Alphen, Netherlands. 21 February. A
brief survey of Britain’s world reinforces the challenges the country faces and
the need for effective national strategy.
Be it the threat posed by terrorism or states, the relatively benign
world-view in the 2010 National Security Strategy seems already out-dated. There is clearly a growing need to compete
effectively in the global race with states, which, in turn, suggests a new
strategic mind-set is needed, together with a re-organisation of state tools
and the commitment of appropriate resources.
Furthermore,
the fusion of terrorism, global flows of illegal funding in support of such
groups also raises the spectre of terrorists armed with mass-destructive power.
Such a threat is not immediate but
cannot be discounted and would act as an asymmetric leveller, forcing states
such as Britain to seek a balance between a credible defence against such
groups, and sufficient expeditionary military power to deter, disrupt and, if
necessary, reach out and destroy. If
that happens, then counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency
and counter-intelligence would then need to merge and Britain’s security effort
organised accordingly.
At
the inter-state level, effective non-proliferation regimes enshrined in
international organisations such as the UN, will, and must, remain central to
British strategy and yet they are fraying and could fail. At the very least, Britain must work to continue
to ensure the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other multilateral arms
control regimes and slow the spread of nuclear weapons, but what if a state
breaks out? If that happens, which
frankly seems only a matter of time, the need for effective nuclear deterrence
could well again become pressing, however ghastly that sounds.
Facing
up to the challenges in Britain’s world will be challenging, but it is a challenge
British strategy must grip. The problem
is that Britain suffers from an overly one-dimensional view of threat –
terrorism – important though that threat is.
Not only is Britain in danger of ceding the strategic space in
Afghanistan to the enemy, it has become overly focused on that enemy. As a result, Britain is failing to properly
consider the large ends of grand strategy in the round and the large means that
could need to be devoted to them in the coming years, given the growing
pressures in the international system are not just about failed states and
failed ideas. Power is back. Only if Britain’s leaders have the political
courage to scan Britain’s strategic landscape and see it for what it could be,
rather than what they hope, will the country begin to place security and defence
in its proper context.
Indeed,
the list of risks and threats discussed herein is by no means complete. There are also tensions in the Arctic High
North, concerns over the security of the Gulf States, Baltic insecurity,
conflict in the Horn of Africa, piracy, human and drug trafficking, trade insecurity,
organised crime, the frictions caused by a rapidly growing world population -
the list goes on. The challenge for
Britain and its allies and partners will be to see these challenges in the
strategic round, not as a series of iterative one-offs, which is, of course,
the political temptation.
Clearly,
the scope, extent and nature of change is challenging traditional British concepts
of security and defence and demanding creative approaches to conflict
prevention, response and consequence management. It is change that will also demand of leaders
a determination to influence events not merely to react to them, and it is this
challenge that British leaders schooled in politics rather than strategy will
face in the coming years. However, to
meet that challenge, London must think anew about British power and influence
and to what ends they are applied and how.
Partnership
will, of course, be central to British strategy. However, such method will only be achieved if
Britain has the power to be an attractive partner and sufficient societal and
governmental cohesion to act as a leader.
Therefore, to compete effectively in the global race, the British must
first have a sound grasp of the scope and extent of change and a clear
understanding about where best to focus the British strategic effort. At the very least, Britain must re-develop a
sound capacity to scan the strategic horizon, rather than merely react to the
headlines of the moment.
Only
then will the British establish a proper appreciation of the extent and nature
of the power shifts taking place in the world.
Only then can the fashioning of British security policy, from which
national strategy flows, be properly made with any confidence. Such a response will need to be radical,
rather than incremental. Such an
appreciation will also necessarily lead to a range of assumptions and policy
choices that will fashion Britain’s political, security, diplomatic and military
effort into the future.
Given the nature of power in today’s world, how
it is measured and quantified, both as an absolute commodity and relative
capability, statecraft will be critical.
Ultimately, soft power is nought without credible hard power. Therefore, how Britain conceives, makes and
exercises strategy in the coming years will be critical. In the twenty-first century, only a
clear-headed view of Britain’s place and power in the world will enable Britain
to compete effectively in the global race and secure its interests, values and
people.
Julian Lindley-French
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