Deterrence and denial
April 14, 2021. This past Tuesday I gave evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament following the submission of my new report Honest Broker? The EU, Strategic Autonomy and Security in the Future Arctic. My own evidence was supported by several colleagues who also gave evidence, including a Danish colleague who made the assertion that Russia would not breach any agreements or seize any area because ‘ownership’ of most of the Arctic has already been settled. As he spoke, Russia was threatening Ukraine with force specifically with the aim of reinforcing its flagrant breach of international law in Ukraine. Deterrence in denial?
Deterrence BY Denial normally concerns a state or an alliance generating sufficient military power to convince an adversary that they will be denied any gains if they use force. As such, deterrence BY denial has been at the heart of NATO strategy since its inception, and such deterrence continues to work for most Western European states. However, the steady erosion of relative European military power compared with Russia (and increasingly China), allied to the growing military overstretch of US forces as they seek to remain relatively strong the world over, is placing allies on the periphery of NATO and the European Union at ever greater risk. This growing risk is increasingly evident from the Arctic to the Baltic Sea through the Black Sea and even into the Mediterranean.
Complex strategic coercion
Strategic communications are a vital component of deterrence, which is essentially about messaging. The counterpart to Deterrence BY Denial is Deterrence BY Punishment by which an adversary is convinced through several channels of strategic communications that any ill-advised military action would inevitably lead to an unacceptably high price for its leadership and wider society. This is the ethos behind mutually assured destruction. Moreover, with the emergence of complex strategic coercion that stretches across the information, cyber and battlespaces, allied to the 5Ds of applied deception, disruption, disinformation, destabilisation and implied destruction a new form of continuous warfare is already being applied against the democracies by China and Russia. Unfortunately, too many Europeans seem to have embraced a new concept called Deterrence IN Denial by which they communicate to adversaries, such as Russia, that there is really no problem at all.
Deterrence, be it by denial or punishment, only works when sufficient countervailing force exists to mount a credible defence or credibly mount a rescue whenever and wherever it is needed. European defence IN denial is to simply hope that a pious belief in the sanctity of international law will be enough to deter predatory powers. Indeed, some of my colleagues yesterday seemed to go out of their way to praise Russia for its constructive commitment to Arctic governance, ignoring the build-up of Russian forces in the region. As Ukraine attests, of course Russia will observe the rules, until it does not because for the strategic autocracies in Moscow and Beijing international law is tactical means to a Realpolitik end. Sometimes, I get the distinct impression Europeans are playing chess, whilst Russia and China are playing poker. If that is indeed the case of course Europe can become strategically autonomous from the Americans because for deterrence IN denial to ‘work’ words will suffice. The German defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has even suggested that Russia is deliberately trying to provoke a reaction and because of that Germany will not get drawn into a response.
The simple facts are these: some 83,000 Russian troops from the Western and Central Military Districts are now deployed to the north and south of the Donbas. They include Special Forces and other elite units, with some enabling elements coming from as far away as Siberia. Moscow claims the force is merely exercising, but the size of the force is far larger than is normally the case for the annual spring exercises in the region. Moreover, given the nature and type of the formations deployed they are clearly configured for offensive operations. If such an operation began it would do so quickly, probably at night, with Spetsnaz and other specialist formations leading the way, accompanied by a host of measures that in the past I have described as ‘strategic maskirovka’, all of which would be designed to keep Western powers politically off-balance. One reason for the scale and configuration of the force could well be that since 2014, Ukrainian forces are far better trained (thanks mainly to the US and UK) and could sustain a far more effective defence than they did when Moscow seized Crimea.
What does Russia want?
Why is Moscow doing this? First, Moscow wants to send a clear signal to President Biden that when it comes to European security the Kremlin will only deal with Washington. For all the efforts of Paris and Berlin in the Minsk process and the Normandy Format, the Russians are only ever interested in being seen as the equals of the Americans (which is why they are considering a summit. Indeed, Moscow dreams of being one-leg of a new tripolar world with China and the US, even though Russia’s economic fundamentals warrant no such status. Second, Moscow wants to warn Ukrainian President Zelensky to back away from his calls for early NATO membership (highly unlikely) and to punish him after he blocked media channels run by the pro-Russian Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of Opposition Platform. Third, Moscow is also keen to deflect attention from growing domestic criticism of the Kremlin in Russia and the imprisonment and hunger strike of Alexander Navalny.
There could well be another reason which is the direct consequence of Deterrence IN Denial. The Biden administration has been particularly critical of Berlin’s determination to complete the NORDSTREAM 2 gas pipeline between Germany and Russia. Some 94% of the 2460km pipeline now complete. If finished NORDSTREAM 2 would double the amount of Russian gas being pumped to Germany and increase the dependency of Germans on the Russians for much of their energy security. Unfortunately, Berlin is a strategy-free zone in which mercantilism and historic guilt continues to shape much of Germany’s foreign and security policy towards Russia, even at the expense of fellow Europeans. Moscow knows that and the message from the Kremlin to Berlin is honour your commitment to NORDSTREAM 2 or else. Moscow would also only be too happy to drive yet another wedge in the US-German Essential Relationship.
Or, there could be another
reason. Moscow has simply decided there will be no better moment than now to
finish the job it began back in 2014, seize the Donbas and completely block
Ukrainian access to the Black Sea.
Speak softly...
Which brings me back to the Arctic. How on earth can Europeans trust Russia to observe international law ad infinitum in the Arctic when Moscow believes the region is just as strategically vital to its interests as Ukraine and Crimea (just look at a map)? At the heart of my new report on the EU and the Arctic is a scenario in which Russia, with the support of Chinese forces, seize Svalbard in 2030. My reason for including the scenario is not to suggest that such an attack is GOING to happen, but rather to get the Arctic States and their European friends to stop being so pious about international law and begin again to consider the worst-case. In other words, start backing their laudable commitment to multilateralism with some military attitude. Only then could any such scenario be definitively ruled out because real deterrence, be it by denial or by punishment, would be clear to all involved, including Russia. Rather, be it in the Arctic or in Europe much of ‘deterrence’ is built on denial, with Germany to the fore, about just what President Putin might do. And that indeed is the point. President Putin has a history of doing what he says and he might just decide to act precisely because he knows Western Europeans (and this is a complacent Western European problem) are in denial.
Denial is NOT deterrence. Indeed, I sometimes think if Teddy Roosevelt had been a contemporary European his mantra would not have been speak softly but carry a big stick, but rather speak a lot, say a lot of words, but forget the stick.
Julian Lindley-French
