“Those Allies who expect Germany to pull its weight in the security and defence of Europe will be disappointed”.
December
14th, 2021. Decisions taken
by the new German government will have profound implications for Europe’s
security and defence and the wider transatlantic relationship. Last week, The Alphen Group https://thealphengroup.home.blog/our-purpose/
which I have the honour to chair, discussed what Allies can expect of Germany. The note of that meeting is below.
It is too early to tell
what Allies can expect of Germany with formation of the new government, although
it is clear that whilst the tone and emphasis of German foreign and security
policy might shift marginally, the essential tenets will remain by and large
the same. The election produced no mandate for major reform of the core tenets
of German foreign, security and defence policy, but some important reforms are
at least intended, such as to the defence procurement system. While a National
Security Strategy is foreseen, no Defence White Paper is planned.
For the Government to
endure the SPD needs the support of its junior partners. Therefore, much of the
coming debate will be about whether the Coalition Compact sets the direction of
travel of German policy or the SPD. These tensions will persist as the
coalition will be transactional with little ‘love between the three parties’ with
a constant “tug of war between idealists and realists”. Equally, the coalition compact is more
forward leaning on foreign and security policy than some expected with an
“emphatic Atlanticism”. However, whilst
the compact reflects the Greens and FDP influence it is likely the SPD that
will try to dictate policy, with foreign policy made in the Bundeskanzleramt.
The language on Russia
and China is tougher than that of the Merkel administration, but the new administration
will also seek to de-escalate tensions in and over Ukraine and the passage on US-German
relations is less “cheerful” than four years ago. There is as yet no decision
over the future of the Nordstream 2
gas pipeline in spite of “huge pressure” to scrap it. There are also profound
contradictions in German energy policy and energy security as Berlin grapples
with meeting carbon commitments whilst maintaining energy supplies without
becoming overly reliant on Putin’s Russia.
It could well be that “Germany will not cope without Russian gas”.
There is a strong
commitment to what the compact calls European “strategic sovereignty”, although
it is markedly not referred to in the chapter on defence. To the new foreign
minister “European sovereignty” is "not primarily a military question, but rather an economic and
technological one”. There is also no mention
of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the Maritime Airborne Weapons System (MAWS),
or the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) programmes, which might point to the
ongoing problems in Franco-German defence co-operation. Emerging and disruptive
technologies (EDT) are only mentioned in passing under arms control. President
Macron will devote the French presidency of the EU to work for a “fully
sovereign Europe free to shape its external choices and destiny”, which might at
first instance appear in line with German policy. However, the nature and cost
of Macron’s ambitions will likely lead to clashes with Berlin, especially if en Marche! loses its majority in the
Assemblée Nationale next May. German efforts to promote both a national/German
and a European legislation to limit arms exports could be a source of
particular contention with France and Berlin shows little appetite to support
Paris in the Sahel. In fact, the first directive the new Defence Minister
issued was to prepare an “exit plan” for Mali.
In the coalition compact there
is strong support for NATO, a commitment to fulfil Alliance planning goals and
meet spending targets (2% by the back door?), replace the Tornado dual-capable
aircraft (DCA), equip the Bundeswehr with
armed drones, and modernise procurement practices. However, Germany’s continued
commitment to nuclear-sharing came at the expense of being observer at the conference
of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and Green Foreign Minister Annalena
Baerbock has already gone public to de-emphasise and question the
nuclear-sharing commitment. There is
little evidence that resolving the chronic lack of readiness from which the Bundeswehr suffers will be a priority. This is partly because “Germany still dreams
of being a big Switzerland” and there remains a profound lack of understanding
amongst Germans about the role of military power in international
relations. It will be interesting to see
how the government will link the tough language on Russia, China and defending
international order and the rule of law with the use of military power, both in
Europe and its neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific.
Looking to the future,
and even if voting patterns suggest younger Germans tend to be more Realist than their forebears, Germany
still needs to overcome its tendency to look inwards. Germans do not feel threatened militarily
which undermines solidarity with other Europeans who do. That begs a big
question for the Allies: how best to bring Germany forward on defence. Do Allies push Germany or simply leave it to Germans
to decide for themselves. Clearly, it will take more time and both push and
pull.
Julian
Lindley-French
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