“Autocracy
is a superannuated form of government that may suit the needs of a Central
African tribe, but not those of the Russian people, who are increasingly
assimilating the culture of the rest of the world. That is why it is impossible
to maintain this form of government except by violence”.
Nikolai
Tolstoy
Alphen, Netherlands. 22
January. The Russian Federation is a relatively small state that governs the world’s single biggest political land
mass, governed by President Putin who has been in power for twenty years and
who, under the existing constitution must finally step down in 2024. However,
President Putin also believes he is indispensable to Russia. Therefore, Russia
is about to witness what passes for political reform. As so often in Russia
history it is the wrong reform by the wrong people for the wrong reasons. Central
to Putin’s ambitions is a desire to ensure the health and wealth of him and his
family during any future succession. In his annual State of Russia address
President Vladimir Putin proposed a series of constitutional changes that would
effectively make him Russia ‘power for life’, even if he is not actually the
President of the Russian Federation. Why does Permanent Putin matter? What are
the proposed changes? Who will benefit? What are the strategic implications, what
to expect now and, finally, what to do?
Why
does Permanent Putin matter? Last week, at a
high-level meeting in Switzerland, I was asked by a senior figure why Russia
posed a threat. It is to do with the nature of autocracies, their fear of political
reform, and a tendency towards military adventurism when their own
contradictions catch up with them, I responded. Moscow is unable to carry out the
vital social, economic and political reforms that would benefit the Russian people
for fear that those very reforms would topple the regime from power. Unwilling to carry out such reforms autocracies
historically have turned to oppression at home and aggression abroad and
constructed a security state to that end.
Putin’s Russia is no different. Incapable of reform Moscow is locked in
its own eventual demise and because of that more military adventurism is likely
as the regime lurches from one engineered crisis to another.
What
are the proposed changes? Putin called for a referendum on
constitutional amendments that would nominally increase the power of both the
parliament (Duma) and the State Council, hitherto an advisory tool for the
Kremlin. As President Putin announced
the proposed reforms former Russian president, and erstwhile Prime Minister
Dmitri Medvedev, immediately stepped down. To maintain his complete authority President
Putin will either return to the post prime minister or become the chair of a
strengthened State Council. Indeed, it is not entirely inconceivable that Putin
could change the Russian constitution from a presidential to a parliamentary
system so as to ensure the prime minister’s office becomes the real power in
the land.
Who
will benefit? Apart from Putin himself there are
several close allies who would seem to benefit from such changes, mainly
because their very mediocrity means they pose no threat to Vladimir
Vladimirovich, to whom they all owe their power and allegiance. The ‘stars’ of Duma Speaker Vyacyheslav
Volodin and Kremlin Chief-of-Staff Anton Vaino both seem to be in the
ascendant, and either could be named at some point as a puppet successor to
Putin. The new Prime Minister, Mikhail
Mishustin, who will ensure the changes Putin proposes are carried out, is also
a possible candidate, although he has been given the poisoned chalice that is
constitutional reform. For obvious
reasons, the so-called Siloviki,
Putin’s apparatchik base in the ‘power ministries’ that deal with foreign
affairs, security, defence and intelligence will be untouched by the proposed
reforms. Critically, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, remain in office, although the former is closer to Putin than the
latter.
What
are the strategic implications and what to expect? Unable
or unwilling to risk the thoroughgoing reforms Russia needs it is likely Moscow
will redouble its efforts to convince the Russian people they are under threat from
an insidious West to justify the regime’s hold on power. The central paradox of Putin’s foreign policy
has always that it bites the European hand that by and large feeds it. Whilst
Russia relies for much of its income of the export of hydrocarbons to its
European neighbours, it also routinely paints those same neighbours as part of
a ‘fascist’ western conspiracy to force Russia into strategic tutelage. Expect
such fabrications and provocations to continue.
Permanent Putin will also
make much of his ‘friendship’ with that other President-for-Life, China’s Xi
Jingping. Both China and Russia are likely to make common grand strategic cause
against an increasingly global West, more idea than place, as and when it suits
them. One of many paradoxes in Putin’s
position is that not only is Russia’s relationship with China today a bit like
contemporary Britain’s relationship with the United States, or ancient Athens
to ancient Rome, the greatest threat to the Russian Far East is posed not by
Washington, but Beijing. What binds them is that both Putin and Xi are latter
day ‘tsars’ who see themselves in strategic competition with the world’s
democracies.
It is also hard to deny
that the intensity of that competition, the economic pressure being exercised
by Beijing on many states, as well as pace and scale of the arms race underway
between the US and China (about which Europeans are in denial). Some form of Second Cold War is now clearly underway,
although Frigid Peace may be a better description. A war that is already taking place across the
‘grey zones’ of hybrid and cyber war, and which could, heaven forfend, one day
break out into a true hyperwar in which a whole host of exotically devastating
technologies are unleashed.
What
to expect now? Expect more Russian defections from the
norms of international relations. This is because many of Russia’s paradoxes
and contradictions are policy intractable. Whilst Permanent Putin will make some
efforts to improve the lives of Russian citizens at the margins, nothing will
be done that could threaten the regime’s grip on power. Russian foreign policy towards Europe will thus
be a distraction strategy designed to give the impression Moscow is out-foxing
Western powers. This will involve a series of defections from international
instruments, such as the INF Treaty and international norms, such as the seizure
of Crimea by force. Increased interference can be expected in a host of
European states from the North Cape to the Arctic, as well as the Middle East
and North Africa, all of which will be designed to give the impression of a
clever, nimble Moscow that hints at Soviet power of the past, routinely
confounding a lumpen West. In fact, over time the strategy cost Russia and its
people dearly.
What
to do? To preserve peace and limit Russia’s strategic
opportunism the United States must first remember it is the leader of the West,
global or otherwise. Second, Washington must also realise it no longer has the
power alone to prevail across the conflict spectrum against the Chinese-Russian
partnership from jawfare to warfare. Third, Europeans, and other allies and
partners of the US, need to realise that only by the sharing of America’s
growing strategic burdens can they assure their own peace. For Europeans that means, first and foremost,
becoming united enough diplomatically, and strong enough militarily, to ensure
peace in and around Europe. And, in so doing, help keep America strong where
she needs to be strong.
Sooner or later Russia
will have to stop biting the European hand that feeds it and realign its strategic
and economic interests. In what could be
a lengthy interim that means the sustained application of sound defence and
credible deterrence in the face of Russian opportunism, allied to a willingness
to consistently and constantly talk to Russia. Such a dual-track approach offers
the best hope of giving Russia the soft landing both Russians and Europeans
need as Moscow inevitably falls from the heady heights of its own manifold
contradictions.
In other words, Europeans
speak with Russia, both softly and firmly, but also carry a sufficiently big
stick to ensure Moscow strategic opportunism does not become grand delinquency. For, as Vladimir Vladimirovich will one day discover,
time waits for no man, not even him.
Julian Lindley-French
