Dear Friend and Colleague, below is the speech I had the honour to give at the Falklands 30th Command Dinner ten years ago. I say 'gave' because by the time I stood up (sort of) to speak it had been a long evening... Still, the words still resonate!
The Falklands Thirty Years on – British Élan and the Aura of Power
By
Julian Lindley-French
Field Marshal
Bramall, Chief of the Defence Staff, Admirals Band, West and Woodward,
Commodore Clapp, Lord Sterling, Major-General Thompson, distinguished guests and,
above all, honoured veterans of the 1982 Falklands Campaign - there is no
greater honour for me than to stand and address you on what was achieved all
those years ago – the defence of freedom through the use of legitimate military
power under Baroness Thatcher’s resolute leadership that has sustained Britain
for these thirty years past. Sadly, it
is an aura of power that in spite of the heroic efforts of colleagues in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and host of other places could fade if real national
strategy does not replace London’s ‘only recognise as much threat as we can
afford’ view of the world and with it a dangerous loss of national
influence. What was done back in 1982 is
thus as relevant to today’s Britain as past Britain.
As Europe
crumbles and America stumbles we are faced as a country with a choice: to
retreat into irrelevance and put up with whatever an unjust world throws at us;
or to galvanise ourselves as we did in 1982 and set out to help shape the world
for the better. “For God’s sake, act
like Britain”, former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk once demanded of then British
Foreign Secretary George Brown. In 1982
we did just that and acted ‘like
Britain’ - the Britain that millions of us out there still believe in,
desperately hoping that today’s political leaders across the political spectrum
can rise above the daily grind of party game and blame to which we are subject.
Let me start
by paying tribute to the 255 British servicemen who did not return and the 775 were
wounded. I would also like to pay my respects to the 3 civilians who lost their lives together with the 679 Argentinian servicemen killed and the 1657 wounded. This was not a cost-free
conflict. They never are. Equally, I can still remember the words of
Major-General Jeremy Moore, Commander, Land Forces, South Atlantic as though
they were yesterday. “Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the Union Jack
once again flies over Stanley. God save the Queen".
My theme tonight will be élan, British élan - defined
as the determined pursuit of a strategic goal with a style and assurance that
is itself power. Élan is something more
than men and kit. It is a strategic
brand that can change things even before a bullet is fired. It is influence. 1982 saw a Britain that had retreated into a
muddled foreign and security policy with strategy made elsewhere. 1982 saw a country in conflict with itself
with many of the same doubts and tensions as today. And yet somehow we defied an all-pervading
sense of decline and showed that Britain could still hack it.
Thirty years ago through your efforts, your
valour and sacrifice you achieved four invaluable victories. First, you defended a fundamental principle
which was far bigger than the islands or the Islanders – the right of
self-determination and the use of great power to that end. Second, you reminded ally and adversary alike
that the spirit of Britain pertained and that our old great country still
understood how to exercise strategic influence fashioned as it was from a
high-level of unity of effort and purpose.
Indeed, implicit in victory was courageous political leadership, deft
and determined diplomacy and the creative and sustained application of
legitimate military power. Third, you
reminded a tired and fractious British people at the end of a long, tired and
fractious decade that Britain was more than a place, it was an idea in which
still to believe. No post-imperial
basket-case but a powerful modern country that could when push came to shove
distinguish between values and interests; principles and parochialism.
Above all, you
showed the world what my good friend Gwyn Prins called, ‘the aura of power’,
that uniquely British blend of purpose, principle and pragmatism that made this
country great and still can.
Let me take my
key elements in turn. First, the defence
of principle. Major Norman and the
heroic April 2 defence by the Royal Marines of Naval Party 8091 had shown the
way, supported by the naval hydrographers and the Falklands Islands Defence
Force. I was under no illusions about
what was coming. As an historian, I was hardened against the ‘all over by
Christmas push over’ talk that so often happens at such moments as the more
enthusiastic and romantic tip over into jingoism. That said, I believed passionately in the
right of our cause. The Islands had been
occupied illegally by a brutal dictatorship that had murdered thousands of its
own. That could not be allowed to stand.
The Falklands would be lost and Britain would be finished. Second, fighting power and fighting
spirit. Yes, the campaign was as Admiral
Lewin said, “a damned close run thing”.
Admiral Woodward had a dangerous balancing act to perform. Hermes
and Invincible were not fleet carriers,
and there were not enough Sea Harriers for
an effective CAP of either the task force or the land force. Sheffield
and Coventry were lost providing the
radar screen for a Task Force that lacked sufficient airborne
early-warning. Ardent and Antelope were
sunk protecting the landing force at San Carlos that was too small according to
military doctrine. The burning of the Atlantic
Conveyor meant that many of the vital helicopters were lost and already
absurdly long supply chains suddenly became even longer. Atlantic
Conveyor, was also a symbol of the doughty volunteers of the Merchant Navy,
many not of these islands.
But, from the
moment Chris Parry forced the Santa Fe
to surrender by helicopter at Gritviken and Vulcan
607 holed Port Stanley airfield, Chris Wreford Brown and the crew of HMS Conqueror did what was tragically
necessary to protect the Task Force, the
constant brave vigil of the ships and Sea Harriers, from 2 Para’s inspirational
battle at Goose Green and the fighting yomp of the Royals, to the heroic
efforts of the chopper pilots to re-supply 5 Brigade’s stoic recovery from the
tragedy of the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram at Bluff Cove/Fitzroy, to the
poor bloody infantry struggles of 3 Para and, of course, 42 and 45 Commandos on
Mount Harriet, through to the Guards and Ghurkhas at Tumbledown and Mount
Longdon, the will of the Argentinians was broken by something more than mere
force. It was will that paved the way to
the 14 June victory – a powerful mix of leadership and strategy, force and
resource, flexibility and creativity that convinced the enemy that defeat was
not when, but if. That is élan.
There have
been other examples. The 1991 Gulf War,
the Balkans Tragedy, the decisive 2000 rescuing of the people of Sierra Leone
from pending slaughter, operations in Southern Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion
of Iraq and more recently Libya all had elements of élan. The manner in which then Brigadier Richards
led Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000 had all the hallmarks of British
élan. Indeed, the way then Captain
Zambellas took HMS Chatham up-river
was reminiscent of HMS Warspite at
Narvik in 1940. As BBC journalist Allan
Little wrote, “It was an astonishing thing to witness: the fortunes of a whole
country transformed in the space of a few days by a single, decisive
intervention”.
Gwyn Prins
told me that when he was in the Advisory Group to former Soviet President
Gorbachev back in 1990 Gorbachev told him that the Falklands action that was an
important factor in convincing him that the Soviet Union could never win the
Cold War. Sad then that a senior Russian
recently remarked, “the things we once admired about Britain are today the
things that you despise”.
Would a
British Government today have the courage to instruct a Chris Wreford-Brown in Conqueror to sink Belgrano? Tragic it may have
been, but this was war. As Clausewitz
said, “an offensive war requires a quick, irresistible decision”. As the fleet left Portsmouth an American
friend said to me, “No-one else can do this.
The sight of Britain galvanising itself, the white ensign to the fore,
is a sight like no other”.
Third, the
impact on the British people. 1982 was
no Elizabethan golden age. Like now it
was tough. Economic decline had to be
arrested, like now. The country reeked
of national decline. Tough decisions had
to be taken, like now. The armed forces
had for years been dragged through the streets and mud of Northern Ireland and
had drifted to the margins of politics, like now. As a country we were slowly drifting into
strategic oblivion having become all too used to the excuses of politicians as
to why our national voice no longer counted for much. All seemed reduced to a question of pounds
and pence. Pride in ourselves as a
country seemed of another age.
You reminded
us all that there was another Britain. Under Prime Minister Thatcher’s
courageous leadership you showed a tired and cynical, some would say, defeatist
political and bureaucratic elite all too willing and able to find ten reasons
why action was impossible, that Britain could again matter. That is not to make a party political point -
Tony Blair also understood that Britain could and should be a force for good. That Britain’s place in the world need not be
some tawdry accommodation between the American world view and the French and
German European view. In short, you
bought us thirty years of strategic credibility.
What now? With
Argentina again on the make both the principle and place you freed thirty years
ago must once again be defended. But
there is a bigger national, strategic picture that needs to honour your
sacrifice and your victory. Leadership
today will mean forging a very new idea; an all-national unity of effort and
purpose. Furthermore, as we move towards
a 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review the ‘strategic’ will need to be
put back into the ‘strategic’. For our
armed forces that will mean a shift from a Europe-plus focus back again to a
global role alongside our increasingly maritime strategic American allies,
albeit one which balances strategic, austerity and influence. This can only be done through the creation of
a truly joined-up force in which no one service owns land, sea or air and which
is part of a truly joined-up security policy, led in turn by a national
strategy worthy of the name. As someone vaguely famous for a moment once
famously said, “Gentlemen, the money has run out. Now is the time to think”.
At the heart
of British strategic influence MUST be state-of-the art armed forces that are
projectable, deployable and sustainable built around a tight concept of
fighting power for which the British armed forces are renowned, and which you
demonstrated with such élan. Thankfully, such unity of effort and purpose does
now exist at the highest levels of the services backed up by the vision to make
it happen. However, such unity needs to
be invested in and preserved at all costs at what is a pivotal moment so that
we can re-grip the bigger picture. Believe me the big strategic picture this
century paints will be enormous and then some.
British
defence strategy will also require some very clever decisions over the future
force. Sound strategy always requires
compromise – only the truly powerful have no need of strategy. BOTH aircraft carriers will be essential, as
will a critical mass of Astutes, Type 45s, Typhoons et al. Our entire front-line Army will need to
become the equivalent of the elite Paras and Marines of 1982, reinforceable by
truly capable reserves. Our air force
will need a global reach concept alongside the army and navy. To that end, I am encouraged to believe that
2015 might indeed see the beginning of a return to sound principles of British
defence strategy based on a simple principle – Britain, Europe and the wider
world is a safer place when we as a country retain the military power to
lead. Not to dominate, but to lead. To realise such a vision there will be no
room for political complacency, nor indeed yet more short-term political
compromise which sacrifices the medium-to-long term balance of the armed forces
for short-term expediency. Now is the
decisive moment – the schwerpunkt.
Clever
decisions will need to be reinforced by tough choices. The first step will be to make a decision
once and for all about those two carriers and stick to it. Whether they have ‘cats and traps’ or not
misses the essential point; the two ships will be central to our strategic
brand for much of this blue water century and cost must be offset against value
and seen as such across a forty to fifty year service life. Nuclear forces – can we really fund them from
the defence budget without leaving the conventional force wholly unbalanced?
Above all, we
must hold our nerve; all the basic components are in place for a powerful
modern navy, army and air force - our future force.
One thing I
can tell you – this century ain’t going to get any easier and like it or not
whatever happens to Britain there is no hiding place for us.
To conclude,
what was achieved thirty years ago was not simply to rescue the Falkland
Islanders from a brutal dictatorship; through your élan you also saved Britain
from a visionless self and made a proud people proud. We are still Britain. We are still Great Britain if we so
choose. Long may it be so.
Why does this
all matter? It matters because influence
is the key to security and British influence still matters and must matter in a
dangerous world. You showed us the way.
Thank you
all. Thank you very much indeed. I
honour you all. I salute you all.
Julian Lindley-French
