CHRISTMAS ESSAY: Putin’s Sphere of Fear

 

December 20^th, 2021

“Today we actually find ourselves in such a situation when we have reached the brink and our proposals, which we have formulated, they are absolutely substantive, absolutely accurately describe without any half-tones how we see our national interests, and we also describe how we seemingly military safety in Europe.  Today we have come to such a moment of truth in our relations with NATO, when it is necessary to decide in principle. We have taken this step and proceed from the fact that it will no longer be possible to brush it off or blabber it out…If this does not work out, then we will also switch to this mode of creating counter-threats.  But then it will be too late to ask us why we made such decisions”.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko, December 18^th, 2021

Putin’s sphere of fear

This is a Christmas essay I would have preferred not to have written. The current crisis in Europe’s east is the most dangerous since the end of the Cold War. So let me take a punt. President Putin will send more Russian troops into Ukraine during the Christmas period, whilst Europe slumbers and the Omicron panic is at full spate.  That is what the Soviets did in December 1979 when they invaded Afghanistan, what Putin did in August 2008 during Europe’s summer break, and what Anwar Sadat and the Arab Coalition did in 1973 when he launched the Yom Kippur War on Israel’s Day of Atonement.  Putin’s strategy bears a marked similarity to Sadat’s Operation Badr before which Egyptian and Syrian forces had repeatedly feigned preparations for an attack to lull Israel into a false sense of security. The geopolitical choreography between China’s President Xi and Putin is also the ghost of Stalin past come back to haunt the West.

Putin’s strident demands that the US sign a treaty over the heads of its European Allies to roll back the Alliance’s presence in former Warsaw Pact countries to pre-1997 has two interpretations both of which are unacceptable. First, Moscow is (again) seeking to establish a precedent by which Russia is permitted to negotiate directly with Washington about Europe in the absence of Europeans.  Second, it is simply a gambit to justify military action in which case the NATO Allies should simply not respond.  Putin is clearly seeking to split the Alliance and again raise the prospect of decoupling of the US from its European Allies, much like Brezhnev’s 1977 demarche when the Soviet Union deployed Europe-busting theatre-range SS20s nuclear-tipped missiles. To repeat, given that the West simply cannot accept what are outrageous demands then they are either a first bid in an effort to force a weak West to accept a de facto Russian sphere of fear over Central and Eastern Europe, or rather like Hitler’s demands of Poland on the eve of World War Two, designed to be rejected thus providing the Kremlin with a casus belli for an attack on Ukraine.

Some in the West claim NATO’s original sin was to enlarge in the first place.  This reveals a profound misunderstanding of the geopolitical stakes. The clash between the West and the Soviet Union was essentially about sovereign choice.  The right of free peoples to choose their allegiances and alliances.  Putin is seeking to again deny that to fellow Europeans and, make no mistake, not just in Ukraine. The original sinners also suggest that all powerful states have spheres of influence.  That is entirely correct.  However, it is the nature of each sphere which is the core of contention now.  The likes of the US and Germany do not force those in their respective spheres into servitude.  Rather, the only demand of Allies they make is they uphold the values of liberal democracy and take part on collective defence.  Putin’s Russia seeks the return of the NKVD/KGB/FSB state in a new sphere of fear.  Just look at Russia itself. The West must resist.  As for those who suggest the West broke a promise when NATO enlarged they are simply victims of Russian propaganda. Read President Gorbachev’s interviews about the events of 1989 to 1991 and no such undertaking was ever agreed. As for the stationing of NATO forces on the territory of former Warsaw Pact the most that ever existed was a tacit agreement not to so but only so long as Russia remained co-operative and constructive.  Indeed, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was meant to codify such a mutually beneficial relationship but Moscow has chosen to destroy it. In other words, it is precisely the actions of President Putin which are destroying a secure Europe and precisely why Russia must not be permitted a de facto veto over the Alliance, its policies and its actions.  

Putin’s power play

President Putin has adopted a classic Russian strategy by probing and seeking to exploit weaknesses and divisions amongst his enemies.  He is not short of options.  Consequently, this Kremlin-engineered crisis has thus far seen three of four phases and is the first real test of the Gerasimov Doctrine (and it is a doctrine – a way of doing military-strategic business) of escalating non-linear warfare reinforced by offensive manoeuvre. The first phase was back in the spring when the Union State with Belarus and Black Seas Fleet enabled Russia to threaten Ukraine from three of its four distinct sides.  This phase was supported by a false historical narrative about the legitimacy of Russia’s claims built on the myths surrounding the Kievan Rus and Grigory Potemkin’s creation of Sevastopol. Putin hoped the mere looming presence of Russian forces would be enough to force President Vlodomir Zelensky and the Ukrainians into compliance with Russian demands that Ukraine remain firmly in Russia’s sphere of fear. This phase secured at least some of its objectives because in June Putin secured a Geneva summit with US President Joe Biden that was full of political symbolism.

Phase two began in October in the wake of Moscow’s taking of full control over Minsk, an engineered migrant crisis on the Belarus border with both Poland and Lithuania, allied to the steady build-up of crack Russian units along the Belarus and Russian borders with Ukraine.  Phase three is now underway, the threat of an invasion of Ukraine allied to a widening of the crisis to overtly include wholly unwarranted allegations about NATO’s defensive posture across much of free Central and Eastern Europe. As UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said on December 8^th, “NATO is a defensive alliance that only borders with 6 percent of Russia’s borders. Russia is being the aggressor. No-one is trying to surround Russia. No-one should be suckered by the phoney narrative coming out of Moscow about provocation”.  Phase four?  The attack on Ukraine.

What is the military situation?

The Americans estimate the Russians could undertake a major offensive into Ukraine in the latter half of January. If Russian objectives are more limited than a full-blown invasion, which is likely, Putin could move tomorrow. As of December 20^th there are some 90,000 Russian troops close to the Ukrainian border stretching from Rostov in the south into Belarus in the north, with spearhead elements of both Western and Central Military Districts now in place.  There are also 80,000 deep strike formations and reserves held back from the border on a jump-off line running north-south centred on Voronezh.  Crucially, elite Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) have now been deployed along the border, supported by field hospitals and other combat support and combat support services.  At present there are 50 BTGs in situ. These are Putin’s shock-troops and are organised into 168 BTGs and have a ‘grab and hold’ function and are designed to link up with Spetsnaz forces and thus act as a link between Special Operating Forces and the bulk of the Russian Army. They are not unlike General Ludendorff’s tactical units deployed during the March 1918 Operation Michael. Five years ago only 66 BTGs existed.

The Russian Army has also deployed rocket artillery, self-propelled artillery, and the tanks of the usually Moscow-based First Guards Tank Army, as well as two tactical air groups and short-range ballistic missiles brought in from across Russia to within range of Ukraine. There are a further 50 BTGs also believed to be moving into place, whilst much of Russia’s heavy weaponry that was deployed during the spring crisis was never withdrawn. At the time, the Russian Army deployed an estimated 110,000 troops, tanks and other offensive systems not far from the border. Much of the Russian force, together with its strategy and tactics, has also been tested during the Zapad 21 and Vostok 18 exercises. Opposing them are some 100,000 Ukrainian regulars and reservists.  The Regulars are better-equipped and trained than they were in 2014 when Russia seized Ukraine, having benefitted from training by US, UK and other Western Allies, but they are spread thinly trying to cover Russian forces along a long front.

If Putin launches an offensive the 41^st Combined Arms Army will be critical.  It is normally based in Novosibirsk almost 2,500 kilometres from Ukraine but has remain forward deployed at the Pogonovo training area south of Voronezh since April.  Elements of the 41st CAA have also been observed at Yelnya close to Belarus.  The 41^st CAA comprises motorised infantry, main battle tanks, rocket artillery and Iskander short-range ballistic missiles organised around seven BTGs.  Crucially, the main battle tanks, rocket artillery and motorised infantry of the First Guards Tank Army have also been observed close to Pogonovo.  Motor rifle brigades from the 49^th CAA have also been observed moving towards Crimea, whilst elements of the 58th CAA are now present in Western Crimea.

As part of phase three of the crisis Moscow is demanding ‘legal guarantees’ that Kiev will never join NATO and, with echoes of the November 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, never host Allied missile systems. What is particularly concerning is that Putin cannot keep his troops at such a high state of readiness indefinitely.  By February, at the latest, Putin will either have to attack or withdraw, which without significant political and strategic gains would look like a defeat.  One reason Putin is demanding major concessions from the Alliance is to provide political top cover for any such withdrawal. A further concern is that the 2015 peace agreement which established the so-called ‘line of demarcation’ between Kiev’s forces and Russian-speaking separatists appears close to collapse.

For all of its impressive combat power there are also some constraints with which the Russian Army must contend.  An excellent November 2021 piece by Alexander Vershinin entitled Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli, claims that whilst the Russian Army is schooled in offensive doctrine (proval blitzkriga) and has the requisite combat power it lacks critical logistics.  This means the Russian Army would probably need both logistics and operational pauses to achieve even a limited objective, although several senior Allied commanders with direct experience of NATO’s eastern flank disagree. They argue that Russia would not have invested in the current force at great expense if it was unable to use it.  That would be like the Mercedes or Red Bull Formula One teams having to go to Kwik Fit every time they needed to change tyres during a race.  One problem is the constant application of Western thinking and practice to the Russian military doctrine.  Russia is not, for the moment, going to attack the Baltic States or the Suwalki Corridor but Ukraine, with everything in its operational and strategic favour. Russian military intelligence (GRU) and Spetsnaz have constructed a detailed operational picture of Ukraine over several years, with the latter now in place to cause mayhem behind the lines if ordered. Whilst Vershinin is right about a sustained land offensive against NATO territory his assumptions about Russian operations in Ukraine are misplaced given the likely objectives. In recent years Moscow has modernised relevant infrastructures to enable discreet and rapid mobilisation and reinforcement on Russia’s western border and the improved use of civilian assets to reinforce military logistics power.

What are Russia’s war aims?

A December article in Defense News by Hans Binnendijk and Barry Pavel suggests Putin has four options: occupy the whole of Ukraine, seize all of Ukraine’s coastline from Donetsk to Moldova, seize part of Ukraine’s coastline from Donetsk to Crimea along the Sea of Azov; or simply annex the Donbas region which Russia already occupies.  Again, at some point Putin is going to do something, not least because repeatedly mobilising large forces is prohibitively expensive, and because having worked up the Russian people to believe something is coming not to act might appear as weakness, the very thing which he believes is Europe’s curse.  It may not be this Christmas or early in 2022 but Putin is first and foremost a Russian nationalist inspired by a lop-sided view of Russia, its greatness and its history,  He also seems determined to consolidate his 2014 seizure of Crimea for a mix of reasons – grand strategic, regional-strategic, political-domestic, and personal legacy.  Given the forces deployed and the balance Russia will still need to strike between risks and benefit option two – seizure of Ukraine’s entire coastline from Donetsk to Moldova - would seem the likely objective. If successful, such a campaign would leave a rump Ukraine dependent on the rest of Europe and thus Europe's problem, and minimize risk of direct operational contact with NATO forces.  It would also establish a further clear buffer between Russia and NATO forces, imply threat to the Baltic States, and also further extend Russia's sphere of fear into the Black Sea Region.

Thereafter, in another ghost of Stalin past, Putin might well expel all non-native Russian speakers from the zone of occupation exacerbating the existing migration crisis on the Belarus border with Poland and Lithuania as part of an ongoing ‘perma-war’ hybrid campaign, whilst undertaking a series of targeted fake news and coercive cyber-attacks on European capitals and critical infrastructure.  In other words, escalating a ‘deep grey’ crisis just enough to de-escalate the chance of a cohesive Western response beyond the sanctions he has already prepared for.  He would then make the remaining population in the zone of occupation Russian citizens and formally annex the conquered territory into the Russian Federation.

What does Putin want?

As any negotiator knows the framing of discussions shapes the outcomes of negotiations because concessions are already hard-wired into the assumptions behind them. Last week President Biden suggested that he wanted to convene talks to “…discuss the future of Russia’s concerns relative to NATO writ large’.  Moscow has ‘responded’ by proposing two treaties, probably prepared when the campaign was being designed earlier this year, that make a series of implausible demands that transform the crisis from one between two non-NATO states into one that is essentially about NATO. 

Putin has already succeeded in establishing a dangerous precedent when President Biden effectively conceded that a threat against a non-NATO member might lead by obvious implication to limits on the security NATO can provide to its Eastern European members. Putin has also succeeded already in sowing a seed of doubt about American resolve in the mind of Allies because the security of the Baltic States would not be strengthened by such discussions. One of Moscow’s objectives is also to prevent the Alliance strengthening deterrence and defence by doing what is required to counter the very real Russian threat. Putin has identified a ‘deterrence hole’ in the Alliance force posture between Western Poland and the Baltic States and Bulgaria and Romania which he would like to make larger.     

NATO membership should be based on the fundamental principle that a citizen of Riga enjoys the same level of security and defence as a citizen of Berlin or Paris. Therefore, the US and its Allies must never accept the principle that Moscow has the right to discuss the planning and deployment of Allied forces whilst it egregiously breaks international treaties and acts coercively.  Any such concession would come close to conceding some form of Russian veto over NATO policy.  One can only hope that the planned talks do not follow the same pattern as the Doha talks with the Taliban and the subsequent sell-out of Afghanistan to which they led. Putin clearly hopes so.

Why now?

There are several reasons why Putin has chosen this moment to threaten Ukraine and the wider West. First, it is getting colder. Germany needs gas after Berlin’s nonsensical decision to abandon nuclear power and commit to carbon-zero climate change goals before having established a new energy mix that avoids overt reliance on Putin’s Russia for energy. It is strategic illiteracy at its worse. The same goes for other parts of Europe. One of the many paradoxes of this crisis is that it is European energy reliance on Russia that is paying for much of Moscow’s capacity to coerce.  Ideally, Nordstream 2, the direct and just-completed gas pipeline between Russia and Germany should now be scrapped. Berlin’s new Scholz government has hinted at such action if Putin attacks Ukraine. However, Putin and his team will have war-gamed such threats and are clearly betting that any such sanctions would not last long because the German people need heat.  Putin can also blame the West for any suffering he has imposed on the Russian people as a consequence of his actions.

Second, Ukraine remains corrupt and divided, mainly thanks to Russian help and Putin is still gambling that the Zelensky regime might collapse like a pack of cards so he can install a Lukashenka-like puppet regime in Kiev.  Crucially, China has also come out in support of the Russians, which begs a further question – what does Beijing want in return?  At the very least the current crisis might well herald what might happen in reverse if China invades Taiwan. Clearly, it is in the interests of both Beijing and Moscow to exacerbate pressures on an already over-stretched US military and to keep Europe permanently politically off-balance.

Third, there is Omicron and a divided Europe that is once again in disarray over the COVID pandemic.  It is a Europe that is also as wary of US as at any time since the Cold War given the recent debacle in Afghanistan and as unsure about Biden’s grip as Putin is. A Europe led by a Germany in which leaders have too often abandoned the responsibility of leadership by citing evidence such Pew research that surprise, surprise tells them their people do not like bad things. 

There are also specifically Russian factors.  Putin has been modernising his armed forces at great expense since the 2008 Georgia fiasco.  His modernised military is now close to peak efficiency and is very expensive to maintain. Putin may well feel he faces a use it or lose it dilemma if the post-COVID Russian economy weakens significantly.  Putin is also unchallenged in Russia with his 2021 change to the Russian constitution ensuring he will be effectively President-for-Life (or at least until 2036). Putin is also 69 years old and clearly seeking to secure a place in the Pantheon of what he regards as Russian ‘greats’. There are also no major elections forthcoming (for what they are worth in Russia) and he has crushed the opposition movement, most notably that of brave Alexander Navalny.  Finally, Putin is surrounded by ‘yes men’ which creates a dangerous dynamic for any unchallenged leader.  His cronies, and the Siloviki who support him, are no doubt competing with each other to reinforce Putin’s prejudices simply to survive in the ‘medieval’ court that is Putin’s Kremlin. It is precisely why Western leaders should never look at Putin’s actions through their liberal eyes.  

How should the West respond?

Western leaders should be reminded of Thomas Hobbes’s dictum that, “Covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.” The Russian ultimatum to the US concerning NATO is straight out of the Soviet playbook with no such ultimatum having been made since the height of the Cold War and the Berlin crises of both 1958 and 1961. Much will depend on President Biden.  In June 1961, President John F. Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev during which the Russian thought he had identified a weakness he could exploit.  He was wrong. Kennedy stood firm. Biden?

The West’s aims must be fourfold. First, to de-escalate the immediate threat. Second, to preserve the rights of Kiev as any European sovereign state to choose its own alliances. Third, to convince Russia that the use of such coercion will not work and will be prohibitively expensive strategically, politically and economically. Fourth, convince Moscow that if it chooses not to be a friend then its only real option is to become a transactional partner in a peaceful Europe.

Ukraine?  The former US Ambassador to Moscow and NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow recently called on NATO to launch a Ukrainian Deterrence Initiative (UDI) as an extension of the Alliance’s Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) programme. Under UDI, the Allies would do all they can to assist Ukraine to defend itself, dissuade Russia from launching further aggression, and thus increase Kiev’s leverage in pursuit of a political settlement to the conflict in Donbas. Such a demarche would include the provision of more military equipment and further training, as well as efforts to enhance Ukraine’s resilience against cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic warfare, and political subversion. UDI could also establish a function-driven form of partnership with NATO, making it a formal Alliance responsibility to help train Ukrainian armed forces and to facilitate their acquisition of modern defensive weapons backed by common funding.  

To conclude, the West must not sacrifice the longer-term for false security in the near term.  Western leaders cannot and must not avoid the fundamental principle/tension in this crisis between the democratic belief in sovereign freedom and Russia’s determination to re-assert a sphere of fear around its borders. If North Americans and Europeans are weak now they could well pay a terrible price in future, particularly those living east of the Oder-Neisse line. As such they might well remember the words of Thucydides in The Melian Dialogue. “The strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept”.  We are better than that!

Happy Christmas!

Julian Lindley-French

 

What Can Allies Expect of Germany?

 “Those Allies who expect Germany to pull its weight in the security and defence of Europe will be disappointed”.

December 14^th, 2021.  Decisions taken by the new German government will have profound implications for Europe’s security and defence and the wider transatlantic relationship.  Last week, The Alphen Group https://thealphengroup.home.blog/our-purpose/ which I have the honour to chair, discussed what Allies can expect of Germany.  The note of that meeting is below.

It is too early to tell what Allies can expect of Germany with formation of the new government, although it is clear that whilst the tone and emphasis of German foreign and security policy might shift marginally, the essential tenets will remain by and large the same. The election produced no mandate for major reform of the core tenets of German foreign, security and defence policy, but some important reforms are at least intended, such as to the defence procurement system. While a National Security Strategy is foreseen, no Defence White Paper is planned.

For the Government to endure the SPD needs the support of its junior partners. Therefore, much of the coming debate will be about whether the Coalition Compact sets the direction of travel of German policy or the SPD. These tensions will persist as the coalition will be transactional with little ‘love between the three parties’ with a constant “tug of war between idealists and realists”.  Equally, the coalition compact is more forward leaning on foreign and security policy than some expected with an “emphatic Atlanticism”.  However, whilst the compact reflects the Greens and FDP influence it is likely the SPD that will try to dictate policy, with foreign policy made in the Bundeskanzleramt.

The language on Russia and China is tougher than that of the Merkel administration, but the new administration will also seek to de-escalate tensions in and over Ukraine and the passage on US-German relations is less “cheerful” than four years ago. There is as yet no decision over the future of the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline in spite of “huge pressure” to scrap it. There are also profound contradictions in German energy policy and energy security as Berlin grapples with meeting carbon commitments whilst maintaining energy supplies without becoming overly reliant on Putin’s Russia.  It could well be that “Germany will not cope without Russian gas”. 

There is a strong commitment to what the compact calls European “strategic sovereignty”, although it is markedly not referred to in the chapter on defence. To the new foreign minister “European sovereignty” is "not primarily a military question, but rather an economic and technological one”. There is also no mention of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the Maritime Airborne Weapons System (MAWS), or the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programmes, which might point to the ongoing problems in Franco-German defence co-operation. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT) are only mentioned in passing under arms control. President Macron will devote the French presidency of the EU to work for a “fully sovereign Europe free to shape its external choices and destiny”, which might at first instance appear in line with German policy. However, the nature and cost of Macron’s ambitions will likely lead to clashes with Berlin, especially if en Marche! loses its majority in the Assemblée Nationale next May. German efforts to promote both a national/German and a European legislation to limit arms exports could be a source of particular contention with France and Berlin shows little appetite to support Paris in the Sahel. In fact, the first directive the new Defence Minister issued was to prepare an “exit plan” for Mali.

In the coalition compact there is strong support for NATO, a commitment to fulfil Alliance planning goals and meet spending targets (2% by the back door?), replace the Tornado dual-capable aircraft (DCA), equip the Bundeswehr with armed drones, and modernise procurement practices. However, Germany’s continued commitment to nuclear-sharing came at the expense of being observer at the conference of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and Green Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has already gone public to de-emphasise and question the nuclear-sharing commitment.   There is little evidence that resolving the chronic lack of readiness from which the Bundeswehr suffers will be a priority.  This is partly because “Germany still dreams of being a big Switzerland” and there remains a profound lack of understanding amongst Germans about the role of military power in international relations.  It will be interesting to see how the government will link the tough language on Russia, China and defending international order and the rule of law with the use of military power, both in Europe and its neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific.  

Looking to the future, and even if voting patterns suggest younger Germans tend to  be more Realist than their forebears, Germany still needs to overcome its tendency to look inwards.  Germans do not feel threatened militarily which undermines solidarity with other Europeans who do. That begs a big question for the Allies: how best to bring Germany forward on defence.  Do Allies push Germany or simply leave it to Germans to decide for themselves. Clearly, it will take more time and both push and pull.  

Julian Lindley-French

Lost in Translation? European Strategic Autonomy

December 7th^th, 2021.  Perhaps this Analysis is apposite given events on the EU's eastern border and on the 80th anniversary of Pearl Harbor as in certain respects Europe's dependency on America began with the formal entry of the US into World War Two. For the first six months of 2022 France will hold the presidency of the European Union. Last week The Alphen Group  https://thealphengroup.home.blog/our-purpose/ , which I have the honour to chair, discussed European Strategic Autonomy which is likely to be a core tenet of the French presidency.  My note of that meeting is below. 

Why European Strategic Autonomy: There are three primary reasons for increased European strategic ‘autonomy’. First, it is time Europeans took more responsibility for their own security and defence. Second, the US and its European Allies might from time to time have different interests, most notably in the Indo-Pacific. Third, to ensure the US can maintain its security guarantee to Europe given growing pressure on American forces. Certainly, Europeans need to shoulder a greater burden of both the costs and risks of their security and defence.  Europe’s deteriorating security environment also makes the current debate of strategic autonomy different and more pressing than the at times decadent discussions of the past, precisely because there may be contingencies during which US forces are no longer present in strength in Europe.

Clarification and definition: Semantic but important distinctions between French and English meanings of the word ‘autonomy’ have created tensions and misunderstanding. There will be no European Army nor a ‘sovereign’ defence Europe because European defence-strategic ‘independence’ from the United States will not be realised for many years.  Rather, ‘autonomy’ should be defined as a stronger European role within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and should be seen thus as a metaphor for increased European security responsibility.  Defence and deterrence must and will remain the primary responsibility of NATO. If Europeans are to collectively shoulder more responsibilities they will need significantly more military capability and capacity. This is particularly the case if Europeans have the ambition to be able by 2030 act as credible high-end first responders in and around Europe in an emergency in which US forces might be engaged elsewhere.

EU or European Strategic Responsibility? A distinction must also be made between EU and European Strategic Responsibility. EU strategic autonomy will be an important theme of the French presidency in the first half of 2022. However, CSDP is only ever likely to undertake modestly more challenging crisis response operations. More challenging scenarios will need the support of NATO, the US and UK, which reinforces the need for practical relationships to be established between CSDP and so-called ‘Third Countries’, together with the strengthening of mechanisms that would afford the EU access to NATO assets and structures.   Rather, the EU should focus on those areas of the forthcoming European Strategic Compass that play to its strength as a civil power, such as enhanced resilience, the creation of a more digital Europe, climate change, innovation, and industrial policy.  

European defence investment: Common or collective European defence investment should be focused on creating enablers, such as C4ISR, and the creation of more deployable European forces that could use them.  To realise even that fairly modest goal would probably need a restructured European defence, technological and industrial base and its decoupling from parochial national industrial and employment policies, which will be politically unpalatable. A major challenge will be to find the funding and a funding mechanism that will ensure efficient and effective procurement of capabilities fielded at the speed of relevance. Other reforms needed are a more ambitious PESCO and, possibly, a new European force structure, although such steps will not be without contentions.

Britain, France and Germany: The new German government will be an important player and has indicated it will fulfil NATO’s Defence Investment Pledge and that it is also committed to fulfilling NATO planning goals.  Berlin will be wary of more politically ambitious interpretations of European strategic autonomy and emphasise the need for unity in Europe and the wider West through the establishment of common goals.  Any discussion of enhanced ‘European sovereignty’ will only be acceptable to Berlin if it leads to more NATO-compatible security and defence capacity. Moreover, for any such European ambition to be plausible Britain, France and Germany would need to agree, which is by no means guaranteed.  Allies should also not under-estimate the continued appeal to the Paris establishment of a ‘Europe’ that is politically ‘autonomous’ from the US.  If the Americans and other Europeans simply dismiss French ambition there is a danger that Paris would instead opt for ‘strategic solitude’ There is also a danger that if profound political friction with the EU persists post-Brexit Britain could further withdraw from the defence of continental Europe and retreat behind its nuclear deterrent and increasingly capable navy.

No status quo: For all the challenges facing a strategically-autonomous Europe remaining in some form of ‘transatlantic cocoon’ and thus almost total reliance on the US is also no longer an option. The Biden administration could assist the realisation of a more strategically-responsible Europe by being candid about the pressures Washington is facing, and by stating unequivocally and repeatedly that more capable European allies is in the American interest. If a more capable Europe leads to a more autonomous Europe, and with it an adjusted division of responsibilities within the Alliance, Washington should welcome it. For example, Europeans could take on more responsibility for the western Mediterranean and parts of North Africa. One option could be an agreement that by 2030 Europeans should account for 50% of minimum Alliance requirements. Perhaps the first step on the road to greater European strategic responsibility will be to re-educate European leaders about basic concepts such as collective defence, which many no longer understand. Only then are they likely to sanction investment in expensive capabilities, such as space-based assets, that would enable responsibility by giving European leaders the capacity to independently see what is happening in their strategic neighbourhood and beyond.

Autonomy, responsibility and capability: European strategic autonomy must lead to greater European strategic responsibility. However, greater European strategic responsibility will also demand significantly more investments in capabilities which, in the long run, will be vital if European 'autonomy' is to be more than a word. If not, calls for greater strategic autonomy will be at best a diversion, at worst lead Europe down a dangerous strategic dead-end. A Europe that becomes progressively and relatively weaker could also weaken the US and in time destroy the very credibility of NATO upon which deterrence stands. European Strategic Autonomy – lost in translation?

Julian Lindley-French

360 Degree NATO?

 December 1^st, 2021

Yesterday, I had the honour of addressing the Riga Security Forum which was a side-event of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Latvia.  My old friend, Ambassador Imants Lietgis, who chaired the session asked me the address the following question:

One of the theses of your book addresses the impact of emerging technologies on future warfare, and the profound implications on European defence. BUT you also had a chapter focussing on Southern Europe and indeed the question of 360 degree Europe? Could you say something more about Europeans needing to reconcile threats beyond Russia?

Thanks for the question, Imants. Central to the thesis in Future War and the Defence of Europe, which is brilliant and very reasonably-priced, is the need to understand the interaction of all the threats Europeans face – strategic, geopolitical, regional, domestic, and technological.  Whilst the Russian threat is central to the thesis of the book a core message is that ALL threats are linked and must be considered in the round.  

INDEED, NATO’s essential challenge in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, the what, where, why, how, with what, with whom and for what end of the Alliance, will be to credibly balance the ends, ways and means of deterrence and defence, with that of security engagement,  outreach and partnership whilst recognising the changing threat and technology landscape. It is a global landscape that is, and will, create such tensions in US foreign, security and defence policy, and stretch American forces to such an extent, that the central tenet of European defence since 1945 should no longer be assumed: that US forces of sufficient strength will always be present in Europe. In other words, Europeans are going to have to do far more for their own security and defence IF the Americans are to maintain their security guarantee to Europe across a full spectrum of missions…and mean it. At the very least, that will mean more European strategic responsibility for the sake of European security and defence and the transatlantic relationship. That is the strategic inflection point we are at.

So, leaving aside Russia let me quickly address three sets of risks, challenges and threats to Europe from elsewhere – MENA, China and Technology.

MENA

First, MENA.  I think it is important to separate regional crises from a wider more systemic challenge apparent in MENA. The challenges and threats to southern Europe are part of globalised systemic change, demographic change, climate change and a mass mega-trend shift of peoples from rural life to urban life and across countries and continents as people become aware of a more secure life elsewhere and many of them seek it, enabled sadly, by growing transnational organised crime networks.  As a privileged migrant myself I understand the motivation. 

However, it is the interaction between systemic change and regional crises which is placing NATO’s south, in particular, on a new front-line of instability and making European societies in general, ever more vulnerable to geopolitical manipulation via 5Ds of perma-warfare—disinformation, deception, destabilization, disruption, and coercion via implied or actual destruction.

Across MENA itself social and political instability has worsened with the emergence of state versus anti-state Salafist Jihadism further exacerbated by COVID-19 with potentially profound implications for southern Europe and the rest of Europe given the dislocation of peoples it is causing, ongoing conflict and suffering, and the dissatisfaction with the established political and economic order in states across Europe’s strategic neighbourhood vital to European interests.

The prospect of a major regional-strategic war is ever present, particularly so given Iran’s hard-line stance over its nuclear programme as evinced by what is happening in Vienna at the moment, and the emergence of regional-strategic blocs in the Middle East, exacerbated by external geopolitical interference.

For Europeans, there is also the constant threat of disrupted energy security, particularly in Libya, which threatens not only to cut off vital oil and gas supplies, but extend Europe’s reliance on, and thus vulnerability to, Russian influence and coercion.

China

The rise of China is the biggest single geopolitical change factor to impact Europe’s defence since 1945 and whilst the US has long been a ‘European’ actor; China is fast becoming one. China is also a Jekyll and Hyde power — both constructive and invasive. COVID-19 has revealed the extent to which China seeks to exploit globalization, or what I call Chinaization (ghastly phrase I know), to impose its will and that is, indeed, Beijing’s longer-term aim. The CCP are nothing if not control freaks.

China’s threat to Europe is indirect at present but its impact on Europe’s future defence could well be as profound as Russia’s post-COVID-19 if wolf-warrior diplomacy and debt diplomacy are combined to ill effect. This is particularly the case in Southern and parts of Eastern Europe where Chinese (and I might add Russian) money are having an effect, particularly in the Balkans and parts of the Eastern Mediterranean.  The Belt and Road Initiative and the indebtedness of many European states already enables China to exert its influence and could over time begin to threaten the very functioning of  the EU, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship if states are effectively bought.

Technology

And then there is technology, and the changing character and conduct of warfare that NATO and the European Allies in particular must grip.   If deterrence is to work Europe’s future defence will need to be credible in all potential worst cases, chronic US over-stretch, and the application of emerging and disruptive technologies in the battlespace.  ALL NATO Europeans, indeed all Europeans, will need by 2030 a defence posture that reaches from sea-bed to space, from open space to urban space warfare and across the multi-domains of air, sea, land, cyber, space, information and knowledge.  

That, in turn, will demand a new concept of European deterrence, defence and security that is credible in the minds of allies and adversaries alike, both Great Power Competitors and Terrorist Groups, and across the mosaic of hybrid, cyber and hyper war that will be the essence of the simultaneous totality of future war. 

A host of new partnerships will also be needed if the new defence is to be both capable and affordable, underpinned by a radical strategic public-private sector partnership that leverages emerging and disruptive technologies and the introduction into the order of battle from Artificial Intelligence and hypersonic missile technologies to super/quantum-computing, Nano engineering et al.  

The test of seriousness?  Irrespective of US policy choices the beating military heart of Europe’s future war defence will need to be European; a new US interoperable, high-end, first responder NATO European future force capable of sufficient manoeuvre that it can reinforce deterrence and of sufficient capacity/mass to support front-line states in the south in the face of systemic instability.

In The Alphen Group’s just completed NATO Shadow Strategic Concept, which will be published in January by several think-tanks, we call it the AMHF or Allied Command Operations Heavy Mobile Force (AMHF). The AMHF would build on the NATO Readiness Initiative and would be EU-available, at the core of the new comprehensive European security and defence concept, and underpin the NATO 2030 Agenda. It would also help strengthen the transatlantic relationship through more equitable burden sharing of both cost and risk. Crucially, it would afford Europeans more strategic responsibility within the Alliance framework, and strengthen the all-important NATO-EU strategic partnership.

To conclude, seven lines of Allied strategy will be needed to deter hydra-headed future war:      management of Russia through defence and dialogue;  the purposeful balancing of post-COVID-19 human security and national defence costs; the re-establishment of European strategic realism and responsibility via a genuine NATO–EU strategic partnership that is built on the twin pillars of defensive power projection and resilience; the building of a radical cross-border strategic public–private partnership that can properly harness emerging and disruptive technologies; a willingness to see security and defence both in the round and in full across the Euro-Atlantic community; recognition by Europeans that only by helping America be strong where she needs to be strong can Americans help keep Europeans secure into the future, be they in the north, east or south of Europe; and, a Europe strong enough militarily and cohesive enough politically to be a strong actor in and around Europe in the face of all threats and from all strategic directions.

Frankly, we Europeans have a choice to make. One that we can no longer fudge or dissemble over. If the forthcoming Strategic Concept does not recognise much of the above it will simply be politics as all too usual dressed up as faux strategy all too usual.

Which begs perhaps the biggest question of all. Are we up to it?

Julian Lindley-French,  November 2021