“I know what you're thinking. Did he fire six shots or only five? Well, to tell you the truth, in all this excitement, I've kinda lost track myself. But being as this is a .44 magnum, the most powerful handgun in the world, and would blow your head clean off, you've got to ask yourself one question: "Do I feel lucky?" Well, do ya, punk?”
Clint
Eastwood explains deterrence by denial
Abstract:
The
new NATO Strategic Concept is clear, concise, and considered and does exactly
what it sets out to do: communicate Allied seriousness about deterrence and
defence. It has been published against the backdrop of a major war in Europe
and like all such documents is a trade-off between what needs to be done and
what can be afforded with transatlantic burden-sharing and European strategic
responsibility central to its ethos. The Strategic Concept is one half of a two
part strategic realignment of NATO and should ideally be read in conjunction
with the NATO Military Strategy. Unfortunately, the Military Strategy is
classified. It adds much of the detail
implicit in the Strategic Concept and the NATO 2030 Agenda. There are two critical
future NATO deterrence and defence components; lessons for the near term from
the Ukraine War and future force interoperability going forward and the balance
between technology and manpower. What matters now is that the strategic
momentum generated is maintained and the goals and missions both implicit and
explicit in the Strategic Concept and the Military Strategy are realised by the
European allies, for whom the Madrid Summit was a call to legitimate arms. If
so, the NATO Madrid Summit will pass the Riga Test and the good citizens
therein can sleep easy in their beds. Time will tell.
The
Riga Test
July
5th. That was the week that was! For many years I have had the
distinct honour of attending the wonderful Riga Conference. Each year I set the
Riga Test: can the good citizens of Riga sleep easier in their beds than last
year. In 2021, I had my concerns having
predicted the war in Ukraine but worried by the continued ‘we only recognise as
much threat’ as we can afford defence policies of many NATO European allies and
the wilful ignoring of the Russian threat.
In the wake of last week’s NATO Madrid Summit I am somewhat more
reassured, but there can be no complacency.
The NATO Deterrence Summit in Madrid was a
much needed dose of Allied strategic realism because it committed the Alliance
to re-generate a credible and relevant threat to use force against a strategic
peer competitor if necessary, implied the will and future capability to do so, together
with an understanding of the need for the demonstrable speed to act allied to a
clear capacity to inflict punishment. Consequently, NATO’s
traditional posture of deterrence by punishment is once again to be reinforced
by ‘Go ahead. Make my day’ deterrence. The tragic and criminal slaughter
of Ukrainian citizens by Russian forces means it is no longer acceptable to
aspire merely to ‘rescue’ the citizens of Allied countries after some possibly
180 days of occupation. Now, the fight will be taken forward against any
aggressor from the moment they set a foot on NATO soil. This is important
because one of the many lessons of the Ukraine War is that if Russia ever did
attack NATO territory it would be on a narrow front and designed to exploit a
lack of strategic depth.
However,
the devil is in the detail and the detail is quite devilish. NATO’s New Force
Model is an act of deterrence in its own right but needs to be delivered and
quickly. The plan is that some 300,000
mainly European troops across the continent soon be placed on high alert (not
high readiness) but it needs to be delivered. Finland and Sweden’s accession to
the Alliance will extend NATO presence on both the northern and eastern flanks
requiring a new concept of victory across a much expanded area of
responsibility (AOR). Existing NATO forward deployed defences on the alliance’s
eastern flank will be increased to the size of a brigade, which is about 3,000
to 5,000 troops in addition to local forces.
The
2022 NATO Strategic Concept
The
centre-piece of the summit was the publication of the first NATO Strategic
Concept since 2010. The 2022 Strategic Concept is deterrence and defence heavy and
thus has the feel of strategic guidance which is what it is for. It also
instructs the Alliance to realign core tasks with capabilities post-Afghanistan
in a new age of geopolitical competition to which Europeans are finally
awakening. To that end, Strategic Concept 2022 re-confirms
NATO’s commitment to collective defence and a 360 degree approach built on
three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management,
and co-operative security. It also
affirms the importance of resilience of the ‘home’ base.
The
basis for future development is the NATO 2030 Agenda agreed at last year’s
Brussels summit. The Agenda can be thus summarised; enough forces to deter,
engage crises and build partnerships and enough European forces able to respond
quickly to any crisis in and around the Euro-Atlantic Area. That is the sum of
an agenda that includes deeper and faster political consultation, strengthened
defence and deterrence, improved resilience, preservation of NATO’s technical
edge, the upholding of the rules-based order, increased training and capacity-building,
and the need to combat and adapt to climate change.
The
Strategic Concept also strikes all the right political chords. NATO’s purpose and common values are all
stressed, particularly on women and security. Reference is also made to further
command and control reform and the need for digital transformation, with strong
passages on cyber, and emerging and disruptive technologies. The friction over increasing common funding
and defence capacity building also seem to have been resolved, whilst it
reaffirms the NATO remains a nuclear alliance that also remains committed to a
nuclear-free world.
It
is also not the first NATO Strategic Concept to be published against the
backdrop of a war. In April 1999, the NATO Washington Summit also published a
Strategic Concept against the backdrop of the Kosovo War. However, Strategic Concept 2022 bears some resemblance to MC3/5 “The
Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area” of December 1952,
which took place against the backdrop of the Korean War. The 1952 Strategic
Concept tried to square the same circle as Strategic Concept 2022 – the need to
ease US military overstretch with increased European capabilities and
capacities in the face of an economic crisis, a Russian aggressor in Europe, and
a Chinese regional-strategic competitor. Both in 1952 and 2022 the elephant in
the room concerned Germany and the role it would play in Allied defence.
Russia
and its invasion of Ukraine pervades all sixteen pages of the Strategic Concept
with a marked change of tone compared to the 2010 Strategic Concept which
described Russia as a ‘strategic partner’, even though Russia had invaded
Georgia two years prior in 2008. The
2022 Strategic Concept is far less equivocal. “The Russian Federation’s war of
aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace and gravely altered our security
environment. Its brutal and unlawful invasion, repeated violations of
international humanitarian law and heinous attacks and atrocities have caused
unspeakable suffering and destruction.” China is now a “systemic challenge” and
terrorism the “most direct asymmetric threat”.
Will
the rubber hit the road?
Can
ambition and reality be aligned? The Military Strategy is centred on SACEUR’s
Area of Responsibility (AOR) wide Strategic Plan (SASP) and the Concept for the
Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA). There are two main pillars, the NATO
warfighting cornerstone concept (NWCC) and the Deterrence Concept. The New Force Model at the heart of the
Strategic Concept is the consequence of the Military Strategy and it is there
one finds the necessary detail. Specifically the call for the enhanced NATO Response
Force of some 40,000 troops to be transformed into a future force of some 300,000
troops maintained at high alert, with 44,000 kept at high readiness. For the
first time all rapid reaction forces under NATO command will be committed to a
deterrence and defence role and all such forces will be consolidated within one
command framework. Whilst the new force
will be held at 24 hours ‘Notice to Act’ the bulk of the NATO Force Structure
will held at 15 days ‘Notice to Move’, which will be a marked improvement over
the current structure in which some forces are 180 days’ notice to move.
At
American behest the new force will be mainly European with Allies on NATO’s Eastern
and South-Eastern Flanks agreeing to expanded deployed battalions to brigades
of between 3,000-5000 troops. For example, the British have two battlegroups
deployed to Estonia and they have now committed to adding an additional
battlegroup. Indeed, the UK will commit an extra 1000 troops and a
carrier-strike group (???) to the defence of Estonia, the US will send an
additional 3000 troops to the Baltic Sea Region, 2 more squadrons of F-35s will
be stationed in the UK and two US Navy destroyers sent to Spain. The new
Forward Defence strategy will also see heavy equipment pre-positioned near NATO
borders.
A
force of that size and with the necessary level of fighting power would
normally mean that with rotation there would always be a force of some 100,000
kept at high readiness, which will be extremely expensive for NATO European
allies grappling with high inflation and post-COVID economies. A NATO standard
brigade is normally between 3200 and 5500 strong. Given that both air and naval
forces will also need to be included a land force of, say, 200,000 would need
at least 50 to 60 European rapid reaction brigades together with all their
supporting elements. At best, there are only 20 to 30 today. There are already
concerns being expressed by some Allies.
That
is precisely why Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the NATO Defence
Investment Pledge of 2% GDP to be spent by each Ally on defence is now “more of
a floor than a ceiling”. Several NATO European allies have now committed to
increasing their respective defence budgets accordingly. Germany is leading the
way (at last) with its commitment to markedly increase its defence budget which
is vital given that the Bundeswehr
will in future become the central pillar of NATO land deterrence on the eastern
flank. The UK has also committed to spend at least 2.5% GDP on defence “this
decade”, whilst the Netherlands has committed to a 5.4% real terms increase in defence
expenditure over last year’s defence budget allied to spending 2% GDP on
defence by 2024.
The
sharing of NATO burdens
Whilst
the Strategic Concept is mainly a consequence of Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine,
the forthcoming US National Defense Strategy (NDS) is no less important. For the first time the NDS places a
premium on the support of allies and partners, particularly NATO. NDS 2022 also
implies a greater role for allies going forward in assisting the US meet its
strategic goals and challenges, particularly in and around the European
theatre. This is because China and the
Indo-Pacific are afforded a higher priority than Russia and Europe in NDS 2022,
even though Russia is described as an “acute threat”. There are also profound
implications for the new NATO future force, in particular the challenge of
maintaining interoperability in high-end conflicts with the US future force. The
US future force will be built on three principles: “integrated deterrence” and
credible combat power (including nuclear forces); effective campaigning in the
grey zone; and “building enduring advantage” by exploiting new, emerging and
disruptive technologies. NATO European forces?
For NATO the
message from the Americans is clear: if the US security guarantee for Europe is
to be credibly maintained going forward Europeans are going to have to share
the defence burdens far more equitably, with 50% of NATO’s minimum capability
requirements by 2030 probably the least the Americans will expect of their
allies. That will mean Europeans taking
on far more strategic responsibility than hitherto within the framework of the
Alliance and all Allies will need to develop an expeditionary mind-set, even
the Finns. In time, greater European
strategic responsibility will inevitably lead to capacity for European tactical
and eventually strategic autonomy.
NATO’s Big
2030 Plan
The Strategic
Concept and the Military Strategy together are NATO’s Big 2030 Plan. The plan involves
two phases much of which will need to run concurrently. Phase one involves
identifying and learning the lessons of the Ukraine War to bolster deterrence, defence
and resilience in the short-term. War is a giant black hole into which people
and materiel vanish at an alarming rate far beyond that envisaged by peacetime
establishments. NATO European forces will need for more robust
logistics forward deployed, with enhanced and far more secure military supply
chains particularly important. Far more materiel is also needed, most notably
ammunition. If NATO deterrence and defence are to be credible Allies will also need
to rebuild and build infrastructure to assist military mobility and remove all
legal impediments to rapid cross border movements in a pre-war emergency.
Deployed NATO forces will also need much improved force protection with the
need to reduce the detectability and thus digital footprint of force
concentrations (‘bright butterflies’).
The
war in Ukraine has also revealed the vulnerability of armour unsupported by
infantry and helicopters in the battlespace, as well as the need for NATO
forces to be able to dominate both fires and counter-fires. Much of the vulnerability of Russian forces
is due to the effectiveness of expendable drones, strike drones and loitering
systems allied to precision-guided munitions. NATO forces need an awful lot
more of all such systems across the tactical and the strategic. Enhanced
land-based, protected battlefield mobility will also be needed together with
increased force command resilience given how often the Ukrainians have been
able to detect and ‘kill’ Russian forward (and less forward) deployed
headquarters.
Thankfully,
given that NATO is a defensive alliance, the war in Ukraine has also revealed
the extent to which the defence has dominated the offence if forces are
reasonably matched. Whilst no-one
envisages a return to some kind of twenty-first century equivalent of the
Maginot Line secure pre-positioned capabilities and access to individual ready
reserves will be vital. There is one
other lesson NATO leaders and commanders need to learn given the attritional
nature of the war: do not sacrifice significant mass to afford a little
manoeuvre. Britain, are you listening?
Beyond
NATO’s horizon
NATO
must also look beyond 2030 and develop a hard core future war concept if
deterrence by denial now enshrined in NATO doctrine is to remain credible. In addition
to the Military Strategy the new SACEUR, General Chris Cavioli and his team must
also set the future force agenda with something akin to the 1952 Long-Term
Defence Plan with the aim of forging a markedly transformed military instrument
of power by 2030. Such a plan will need
to include strengthened forces postures, news structures & forces, a much
expanded NATO Readiness Initiative with supporting plans & concepts, transformed
training & exercises not dissimilar to the famous Battle Schools set up by
General Harold Alexander during World War Two, and a proper understanding where
capability, capacity, manpower and interoperability meet, especially when it
involves new emerging and destructive technologies.
In
other words, the true test of Madrid’s legacy will be the standing up of a
high-end, collective, US-interoperable, strategically autonomous (if needs be)
European-led Allied Mobile Heavy Force able to operate as a powerful first
responder in a pre-war emergency in and around Europe and across the domains of
air, sea, land, cyber, space, information and knowledge from sea-bed to space at
the highest levels of conflict complete with its own combat support and
enablers. Nothing less will suffice to
meet the ambition implicit in the NATO Strategic Concept. Are Europeans up to the challenge? Some leaders
are already looking to slide out of their respective commitments partly because
they never really understand what they have signed up to until their finance
ministers present the bill/check. So, here’s a novel
idea. Turn the NATO defence planning process on its head. Let the experts
identify the defence architecture NATO will need by 2030 and beyond, together
with the capabilities, capacities, structures and organisation to support it. Then
sit down again and agree how it can be afforded and fielded.
Critics
suggest that the Strategic Concept’s conciseness is a weakness, that it is
light on facts. What did they expect? NATO’s
strategic and political goals are now far more closely aligned with NATO’s Military
Strategy, the first such demarche since 1962, implying a new relationship
between effectiveness, efficiency and affordability. Critics also fail to understand the purpose
of a Strategic Concept or its relationship with the NATO Military Strategy. A NATO Strategic Concept is essentially a contract between
leader and practitioner in which the former instructs the latter what the
Alliance must minimally ensure and assure over the coming decade or so and
publicly commit to those goals. It is not a public relations document per se,
even if it does play such a role.
In
time, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept could well come to be seen as a landmark
document that set the direction of travel for the Alliance in a new “age of
strategic competition”, in much the same way as the December 1967 MC14/3.
However, that will only happen if the Alliance adopts the “Clint Doctrine”. For
that reason Secretary-General Stoltenberg and his team are to be congratulated
for being bold. '
Sleep
well, Riga.
Julian Lindley-French
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