“Do not try and do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them.”
T.E. Lawrence
Syria 2024
December 10, 2024. The renewed war in Syria had its roots in the October 7, 2023 attack on Israelis and Tel Aviv’s subsequent destruction of much of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran’s anti-Israel strategy across the Levant. What will happen next? In reality, no one knows, least of all me. What I can discuss is where Syria is today, literally, and politically, the implications both for the region and the wider world.
Syrian is a country in the Levant of some 22 million people which is bordered to the north by Turkey, to the east by Iraq, to the south by Jordan and to the west and south-west by Israel, Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, Syria is the epicentre of several contending and parallel geopolitical, regional strategic, confessional, and ethnic struggles.
Syrian society has been riven by ethnic tensions ever since the minority Alawite community seized power in Damascus led by former President Bashir al-Assad’s father and the Ba’ath Party in 1966. Syria is 90% Arab, with some two million Kurds plus other smaller groups making up the balance of a population that grew by over 300% between 1966 and 2013. It is a demographic shift that is evident across much of the Middle East and North Africa, as are many of the ethnic divisions.
Ethnic tensions have also reinforced the sectarian divisions that helped Islamist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which seized power in Damascus this week, to grow rapidly since its founding in Jordan. Syria is 87% Muslim with Shias making up 13% of the population, Sunnis 74%, with the rest small Christian, Druze, and other communities. In the past the Ba’athist constitution protected minorities and until those self-same minorities feel secure, peace is unlikely to be re-secured.
Regional-Strategic Implications
When the Arab Spring broke out in Tunisia in 2011 many commentators in the West hoped that some form of Western-leaning pluralism would emerge. In Syria today whatever happens in the coming weeks the result will certainly be pluralistic and anti-Russian given Moscow’s backing (and sanctuary) for Assad. However, it is unlikely to be pro-Western either. Rather, there is a very real danger that ethnic, sectarian, and regional tensions will merge. For example, in Iraq tensions between Sunni and Shia tribes were reinforced by divisions between the Arab and Kurdish peoples. Iran and Turkey are looking on nervously. Neither Ankara nor Tehran seems likely to permit the appearance of some kind of Kurdish ‘state’ which would have profound implications for Iran’s eastern and Turkey’s south-eastern provinces. Israel is already moving to carve out buffer zones in both the Qumaitra Governorate in the south-east of Syria and southern Lebanon.
Syrian instability is also a profound threat to the region’s many precarious states in the region which only just managed to see off the Arab Spring in 2011, which led to the further emaciation of the power of already weak Arab states. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon all suffer from a potent mix of contending ethnicities, sectarianism, economic decline, and enduring political tensions between states, rulers, and peoples. Islamist groups and affiliates of al Qaeda and Islamic State are also deeply entrenched across the region. Tel Aviv’s early moves to prevent Syrian chemical weapons falling into the hands of the new ‘regime’ suggests the very real chance that nuclear-armed Israel could be further dragged into a continuing conflict, especially if Jordan is threatened by some form of new Intifada that further exacerbates tensions between Israelis and Palestinians.
Most refugees simply want to escape danger, but a small minority also pose a very real threat to Europeans of all ethnicities and beliefs, which is why Britain, France, and Germany have moved swiftly to deny Syrians the right of asylum. The mass immigration of millions of Syrians, Iraqis, Iranians, and others into Western Europe since 2003 has already led to sectarian and identitarian conflicts being played out in European cities and streets. Conflict breeds radicalisation and there is a clear and present danger of hardened Islamist fighters now coming (returning) to Europe.
Geopolitical Implications
Ideally, the first task of the Western statesman would be to recognise the Syrian war for what it is and indeed the limits of Western statecraft. Syria is at the epicentre of conflicts across the Middle East that are now breaking out of one region and beginning to de-stabilise others. That is why a comprehensive strategy and strategic patience that works overtime to fill the power vacuum, prevent conflict and build stability. Such a strategy can only be crafted by big powers in support of regional powers. Herein lies the problem: in the wake of the disastrous Afghanistan and Iraq imbroglios the West have become mere spectators. There is a profound lack of real American strategic and political leadership in the region which is likely to be compounded by Trump 45. Europeans are both strategically incompetent and incapable.
Einstein once suggested that the only way to counter the unimaginable gravitational pull of a black hole is with countervailing superior power. If the Syrian vacuum is to be ended such power will mean far more than superior kinetic force. At the very least, a serious Western strategy would need to be precisely that, Western. This would demand of Americans and Europeans the political will that conflict resolution will take a lot of time, immense resources, huge power, and loss. It would also demand a real and sustained partnership with states across the region and beyond.
Unfortunately, there is no ‘West’ in the Middle East or anything like the requisite political will. President-elect Trump does not want America dragged into another entangling war beyond supporting Israel. The ‘major’ Europeans have swapped hand wringing over real past imperialism for the nonsense that is virtue imperialism. For the West, the Syrian war had a dreadful beginning, an appalling muddle, and with no end in sight. There are no statesmen and little statecraft. To paraphrase Churchill what happened in Syria this past week is certainly not the end, it may just be the end of the beginning.
Julian Lindley-French