti-tank systems, and is in the process of sending its latest Starstreak air defence systems, as well as 6,000 more anti-tank high explosive missiles, as well as body armour, helmets, boots, ration packs, rangefinders and communications equipment. Vital though such aid has been it is not enough to help Ukraine prevail given the nature of the current and coming fight. That is why Britain, along with its 35 partners, are actively considering sending tanks, artillery and anti-ship missile systems to counter the threat posed by Russian forces in the east and south, including the Russian Black Seas Fleet and additional amphibious units which are now threatening Odesa. More lethal aid in conjunction with tougher sanctions would increase the pressure on the Kremlin without putting Western forces in direct conflict with Russian forces. Could sanctions and the level of lethal aid envisaged tip the balance in the coming fight? Unlikely. 

No Fly Zone: Some are proposing a Western or NATO No Fly Zone which would afford Ukrainian forces a much higher level of force protection against Russian air and missile power. However, to be effective an ‘NFZ’ must be imposed both over the fight and the lines of supply and re-supply. Much of the next phase of the Russian campaign will take place close to the Russian border and air defence hubs. Therefore, if NATO, for example, were to try and enforce such a Zone, it would be less a No Fly Zone and more a major air campaign that would inevitably lead to direct contact and conflict between NATO air forces and the Russian Air Force, with all the dangerous capacity for rapid escalation such a conflict would entail. Most European air forces also simply lack the capability to undertake such a deployed forward air campaign over hostile air space, and the one or two that do, such as Britain’s Royal Air Force, lack the capacity to sustain it. Therefore, any such campaign would need to be overwhelmingly American.  It would also offer Putin the opportunity to claim that he was right all along: NATO is not a defensive alliance and poses an existential threat to Russia. Therefore, whilst a No Fly Zone would undoubtedly improve the tactical position of Ukrainian forces it would come with a host of strategic risks.

Direct Allied action: The most unlikely scenario is that NATO would move to act directly in support of Ukrainian forces across the full bandwidth of the conflict. It is very hard to see any such proposal making it to the North Atlantic Council, let alone being approved. If such a decision were ever to be approved what options would be open to SACEUR. One such option could be to use American and British nuclear submarines to launch distant cruise missile strikes from the Eastern Mediterranean against Russian naval and amphibious forces threatening Odesa.  Possible, but highly unlikely given current circumstances and Alliance politics. 

What other options exists? As I proposed in a previous Analysis NATO, or more precisely the Americans and the British, could increase further their intelligence support for the Ukrainians. Another option could be to impose a blockade of the Black Sea by enforcing the Montreux Convention, either by closing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, or via a distant Alliance blockade in the Mediterranean. Bottling up Russian naval forces in the Black Sea would have significant consequences for Russian naval operations elsewhere, not least in the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic, Arctic and the Pacific.  Other options include increasing cyber and more electronic warfare support for the Ukrainians, both offensive and counter-measures.

What it likely to be agreed to by Western nations are a mix of increased stand-off short-of-direct engagement measures to support the Ukrainians, including marginally tougher sanctions, some more lethal aid, and greater covert combat support, but no direct confrontation with Russian forces in or near Ukraine unless they step over onto Alliance territory.  Paradoxically, such a confrontation might only be triggered if Russia were to use chemical, biological or even tactical nuclear weapons if, for example, its efforts to seize Odesa failed and thus to cut Ukraine off completely from the sea. Denying Odesa to Ukraine rather than taking the port could be just as attractive to Russia.

Or, it might have the opposite effect. Any such action would certainly split the Alliance. Why not more? There is the obvious fear in Europe of another major European war and with it the threat of potential nuclear annihilation. There is also another reason. In the event of some form of political settlement Ukraine wants security guarantees from its Western partners that most are simply not willing to give.  The Ukrainians are also only likely to want to work with the Americans, British, Poles and a few others. The French and the Germans are seen by Kyiv as appeasers of Putin at best, collaborators at worst.

The Russian Order of Battle, April 4th

 The current Order of Battle of Russian Forces in Ukraine reveals not only the state of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also its sheer scale of the campaign, and the strain it is imposing on Russian forces and their commanders are under, with so many killed, sacked or arrested (with thanks to Dr R.D. Hooker Jr. and the Institute for the Study of War). It also shows how far and wide the Russian General Staff have had to trawl to maintain any scale of force and its increasingly disparate and, therefore, potentially ill-disciplined nature. What it also reveals is that the coming Russian ‘offensive’ will be as much defensive as offensive, designed to consolidate existing limited gains in the east and south of Ukraine. This is because not only has the Russian Army lost much of its manoeuvre capability, it has lost almost all of its capacity to conduct intelligent manoeuvre en masse. Just look carefully from where the forces are drawn. Perhaps the most telling sign of force stress is the presence in Ukraine of 11 Corps, the Kaliningrad garrison. The next two months will also see Ukraine at its muddiest.

It is precisely for these reasons Russia has switched from conquest to confrontation and even terrorism. They have the forces for it. In addition to the mercenaries of The Wagner Group and the Chechen fighters of the Kadyrovtsy force, there are also believed to be African, Arab, Azeri, South Ossetian and Libyan mercenaries fighting alongside Russian forces.

 Russia (Commander-in-Chief: President Vladimir Putin)

o       Ministry of Defence (General of the Army Sergey Shoygu)

§     Russian General Staff

§     Russian Armed Forces (General of the Army Valery Gerasimov)

§     Russian Ground Forces (General of the Army Oleg Salyukov)

§     1st Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General Sergey Aleksandrovich Kisel [dismissed]; unnamed deputy commander [dismissed])

§     2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel (Guards) Sergey Viktorovich Medvedev)

§     4th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Yevgeny Nikolayevich Zhuravlyov)

§     47th Guards Tank Division

§     27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergey Igorevich Safonov)

§     96th Reconnaissance Brigade (Colonel Valery Vdovichenko)

§     2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (Major General Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Gurov)

§     15th Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Sergeevich Marushkin)

§     21st Guards Motor Rifle Brigade

§     30th Motor Rifle Brigade

§     5th Combined Arms Army (Major General Aleksey Podivilov)

§     57th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade

§     127th Motor Rifle Division

§     6th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Vladislav Nikolayevich Yershov [dismissed & arrested])

§     25th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Andrei Nikolaevich Arkhipov)

§     138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Sergei Maksimov)

§     8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Nikolayevich Mordvichev)

§     20th Guards Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Aleksei Gorobets)

§     150th Motor Rifle Division (Major General Oleg Mityaev †)

§     20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Andrey Sergeevich Ivanaev)

§     3rd Motor Rifle Division

§     144th Guards Motor Rifle Division

§     448th Rocket Brigade

§     29th Combined Arms Army (Major General Andrei Borisovich Kolesnikov †)

§     36th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel (Guards) Andrei Vladimirovich Voronkov)

§     200th Artillery Brigade

§     35th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Aleksandr Semyonovich Sanchik, Deputy Commander Major General Sergei Nyrkov [wounded, not returning to active duty])

§     38th Motor Rifle Brigade

§     64th Motor Rifle Brigade

§     69th Covering Brigade

§     107th Rocket Brigade

§     165th Artillery Brigade 

§     36th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Valery Solodchuk, Deputy Commander Major General Andrei Anatolyevich Seritskiy, seriously wounded)

§     5th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel (Guards) Andrei Viktorovich Kondrov)

§     37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Yuri Medvedev †)

§     103rd Rocket Brigade

§     41st Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Sergey Ryzhkov, Deputy Commander Major General Andrey Sukhovetsky †)

§     35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Major General Vitaly Gerasimov †)

§     55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade

§     74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Alekseyevich Yershov)

§     120th Artillery Brigade

§     119th Missile Brigade

§     90th Guards Tank Division (Colonel Ramil Rakhmatulovich Ibatullin)

§     49th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Yakov Vladimirovich Rezantsev †)

§     34th Motor Rifle Brigade (Mountain)

§     205th Motor Rifle Brigade (Lt. Colonel Eduard Yuryevich Shandura)

§     227th Artillery Brigade (Colonel Aleksei Viktorovich Repin)

§     90th Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade

§     66th Headquarters Brigade

§     32nd Engineer-Sapper Regiment

§     58th Combined Arms Army (Lieutenant General Mikhail Stepanovich Zusko [dismissed and arrested])

§     19th Motor Rifle Division (Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Uskov)

§     42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division

§     136th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Roman Geradotovich Demurchiev)

§     291th Artillery Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Mikhailovich Tikhonov)

§     11th Army Corps (Major General Andrey Ruzinsky)

§     18th Guards Motor Rifle Division

§     14th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Dmitry Vladimirovich Krayev)

§     200th Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel Denis Yuryevich Kurilo †)

§     22nd Army Corps (Major General Denis Lyamin)

§     126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade (Colonel Sergey Storozhenko)

§     127th Reconnaissance Brigade

§     12th Guards Engineering Brigade (Central Military District, Colonel Sergei Porokhnya †)

§     45th Guards Engineering Brigade (Western Military District, Colonel Nikolai Ovcharenko †)

§     439th Guards Reactive Artillery Brigade (Southern Military District)

§     Special Operation Forces (SSO) (Major General Valery Flyustikov)

§     Russian Navy (Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov)

§     Black Sea Fleet (Admiral Igor Osipov, Deputy Commander First Rank Captain Andrei Paliy †)

§     Moskva

§     Vasily Bykov

§     Northern Fleet (Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev)

§     Russian Coastal Troops

§     Russian Naval Infantry (Lieutenant General Alexander Kolpachenko)

§     40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Colonel Dmitri Ivanovich Petukh)

§     61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet, Colonel Kirill Nikolaevich Nikulin)

§     155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet)

§     336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Colonel (Guards) Igor N. Kalmykov)

§     810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Colonel Aleksei Nikolaevich Sharov †, Deputy Commander Colonel Aleksei Berngard)

§     177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla)

§     Russian Aerospace Forces (General of the Army Sergey Surovikin)

§     Russian Air Force (Lieutenant General Sergey Dronov)

§     4th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Nikolai Vasilyevich Gostev)

§     1st Guards Composite Aviation Division

§     6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Major General Oleg Makovetskiy)

§     105th Guards Mixed Aviation Division (Colonel Sergei Prokofyev)

§     11th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Lieutenant General Vladimir Kravchenko)

§     303rd Composite Aviation Division

§     14th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Major General Vladimir Sergeyevich Melnikov)

§     41st Air Defence Division

§     Russian Airborne Forces (Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov)

§     7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division

§     76th Guards Air Assault Division (Major General Alexey Naumets)

§     98th Guards Airborne Division (Guards Colonel Viktor Igoryevich Gunaza [dismissed] by end of March)

§     106th Guards Airborne Division (Guards Colonel Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Selivyorstov)

§     45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Vadim Pankov)

§     11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Denis Viktorovich Glebov †)

§     31st Guards Air Assault Brigade

§     83rd Guards Air Assault Brigade (Guards Colonel Aleksandr Kornev, Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Vitaliy Nikolaevich Slabtsov †)

§     GRU (Admiral Igor Kostyukov)

§     2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Konstantin Bushuev)

§     3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Colonel Albert Ibragimovich Omarov)

§     10th Spetsnaz Brigade

§     22nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade

§     24th Spetsnaz Brigade

o       Security Council

§     Russian National Guard (General of the Army Viktor Zolotov; Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Roman Gavrilov [dismissed and arrested])

§     604th Special Purpose Center (Colonel Alexey Stromakov)

§     Kadyrovtsy (Head: Ramzan Kadyrov)

§     OMON

§     SOBR

o       Ministry of Internal Affairs (Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev)

§     Police of Russia^[15]

o       Federal Security Service (General of the Army Alexander Bortnikov)

§     Border Service of the Federal Security Service

o       Foreign Intelligence Service (Director: Sergey Naryshkin)

o       Russian Irregular forces

§     Union of Donbas Volunteers

o       Mercenaries

§     Wagner Group (Leader: Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Utkin)

§     Arab and African mercenaries

§     South Ossetian and Abkhazian mercenaries

§     Serb, Azeri and Libyan mercenaries

·                      Donetsk People's Republic (Supreme C-in-C: Denis Pushilin)

o       Donetsk People's Militia (Major General Denis Sinenkov)

§     Sparta Battalion (Colonel Vladimir Zhoga †)

§     100th Brigade

§     Mariupol-Khingan Naval Infantry

·                      Luhansk People's Republic (Supreme C-in-C: Leonid Pasechnik)

o       Luhansk People's Militia (Colonel Yan Leshchenko)

Assessment

There is another factor that should be considered looking at the Russian Order of Battle: just how long can Russia maintain this level of operations? Two weeks ago, Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Ben Hodges and I wrote a piece entitled Kulminatsionny Moment? We argued that the Russian Army was at the limit of its offensive potential. Whilst the Russian General Staff is trying to re-organise to maintain some level of offensive momentum, the conventional combat power available to it is clearly diminishing. In our book, Future War and the Defence of Europe, we also suggest that Russia could cause mayhem near its borders for thirty days and then begin to run out of steam. To be honest, we did not realise it would be so close to Russia’s borders, that much of the mayhem would be self-inflicted and that it would run out of steam and much else so quickly.

Which leads to me to yet another paradox of the Russian campaign in Ukraine. Moscow is clearly now preparing its people for a longer war with an army clearly unable and not particularly willing to fight it.   Some reports suggest that President Putin wants to declare victory by the May 9^th Victory Day commemorations. However, given the changing nature of the conflict if he is ever to declare ‘victory’ it will probably need to be closer to the 80^th anniversary of the start of the Battle of Stalingrad on August 2^nd  and only after many more conscripts have been killed and wounded. What happened in Stalingrad was not conquest by either side, but annihilation of a people and a city and on the Soviet side it was carried out in the name of de-Nazification.

Therefore, if the West wants to make a real difference it will at the very least need to demonstrate a determination to prevent Russia from claiming victory, and if possible help Ukraine win. The question then is what would victory look like for Ukraine and how could the West best help achieve it? Short of all-out NATO intervention it is very unlikely that Russian forces can be forced out of their pre-February 24^th positions, let alone back to the pre-2014 position. The closer Russian forces are to their own border the more difficult they will be to dislodge from a battlespace they have had eight years to prepare.

The most that can be reasonably expected given the correlation of forces is a return to pre-February 24^th positions, the blocking of a secure land bridge between Russia, Crimea and Moldova and Transnistria, the holding of Mariupol and the denial of Odesa, as well as the preservation of the bulk of Ukraine’s regular forces. To be blunt, it is hard to see this war ending in any peace agreement anytime soon. It is going to be a long haul. Much more likely is some form of frozen conflict akin to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement after which the preservation of Ukraine’s fighting power will be crucial. 

Putin is conducting an incompetent, cack-handed and brutal war in Ukraine, but then again history would suggest that is precisely the Russian way of war, now made worse by the forever stench of terrible war crimes.

Julian Lindley-French  

 

 

Falklands 40

Dear Friend and Colleague, below is the speech I had the honour to give at the Falklands 30th Command Dinner ten years ago. I say 'gave' because by the time I stood up (sort of) to speak it had been a long evening...  Still, the words still resonate!

 The Falklands Thirty Years on – British Élan and the Aura of Power

By

Julian Lindley-French

Field Marshal Bramall, Chief of the Defence Staff, Admirals Band, West and Woodward, Commodore Clapp, Lord Sterling, Major-General Thompson, distinguished guests and, above all, honoured veterans of the 1982 Falklands Campaign - there is no greater honour for me than to stand and address you on what was achieved all those years ago – the defence of freedom through the use of legitimate military power under Baroness Thatcher’s resolute leadership that has sustained Britain for these thirty years past.  Sadly, it is an aura of power that in spite of the heroic efforts of colleagues in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and host of other places could fade if real national strategy does not replace London’s ‘only recognise as much threat as we can afford’ view of the world and with it a dangerous loss of national influence.  What was done back in 1982 is thus as relevant to today’s Britain as past Britain.

As Europe crumbles and America stumbles we are faced as a country with a choice: to retreat into irrelevance and put up with whatever an unjust world throws at us; or to galvanise ourselves as we did in 1982 and set out to help shape the world for the better.  “For God’s sake, act like Britain”, former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk once demanded of then British Foreign Secretary George Brown.  In 1982 we did just that and acted  ‘like Britain’ - the Britain that millions of us out there still believe in, desperately hoping that today’s political leaders across the political spectrum can rise above the daily grind of party game and blame to which we are subject.

Let me start by paying tribute to the 255 British servicemen who did not return and the 775 were wounded. I would also like to pay my respects to the 3 civilians who lost their lives together with the 679 Argentinian servicemen killed and the 1657 wounded. This was not a cost-free conflict.  They never are.  Equally, I can still remember the words of Major-General Jeremy Moore, Commander, Land Forces, South Atlantic as though they were yesterday.  “Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the Union Jack once again flies over Stanley. God save the Queen". 

My theme tonight will be élan, British élan - defined as the determined pursuit of a strategic goal with a style and assurance that is itself power.  Élan is something more than men and kit.  It is a strategic brand that can change things even before a bullet is fired.  It is influence.  1982 saw a Britain that had retreated into a muddled foreign and security policy with strategy made elsewhere.  1982 saw a country in conflict with itself with many of the same doubts and tensions as today.  And yet somehow we defied an all-pervading sense of decline and showed that Britain could still hack it. 

Thirty years ago through your efforts, your valour and sacrifice you achieved four invaluable victories.  First, you defended a fundamental principle which was far bigger than the islands or the Islanders – the right of self-determination and the use of great power to that end.  Second, you reminded ally and adversary alike that the spirit of Britain pertained and that our old great country still understood how to exercise strategic influence fashioned as it was from a high-level of unity of effort and purpose.   Indeed, implicit in victory was courageous political leadership, deft and determined diplomacy and the creative and sustained application of legitimate military power.  Third, you reminded a tired and fractious British people at the end of a long, tired and fractious decade that Britain was more than a place, it was an idea in which still to believe.  No post-imperial basket-case but a powerful modern country that could when push came to shove distinguish between values and interests; principles and parochialism. 

Above all, you showed the world what my good friend Gwyn Prins called, ‘the aura of power’, that uniquely British blend of purpose, principle and pragmatism that made this country great and still can. 

Let me take my key elements in turn.  First, the defence of principle.  Major Norman and the heroic April 2 defence by the Royal Marines of Naval Party 8091 had shown the way, supported by the naval hydrographers and the Falklands Islands Defence Force.  I was under no illusions about what was coming. As an historian, I was hardened against the ‘all over by Christmas push over’ talk that so often happens at such moments as the more enthusiastic and romantic tip over into jingoism.  That said, I believed passionately in the right of our cause.  The Islands had been occupied illegally by a brutal dictatorship that had murdered thousands of its own.  That could not be allowed to stand. The Falklands would be lost and Britain would be finished.  Second, fighting power and fighting spirit.  Yes, the campaign was as Admiral Lewin said, “a damned close run thing”.  Admiral Woodward had a dangerous balancing act to perform.  Hermes and Invincible were not fleet carriers, and there were not enough Sea Harriers for an effective CAP of either the task force or the land force.  Sheffield and Coventry were lost providing the radar screen for a Task Force that lacked sufficient airborne early-warning.  Ardent and Antelope were sunk protecting the landing force at San Carlos that was too small according to military doctrine. The burning of the Atlantic Conveyor meant that many of the vital helicopters were lost and already absurdly long supply chains suddenly became even longer.  Atlantic Conveyor, was also a symbol of the doughty volunteers of the Merchant Navy, many not of these islands. 

But, from the moment Chris Parry forced the Santa Fe to surrender by helicopter at Gritviken and Vulcan 607 holed Port Stanley airfield, Chris Wreford Brown and the crew of HMS Conqueror did what was tragically necessary to protect the Task Force,  the constant brave vigil of the ships and Sea Harriers, from 2 Para’s inspirational battle at Goose Green and the fighting yomp of the Royals, to the heroic efforts of the chopper pilots to re-supply 5 Brigade’s stoic recovery from the tragedy of the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram at Bluff Cove/Fitzroy, to the poor bloody infantry struggles of 3 Para and, of course, 42 and 45 Commandos on Mount Harriet, through to the Guards and Ghurkhas at Tumbledown and Mount Longdon, the will of the Argentinians was broken by something more than mere force.  It was will that paved the way to the 14 June victory – a powerful mix of leadership and strategy, force and resource, flexibility and creativity that convinced the enemy that defeat was not when, but if.  That is élan.

There have been other examples.  The 1991 Gulf War, the Balkans Tragedy, the decisive 2000 rescuing of the people of Sierra Leone from pending slaughter, operations in Southern Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and more recently Libya all had elements of élan.  The manner in which then Brigadier Richards led Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000 had all the hallmarks of British élan.  Indeed, the way then Captain Zambellas took HMS Chatham up-river was reminiscent of HMS Warspite at Narvik in 1940.  As BBC journalist Allan Little wrote, “It was an astonishing thing to witness: the fortunes of a whole country transformed in the space of a few days by a single, decisive intervention”.

Gwyn Prins told me that when he was in the Advisory Group to former Soviet President Gorbachev back in 1990 Gorbachev told him that the Falklands action that was an important factor in convincing him that the Soviet Union could never win the Cold War.  Sad then that a senior Russian recently remarked, “the things we once admired about Britain are today the things that you despise”. 

Would a British Government today have the courage to instruct a Chris Wreford-Brown in Conqueror to sink Belgrano?  Tragic it may have been, but this was war.  As Clausewitz said, “an offensive war requires a quick, irresistible decision”.  As the fleet left Portsmouth an American friend said to me, “No-one else can do this.  The sight of Britain galvanising itself, the white ensign to the fore, is a sight like no other”.

Third, the impact on the British people.  1982 was no Elizabethan golden age.  Like now it was tough.  Economic decline had to be arrested, like now.  The country reeked of national decline.  Tough decisions had to be taken, like now.  The armed forces had for years been dragged through the streets and mud of Northern Ireland and had drifted to the margins of politics, like now.  As a country we were slowly drifting into strategic oblivion having become all too used to the excuses of politicians as to why our national voice no longer counted for much.  All seemed reduced to a question of pounds and pence.  Pride in ourselves as a country seemed of another age.

You reminded us all that there was another Britain. Under Prime Minister Thatcher’s courageous leadership you showed a tired and cynical, some would say, defeatist political and bureaucratic elite all too willing and able to find ten reasons why action was impossible, that Britain could again matter.  That is not to make a party political point - Tony Blair also understood that Britain could and should be a force for good.  That Britain’s place in the world need not be some tawdry accommodation between the American world view and the French and German European view.  In short, you bought us thirty years of strategic credibility. 

What now? With Argentina again on the make both the principle and place you freed thirty years ago must once again be defended.  But there is a bigger national, strategic picture that needs to honour your sacrifice and your victory.  Leadership today will mean forging a very new idea; an all-national unity of effort and purpose.  Furthermore, as we move towards a 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review the ‘strategic’ will need to be put back into the ‘strategic’.  For our armed forces that will mean a shift from a Europe-plus focus back again to a global role alongside our increasingly maritime strategic American allies, albeit one which balances strategic, austerity and influence.  This can only be done through the creation of a truly joined-up force in which no one service owns land, sea or air and which is part of a truly joined-up security policy, led in turn by a national strategy worthy of the name. As someone vaguely famous for a moment once famously said, “Gentlemen, the money has run out.  Now is the time to think”.

At the heart of British strategic influence MUST be state-of-the art armed forces that are projectable, deployable and sustainable built around a tight concept of fighting power for which the British armed forces are renowned, and which you demonstrated with such élan. Thankfully, such unity of effort and purpose does now exist at the highest levels of the services backed up by the vision to make it happen.  However, such unity needs to be invested in and preserved at all costs at what is a pivotal moment so that we can re-grip the bigger picture. Believe me the big strategic picture this century paints will be enormous and then some.

British defence strategy will also require some very clever decisions over the future force.  Sound strategy always requires compromise – only the truly powerful have no need of strategy.  BOTH aircraft carriers will be essential, as will a critical mass of Astutes, Type 45s, Typhoons et al.  Our entire front-line Army will need to become the equivalent of the elite Paras and Marines of 1982, reinforceable by truly capable reserves.  Our air force will need a global reach concept alongside the army and navy.  To that end, I am encouraged to believe that 2015 might indeed see the beginning of a return to sound principles of British defence strategy based on a simple principle – Britain, Europe and the wider world is a safer place when we as a country retain the military power to lead.  Not to dominate, but to lead.  To realise such a vision there will be no room for political complacency, nor indeed yet more short-term political compromise which sacrifices the medium-to-long term balance of the armed forces for short-term expediency.  Now is the decisive moment – the schwerpunkt.

Clever decisions will need to be reinforced by tough choices.  The first step will be to make a decision once and for all about those two carriers and stick to it.  Whether they have ‘cats and traps’ or not misses the essential point; the two ships will be central to our strategic brand for much of this blue water century and cost must be offset against value and seen as such across a forty to fifty year service life.  Nuclear forces – can we really fund them from the defence budget without leaving the conventional force wholly unbalanced?

Above all, we must hold our nerve; all the basic components are in place for a powerful modern navy, army and air force - our future force. 

One thing I can tell you – this century ain’t going to get any easier and like it or not whatever happens to Britain there is no hiding place for us.

To conclude, what was achieved thirty years ago was not simply to rescue the Falkland Islanders from a brutal dictatorship; through your élan you also saved Britain from a visionless self and made a proud people proud.  We are still Britain.  We are still Great Britain if we so choose.  Long may it be so.

Why does this all matter?  It matters because influence is the key to security and British influence still matters and must matter in a dangerous world.  You showed us the way.

Thank you all.  Thank you very much indeed. I honour you all.  I salute you all.

Julian Lindley-French

Putin: War by All and Other Means

 “If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships of the situation must not be merely transient - at least not in appearance. Otherwise, the enemy would not give in, but would wait for things to improve”.

Carl von Clausewitz

Tsar Vladimir Vladimirovich

March 28th, 2022. Putin is Russia. Putin faces an existentialist threat from enemies within and without Russia. Ergo, Russia faces an existentialist threat. To survive Putin and thus Russia must wage war because war is the only way Putin and Russia can survive. War must thus be permanent. That circular argument pretty much sums up how Putin sees himself and the Russia if which he is the dynasty-lite Tsar, an increasingly bizarre mix of Romanov and Stalin. Putin believes HIS Russia is facing an existential threat from systemic change in which Russia simply cannot compete. A Russia that could well become little more than a long railway line for the trans-shipment of goods from China to Europe, effectively enslaved by both.

The problem for Putin now is that he has called his own bluff through the spectacular incompetence of the Russian armed forces.  In Future War and the Defence of Europe John Allen, Ben Hodges and I suggest that the Russian Army could cause mayhem for thirty days or so before they ran into trouble.  They have certainly caused mayhem and it lasted thirty days but not even I expected them to run out of steam so close to the Russian border.

Putin on War

Does that mean the war will soon end? No. There may be a cease-fire but such a temporary cessation of hostilities does not mean the war will be over.  This is because Putin’s real war is not with Ukraine, it is with NATO and the West. Indeed, many commentators in the West simply fail to realise that in Putin’s zero sum view of the world all wars are existential, however small, and the West is a permanent threat. This is not because the West poses any military threat to Russia. It does not.  It is because the West is not Putin’s Russia and offers its people so much more than Putin can ever offer his.  That is why for Putin the war in Ukraine is the first geopolitical proxy war of the twenty-first century; a war that is being fought in Ukraine about the future of Europe and Russia.

For over a decade Putin has not only seem himself as indispensable to Russia, but the very embodiment of Russia. In such circumstances, Putin/Russia has no option but to strike hard, fast and early and continuously to prevent or at least delay the decline from real world power that is the real cause of this ghastly European war.  Therefore, the Ukrainian impasse is likely just the beginning, or rather the continuation of a long war that will be fought directly and indirectly across the 5Ds of applied Russian complex strategic coercion – deception (Maskirovka), disinformation, destabilisation, disruption, and actual or implied destruction.

For Putin the war in Ukraine is not simply to save his very traditional view of the traditional Russian nation-state, but the very idea that the nation-state is THE primary political unit in international relations.  He believes he is confronting three ‘threats’ separate but inter-linked threats to autocracy posed by democratisation, institutionalisation and globalisation, none of which Putin’s Russia is well-equipped to master. Putin’s answer is to do the only thing that the security state he has created knows what to do, or at least thinks it does, fight. 

Carl von Putin?

Perhaps the most famous quote from Clausewitz’s “On War” is that “war is a continuation of politics by other means”.  However, to properly understand what Clausewitz meant one also has by that one also has to understand his concept of strategy and “the use of engagement to attain the object of war”.  Thereafter, one can only understand his concept of ‘engagement’ if one also understands his idea that war is the application of all means and materiel by what for Clausewitz was still a relatively new political artifice: the nation-state.  In the world of the twenty-first century there is no greater early nineteenth century entity than the Russian nation state under President Putin.  Suffusing and permeating Putin’s reactive nationalistic ideology, such as it is, is a romantic and archaic notion of the Russian nation and its state. War, for Putin, is thus an extension of a primary trinity between the Russian state, the Russian nation (the people), and the Russian Army, all of which come together in him.

The destruction of the men, materiel and, above all, prestige of the Russian Army in Ukraine means that his primary tool for buttressing both the Russian State and his own power internationally has failed, whatever how happens in Ukraine.  Caught in a trap of his own making Putin has never been so dangerous to Russians, Ukrainians, Europe and the wider West. Therefore, in the absence of any cease-first and despite the Russian Army having now reached its culminating point it will not stop fighting. Rather, the nature of the fight will likely morph into the long, ghastly, grinding meat-machine that Russia has traditionally adopted when its forces have ground to a halt. 

War by all and other means

Putin will also apply all 5Ds of what he sees a perma-war; if Russia cannot have the spoils of war, then its enemies will be denied the spoils of Russia’s failure. Like Dante’s Alighieri’s Divine Comedy, Putin’s distinctly non-divine tragedy will go through several ever decreasing circles of coercion on the downward descent to Putin’s Hell. The first circle or target will, of course, be Ukraine. The many thousands now dying in Ukraine will have gone to their doom simply so that Russia can pretty much end up right where it started – fuelling a frozen insurgency in eastern and southern Ukraine. Cease-fire or no Russia will increase efforts to destabilise the Zelensky regime, disrupt the functioning of the Ukrainian state, spread disinformation at home and abroad, and systematically apply deception to discredit the Ukrainian political class. Putin will apply the same complex strategic coercion against a second circle of neighbours, the Baltic States, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and much of the Black Sea Region. The third circle will be the rest of democratic Europe which Putin will continue to seek to divide from each other, and decouple from the United States.

This is because Putin’s view of himself and Russia’s place in the world is vastly different from Russia’s reality. During the 2021 Moscow Victory Day Parade some Russian soldiers were dressed in the Red Army uniform of May 1945 to mark victory in the Great Patriotic War. However, the parade also marked the 800^th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Nevsky, the thirteenth century ruler/saint of the so-called Kievan Rus who defeated Swedish and German knights and in Putin’s mind laid the foundation for Putin’s reborn Novorossiya.  President Putin casts himself in Nevsky’s heroic mould and in his ‘splendid’ autocratic isolation Vladimir Vladimirovich may well have convinced himself he is Nevsky re-born.

Intelligent power

Europeans and the wider West need to understand Putin’s imperative if they are to craft both a short-term response and a longer-term strategy based on the intelligent use of power. The invasion of Ukraine is for Putin simply the latest iteration of a systemic struggle in which he sees Russia engaged. To disabuse him of any chance of success Western leaders must collectively understand that setbacks in Ukraine will not dissuade him of his ‘crusade’, because as long as he is in power that is all that matters to him. 

Over the short-term, the West must collectively keep Ukraine in the fight be supplying all the weapons and support Kyiv needs, increase pressure on Russia to end their aggression, stop it from spreading further, and then properly learn the lessons so that they are ready for Putin’s next act of aggression.  The latter requirement is vital.  If Syria was a preparation for Ukraine then given Putin’s world-view it is reasonable to assume Ukraine could well be preparation for some further demarche downstream either in the Black Sea Region or the Baltic.  The month of fighting in Ukraine has revealed a whole host of weaknesses in Russian fighting power which suggest that General Gerasimov and his efforts to modernise the Russian armed forces has been less successful than many in the West assumed. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov back in the 1980s would recognise much of the Russian Order of Battle today, particularly the poor quality of junior officer leadership and the patent lack of tactical initiative and innovations all too apparent. The joint force ‘jointness’ between air and land forces has been at times appalling, military intelligence has been weak, and much of Russia’s arsenal either old or very poor build quality. However, if Russian history is anything to go by heads will roll and lessons will be learnt.

No time for NATO complacency

One of the many paradoxes of Putin and his war in Ukraine is that whilst he is at some level the very latter day embodiment of a Clausewitzian prince (albeit without the Enlightenment), he is not a very good Clausewitzian.  Even a cursory glance of On War should have suggested to Putin that his so-called ‘force ratios’ were never likely to be enough to conquer and occupy much of Ukraine. However, given the nature of the man, his view of the world and the Clausewitzian nineteenth century state he leads with its latter day Boyars and the poor Muzhiks he uses as cannon-fodder, this is no time for NATO or its leaders to pat themselves on the back and take the complacent view that Russia no longer poses a threat.  He does. Putin simply cannot help himself.

Julian Lindley-French