NATO
and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats
“True genius resides in the capacity for
evaluation of uncertain, hazardous and conflicting information”.
Winston
Spencer Churchill
Alphen, Netherlands. 19
May. This blog is devoted to my report
on a major NATO conference entitled “NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating
Hybrid Threats,” for which I acted as Rapporteur and which was held between
29-30 April at the NATO Defense College in Rome. Below are the core messages
and policy recommendations from the report.
A full text of my report can be found at http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=814.
My sincere thanks to Major-General Bojarski, Commandant, NATO Defense College,
Dr Daria Daniels-Skodnik, Dean and Dr Jeff Larsen, Director of the Research
Divsion and his team for their help and support in the preparation of this
report.
Core
Messages
“NATO
and the New Ways of Warfare; Defeating Hybrid Warfare”
explored four main themes: NATO’s changing strategic environment, the scope and
nature of hybrid threats; NATO’s pol-mil responses to hybrid warfare; and NATO’s
military response to hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare was defined as the denial
of and defection from standard norms and principles of international relations
in pursuit of narrow interests. Contemporary
hybrid warfare is strategic in its ambition and employs a mix of
disinformation, destabilising gambits and intimidation to force an adversary to
comply with those interests. The
essential purpose of hybrid warfare is to keep an adversary politically,
militarily and societally off-balance.
Whilst much of the
debate concerned the military aspects of hybrid warfare the need for a tight
pol-mil relationship was seen as the essential pre-requisite for effective
Allied engagement of the threats posed. Indeed,
a fundamental issue at debate concerned how to create devolved political
command authority in the early phase of a crisis to ensure that military high
readiness is matched by the exercise of political agility in response to hybrid
threats. Critically, whilst the debate centred on the threats posed by Russia
to NATO Strategic Direction East, and by ISIS to NATO Strategic Direction
South, such threats and risks were seen as reflective of a more conflictual
world in which power is shifting at pace away from the Western liberal states.
Hybrid warfare exploits
political seams within the Alliance and societal seams within open
societies. Therefore, if NATO is to successfully
adapt and adjust strategy, capability and resiliency it is vital that such
threats are defined and properly understood and thereafter early indicators
established as effective conventional and nuclear deterrence remains the first
order principle of Alliance action and high readiness (and high responsiveness).
However, in the event
deterrence fails NATO must have the capacity and capability to fight war. That in turn entails the strengthening of
societal cohesion within NATO nations, the forging of close links between the
civilian and military aspects of security and defence. The future NATO must be
built on good intelligence, knowledge, robust command and control, rapid
response allied to the capacity to “surge to mass” via a “big, agile reserve”.
Policy
Recommendations:
NATO’s policy response
to strategic hybrid warfare will in effect require reflection on and adaptation
of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept in light of the lessons of hybrid warfare. Effective strategic communications (Stratcom)
will be vital both for home audiences and the strategic key leader engagement
implicit in strategic hybrid warfare. Such an adaptation and the strategic
realignment of the Alliance would in effect reflect a mid-term (five year) policy
review of the Strategic Concept for accuracy, credibility and contemporary relevance
given the challenges posed by hybrid warfare. Such realignment would need to incorporate the
following elements:
Prevention
Better
understand strategic hybrid threats: NATO must establish a
proper distinction between and granulated understanding of the threats posed to
the Alliance from Strategic Direction East and Strategic Direction South.
Craft
a hybrid warfare strategy: As part of NATO’s strategic
realignment a NATO hybrid warfare strategy should then be considered and
prepared by the Military Committee.
Establish
adapted early indicators: Adapted early indicators must be
established to enable more agile response to hybrid threats, especially in the
early phase of the conflict cycle. This
will require a new relationship between closed and open source information and
better exploitation of the Alliance of knowledge communities.
Establish
a Stratcom policy: Effective strategic communications is
part of Alliance defence against hybrid warfare and effective messaging is
central to strategic communications. A NATO Stratcom policy should be crafted to
counter the narrative at the heart of an adversary’s conduct of hybrid
warfare. Particular emphasis should be
placed on NATO-EU synergy and tight joint messaging thereafter.
Adaptation
Reconsider
information management: To defeat hybrid warfare NATO must
beat the adversary to the message. That will require reconsideration of the use
of classified information, a move to ensure the early release of mission
critical information, and the relationship between classified and unclassified
information.
Adapt
nuclear posture: NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture,
readiness and messaging also needs to be re-considered in response to Moscow’s
heightened use of nuclear weapons as part of hybrid warfare. The Alliance message must be clear: Moscow
must be under no illusion. The Alliance still understands the role of nuclear
weapons in deterrence and Russia will never achieve escalation dominance. Deterrence
will thus be enhanced by a heightened role for the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)
and a demonstration that since the end of the Cold War NATO has lost neither
the knowledge nor understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence.
Close
the conventional/nuclear seam: NATO’s military
preparedness and readiness will also need to include exercising and training
for the transition from conventional operations to nuclear operations.
Specifically, NATO must respond to Russia’s stated military doctrine that seeks
to use nuclear weapons to “de-escalate crises” in Moscow’s favour.
Adapt
exercising and training: Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) must be given a clear tasking to develop exercise and training programmes
to reflect recent developments in and reactions to hybrid warfare. Specifically, NATO needs to make far better
use of lessons identified and lessons learned from recent campaigns and
incorporate them in a ‘scientific’ development programme in which the future
force (and forces) are built via a series of linked exercises and defence
education initiatives that test the unknown rather than confirm the already
known. The two joint force commands and
the high readiness force headquarters would have a key role to play in the
development of such a programme.
Re-consider
the role of Partners: A specific study is needed on the role
of Partners in a NATO hybrid warfare strategy.
Such a study would re-consider partnership mechanisms in light of hybrid
warfare, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Co-operation Initiative,
Partners across the Globe and Partnership for Peace.
Enhance
Resiliency: A NATO hybrid warfare strategy would
need to properly consider how best to enhance resiliency of Allies and Partners.
A particular focus would be needed on the protection of critical national
information and infrastructures and consequence management. A useful first-step could be an analysis of
key vulnerabilities to better understand how individual NATO nations could be
undermined by hybrid warfare. Such an
analysis would include a better understanding of how minorities are susceptible
to manipulation; the vulnerability of the media space to external saturation;
how the lack of a binding national narrative could be exploited; and how
electorates could be alienated from leadership during a hybrid warfare-inspired
crisis, particularly through elite corruption.
Engagement
Enhance
military responsiveness and agility: Hybrid warfare seeks to
exploit the seams between collective defence, crisis management and
co-operative security. Therefore, twenty-first century Alliance collective
defence will also require a mix of coalitions and Alliance-wide action. The capacity for the rapid force generation
of coalitions of allies and partners, supported by effective command and
control at short notice will be central to NATO’s military responsiveness and
agility.
Establish
credible forward deterrence: In countering hybrid
warfare forward deterrence is as important as forward defence. Indeed, NATO must not be forced to trade
space for time in the event of a full-scale war of which hybrid warfare is but
a prelude. Critically, the Alliance needs
to consider how best to force an adversary and its forces off-balance, both
politically and militarily. Critically, NATO
forces must be aim to force an adversary onto the defensive via a counter
hybrid warfare strategy that imposes the unexpected on decision-makers. Such a posture will require demonstrable reassurance
and readiness.
Reconceive
NATO forces: In support of forward deterrence combined
and ‘deep joint’ Alliance forces must be able to operate effectively in and
across the seven domains of strategic hybrid warfare – air, sea, land, space,
cyber, information and knowledge. Critically,
the military relationship between NATO’s first responder forces and heavier,
follow-on forces many of which may be deployed outside of Europe will need to
be worked up.
Implement
Wales in full: The September 2014 NATO Wales Summit
was a benchmark summit; much like London in 1991 and Washington in 1999 and
must be implemented in full. Therefore, NATO
political guidance must establish credible capability requirements for
twenty-first collective defence that generates a new kind of ‘defence’ through
a mix of advanced deployable forces, cyber-defence and missile defence. Strategic hybrid warfare is not simply an
alternative form of warfare; it is the new way of warfare.
Julian Lindley-French
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