“Tukhachevsky hid Napoleon’s baton
in his rucksack”.
Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky
Riga, Latvia.
4 October. Can Russia reform before it
starts a war? The Riga Conference is one of Europe’s top security conferences.
It is excellent not just because of the quality of the organisation by the
Latvian Transatlantic Organisation, but because the conference takes place on
the front-line of freedom, and thus concentrates the minds of all present. This year was no exception. Not surprisingly,
the Russian bear loomed large, with the conference reinforcing a dangerous
reality. Russia is in desperate need of
economic and social reform, but any such reforms would sweep away the Putin
regime. Ergo, no reform. So, how can the
regime stay in power without reform?
Easy, Moscow creates artificial grievances with the West, manufactures a
non-existent threat from the West, and then appeals to the deep, deep wells of
Russian patriotism for support against an enemy that ‘threatens’ to surround
Mother Russia.
On Saturday,
I went with a small group of distinguished colleagues to visit the Latvian Land
Forces Base deep in the woods at Adazi close to the strategic road between
Pskov in Russia and the Latvian capital, Riga.
The group was hosted and briefed by the extremely impressive Latvian
Land Forces Commander, who has some 3000 men under his direct command at the
headquarters. Also present were some 1200 Canadian, Italian, Spanish, and other
Alliance forces, that comprise the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) Battlegroup,
Latvia. Now, my criticisms herein in no way imply criticism of my host. They are
doing their level best with what they have to achieve what they can.
The
collective mission of both forces (there is no single, unified command
structure), in parallel with that of partner forces stationed in Estonia and Lithuania, is to
deter Russian forces from invading the Baltic States. It is a serious mission. Just across the Russian
border there are some 120,000 of Russia’s best troops, including the famous 1st
Guards Tank Army. Most of these forces
are centred on Pskov, some 50 miles/80 kms from the Latvian border, with a
significant portion of the land in between given over to military exercising.
One of my jobs
is to ask tough questions and crash-test thinking. I am good at it. They are
the kind of questions that politicians, bureaucrats, and often military
commanders, find inconvenient. My purpose is not to trip them up, but to make
them look up and think ‘outside of the box’, to employ that vastly over-used,
but rarely acted upon military metaphor. So, bear with me (no pun intended) whilst I
unfold the logic of the unease I felt as I was driven away from Adazi.
Let me start with
President Putin’s dilemma. What matters to Moscow is the appearance of strength
beyond Russia’s borders, to reinforce the strength of the regime within Russia’s
borders. Russia today is a toxic mix of economic decline, military
expansionism, strategic paranoia (‘encircled by enemies’), and self-reinforcing
nationalist assertion. The implication
being that if Russia really is unreformable, then the Russian state really
is on the road to collapse. That was
certainly the message of an excellent panel at the Riga Conference. Now, a
caveat is needed at this juncture. Western Europeans (in particular) often
under-estimate the toughness of the Russian people, the willingness of an awful
lot of them to accept far less freedom and prosperity than other Europeans, and
their passionate love of country (something for which I admire the Russians,
and which not many other Europeans seemingly understand these
days). For all that Moscow clearly has a
problem or two it is failing to address, and clearly has little idea how to.
Given that, what
are Russia’s regional-strategic policy options? First, there is no reason to
believe Russian policy will change. President Putin has already shown in
Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and indeed Syria, that he is willing to use political
and military adventurism to shore up his domestic position. Second, there is no
reason to believe Russia’s leadership will change. President-for-Life Putin
will ensure his ‘victory’ in the March 2018 presidential elections. Therefore, and in all likelihood, President Putin
will continue his efforts to ‘change facts on the ground’. Specifically, that means
Russian will continue to try to force the Baltic States to look to Moscow, as
much as they look to Berlin, Brussels or Washington. Still, only in the Kremlin worst-case would
Moscow consider a direct attack on the Baltic States, although it is not
inconceivable.
It is to
counter the worse-case that the impressive Latvian colonel and his team, plus
the NATO battlegroup that share his headquarters, are doing what they are
doing. And, as I saw from the briefing I
was given, they are very serious about their work, and clearly very good at it.
But, is it enough? My problem, or rather my problems, with the EFP is that it
is a bluff, and the Russians know it.
The forces that would block/harass Russian forces in extremis are too few, too light, and have too little support to stop
a determined Russian thrust. Worse, the
command chain is fractured and unclear, particularly the relationship between
Latvian forces and their NATO counterparts. NATO forces under current rules of
engagement would only be able to fight back if they themselves were
attacked. There are also problems of
communications between the deployed Allied forces, and a lack of any real deployed
force protection.
If the
Russians did attack they would have (at least) two options. First, they could isolate
the Latvian forces from their NATO Allies, using Spetsnaz and other specialised
and irregular forces, to ‘neutralise’ NATO. However, given the close proximity
of Latvian forces and their NATO allies that would require of Russian forces
real operational finesse, something for which they are not known. Second, they could simply take out the main
concentration points of all NATO forces in the Baltic States with a surprise
strike. One senior diplomat told me not to worry because Russia has always
provided indications of an attack. This is wrong. History suggests the greater
the strategic gamble, the less warning there would be. And, even if there were
such warnings, would Western politicians really be willing to ‘see’ what they
are seeing? They refused to do so during the early phases of the 2014 Ukrainian
crisis.
My analysis
of Zapad 2017, the massive and
recently-concluded Russian military exercise, plus my understanding of the
writings of Russian Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov, lead
me to a very sobering conclusion. General Gerasimov and his team are successfully adapting the
1930s thinking of Marshal Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky and his concept of
‘deep battle’. Deep battle a la
Gerasimov involves getting an enemy used over time to large-scale Russian troop
movements close to their borders and then, suddenly, and with as little warning
as possible, using Special Forces in concert with large-scale combined forces
to strike deep behind enemy lines to cripple the latter’s capacity to resist or
defend.
To my trained
eye I am watching just such a strategy unfold. What’s new? General Gerasimov is
layering and combining disinformation, deception, and military doctrine as part
of a new concept that entangles deep battle with deep chaos to keep the enemy
(that’s us) permanently strategically and politically off-balance. These efforts, which are happening now, are not-so-much
a prelude to imminent attack, but rather designed to create the space for a quick and
decisive victory should President Putin will it.
Furthermore, looking at the nature and strength of Russian forces it is clear that in the event of a conflict, the timing and launch location of which Russia would choose, Moscow could unleash a coherent set of strategic and military operations in pursuit of limited, but dangerous objectives. However, it is also clear Russia would be as yet unable to sustain a long war, or possibly even a war lasting more that 60 days if things did not go Moscow's way immediately. Therefore, the political aim would be to force the major European powers to make a hard, under duress and quick choice between a nuclear war with Russia, or some form of Russian-dictated peace in which the Baltic States are lost.
Furthermore, looking at the nature and strength of Russian forces it is clear that in the event of a conflict, the timing and launch location of which Russia would choose, Moscow could unleash a coherent set of strategic and military operations in pursuit of limited, but dangerous objectives. However, it is also clear Russia would be as yet unable to sustain a long war, or possibly even a war lasting more that 60 days if things did not go Moscow's way immediately. Therefore, the political aim would be to force the major European powers to make a hard, under duress and quick choice between a nuclear war with Russia, or some form of Russian-dictated peace in which the Baltic States are lost.
Now, again, I
am not suggesting Russian tanks are going to drive down the road from Pskov to
Riga tomorrow. And, there will be a lot of scenario-planning being undertaken
of which I am not aware. However, Russia is cleverly creating the conditions in
which such an attack would be a serious policy option for a Moscow in extremis. The first sign of such an attack? A nuclear mushroom cloud over Adazi.
The greatest ally of this plan in the rest of Europe are leaders who continue
to live in denial about just such a possibility.
What to do? Napoleon, once said that one should never interrupt an enemy when he is making a mistake. For
all the impressive efforts of my Latvian colonel friend and his team, plus the
forward deployed NATO battlegroups that form the EFP, deterrence and defence
will only be served by extending and accelerating major and urgent reforms across the entire NATO command structure. Such reforms would need to include the
following essential elements: delegation of far more strategic and operational
discretion to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; establishment of a far more
‘granulated’ set of indicators and early-warning ‘sensors’ across the conflict
space; acceleration of the Notice to Move of all NATO forces; eradication of all road, rail and legal blocks that prevent the freedom of movement of NATO forces within the NATO
Area of Operations; establishment of far more resilient (and far more) logistical hubs
to enable NATO forces to conduct an extensive land, air and sea campaign.
My aim is to
stop a war not to fight it. Even a clear, declared commitment to such reforms would reinforce NATOs defence and deterrence
posture. Fifty years ago in December
1967 Pierre Harmel published a report entitled “The Future Tasks of the
Alliance”, which called for a dual-track approach to Russia – détente and
defence. That dual-track is as relevant
today as it was then. However, there is a problem – too many Europeans seem to
have forgotten that Harmel called not only for sound dialogue with the Russians,
but sound defence. Given my genuine
respect for Russia (and I am no Russo-phobe) I am saddened that all and any
analysis of Russian policy and strategy today suggests the Alliance has no
alternative but to communicate to Moscow a real determination to deploy
credible, legitimate and strong forces in defence of all the Allies.
In certain
dire Russian circumstances (and Russia is pretty good at creating dire
circumstances) Moscow may simply be unable to stop itself from attacking the
Baltic States given the train wreck course upon which Russia is now embarked.
Therefore, if NATO forces in the Baltic States focus too much on the concentration
of limited firepower they may well be walking straight into a Russian bear trap. And, at some point, Moscow may be unable to resist springing it.
The best way
for Russia to prove me wrong is to talk. I am ready to listen.
Julian Lindley-French
