hms iron duke

hms iron duke

Thursday, 1 October 2026

My speech this week to a NATO conference in Italy on Strategic Culture

 


PROFESSOR DR JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH SPEECH TO “STRATEGIC CULTURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY NATO ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION, ALMA MATER STUDORIUM UNIVERSITA DI BOLOGNA AND ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALE, BERTINORO, ITALY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2026

GOOD MORNING. I WAS GIVEN TWO QUESTIONS TO ANSWER: WHAT IS NATO’S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND HOW DOES THE DIVERSITY OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURES WITHIN NATO AFFECT ITS ABILITY TO FORMULATE AND EXECUTE A UNIFIED ‘STRATEGIC SHAPING’ POLICY? I WILL ADD A THIRD – WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE?

1.              WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE?

I WAS RIGHT! FOR YEARS I HAVE BEEN WARNING LEADERS WE ARE FAST APPROACHING A TIPPING POINT/RECKONING IN EUROPE’S DEFENCE. AND BEING POLITICIANS THEY ARE A) PRETENDIING THEY KNEW ALL ALONG. B) THEY ARE PREPARED.  THEY ARE NEITHER!

THAT RECKONING IS HERE NOW BUT STILL THE “WE ONLY RECOGNISE AS MUCH THREAT AS WE THINK WE CAN AFFORD” BRIGADE CLING TO THEIR DELUSION THAT NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE IS UNAFFORDABLE THUS COMPOUNDING RISK INTO DANGER. TRY WAR! THAT REALLY IS EXPENSIVE.

WHAT WE URGENTLY NEED IS NOT JUST A STRATEGIC CULTURE BUT A NON-US NATO STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FAST. WHY BECAUSE DETERRENCE IS OUR BUSINESS. THE MOMENT WE GET INTO DEFENCE THEN WE HAVE FAILED.  WE THUS NEED TO MAKE THE ALLIANCE THE DETERRENT IT SHOULD BE BUT WHICH TODAY IT IS NOT. 

SO, LET ME BEGIN BY GOING BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES BECAUSE STRATEGIC CULTURE IS ONE OF THOSE BULLSHIT PHRASES WHICH PEOPLE THROW OUT THERE BUT HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IT ACTUALLY MEANS – ME INCLUDED.

STRATEGIC: THIS IS THE MOST MISUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD WORD IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE MEANS VERY BIG THINGS REQUIRING VERY BIG MEANS APPLIED CONSISTENTLY IN PURSUIT OF VERY BIG AND CLEAR ENDS OVER A VERY LONG TIME BY VERY BIG MINDED PEOPLE TOGETHER.

CULTURE: THIS IS THE SECOND MOST MISUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD WORD IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. THIS MEANS DEEPLY HELD SHARED BELIEFS SOME OF WHICH ARE GROUNDED IN HISTORICAL MYTH HELD FOR A VERY LONG TIME THAT ACT AS REFLEXIVE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TOGETHERNESS, THE PLACE OF A COMMUNITY IN THE WORLD, AND HOW, WHY AND WHEN THEY ACT PARTICULARLY IN A CRISIS.

A STRATEGIC CULTURE FOR ME IS THUS: DEEPLY HELD SHARED BELIEFS THAT ACT AS A REFLEXIVE SET OF ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VERY BIG THINGS REQUIRING BOTH THE WILL AND THE CAPACITY TO APPLY VERY BIG MEANS CONSISTENTLY IN PURSUIT OF VERY BIG AND CLEAR ENDS OVER A VERY LONG TIME BY VERY BIG MINDED PEOPLE TOGETHER.  IN THIS CASE DEFENDING THE FREEDOMS OF OUR EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY NOW AT RISK.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH BIG PEOPLE WITH BIG MEANS IN POWER.  

2.              WHAT IS NATO’S STRATEGIC CULTURE?

I AM NOT SURE IT HAS ONE. IT DOES HAVE A STRATEGIC POSTURE IF IT CAN BE AGREED AND AFFORDED. AS SUCH, SUCH POSTURE HAS THREE ELEMENTS THAT COULD BECOME A CULTURE

THREAT INTERPRETATION: NATO VIEWS SECURITY THROUGH THE LENS OF COLLECTIVE VULNERABILITY, DEFINING RUSSIA AS ITS MOST SIGNIFICANT AND DIRECT PEER THREAT ALONGSIDE EMERGING CHALLENGES LIKE CYBER WARFARE, HYBRID GRAY-ZONE TACTICS, AND STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND THE LOSS OF THE US AS A RELIABLE PARTNER.

ACCEPTED METHODS OF ACTION: THE ALLIANCE RELISES ABOVE ALL ON DETERRENCE-BY-DENIAL ANCHORED BY ARTICLE 5 (THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE CLAUSE), COMBINING CONVENTIONAL MILITARY READINESS, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WITH LIKE-MINDED PARTNER NATIONS.

A STRATEGIC CULTURE COULD BE OPERATIONALIZED BY AN INTEGRATED APPROACH OVER TIME TO CORE TASKS IN NATO’S CASE THREE THREAT RELEVANT PERMANENT MISSIONS: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT, AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY WHICH FURTHER DEPEND ON RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS

3.              HOW DOES THE DIVERSITY OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC CULTURES WITHIN NATO AFFECT ITS ABILITY TO FORMULATE AND EXECUTE A UNIFIED ‘STRATEGIC SHAPING’ POLICY?

FIRST, ONLY TWO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BRITAIN AND FRANCE AND MAYBE A THIRD, POLAND, HAVE RESIDUAL STRATEGIC CULTURES PARTLY BECAUSE THEY STILL HAVE SOME CAPABILITIES THAT MAINTAIN THE PRETENCE THEY CAN ACT INDEPENDENTLY.

SECOND, THE REAL ELEPHANT IN THE NATO ROOM IS HOW TO ‘SHAPE’ (ANOTHER WORD THAT FEW UNDERSTAND) ND GENERATE THE WAYS AND MEANS TO CONFRONT AND DEAL WITH THE SHEER SCOPE AND SPEED OF UNFAVOURABLE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. IF CANADIAN AND EUROPEAN ALLIANCE MEMBERS ARE TO MEET THAT CHALLENGE THEY WILL NEED TO CRAFT AN ENTIRELY NEW STRATEGIC CULTURE DRIVEN BY SYNERGIES OF AND IN EFFORT THAT GENERATE MUCH GREATER EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH MUCH GREATER EFFICICENCY. ANY SUCH ‘CULTURE’ IN TURN WILL BE  BUILT ON A NEW AND RELEVANT THREAT RESPONSIVE NON-US NATO ARCHITECTURE AND CAPABILITIES ALLIED TO A RECONSTRUCTED BELIEF THAT WE CAN DEFEND OURSELVES TOGETHER AND WITH POPULAR FAITH IN LEADERS IMBUED WITH SUFFICIENT GEOPOLITICAL REALISM THAT PEOPLE CAN BELIEVE IN THEM AND THE MISSION – THIS IS THE GREAT AND CURRENT CRISIS IN NATO’S NEW CENTRE OF GRAVITY UNDER TRUMP’S AMERICA - WESTERN EUROPE AND ITS UNIMPRESSIVE LEADERS. 

THERE ARE FOUR PROBLEMS TO ACHIEVING WHAT WE REALLY NEED – THE AMERICANS, WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS, DEBT AND TECHNOLOGY.

THE AMERICANS: THE AMERICANS ARE OVER-STRETCHED BY THE GROWING MILITARY-STRATEGIC THREAT POSED BY CHINA AND BEIJING’S GRAND STRATEGIC WAR AIMS.  THE AMERICANS ALSO WANT SOMETHING THEY CANNOT HAVE THAT IS IMPLICIT IN BURDEN SHARING - THE CANADIAN AND EUROPEAN ALLIES TO DO FAR MORE WITH FAR MORE BUT RETAIN THE SAME LEVEL OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CONTROL AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION OVER THE ALLIANCE.  THAT IS NOT HOW COLLECTIVE SECURITY/DEFENCE MACHINES LIKE NATO WORK. THE GREATER THE POWER THE GREATER THE SAY.

WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS: TOO MANY WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE IN STRATEGIC LA LA LAND.  TAKE MY OWN COUNTRY, BRITAIN.  IT HAS TWO DEFENCE POLICIES AND CAN AFFORD NEITHER.  AN AGEING NUCLEAR DETERRENT THAT COSTS AROUND 25% OF BRITAIN’S 2.3% GDP ANNUAL DEFENCE INVESTMENT JUST IN CASE NATO COLLAPSES AND BRITAIN IS FORCED TO WITHDRAW ONTO ITS NUCLEAR ARMED ISLAND.  A VERY SMALL CONVENTIONAL LAND AND AIR FORCE THAT IS MEANT TO SUPPORT SACEUR WITH AT LEAST A DIVISION AND COVER THE NORTH ATLANTIC AT A COST OF 1.5% OF THE DEFENCE BUDGET.  THIS IS MILITARY STRATEGIC FANTASY DRIVEN BY A LONDON ELITE ESTABLISHMENT THAT REALLY NO LONGER BELIEVES IN BRITAIN AS A POWER OR NATO AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR BRITAIN’S DEFENCE AND HAS WILFULLY ABANDONED PAST STRATEGIC CULTURE IN FAVOUR OF VIRTUE IMPERIALISM.

DEBT: WITH THE AMERICANS OVER-STRETCHED AND CENTRAL, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPEANS TOO SMALL TO GENERATE STRATEGIC EFFECT NATO’S CENTRE OF GRAVITY IS BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY AND ITALY. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT GROWTH IN THESE STATES TO REDUCE DEBT AS A SHARE OF GDP.  THIS MAKES 5% OR 3.5% PLUS 1.5% DEFENCE INVESTMENT TARGETS AT BEST DIFFICULT IN REALITY IMPOSSIBLE GIVEN SAID LEADERS TO DELIVER BEYOND CREATIVE ACCOUNTING.

THEREFORE, WESTERN EUROPEANS CAN ONLY AFFORD THE DEFENCE NATO NEEDS IF WE INCREASE DEBT. BUT THE COST OF SERVICING DEBT GIVEN THE OTHER DEMANDS ON WELFARIZED STATES MEANS THAT DEFENCE INVESTMENT DOES NOT DELIVER POLITICAL AS OPPOSED TO STRATEGIC INFLUENCE IN TIME FOR POLITICAL LEADERS’ CONSCIOUS OF THE ELECTORAL CYCLE.

THE ANNUAL COST OF SERVICING/ INTEREST UPON BRITAIN’S NOW £3 TRILLION DEBT IS NOW ROUGHLY TWICE THE AMOUNT OF THE ANNUAL DEFENCE BUDGET.

WORSE, TOO MANY WESTERN EUROPEANS ARE IN DEBT TO THE VERY PEOPLE WHO SEEK TO HARM US.  THIS IS NOT SIMPLY AN ISSUE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY: THE LIKES OF CHINA, RUSSIA AND OTHERS ARE EXPLOITING SUCH WEAKNESS TO UNDERMINE OUR NATIONS AND THE ALLIANCE’S CAPACITY TO ACT FURTHER.

TECHNOLOGY: OVER THE NEXT DEFENCE PLANNING CYCLE THE ADVENT OF AI, QUANTUM COMPUTING, DRONES AND OTHER NETWORKED TECHNOLOGIES WILL PROFOUNDLY CHANGE THE CHARACTER IF NOT THE NATURE OF WAR AND PEACE. LOOK AT UKRAINE. WE EUROPEANS ARE INCREASINGLY AN ANALOGUE FORCE IN A HYPER-DIGITAL WORLD.  ULTIMATELY, A STRATEGIC CULTURE INFORMS STRATEGIC PLANNING VIA POLITICAL REALISM AND WILL, STRATEGIC AMBITION, APPLIED INNOVATION AND CONSIDERED APPLICATIONS OF CAREFULLY CHOSEN ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES.

THE ONLY WAY TO AFFORD A EUROPEAN RESPONSE THAT IS THREAT RELEVANT ACROSS THE HYBRID/GREY/SHADOW WAR, CYBER WAR, AND COMING HYPER-FAST WAR SPECTRUM AND BEST USE NATO AS THE DRIVER OF RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY IS TO FORGE A CANADIAN-FRIENDLY EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURE CENTRED ON THE NATO EUROPEAN PILLAR.

THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT IS AN INTEROPERABILITY/STANDARDISATION MECHANISM WITH THE AMERICANS AT THE HIGHEST END OF CONFLICT AT THE MOMENT OF GREATEST SYSTEMIC STRESS AND A NEW CIVIL MILITARY CULTURE THAT INTEGRATES POWER PROJECTION WITH PEOPLE PROTECTION AND BALANCES CAPABILITY WITH AFFORDABILTIY – WHAT THE NORDIC MEMBERS OF THAT ALLIANCE CALL TOTAL DEFENCE.

WHAT TO DO?

BUILD A NEW NON-US NATO PILLAR THAT IS CAPABLE OF FAR MORE POWER PROJECTION AND PEOPLE PROTECTION THROUGH MUCH DEEPER COLLECTIVE PLANNING AND FORCE ALIGNMENT WITH MUCH FASTER DECISION-MAKING WHICH IS AND WILL BE THE VERY ESSENCE OF CREDIBLE DEFENCE BY CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY AND DETERRENCE BY DENIAL.  THEN, A COLLECTIVE STRATEGIC CULTURE MIGHT EMERGE BECAUSE POLITICAL LEADERS WILL BELIEVE THEY CAN BALANCE NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY.  IF NOT, IN AN EMERGENCY, THE AMERICANS WILL EITHER LET EUROPEANS SWING (CANADIANS ARE TOO CLOSE TO THE US TO BE ALLOWED TO SWING) OR IGNORE NATO UNTIL D PLUS 60 OR EQUIVALENT AND SIMPLY TALK TO THOSE EUROPEANS WILLING TO FOLLOW THEIR COMMAND.

CREATE A NEW LEND-LEASE DEAL WITH THE BOND MARKETS SO THAT DEBT CAN BE PUT INTO A VERY LONG-TERM REPAYMENT BOX TO CREATE THE SPACE FOR EUROPEANS TO INVEST IN HIGH END CAPABILITIES AND THUS REBUILD A NON-US NATO FORCE BOUND BY A  COLLECTIVE AND IN TIME STRATEGIC CULTURE.

ONE FINAL THOUIGHT: THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF THE HIGH END A5 THREAT TO NATO IS TWOFOLD: ON US FORCES IN THE PACIFIC LINKED TO A5 THREATS TO THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN FLANKS.  THEREFORE, ANY SUCH CREDIBLE  DEFENCE WOULD NEED TO BE BUILT AROUND THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND THE BUNDESWEHR AND POLISH ARMED FORCES IN THE DEFENCE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, WITH FRANCE ADDING VALUE WHERE AND HOW IT CAN AND THE REST DIVIDING BETWEEN SUPPORTING ONE AND THE OTHER AND FOCUSED ON THE VERY REAL A3 AND A4 THREATS TO THE SOUTH.   LIKE IT OR NOT, SECURITY REALLY IS DIVISIBLE AND NEEDS TO BE.

THE FORGING INSTRUMENT? AN ALLIED MOBILE HEAVY FORCE FAR BIGGER THAN THE ALLIED REACTION FORCE AND FAR MORE RESPONSIVE AT THE VERY HIGH END TO ACCELERATE AND EXPAND THE NATO FORCE MODEL.

WHY? BECAUSE STRATEGIC CULTURE IS REALLY ABOUT HAVING THE RIGHT WAYS WITH SUFFICIENT MEANS TO REALIZE GRAND STRATEGIC AND MILITARY STRATEGIC ENDS THAT NOT ONLY CREATES A CULTURE OF CAN DO BUT ALSO CONVINCES ADVERSARIES THAT WE REALLY CAN.

ULTIMATELY, STRATEGIC CULTURE IS ABOUT SEEING CRISES THE SAME WAY, BEING ABLE TO APPLY THE NECESSART MEANS COLLECTIVELY AND FAST AND ABOVE ALL FOUNDED ON A DEMONSTRABLY EVIDENT SHARED WILL AND DETERMINATION TO SHOW ANY ADVERSARY THAT WE ARE ALL PREPARED TO SHARE ANY RISK OR DANGER FOR EACH OTHER HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES.  

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

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