My speech this week to a NATO conference in Italy on Strategic Culture

 

PROFESSOR DR JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH SPEECH TO “STRATEGIC CULTURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY NATO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION, ALMA MATER STUDORIUM UNIVERSITA DI BOLOGNA AND ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALE, BERTINORO, ITALY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2026

GOOD MORNING. I WAS GIVEN TWO QUESTIONS TO ANSWER: WHAT IS NATO’S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND HOW DOES THE DIVERSITY OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURES WITHIN NATO AFFECT ITS ABILITY TO FORMULATE AND EXECUTE A UNIFIED ‘STRATEGIC SHAPING’ POLICY? I WILL ADD A THIRD – WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE?

1.              WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE?

I WAS RIGHT! FOR YEARS I HAVE BEEN WARNING LEADERS WE ARE FAST APPROACHING A TIPPING POINT/RECKONING IN EUROPE’S DEFENCE. AND BEING POLITICIANS THEY ARE A) PRETENDIING THEY KNEW ALL ALONG. B) THEY ARE PREPARED.  THEY ARE NEITHER!

THAT RECKONING IS HERE NOW BUT STILL THE “WE ONLY RECOGNISE AS MUCH THREAT AS WE THINK WE CAN AFFORD” BRIGADE CLING TO THEIR DELUSION THAT NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE IS UNAFFORDABLE THUS COMPOUNDING RISK INTO DANGER. TRY WAR! THAT REALLY IS EXPENSIVE.

WHAT WE URGENTLY NEED IS NOT JUST A STRATEGIC CULTURE BUT A NON-US NATO STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FAST. WHY BECAUSE DETERRENCE IS OUR BUSINESS. THE MOMENT WE GET INTO DEFENCE THEN WE HAVE FAILED.  WE THUS NEED TO MAKE THE ALLIANCE THE DETERRENT IT SHOULD BE BUT WHICH TODAY IT IS NOT. 

SO, LET ME BEGIN BY GOING BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES BECAUSE STRATEGIC CULTURE IS ONE OF THOSE BULLSHIT PHRASES WHICH PEOPLE THROW OUT THERE BUT HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IT ACTUALLY MEANS – ME INCLUDED.

STRATEGIC: THIS IS THE MOST MISUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD WORD IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE MEANS VERY BIG THINGS REQUIRING VERY BIG MEANS APPLIED CONSISTENTLY IN PURSUIT OF VERY BIG AND CLEAR ENDS OVER A VERY LONG TIME BY VERY BIG MINDED PEOPLE TOGETHER.

CULTURE: THIS IS THE SECOND MOST MISUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD WORD IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. THIS MEANS DEEPLY HELD SHARED BELIEFS SOME OF WHICH ARE GROUNDED IN HISTORICAL MYTH HELD FOR A VERY LONG TIME THAT ACT AS REFLEXIVE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TOGETHERNESS, THE PLACE OF A COMMUNITY IN THE WORLD, AND HOW, WHY AND WHEN THEY ACT PARTICULARLY IN A CRISIS.

A STRATEGIC CULTURE FOR ME IS THUS: DEEPLY HELD SHARED BELIEFS THAT ACT AS A REFLEXIVE SET OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VERY BIG THINGS REQUIRING BOTH THE WILL AND THE CAPACITY TO APPLY VERY BIG MEANS CONSISTENTLY IN PURSUIT OF VERY BIG AND CLEAR ENDS OVER A VERY LONG TIME BY VERY BIG MINDED PEOPLE TOGETHER.  IN THIS CASE DEFENDING THE FREEDOMS OF OUR EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY NOW AT RISK.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH BIG PEOPLE WITH BIG MEANS IN POWER.  

2.              WHAT IS NATO’S STRATEGIC CULTURE?

I AM NOT SURE IT HAS ONE. IT DOES HAVE A STRATEGIC POSTURE IF IT CAN BE AGREED AND AFFORDED. AS SUCH, SUCH POSTURE HAS THREE ELEMENTS THAT COULD BECOME A CULTURE

THREAT INTERPRETATION: NATO VIEWS SECURITY THROUGH THE LENS OF COLLECTIVE VULNERABILITY, DEFINING RUSSIA AS ITS MOST SIGNIFICANT AND DIRECT PEER THREAT ALONGSIDE EMERGING CHALLENGES LIKE CYBER WARFARE, HYBRID GRAY-ZONE TACTICS, AND STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND THE LOSS OF THE US AS A RELIABLE PARTNER.

ACCEPTED METHODS OF ACTION: THE ALLIANCE RELISES ABOVE ALL ON DETERRENCE-BY-DENIAL ANCHORED BY ARTICLE 5 (THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE CLAUSE), COMBINING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY READINESS, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WITH LIKE-MINDED PARTNER NATIONS.

A STRATEGIC CULTURE COULD BE OPERATIONALIZED BY AN INTEGRATED APPROACH OVER TIME TO CORE TASKS IN NATO’S CASE THREE THREAT RELEVANT PERMANENT MISSIONS: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT, AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY WHICH FURTHER DEPEND ON RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS

3.              HOW DOES THE DIVERSITY OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURES WITHIN NATO AFFECT ITS ABILITY TO FORMULATE AND EXECUTE A UNIFIED ‘STRATEGIC SHAPING’ POLICY?

FIRST, ONLY TWO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BRITAIN AND FRANCE AND MAYBE A THIRD, POLAND, HAVE RESIDUAL STRATEGIC CULTURES PARTLY BECAUSE THEY STILL HAVE SOME CAPABILITIES THAT MAINTAIN THE PRETENCE THEY CAN ACT INDEPENDENTLY.

SECOND, THE REAL ELEPHANT IN THE NATO ROOM IS HOW TO ‘SHAPE’ (ANOTHER WORD THAT FEW UNDERSTAND) ND GENERATE THE WAYS AND MEANS TO CONFRONT AND DEAL WITH THE SHEER SCOPE AND SPEED OF UNFAVOURABLE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. IF CANADIAN AND EUROPEAN ALLIANCE MEMBERS ARE TO MEET THAT CHALLENGE THEY WILL NEED TO CRAFT AN ENTIRELY NEW STRATEGIC CULTURE DRIVEN BY SYNERGIES OF AND IN EFFORT THAT GENERATE MUCH GREATER EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH MUCH GREATER EFFICICENCY. ANY SUCH ‘CULTURE’ IN TURN WILL BE  BUILT ON A NEW AND RELEVANT THREAT RESPONSIVE NON-US NATO ARCHITECTURE AND CAPABILITIES ALLIED TO A RECONSTRUCTED BELIEF THAT WE CAN DEFEND OURSELVES TOGETHER AND WITH POPULAR FAITH IN LEADERS IMBUED WITH SUFFICIENT GEOPOLITICAL REALISM THAT PEOPLE CAN BELIEVE IN THEM AND THE MISSION – THIS IS THE GREAT AND CURRENT CRISIS IN NATO’S NEW CENTRE OF GRAVITY UNDER TRUMP’S AMERICA - WESTERN EUROPE AND ITS UNIMPRESSIVE LEADERS. 

THERE ARE FOUR PROBLEMS TO ACHIEVING WHAT WE REALLY NEED – THE AMERICANS, WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS, DEBT AND TECHNOLOGY.

THE AMERICANS: THE AMERICANS ARE OVER-STRETCHED BY THE GROWING MILITARY-STRATEGIC THREAT POSED BY CHINA AND BEIJING’S GRAND STRATEGIC WAR AIMS.  THE AMERICANS ALSO WANT SOMETHING THEY CANNOT HAVE THAT IS IMPLICIT IN BURDEN SHARING - THE CANADIAN AND EUROPEAN ALLIES TO DO FAR MORE WITH FAR MORE BUT RETAIN THE SAME LEVEL OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CONTROL AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION OVER THE ALLIANCE.  THAT IS NOT HOW COLLECTIVE SECURITY/DEFENCE MACHINES LIKE NATO WORK. THE GREATER THE POWER THE GREATER THE SAY.

WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS: TOO MANY WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE IN STRATEGIC LA LA LAND.  TAKE MY OWN COUNTRY, BRITAIN.  IT HAS TWO DEFENCE POLICIES AND CAN AFFORD NEITHER.  AN AGEING NUCLEAR DETERRENT THAT COSTS AROUND 25% OF BRITAIN’S 2.3% GDP ANNUAL DEFENCE INVESTMENT JUST IN CASE NATO COLLAPSES AND BRITAIN IS FORCED TO WITHDRAW ONTO ITS NUCLEAR ARMED ISLAND.  A VERY SMALL CONVENTIONAL LAND AND AIR FORCE THAT IS MEANT TO SUPPORT SACEUR WITH AT LEAST A DIVISION AND COVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC AT A COST OF 1.5% OF THE DEFENCE BUDGET.  THIS IS MILITARY STRATEGIC FANTASY DRIVEN BY A LONDON ELITE ESTABLISHMENT THAT REALLY NO LONGER BELIEVES IN BRITAIN AS A POWER OR NATO AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR BRITAIN’S DEFENCE AND HAS WILFULLY ABANDONED PAST STRATEGIC CULTURE IN FAVOUR OF VIRTUE IMPERIALISM.

DEBT: WITH THE AMERICANS OVER-STRETCHED AND CENTRAL, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPEANS TOO SMALL TO GENERATE STRATEGIC EFFECT NATO’S CENTRE OF GRAVITY IS BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY AND ITALY. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT GROWTH IN THESE STATES TO REDUCE DEBT AS A SHARE OF GDP.  THIS MAKES 5% OR 3.5% PLUS 1.5% DEFENCE INVESTMENT TARGETS AT BEST DIFFICULT IN REALITY IMPOSSIBLE GIVEN SAID LEADERS TO DELIVER BEYOND CREATIVE ACCOUNTING.

THEREFORE, WESTERN EUROPEANS CAN ONLY AFFORD THE DEFENCE NATO NEEDS IF WE INCREASE DEBT. BUT THE COST OF SERVICING DEBT GIVEN THE OTHER DEMANDS ON WELFARIZED STATES MEANS THAT DEFENCE INVESTMENT DOES NOT DELIVER POLITICAL AS OPPOSED TO STRATEGIC INFLUENCE IN TIME FOR POLITICAL LEADERS’ CONSCIOUS OF THE ELECTORAL CYCLE.

THE ANNUAL COST OF SERVICING/ INTEREST UPON BRITAIN’S NOW £3 TRILLION DEBT IS NOW ROUGHLY TWICE THE AMOUNT OF THE ANNUAL DEFENCE BUDGET.

WORSE, TOO MANY WESTERN EUROPEANS ARE IN DEBT TO THE VERY PEOPLE WHO SEEK TO HARM US.  THIS IS NOT SIMPLY AN ISSUE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY: THE LIKES OF CHINA, RUSSIA AND OTHERS ARE EXPLOITING SUCH WEAKNESS TO UNDERMINE OUR NATIONS AND THE ALLIANCE’S CAPACITY TO ACT FURTHER.

TECHNOLOGY: OVER THE NEXT DEFENCE PLANNING CYCLE THE ADVENT OF AI, QUANTUM COMPUTING, DRONES AND OTHER NETWORKED TECHNOLOGIES WILL PROFOUNDLY CHANGE THE CHARACTER IF NOT THE NATURE OF WAR AND PEACE. LOOK AT UKRAINE. WE EUROPEANS ARE INCREASINGLY AN ANALOGUE FORCE IN A HYPER-DIGITAL WORLD.  ULTIMATELY, A STRATEGIC CULTURE INFORMS STRATEGIC PLANNING VIA POLITICAL REALISM AND WILL, STRATEGIC AMBITION, APPLIED INNOVATION AND CONSIDERED APPLICATIONS OF CAREFULLY CHOSEN ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES.

THE ONLY WAY TO AFFORD A EUROPEAN RESPONSE THAT IS THREAT RELEVANT ACROSS THE HYBRID/GREY/SHADOW WAR, CYBER WAR, AND COMING HYPER-FAST WAR SPECTRUM AND BEST USE NATO AS THE DRIVER OF RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY IS TO FORGE A CANADIAN-FRIENDLY EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE CENTRED ON THE NATO EUROPEAN PILLAR.

THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT IS AN INTEROPERABILITY/STANDARDISATION MECHANISM WITH THE AMERICANS AT THE HIGHEST END OF CONFLICT AT THE MOMENT OF GREATEST SYSTEMIC STRESS AND A NEW CIVIL MILITARY CULTURE THAT INTEGRATES POWER PROJECTION WITH PEOPLE PROTECTION AND BALANCES CAPABILITY WITH AFFORDABILTIY – WHAT THE NORDIC MEMBERS OF THAT ALLIANCE CALL TOTAL DEFENCE.

WHAT TO DO?

BUILD A NEW NON-US NATO PILLAR THAT IS CAPABLE OF FAR MORE POWER PROJECTION AND PEOPLE PROTECTION THROUGH MUCH DEEPER COLLECTIVE PLANNING AND FORCE ALIGNMENT WITH MUCH FASTER DECISION-MAKING WHICH IS AND WILL BE THE VERY ESSENCE OF CREDIBLE DEFENCE BY CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY AND DETERRENCE BY DENIAL.  THEN, A COLLECTIVE STRATEGIC CULTURE MIGHT EMERGE BECAUSE POLITICAL LEADERS WILL BELIEVE THEY CAN BALANCE NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY.  IF NOT, IN AN EMERGENCY, THE AMERICANS WILL EITHER LET EUROPEANS SWING (CANADIANS ARE TOO CLOSE TO THE US TO BE ALLOWED TO SWING) OR IGNORE NATO UNTIL D PLUS 60 OR EQUIVALENT AND SIMPLY TALK TO THOSE EUROPEANS WILLING TO FOLLOW THEIR COMMAND.

CREATE A NEW LEND-LEASE DEAL WITH THE BOND MARKETS SO THAT DEBT CAN BE PUT INTO A VERY LONG-TERM REPAYMENT BOX TO CREATE THE SPACE FOR EUROPEANS TO INVEST IN HIGH END CAPABILITIES AND THUS REBUILD A NON-US NATO FORCE BOUND BY A  COLLECTIVE AND IN TIME STRATEGIC CULTURE.

ONE FINAL THOUIGHT: THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF THE HIGH END A5 THREAT TO NATO IS TWOFOLD: ON US FORCES IN THE PACIFIC LINKED TO A5 THREATS TO THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN FLANKS.  THEREFORE, ANY SUCH CREDIBLE  DEFENCE WOULD NEED TO BE BUILT AROUND THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND THE BUNDESWEHR AND POLISH ARMED FORCES IN THE DEFENCE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, WITH FRANCE ADDING VALUE WHERE AND HOW IT CAN AND THE REST DIVIDING BETWEEN SUPPORTING ONE AND THE OTHER AND FOCUSED ON THE VERY REAL A3 AND A4 THREATS TO THE SOUTH.   LIKE IT OR NOT, SECURITY REALLY IS DIVISIBLE AND NEEDS TO BE.

THE FORGING INSTRUMENT? AN ALLIED MOBILE HEAVY FORCE FAR BIGGER THAN THE ALLIED REACTION FORCE AND FAR MORE RESPONSIVE AT THE VERY HIGH END TO ACCELERATE AND EXPAND THE NATO FORCE MODEL.

WHY? BECAUSE STRATEGIC CULTURE IS REALLY ABOUT HAVING THE RIGHT WAYS WITH SUFFICIENT MEANS TO REALIZE GRAND STRATEGIC AND MILITARY STRATEGIC ENDS THAT NOT ONLY CREATES A CULTURE OF CAN DO BUT ALSO CONVINCES ADVERSARIES THAT WE REALLY CAN.

ULTIMATELY, STRATEGIC CULTURE IS ABOUT SEEING CRISES THE SAME WAY, BEING ABLE TO APPLY THE NECESSART MEANS COLLECTIVELY AND FAST AND ABOVE ALL FOUNDED ON A DEMONSTRABLY EVIDENT SHARED WILL AND DETERMINATION TO SHOW ANY ADVERSARY THAT WE ARE ALL PREPARED TO SHARE ANY RISK OR DANGER FOR EACH OTHER HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES.  

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

What is Europe’s Ukraine Strategy?

 

Headline: There is no strategy. Western Europe’s Lilliputian leaders seem to have little appreciation of either the stakes or the importance of this moment beyond keeping Ukraine in a failing fight but only at the expense of Europe’s own defences thus aiding and abetting Putin’s war aims.

Collaboration

September 9th.  The Kushner-Witkoff visit to Moscow underlined not only the vacuousness of US policy towards Ukraine, but also the Trump administration’s collaboration with Moscow.  That is why a smiling Putin was simply able to re-iterate his demands for the ‘denazification’ of Kyiv, suzerainty over Crimea, the Donbas and much else, the effective defenestration of Ukraine and the transformation of Europe from a rules-based order into competing spheres of influence.

Keir Giles in his brilliant new book, “American Overthrow – Moscow’s Endgame in its Long War with Washington” reveals the stakes. My take of Russia’s war aims is thus.  First, the Russians are not fighting the Americans but fighting for coercive control over much of Europe, including Ukraine.  Second, Putin is succeeding in decoupling the US from the defence of Europe. Third, and with the help of China, destabilize from within those parts of Western Europe that might just get in the way of Putin's war aims. Fourth, isolate those parts of Europe that Moscow wishes to coerce and if possible, re-conquer. Fifth, create a window of opportunity to that end.

Appeasement

And yet, Western Europe’s Lilliputian leaders (Crash and Burnham are you listening?) seem to have little appreciation of either the stakes at play or the importance of this moment beyond keeping Ukraine in a failing fight at the expense of Europe’s own defences thus aiding and abetting Putin’s war aims.  At best, Western Europe seems to have what might best be called a 1917 or 1941 strategy; keeping Ukraine in the fight long enough in the hope that the next US Administration returns to its senses, returns to NATO, and returns to the defence of a Europe whole and free.  Putin is also aware of that timetable.

The reality is that there is no European strategy for either defending Ukraine or itself.  The lack of the needed (as opposed to the declared) level of European defence investment is not only undermining Ukraine but seeing the progressive atomisation of NATO’s European pillar.  For all the rhetoric to the contrary Britain, France and Germany are not willing to pay the real price they would need to both properly support Ukraine to restore its 2013 borders and invest enough to defend themselves and their NATO Allies.  They will soon face a choice because Kyiv is fast running out of money, men and missiles to defend itself. And yet, beyond increasingly crass photo ops in Kyiv for new leaders wishing to signal their virtue or pious statements about being committed for as long and as much as it takes, Ukraine’s European supporters give Kyiv just enough to keep it in the fight, but only at the expense of their own armed forces.

Insurance

Balts, Poles, the Nordic states or other smaller powers on the wrong side of the Baltic and Elbe must build together a Porcupine Defence because the hard truth is Britain, France, Germany, and even the US can no longer be trusted to come to your aid in an emergency.  Take Britain.  It has given a lot of the few war stocks it had to Ukraine but done nothing like enough to properly meet its NATO defence and commitments.  With a bond market crash imminent these indebted, welfarist, deeply divided states are unlikely to do much more in their own defence let alone Ukraine’s for the foreseeable future.

If Europeans are really unwilling or unable to markedly step up their support for Ukraine then Putin will hold onto his ill-gotten gains and when he does will move to the next phase of Plan Putin.  Putin’s wet dream is a new Iron Curtain from Kaliningrad in the north to Ljubljana in the south built on coercion and threat. He wants control of Northern Norway to secure the ingress and egress of the Russian Northern Fleet from Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula, as well as control over much of the North Atlantic, and the re-Finlandization of Finland.

Surrender

The signal?  When Western Europeans start talking about cease-fires and peace deals what they will really mean is Ukraine’s surrender.  They will dress it up in talk of lease back deals for Crimea and Donbas in which conquered Ukrainian territory is nominally under Kyiv’s sovereignty, they will make empty promises that Ukraine will be both non-aligned and protected and salve their bruised virtues by ‘committing’ to rebuilding Ukraine.  In other words, the European taxpayer will pay for Russia/’s war on Ukraine.

Ukraine’s reality is this: given Trump’s collaboration with Putin and at current levels of investment Western Europeans can either support Ukraine or defend themselves against the massive information and cyber attacks they face daily as well as the threat of military attack. They cannot do both. Any ‘strategy’ worthy of the name must reflect that because that is the reality of their situations and the ends, ways and means available to them given the circumstances.  In other words, a strategy of enforced appeasement.

If nothing else, read Keir!

Julian Lindley-French

CAN NORWAY TRUST BRITAIN?

 

(THIS IS AN ABRIDGED VERSION OF THE SPEECH I GAVE IN OSLO ON AUGUST 24, 2026)

Headline: Britain has two defence policies when it can only afford one. The conventional force is essentially an underfunded and fading influence buyer in Washington, a vestige of past power. The nuclear force is the ultimate insurance in the event NATO collapses and Britain is forced to retreat onto its nuclear armed island.  Britain funds neither force sufficiently and thus both are sub-optimal.  

No. Lunna House agreement or not. This is because British security and defence policy is a monumental bluff with Britain’s armed forces critically lacking the firepower, the mass of force and the ability to manoeuvre it should have given Britain`s weight, place in NATO and what fighting power Britain needs to lead and fight in the twenty-first century.  Why? 

First, most of the so-called defence reviews since 2010 have been amongst the greatest works of British fiction with the British Establishment retreating ever deeper into the political spin that is defence pretence. In 2010, the British armed forces were cut by 10% at a stroke even though they were engaged in a major campaign in Afghanistan. 

Second, HM Treasury economists still see affording the defence of Britain as discretionary expenditure even though Russia invaded Ukraine and the British are also spending billions supporting the Ukrainians.  

The consequence is there for all to see.  The weakening of British defence readiness is so bad that Britain today ranks 31st out of 32 in progress towards Alliance capability requirements and rearmament goals. That places Britain is just ahead of Iceland which has no standing armed forces.    

More proof? I spoke at the London Defence Conference in May, which was attended by your Chief of Defence.  I started by congratulating the Russian Navy for successfully escorting a British military tanker successfully through the channel because that is all the Royal Navy had available to escort a Russian frigate.  

Then, I demolished the then Secretary of State for Defence John Healey, who had just spoken, for claiming Britain had a “warfighting force on a war footing”. It does not and is not. 

I then addressed Ukraine: yes, Britain has taken the lead but what to what end? What is the strategy other than keeping Kyiv in the fight and waiting for the Americans to get serious and come over the horizon? What about Britain’s own defences?  Where is the defensive effort needed to harden Britain´s critical infrastructure, most notably its critical undersea infrastructure other than warning the Russians, “we know what you´re doing?”  

Then I focused on the greatest weakness of British defence policy. Britain has two defence policies when it can only afford one. The conventional force is essentially an underfunded and fading influence buyer in Washington, a vestige of past power. The nuclear force is the ultimate insurance in the event NATO collapses and Britain is forced to retreat onto its nuclear armed island.  

Britain funds neither force sufficiently and thus both suffer from dangerous weaknesses.  London tries to hide this by regularly announcing absolute increases in investment rather than investment relative to what the force needs given the threat. London also routinely lies. In August 2026, the National Statistics Authority officially sanctioned then Prime Minister Kier Starmer for misleading Parliament when he claimed he would increase defence expenditure by £270 billion over the course of this Parliament. The real figure is £15 billion, with £272.2 billion the total spend over four years 

The July Defence Investment Plan also claimed to have found an additional £15 billion for defence, when in fact it found only £5 billion of additional funding. The day Starmer left office he also miraculously announced a further £11 billion of funding for foreign aid.  From where would that money come? 

The current Burnham government is also retreating from the commitment Britain will spend 3% GDP on defence by 2030, and 3.5% on core defence by 2035.  Yet more smoke and errors?  Yes. Public debt has just this month passed the GDP 3 trillion mark and is now over 100% GDP. It took 100 years to go from GDP 1 trillion to GDP 2 trillion and 6 years to reach GDP 3 trillion. This year the cost of the welfare budget alone will be GDP 330 billion which is the same as the entire tax take or about £1 billion a day!    

With the US no longer THE save haven for lenders and their public debt now over $40 trillion we are heading towards an almighty bond market crash. US debt is driving up the cost of borrowing for Britain which is soaring and such is the power of the bond markets that servicing public debt interest is more important than defending the country.  Debt interest payments are now £130 billion a year over twice the defence budget for 2025-2026 of GDP 65.4 billion. In other words, Britain cannot afford to defend itself let alone defend Norway and fund an advanced expeditionary capability such as the Joint Expeditionary Force vital to that role.  Indeed, such is the impact of public debt on European defence I fear Europe’s indebted states will need to re-structure debt with all the market consequences that will follow. 

Even the 2.6% GDP spent by Britain on defence is spent very badly and includes items that have no place being there (other NATO allies do the same) so that defence expenditure is really a form of creative accounting designed by Special Advisors to hide the blushes of their political masters.  Britain only spends 1.5% GDP on advanced expeditionary conventional capabilities and capacity.  The rest goes on the Nuclear Enterprise.  The under-funding of the ends, ways and means of the British armed forces has gone on for so long that the force is utterly hollowed out.  Worse, Britain has transferred so much of the little munitions it had to Ukraine and despite modest efforts to replenish them the arsenals are depleted.  It will also take time for the British to rebuild their defence, technological and industrial base, which is emaciated and focused on the US market rather than the British.  

The result? Britain’s armed forces are like Britain itself, a hollowed-out shell built on image, past glory and memory rather than requisite fighting power.  This is a tragedy and not just for Britain. A Britain properly and sensibly led would restore its defence leadership at the core of NATO by changing its spending priorities because only a credible NATO can afford Britain a credible defence.  It is doing the exact opposite.  

What does this mean for Norway (and NATO)? With the US stretched thin the world over by China the future defence of Europe, given the threats Europeans are facing on the Northern and Eastern Flanks should ideally be built around two forces: the Bundeswehr and German land power and the Royal Navy and Britain’s maritime-amphibious power, with the Joint Expeditionary Force central to that mission. 

Why?  In the worst case the Chinese will engineer simultaneous crises in the Arctic, North Atlantic, Europe, Middle East and the Pacific to force the Americans to make hard choices.  Britain (and Norway) will then be called upon to lead the defence of the Arctic and North Atlantic. And yet, Britain today is incapable of leading the JEF unless powers such as Norway act to offset British weaknesses, most notably force sustainability.  This is because Britain’s armed forces are particularly lacking at the high end of the conventional war spectrum and need at least £35 billion invested above and beyond current plans to really put the British armed forces on the war footing for the war they would need to fight. 

Do not believe me? Look at the state of the Royal Navy today (the Army and the RAF are little different). At present the ‘RN’ has only 6 destroyers and frigates that are operational, some of which are the hull-expired Type 23 frigates. There will not be the planned 13 such ships available until 2041 at the earliest, and most certainly not the 17 ships that John Healey claimed the Royal Navy had in May. The Royal Navy is deep in the mire of an availability and readiness crisis caused by chronic underfunding and paper planning over many years. 

Of the 5 of 7 in service Astute-class nuclear attack submarines all of them are currently in dockyards. The 4 Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines are all now beyond the operational design life of 25 years by between 2 and 8 years. The four Dreadnought class ‘boomers’ will not enter service until the early 2030s, Probably later.  

Fleet readiness: of 6 advanced Type 45 destroyers, 2 are undergoing deep refit/power improvement programme to correct a catastrophic design error 1 (HMS Duncan) is awaiting PIP, 2 are on sea trials and 1 is sort of operational (HMS Dragon, The plan is to have all the 8 new Type 26 and 5 Type 31 frigates operational by 2035, with 3 new fleet support ships by 2032.  Meanwhile, both Queen Elizabeth-class carriers have had to undergo extensive repairs to their propulsion systems.     

The Type 23 frigates are a metaphor for the worse crisis in Britain’s armed forces in my lifetime and the worst crisis faced by the Royal Navy since Samuel Pepys was Comptroller of the Navy in the Seventeenth Century. The Lloyd's registry of naval ships has since 2000 certified Royal Navy ships as fit for sea service.  However, because an uncertified ship imposes liability London and Lloyds has refused to certify Type 23s the RN has been forced to scrap Type 23 with utterly worn-out hulls far earlier than planned because the cost of fixing them would be prohibitive. 

Worse, the Defence Investment Plan cut the next generation Type 83 destroyer and Type 32 frigates for fewer and cheaper platforms to be replaced by unmanned vessels as part of the so-called Hybrid Navy, partly to offset the chronic crewing problems the Royal Navy faces.  

Yes, Norway, you will eventually get your 5 Type 26 frigates but I cannot say when.  Ask the Australians who are increasingly concerned the UK will be unable to deliver the planned SSN Aukus

My advice to is this? Trust the British to a point but have a Plan B – a Nordic Porcupine defence that would make you, the Finns, Swedes and Danes a very prickly adversary for the Russians. The British people will always be willing to defend its friends in Norway but the British Establishment is far less trustworthy.  This is in part because they seem unable or unwilling to defend the British and in part because the epidemic of young and ambitious Special Advisors with which ministers surround themselves prevents the professional civil service form speaking truth to power.  

Britain?  Britain today is not simply a Potemkin Village, it is a Potemkin state with a Potemkin military full of Bonzai capabilities - a little bit of everything but not much of anything.  A state that can neither project the power contemporary defence demands nor protect the people or the critical infrastructures without which defence cannot start. Our enemies know that.  

Hanna Arendt once said that politicians do not just lie, they remake reality. It is not just that politicians, and indeed bureaucrats remake reality, they also choose reality and today they choose the appearance of economic and social security above national security and the defence of the realm. They gambled on Globalisation and lost and now they want to hide the consequences of this profound failure of policy from the people. Now, real reality is back.  And it bites! Bites hard. Sadly, we British have few teeth and the British people must live with the added risk that such failure imposes on them. 

Julian Lindley-French