December 7thth, 2021. Perhaps this Analysis is apposite given events on the EU's eastern border and on the 80th anniversary of Pearl Harbor as in certain respects Europe's dependency on America began with the formal entry of the US into World War Two. For the first six months of 2022 France will hold the presidency of the European Union. Last week The Alphen Group https://thealphengroup.home.blog/our-purpose/ , which I have the honour to chair, discussed European Strategic Autonomy which is likely to be a core tenet of the French presidency. My note of that meeting is below.
Why
European Strategic Autonomy: There are three primary
reasons for increased European strategic ‘autonomy’. First, it is time
Europeans took more responsibility for their own security and defence. Second,
the US and its European Allies might from time to time have different
interests, most notably in the Indo-Pacific. Third, to ensure the US can
maintain its security guarantee to Europe given growing pressure on American
forces. Certainly, Europeans need to shoulder a greater burden of both the
costs and risks of their security and defence.
Europe’s deteriorating security environment also makes the current debate
of strategic autonomy different and more pressing than the at times decadent
discussions of the past, precisely because there may be contingencies during
which US forces are no longer present in strength in Europe.
Clarification
and definition: Semantic but important distinctions
between French and English meanings of the word ‘autonomy’ have created
tensions and misunderstanding. There will be no European Army nor a ‘sovereign’
defence Europe because European defence-strategic ‘independence’ from the United
States will not be realised for many years.
Rather, ‘autonomy’ should be defined as a stronger European role within
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and should be seen thus as a metaphor
for increased European security responsibility.
Defence and deterrence must and will remain the primary responsibility
of NATO. If Europeans are to collectively shoulder more responsibilities they
will need significantly more military capability and capacity. This is
particularly the case if Europeans have the ambition to be able by 2030 act as
credible high-end first responders in and around Europe in an emergency in
which US forces might be engaged elsewhere.
EU
or European Strategic Responsibility? A distinction must also
be made between EU and European Strategic Responsibility. EU strategic autonomy
will be an important theme of the French presidency in the first half of 2022.
However, CSDP is only ever likely to undertake modestly more challenging crisis
response operations. More challenging scenarios will need the support of NATO,
the US and UK, which reinforces the need for practical relationships to be
established between CSDP and so-called ‘Third Countries’, together with the
strengthening of mechanisms that would afford the EU access to NATO assets and
structures. Rather, the EU should focus
on those areas of the forthcoming European Strategic Compass that play to its
strength as a civil power, such as enhanced resilience, the creation of a more
digital Europe, climate change, innovation, and industrial policy.
European
defence investment: Common or collective European defence
investment should be focused on creating enablers, such as C4ISR, and the
creation of more deployable European forces that could use them. To realise even that fairly modest goal would
probably need a restructured European defence, technological and industrial
base and its decoupling from parochial national industrial and employment
policies, which will be politically unpalatable. A major challenge will be to
find the funding and a funding mechanism that will ensure efficient and
effective procurement of capabilities fielded at the speed of relevance. Other
reforms needed are a more ambitious PESCO and, possibly, a new European force
structure, although such steps will not be without contentions.
Britain,
France and Germany: The new German government will be an
important player and has indicated it will fulfil NATO’s Defence Investment
Pledge and that it is also committed to fulfilling NATO planning goals. Berlin will be wary of more politically
ambitious interpretations of European strategic autonomy and emphasise the need
for unity in Europe and the wider West through the establishment of common
goals. Any discussion of enhanced ‘European
sovereignty’ will only be acceptable to Berlin if it leads to more
NATO-compatible security and defence capacity. Moreover, for any such European
ambition to be plausible Britain, France and Germany would need to agree, which
is by no means guaranteed. Allies should
also not under-estimate the continued appeal to the Paris establishment of a
‘Europe’ that is politically ‘autonomous’ from the US. If the Americans and other Europeans simply
dismiss French ambition there is a danger that Paris would instead opt for
‘strategic solitude’ There is also a danger that if profound political friction
with the EU persists post-Brexit Britain could further withdraw from the
defence of continental Europe and retreat behind its nuclear deterrent and
increasingly capable navy.
No
status quo: For all the challenges facing a
strategically-autonomous Europe remaining in some form of ‘transatlantic
cocoon’ and thus almost total reliance on the US is also no longer an option.
The Biden administration could assist the realisation of a more strategically-responsible
Europe by being candid about the pressures Washington is facing, and by stating
unequivocally and repeatedly that more capable European allies is in the
American interest. If a more capable Europe leads to a more autonomous Europe,
and with it an adjusted division of responsibilities within the Alliance,
Washington should welcome it. For example, Europeans could take on more
responsibility for the western Mediterranean and parts of North Africa. One
option could be an agreement that by 2030 Europeans should account for 50% of
minimum Alliance requirements. Perhaps the first step on the road to greater
European strategic responsibility will be to re-educate European leaders about
basic concepts such as collective defence, which many no longer understand.
Only then are they likely to sanction investment in expensive capabilities,
such as space-based assets, that would enable responsibility by giving European
leaders the capacity to independently see what is happening in their strategic
neighbourhood and beyond.
Autonomy,
responsibility and capability: European strategic
autonomy must lead to greater European strategic responsibility. However, greater
European strategic responsibility will also demand significantly more
investments in capabilities which, in the long run, will be vital if European
'autonomy' is to be more than a word. If not, calls for greater
strategic autonomy will be at best a diversion, at worst lead Europe down a
dangerous strategic dead-end. A Europe that becomes progressively and
relatively weaker could also weaken the US and in time destroy the very
credibility of NATO upon which deterrence stands. European Strategic Autonomy –
lost in translation?
Julian
Lindley-French
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