At the core of Britain’s defence
strategy must be a force able to lead coalitions via a combined and joint force
concept that is so closely co-ordinated that, in effect, it represents a true
revolution in military affairs – organic jointness. In a 2013 speech to the Royal United Services Institute, the British Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Houghton stated, “As far
as the force structure is concerned, we must exploit the advent of the Joint
Forces Command to champion the enablement of the force. This command is now the proponent for C4ISR,
for Cyber, for Special Forces, for Joint Logistics and Defence Medical
Services. It owns those things that
represent the nervous system of capability. And it has come of age”. In fact, the new Joint Force Command (JFC)
must become far more than a mere proponent – it must drive change.
Therefore, it is time for
Britain to be defence radical. It was
Britain that created the first all-professional force back in 1960. Britain must now create the first truly
strategic and truly joint force. The new
Joint Force Command is a start, but it goes nowhere near far enough and, at the
very least, must have high-level representation from all three services, if the
new Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is to be realised as a strategic rather
than an economy force. To that end, a
showcase is needed that demonstrates the capacity of British forces to reach
and strike and afford Britain effective command and control of coalitions. In that context, jointness means synthesis
thorough combined and integrated forces, including appropriate civilian
elements.
However, it is precisely in the domain of joint and integrated
capability that organic jointness is vitally needed. For too long Service chiefs have seen such
capability as secondary to their own core Service capabilities. That must end. Joint and integrated capabilities are the
bedrock upon which the Joint Force must be established, and central to the
working up of organic jointness. This is
vital for effective command and control and strategic situational awareness.
The Joint Force Command must therefore be given the status and authority to
drive organic jointness across the three Services. It should also be given a further role (with
supporting capabilities and resources) to reach out to all civilian national
means.
To achieve such a radical shift Britain's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR 2015) would need to mark a clean break
from SDSR 2010. SDSR 2010 was a spread-sheet review, where balancing the books came
well before establishing a coherent strategic military capability. To be fair, this is not surprising given the
current government was faced in 2010 with unfunded spending commitments of
£74bn when it came to power. Defence
Secretary Philip Hammond, faced with such a liability, was right to suggest
that one of his main tasks was to end what he called a “conspiracy of optimism”
at the Ministry of Defence and defence equipment. However, balancing strategy with commitments
has proven harder than expected.
The
sheer scale and pace of cuts also had a disastrous effect on British
influence. SDSR 2010 nominally cut the
defence budget by 8% but, in reality, went far further, whilst the Government’s
June 2013 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) ‘shaved’ a further 7% off what
was meant to have been the absolute defence bottom-line. This sent a very negative set of signals to
allies, partners and the armed forces themselves. It almost certainly encouraged those who would
welcome diminished British and, by extension, Western influence in the
world.
Hopefully,
with the CSR the British defence budget appears to have at last been
stabilised, although the Chancellor is calling for a further 20% off public
expenditure post 2015. Moreover, defence
cost inflation is running markedly higher than the allowances incorporated into
planning the defence budget, which is still declining in real terms. The Special Military Reserve will be cut by
£900m but this is in line with reducing operational costs as British forces
begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The CSR retained the defence resource budget at £24bn ($37bn) and the
defence equipment budget was fixed at £14bn ($21bn), with a year-on-year
real-terms increase of 1% up to 2020.
However, whilst there will be no cuts to the numbers of soldiers,
sailors and airmen, major cuts were earmarked for defence civilians which will
mean either the engagement of expensive contractors, the diversion of military
personnel to undertake jobs hitherto done by civilians or simply a reduction of
capacity to undertake work.
Julian Lindley-French
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