“There is a Providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children
and the United States of America”.
Otto von Bismarck
Alphen,
Netherlands. 10 December. Can the German-US
relationship ever be special? That was
the question that this interloping, Brexit-escaping Brit saw hanging in the
crisp Alpine air like new snow on a mountain fir in Germany’s beautiful
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. My purpose for
being in Germany was to attend a meeting of the Loisach Group. Set up this year, the Group is ‘co-hosted’ by the
excellent George C. Marshall Center and the Munich Security Conference. The aim
of this high-level working group is to explore those areas of grand (and
not-so-grand) strategy where Germany and the United States should co-operate
more fully in pursuit of peace and stability.
It is a timely and much needed initiative.
Now, I
suppose my first port of call should be to define the meaning of ‘special
relationship’. President Trump, in the way that President Trump does, put the
UK-US special relationship this way, “The special relationship between America
and the UK has been one of the great forces in history for justice and for
peace, and by the way, my mother was born in Scotland, Stornoway, which is
serious Scotland”. His essential point
is that for the past seventy or so years the US and UK working together have
been one of the “…great forces in history”.
The contemporary
West certainly needs a strong German-US strategic relationship and for it to be
a new force in history. Sadly, with the UK in a mess, and the British political
elite seemingly incapable of rising the challenges of the twenty-first century,
the two anchor states of the West are undoubtedly Germany and the United
States. Nor, as a Brit, am I particularly
concerned about the strategic eclipsing of Britain by Germany, were it the case.
My German friends can irritate the hell out of me, primarily because they have
a tendency to believe they are always right about everything all of the time,
even when they are plain wrong. Americans? Their collective and complete
refusal to properly understand the causes of Brexit being a case-in-point.
Equally, I am
equally irritated by those, particularly in my own country, who seek to equate contemporary
liberal democratic Germany with Nazi Germany simply because they resent
powerful Germany. As L.P. Hartley once
wrote, “The past is a foreign country, they do things differently there”. In other words, the need for America and
Germany to lead, and preferably lead together, is just plain power-sense.
It is at that
point the complexities in the German-US relationship become apparent. Donald
Trump’s other point was that kinship does indeed play a role in the US-UK special
relationship. It is changing, and over
time will change, but whilst the US and UK are very different countries, with
the latter very much a European country, there are still powerful cultural ties
between the two that do not exist between Germany and the US.
Moreover, the
‘special’ bit in the special relationship has hitherto been founded on a level
of mutual trust and respect of such import that the most sensitive of material and
information continues to be shared between the US and UK (although whether that
trust survive a Jeremy Corbyn government in London is a moot point). It is this ‘automaticity’ of trust that is missing
in the German-US relationship. Indeed, I
would go as far as to say that the US and German establishments are profoundly
ambivalent about each other, and that such ambivalence goes far deeper than the
implicit animosity that characterises the Merkel-Trump non-relationship.
This is a
shame because as America’s over-stretched, world-wide reach grows relatively
weaker over time as China and other ‘super-regional powers’ rise to challenge Washington’s
writ the US will rely ever more on powerful allies and partners such as
Germany. And, with Britain leaving the EU (if one reads the small-print of this
week’s deal Britain really is leaving the EU) and with Berlin leading the way
to deeper European integration, Germany will inevitably become relatively more
powerful, and thus more vital to the US.
There is,
however, a very large caveat with my thesis – Germany and its attitude to the
utility and use of military power. As the
Loisach Group debated with Germans occupying
the 'high' ground of theory, whilst Americans seeking joint policy action, a few
hundred kilometres to the West a ceremony was taking place of profound
strategic and political significance.
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II was commissioning the first of Britain’s
new 70,000 ton aircraft carrier’s HMS
Queen Elizabeth into the Royal Navy.
Now, being
rude about my country is a European habit these days because Brexit has dared
pose a question the Euro-Aristocracy regard as heretical and would rather not
have asked; who governs us? And, yes, one can nit-pick over the number of
aircraft Big Lizzie will operate etc.
etc. However, the simple truth is that
Britain will soon have two such ships that will greatly assist the United
States to maintain global military reach.
Germany does not have, nor will it have anything like such military power.
You see, for
all the bluster about the ‘special relationship’ over the decades, culture,
shared values, kinship et al, it was only ever REALLY special when Britain brought
significant additional military heft to America’s super-heft (are you listening
Mr Hammond?). Or, to put it another way, for all their challenges the British face
they are investing in the kind of military force projection the Americans see
as power vital to maintaining a special relationship, whilst the Germans, who
continue to see ‘power’ in very different and mainly civilian and institutional
ways, are not.
The subject for
the Group’s discussion was, Harmonizing German
and US Engagement with Russia. As I
sat through the various presentations I became ever more convinced the title of
the meeting should have been, Harmonizing
German and US Engagement with Each Other.
This is a vital mission because the German-US strategic partnership really
matters. However, the Americans see the centre of gravity of the relationship as
primarily helping them by better sharing burdens to offset their increasing military-strategic over-stretch, whilst
the Germans see it as part of a non-military grand bargain that would constrain, as much as reinforce American might. As long as that fundamental fissure
exists the best that will be said of the German-US strategic relationship is
that is essential, rather than special.
Still, the Loisach Group has a vital role to play
to strengthen what is for all my caveats a, if not the vital strategic transatlantic
relationship of the twenty-first century. For, to re-phrase Bismarck, in the twenty-first
century there is no longer a Providence that protects idiots, drunkards,
children, Germans, or even Americans.
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