Baltic Spirit

Vilnius, Lithuania.  Having dinner with the Lithuanian Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Pocius was a moving experience.  Listening to the story of his family’s struggle for freedom left with me with the profound sense that every NATO and EU leader should visit the Baltic States at least once a year to remind themselves of the importance of both the Alliance and the Union.  Therefore, I am proposing two initiatives.  First, that NATO Exercise Baltic Spring, at which I had the honour to speak, should be renamed Exercise Baltic Spirit.  It is the Baltic spirit of freedom that really underpins the Alliance.  Second, that the three Baltic States join together to create an annual high-level security conference similar to the Halifax International Security Forum held in Canada that would involve heads of states and government and/or their appropriate ministers from across NATO and the EU. 
 

This is a great part of the world.  Now, do not get me wrong.  I am a hard-bitten analyst and advisor and I know things...lots of things both good and bad.  However, what I love about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (and they are very different) is their enduring spirit of optimism that sustained them during many dark years.  Speaking with young people here I am particularly motivated by their self-belief, their love of country and their commitment to our shared institutions in which they play such a critical role.  As we western Europeans sink into an ever-deeper tar-laden pit of cynicism a trip to this part of the world reminds us all of a simple truism.  It is not money in the case of the EU or military capabilities in the case of NATO that is the force that binds us, but a shared sense of political mission.

Of course, the big bear in the room in this part of Europe is always Russia.  One western European officer likened Russia’s relationship with the Baltic States as similar to that of a recently divorced partner who simply cannot let go.  My visit to Moscow a couple of weeks ago left me with an enduring sense that until Russia escapes from a history purely defined by its immense sacrifice in World War Two it will continue to lurch between trying to rekindle lost relationships and then reacting aggressively when it realises that those days are gone.  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have made their respective sovereign choices and it is the freedom implicit in those choices which is and must be the litmus test for both the EU and NATO.

For me it seems such a lost opportunity that the good people of the Baltic States still live under a pall cast by history.  In the twenty-first century Russia still regularly tests their borders and Russia short-range mobile nuclear weapons are but a short distance away.  A long, long time ago such pointless strategic posturing would have angered me and even left me a little fearful. Today, it merely saddens me.  It is just so twentieth century, so boring and frankly a truly great power such as Russia is better than that.  For that reason I am proposing that Exercise Baltic Spring be renamed Exercise Baltic Spirit so that no-one ever miscalculates as to the will of both the Alliance and the Union to help preserve the freedoms so hard won by the people of this region. 

That is why I am also re-iterating my proposal to Lieutenant-General Pocius that during its forthcoming EU presidency Lithuania host the first of a regular high-level series of security policy conferences and which I humbly asked him to convey to the Lithuanian President Madame Grybauskaite.  This will come as a surprise to Madame President as prior to the Snow Meeting in January she gave me a bit of a ticking off about my views on the Euro-mess.  My views on the Euro-mess have not changed, Madame President, but you should never doubt either my belief in or resolve to support your freedom. 

The conference could over time become a kind of security Davos to challenge Wehrkunde in Munich. Indeed, precisely because it would be held not in the now comfortable heartland of Europe but on one of the security fault-lines that still absurdly disfigure Europe’s peace landscape.  And, the EU should pay for it as for once my money would be spent on something useful.  Indeed, even though it is short notice the event would act as a precursor to the December EU summit on the future of the EU’s almost moribund Common Security and Defence Policy.  Critically, such a conference should also include partners and neighbours...most notably Russia. 

The aim of the conference would be a twenty-first century pan-European security dialogue.  The title of the new conference?  Baltic Spirit of course!  Can I come too?

Julian Lindley-French

Spitfire

Gilze-Rijen Air Base. Netherlands. 4 June.  Spitfire.  The hum turns into a choral roar.  Over the tree-top an iconic shape makes it entry soaring for a moment and then bearing down upon me in majesty and triumph.  She roars over my head no more than eighty metres above the unforgiving runway next to which I am standing, the symphonic scream of her Rolls Royce Merlin engine for a brief moment drowning out the twenty-first century with a sound that belongs ever so far away but which still means so much to so many. 

 

It is hard to believe what this eighty-year old technology can do but a Spitfire in the right hands remains a honed thoroughbred of the sky.  She pitches, rolls and climbs and swallow dives as though this is the day she first joined her RAF squadron back in 1943.  For those of us of a certain age and provenance even the sound is enough to make the hairs stand up on the back of the neck.  This is a mystical old 'bird' the wings of which beat with history. 

 

Today I had the very distinct privilege of attending my own exclusive Spitfire air show.  The Royal Netherlands Historical Flight are a small, well-respected and utterly committed group of heritage professionals who devote much of their time and a lot of their money to keeping this beautiful aircraft aloft.  As one of them said to me, "you can start a billionaire in this business and soon end up a millionaire".  I am lucky enough to have Air Commodore Chris Lorraine, the 'other' Spitfire pilot explain every move but in truth the old girl does all the speaking for herself.     

 

Spitfire may be a weapon of war and this one certainly had her fair share of 'kills', including two over the D-Day beaches.  However, not only was she a decisive weapon at a critical moment for freedom she is just one hell of an aeroplane - a joy in peacetime to behold. 

 

Having rolled back the years Spitfire climbs triumphantly into a victory roll and the moment is just long enough to savour before the twenty-first century rolls back upon me.

 

At the end of the show I thank the pilot for the experience. Lt Colonel Koos de Rooy of the Royal Netherlands Air Force pauses; "do not thank me, thank the Spitfire".  How right he is. 

 

Thank you for the privilege gentlemen.

Julian Lindley-French  

Chuck Hagel’s Shangri La La?

Alphen, Netherlands.  03 June.  In James Hilton’s fictional 1937 novel “Lost Horizons” Shangri-La is a heaven on earth, a happy island of peace, permanently isolated from the outside world (no, not Britain).  For the High Lama (a sort of David Cameron) harmony, “...is the entire meaning and purpose of Shangri-La.  It came to me as a vision long, long ago.  I saw all the nations strengthening, not in wisdom, but in the vulgar passions and the will to destroy”.  Reading US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s 1 June speech on the “US Approach to Regional Security” at the IISS 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, I am reminded of the High Lama. 

 

Viewed from Washington much of Asia-Pacific is fast-tracking into an arms race fuelled by nationalist tensions, competition over growth-fuelling resources and the ‘prestige’ muscle-flexing favoured by all adolescent powers.  Even the shortest survey of Asia-Pacific’s strategic horizon reveals the dangers that abound.  China’s regional-strategic and resource ambitions come up hard against Indian, Indonesian, Japanese, Malaysian, Philippines and Vietnamese interests.  Some Chinese interpretations of its Exclusive Economic Zone have the boundary bordering the territorial waters of Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.  The recent Chinese-Japanese spat over the Daioyu/Senkaku islands highlights the sensitivities of an overly sensitized region.  And then there is North Korea.

In fact Hagel’s speech is for me déja vu all over again.  Indeed, I am struck by the similarities between America’s stabilising mission in Asia-Pacific in the first decades of the twenty first century and Britain’s similar mission in the last decades of the nineteenth century.  Both America and Britain had passed the zenith of their global influence but were by no means in decline.  Both faced the emergence of a peer competitor and both faced financial shocks at home which undermined their respective capacities to project stabilising influence world-wide.

One has only to read the long shopping-list of security challenges Hagel outlines in his speech to realise the challenge America faces.  The great panda in the room is of course China.  It is clearly up to China whether the US ‘re-balancing’ to Asia-Pacific turns into a full-scale containment strategy.  What Hagel is offering is insurance.  The US will for the foreseeable future represent forty per cent of global defence expenditure.  In that light shifting sixty per cent of US naval and air forces to Asia-Pacific makes perfect strategic sense given that Asia not Europe is the world’s strategic epicentre.  In any case, as a Washington friend said to me some time ago, “we could sort out the Chinese military in an afternoon”.  He should know; he was very, very high up in the Pentagon.  For how long?

The Hagel speech is simply strategic common sense.  It is precisely that common sense that is missing in Europe.  Indeed, it is Europe not America that is retreating into a fictional Shangri-La.  Even the once sturdily imperial British have become so strategically myopic and short-termist that they are about to make another defence cut to follow the ravaging of the British armed forces that took place in 2010.  If the British have lost the strategic influence plot then the rest of Europe has become a kind of strategic Rip Van Winkel (to mix my fictional metaphors).

The danger is this; America is still the world’s pre-dominant power but it is no longer the dominant power. Equally, America’s global stabilising strategy only makes credible sense if the European allies can look beyond the pit of their own self-induced despair and develop a regional-strategic security strategy worthy of the name.  That means Europeans collectively considering in all seriousness their grand strategic role beyond cloudily pointless efforts to create Shangri-La.  That means NATO.

NATO was not mentioned by Hagel in his speech, although he did say that the, “rebalancing should not be misinterpreted.  The US has allies, interests and responsibilities across the world.  The Asia-Pacific rebalance is not a retreat from other regions of the world”.  Here I beg to differ, Mr Secretary.  If the European allies continue to avoid the big world picture (as opposed to Planet Europe) Asia-Pacific powers will progressively tip the balance of power away from the West.  Sooner or later an over-stretched America will be forced to make the most profound of strategic choices.  This is just what Britain did when it effectively abandoned its Asian empire to cope with the growing challenge of Germany.  NATO’s job is to keep America engaged in Europe by keeping America strong in Asia-Pacific. Get it?

History is full of ironies.  The USS Freedom is sitting alongside the quay at the Singapore Naval Base.  It was not the Singaporeans that built that base, but the nineteenth century British.  At some point one hundred years or so ago an HMS Freedom (or its equivalent) was doing exactly the same.  Now, whatever happened to that empire?

Julian Lindley-French

Influencing the World or Organising Europe?

Alphen, Netherlands.  31 May.  As I was about to board a plane at Oslo Airport yesterday I found myself confronted by a dilemma. Do I read the latest Dan Brown based at it is on Dante Alighieri’s fourteenth century classic “The Inferno”, or do I read the new "Towards a European Global Strategy", Europe’s eternal infernal?  Push came to shove and I finally decided I would read the fiction and sat down to read “A European Global Strategy”.  Now, don’t get me wrong, EGS (as it is known amongst European strato-wonks) is well-written and well-structured.  Moreover, reading it took me back to my distant past when I used to write this stuff for the now long-dead and ever-so-slightly misnamed Venusberg Group...and moreover believe it!  In fact the idea that European nation-states should work very closely together for the common good in this world is still something in which I profoundly believe. 

 

And, even though one can feel the pain of those involved in its drafting EGS is a classy piece of work.  Although led by four worthy and well-respected think-tanks EGS was instigated by the foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden.  Not surprisingly, whilst EGS is strong on the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of strategy, it is necessarily weak on the ‘why’ and the ‘how’, even though it has a stab at the ‘when’. 

There is of course much talk of ‘solidarity’, i.e. those of us with not-so-much debt (I speak as a Dutch taxpayer) should pay ever more for ever more those with deep-pan pizza-loads of debt.  There is also the usual wonk-speak of “strategic objectives” and “instruments” and the need for a deepened Europe to influence “multipolarity” and a “rules-based order”, whatever that means.  Apparently, it is precisely that order upon which Europe is today built and which should be exported via example first to the wider European region and then to the world.  There is also the usual blah-blah about “shared values”.  Yawn!

However, this report should not be under-estimated.  The ambition of getting Europeans to “think strategically about their global role” is to be commended as is the analysis which fuels it (or is that the other way round?).  The EU is (for the moment) the world’s largest trading bloc with over five hundred million people and “European engagement should be proactive not just a response to changes in the global environment”.  The attempt to strike a new balance between improved co-ordination and integration is also sound.

Furthermore, the focus for much of the report on interests is sensible as it addresses this very contradiction at the top of power in Europe’s strongest state – Germany.  It was fascinating talking with a senior German recently.  For all the Euro-speak that Berlin generates Germany has a very clear sense of its national interest and a strategy to realise it.  This involves a determinedly German focus on global out-reach (see Germany's China policy) whilst championing ‘Europe’ to organise Germany’s neighbours in pursuit of Berlin’s strategic goals.  This was confirmed to me by a senior Dutchman who told me that in spite of appearances from time to time the Netherlands will ultimately do what Germany tells it to.

However, having waded through the inevitable strategic political correctness and Euro-speak there are two innate tensions implicit in the report.  First, the need to ‘contain’ Germany flows through the report like spilt Schnapps on Roesti.  This is clearly the work of four peripheral powers the futures of which are now so tied to Germany that their entire foreign and security policies must reflect the strategic choices Germany makes, the willingness of German taxpayers to fund ‘Europe’, and the extent to which Germany is prepared to be constrained in the name of ‘Europe’.  Second, in trying to define an alternative “rules-based order” one can feel the pain of the authors as they try valiantly to resist clear pressure from the European Commission and strike a new foreign and security policy balance between Brussels and its member-states.  In the end the report fails to deal adequately with either option or find any middle way between them.    

Rather, implicit in EGS is a stark choice; German power or Commission power.  On balance (of course) EGS rejects the greater Germany option and opts for what is believed to be the lesser of two-evils. It is the very subterfuge the European elite have always practiced on the rest of us – the pretence that ‘progress’ is a partnership between Brussels and its member-states when in fact the transfer of ever more ‘sovereignty’ is the very replacement by Brussels of the member-state. 

The subliminal message of EGS is thus; either the European nation-state is too weak or too dangerous to survive.  The choice is thus between the “Infernal” and the “Inferno”.  As ever influencing the world comes second to organising Europe.  

Julian Lindley-French

The Battle of the Atlantic

Oslo, Norway.  28 May. Winston Churchill said “The only thing that ever frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril”.  Last Friday in Moscow’s Victory Park I had the honour of an escorted visit to the Hall of Memory and Sorrow in which 2650 ‘teardrops’ commemorate the 26.5 million Russian war dead.  It was a truly moving experience.  Here in Oslo in support of a NATO meeting I am reminded of the enormity of the Allied effort to defeat Nazi Germany.  This week sees not only the seventy-second anniversary of the sinking of the German fast battleship Bismarck, but also the seventieth anniversary of what the U-boat arm called “Black May” when over forty U-boats were lost to new British tactics and technology.  It is seen as the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic and for that reason marks the commemoration of what was the longest campaign of World War Two.
 

The sheer scale of the battle speaks for itself.  It lasted the entirety of the war from September 1939 to May 1945.  Simply to stay in the war Britain had to import one million tons of food and materials each week.  Three thousand five hundred merchant ships were lost with some thirty thousand sailors killed.  The massive bulk of those lost were British but there were also American, Canadian, Danes, Dutch, French, Norwegian and host of other allies who suffered casualties.  One hundred and seventy-five allied warships were sunk but seven hundred and eighty three U-boats were also sunk.  Indeed, ninety per cent of U-boat crews were killed. Only RAF Bomber Command comes close to that casualty rate with some fifty per cent of crews killed.

Nor was this simply a sea war with the RAF, Royal Canadian Air Force and US Army Air Force playing a critical role in the eventual victory.  There were over one hundred major convoy battles and over one thousand single ship engagements.  Attacks came not just from under the waves but also from German air and surface raiders.  Moreover, the convoys did not simply sail between North America and Britain.  In what Churchill described as the “worst journey in the world” one of the decisive campaigns was the successful re-supplying of the Soviet Union by convoys from Britain to Murmansk in the Soviet high north. 

Whilst not immediately obvious to Russians the Battle of the Atlantic was critical not simply to Britain’s survival but that of the Soviet Union.  The Murmansk convoys suffered terribly from air, sea and U-boat attacks launched from bases here in occupied Norway.  Critically, on 26 December, 1943 the British battleship HMS Duke of York cornered and sank the German battle-cruiser Scharnhorst.  The Battle of North Cape was one of the last battleship-to-battleship duals in which air power played no meaningful role.  As a sign of things to come it was the first occasion when radar-controlled gunnery was used.  In the Arctic twilight HMS Duke of York completely surprised the Scharnhorst with her massive fourteen inch guns straddling and hitting the German ship with her very first salvo. 

Ultimately, the battle was an exercise in British sea power which still has lessons for today.  Specifically, why Britain must retain a powerful navy able to reach those parts most other navies cannot.  Ninety-five per cent of all British trade goes by sea and with sea-lines of communication (SLOC) ever more important to global trade keeping sea-lanes open is a vital British interest.

There is another reason.  The Royal Navy remains a ‘strategic brand’ one of those iconic services the history of which makes it far more than any old navy.  If the Royal Navy is weak, as it is dangerously close to being today, then not only Britain’s defence but British influence is at risk.  This is something all too apparent to me when I visit Washington, Moscow, Beijing or indeed Paris or Berlin.  National wealth stands ultimately on national influence.  It is something too many British politicians fail to understand.  Even more worrying too many of those with responsibility for planning Britain’s future military also fail to understand this basic power truism in what is still a world driven by state power.

On Sunday the last remaining veterans of the Battle of the Atlantic gathered in Liverpool Cathedral for a service of remembrance.  The Port of Liverpool had been the hub of the Battle of the Atlantic.  Although now few in number they remain stout of heart.  The role they played was to critical in the winning of the war.  We owe our freedom to the thousands of Britons, Americans, Canadians and those of many other proud lands who surrendered their lives to the chill depths of the Atlantic during that terrible time.

Honour them.

Julian Lindley-French

Moscow European Security Conference

Moscow, Russia. 23 May. The Moscow River flows through this ancient seat of Russian power like a timeless reminder of a timeless country and its seemingly endless space.  The Moscow European Security Conference at which I today spoke is a jewel in the crown of Russia’s Ministry of Defence. Now, I am no Russophobe.  Indeed, as a student of Russian history my respect for this immense country is great.  And, seen from Moscow it is very easy to see just how Russians see their place in Europe and Europe’s place in Russia.  And yet listening to several of today’s speeches I was reminded of a nineteenth century Russian Prime Minister Gorschakov who once described Europe as a peninsula stuck on the end of Russia.  In other words what happened in Europe only did so in the context of Russia.  That is not how Europe works today if it ever did.  Russian concerns must of course be treated with respect but I fear that Moscow is about to miss a great opportunity to influence a Europe in more flux than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

 

The day has been dominated by what for most Europeans and North Americans are yesterday’s issues; NATO enlargement, the defunct Conventional Forces Europe treaty and that old favourite ballistic missile defence.  What has surprised me is the extent to which Moscow obsesses over American plans for a limited NATO missile defence.  There is a very genuine and heartfelt belief in Moscow that plans for BMD are the thin end of a wedge that could in time threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

With the cancellation of Phase 4 of the planned system one would have thought that Moscow would now realise something the rest of us have suspected for some time; missile defence does not work,  the NATO allies cannot afford it and the American taxpayer is not prepared to pay for it.  The same should go for NATO’s conventional capabilities.  The NATO that is being described here simply does not exist.  Far from threatening Russia’s borders NATO is being reduced by most of its defence-lite members to little more than an umbrella organisation for vastly different and differing states with vastly different interests and capabilities a few of whom on occasions might from time to time work together in a crisis and not very well. 

Instead Russia should focus on two things.  First, the changing power relations in Europe.  When the Eurozone core deepens political relations relationships with and between Europe’s new peripheral powers- Britain, the Nordic states, Russia and Turkey - will also change.  Indeed, their interests will tend to align beyond existing institutional boundaries.  Second, emerging security challenges and threats should be the stuff of Russia’s European and Euro-Atlantic strategy rather than trying to preserve mutually assured destruction in Europe.  MAD belongs to Europe's last century not this one.

In Yorkshire we have a saying; if you have nothing nice to say to someone talk about something else.  A functional strategic agenda for Europe would necessarily promote a pan-European concept of security which is in Russia’s interest.  Pandemics, economic uncertainty, energy insecurity, the rise of an instable Asia, WMD proliferation and the democratisation of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, global crime focused on illicit flows of money, people and drugs, fanaticism and hatred of the sort we saw on the streets of London yesterday and the instability we all face to Europe’s and Eurasia’s south these are the stuff of pan-European security.  Make them work and fears of a fantasy NATO will over time simply fade away.

The irony for me about today’s debate is that Russia’s inner Europe-Europe border with EU and NATO members is Moscow’s one stable border shared as it is with its main trading and economic partners.  In other words to this friend of Russia Moscow’s stated intent of a stable Europe and the concerns it expresses simply do not add up.  

The challenge for all we Europeans – both Russian and non-Russian - will be to put history into its shield-encrusted showcase if we are to manage together the globalisation-driven tsunami of change forging towards us.  It is therefore critical that together we have the political courage to see danger for what it is, not what it was. 

 

To a large extent Prime Minister Gorschakov was right; Europe is indeed a peninsula stuck on the end of Russia.  However, given the globalised and globalising context of contemporary security Russia is a European power and together we are all ever more a peninsula stuck on the end of Asia.

Russia is missing a fundamental strategic point - if Russia wants to fashion a single European security space it needs to promote a new security agenda and soon.

 

This is a great country and I am glad I came.  

 

Julian Lindley-French 

Hollande’s Europe

Alphen, Netherlands.  20 May. “It is my responsibility as a leader of a founder member of the European Union...to pull Europe out of this torpor that has gripped it, and to reduce people’s disenchantment with it.  If Europe stays in the state it is in now, it could be the end of the project”.  Europe owes French President Francois Hollande a deep debt of gratitude.  His call for an “economic government” for the Eurozone with its own budget, the right to borrow, a harmonized tax system and a full-time president was the first really honest statement of intent by one of Europe’s big leaders. The federal cat is now out of the Euro bag.  President Hollande has also revealed for what it is the nonsense being peddled by those who argue that Britain’s relationship with much of the rest of Europe is about this EU or simply a matter of economics.  It is about Britain’s relationship with Hollande’s Europe, a future federalised EU vitally-needed to preserve the Euro.  As we approach Le Crunch is there any way a just balance can be found between Hollande’s and Cameron’s very different visions for Europe?

 

President Hollande faces three major roadblocks before he realises his “Europe”.  Berlin buys into much of what Hollande suggests, at least in theory.  However, Chancellor Merkel still believes she can prevent the British and French extremes from pulling the EU apart.  She is also fully aware that behind President Hollande’s call is not simply a vision of Europe long a dream of those on the Mitterand Left of French politics.  It also reflects a Paris desperate to get the German, Dutch and other northern Europeans to bear the burden for French public debt.  The German people will not accept debt mutualisation without fiscal and budgetary discipline and that means massive structural economic and political reforms.  That in effect is precisely what President Hollande is offering Berlin.

If Berlin accepts the offer then Eurozone governments will need first to overcome deep public dissatisfaction with both the EU and the political elite.  Recent Eurobarometer data demonstrates the gravity of the crisis.  Since 2008 trust in the EU has crashed from 20 to -29 polling points in Germany, 30 to -22 points in Italy, from 42 to -52 points in Spain, and from 50 to 6 points in Poland.  Critically, the polls have moved from 10 to -22 points in France, which is clearly of deep concern to President Hollande.  Not surprisingly support in Britain has shifted from a heady -13 to a relationship-busting -49.   It is unclear whether this data reflects dissatisfaction with the way the crisis has been handled or something deeper; that the European nation-state actually still matters to its citizens.

For David Cameron President Hollande’s timing could not have been worse, which may of course explain it.  The Hollande speech came a day after Cameron suffered the worst parliamentary revolt over Europe of any sitting prime minister.  Cameron is now in full EU crisis mode.  Hollande has also made it much harder for Cameron to negotiate a “new relationship” for Britain with the EU.  Indeed, implicit in President Hollande’s offer to Berlin is another mug's deal for London; even less influence for the same if not more massive cost.  This makes a mockery of London’s mantra that Britain’s relationship is not about to change fundamentally.  Even if London does precisely nothing Britain’s relationship with the EU will change fundamentally and not for the better. 

So can a “new relationship” be forged?  Cameron believes he has allies in both Berlin and The Hague.  However, they are inside the Euro and Britain is not.  With the best will in the world it is hard to see what deal could be struck amenable to a power centralising Eurozone and to a power repatriation-seeking Britain – one camp which wants a super-Brussels and one state that seeks a mini-Brussels.  Unless that is those EU member-states outside the Eurozone are firmly embedded in an EU-US Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement.  Such an agreement would be a real game-changer and which explains Cameron’s visit last week to Washington.   In effect a huge single market would balance a large currency union.  However, Cameron should not hold his breath.  One of my well-placed Washington sources tells me that the Obama Administration is only playing with this idea, it has little support in Congress and that part of the reason for floating this is to help Cameron see off his rebellious back-benchers.

Cameron, Hollande and Merkel should at least be given the chance to strike this new balance but they had better get on with it.  If not President Hollande is right – the EU and the Eurozone will become one and the same thing and those in the twilight zone between the Eurozone and an exit will find themselves in a strategic, political and economic no man’s land, which apparently is where the Obama administration now wants to cast Britain. So much for the Special Relationship! Why can Americans never 'get' Europe? 

In other words the Eurozone either integrates or disintegrates.  If the latter then the Euro fails and it is hasta la vista EU!

Je dois vous remercie, Monsieur le President!

Julian Lindley-French