“All cruelty springs from weakness”.
Seneca
Alphen,
Netherlands. 28 May. The great European defence crisis is upon us. It has been
a long time coming and can even be traced back to the very founding of NATO. Most
Europeans never got over World War Two and have been happy to do the least
possible to defend themselves ever since, albeit commensurate with ensuring the
Americans did their defending for them. However,
news that Germany, Belgium and in reality a host of other Europeans have absolutely
no intention of honouring the NATO Defence Investment Pledge (the
appropriately-named DIP). The DIP was the formal commitment made by the nations
of the Alliance at the 2014 Wales Summit that by 2024 they would all spend 2%
GDP on defence of which 20% each year would be on new equipment.
When the Cold
War began spluttering joyfully to an end in 1989 ‘Europe’ re-defined itself as
a civil power. Subsequently, European armed
forces were cut to the bone and often beyond in the decades that followed. Slashing defence spending became a habit. Now,
Europe again faces threats some of which demand a level of force commensurate
with establishing a new level of deterrence, credible defence and meaningful
engagement. Sadly, ALL Europeans are failing the test implicit in that challenge,
whatever the small ‘dead cat bounce’ increases in defence spending that some
leaders have championed. What has caused
the great European defence crisis and is there a way out?
Lack of money and unreformed militaries: Some leaders have questioned the commitment they made to the
Defence Investment Pledge, whilst some have suggested that they spend c. 1% GDP
on defence so well it is, in fact, the equivalent of 2%. This is nonsense. 2%
GDP on defence spent moderately well would be at least twice as effective as
the 1% currently spent very badly. However,
before such increases could take place many European forces and their
procurement systems would need to undergo thoroughgoing reforms if new money is
to be applied to any effect. There is little sign of such reforms taking place.
Financial crisis: The effects
of the financial crisis that started in 2008 and the austerity that followed have
had a disastrous effect on most European armed forces, even the strongest. Last
week the much-respected Paul Johnson of London’s Institute for Fiscal Studies suggested
the UK government can no longer take money away from defence to fund the
National Health Service. The raiding of hard security to fund social security has
been a phenomenon across Europe. The Dutch armed forces are a case in point. Reduced
to the verge of incapacity by successive governments they have just received a
small cash inject that will do little to resolve the force-resource crisis in which
they are mired.
Strategic pretence: In an effort
to wiggle out of the DIP EU member-states last year re-invented Permanent
Structured Co-operation or PESCO. The
idea at the core of PESCO is that by being more efficient and more together EU
member-states could generate the same defence outcomes spending 1% GDP on
defence as each state separately spending 2% GDP on defence. This is again nonsense. I wrote my doctorate
on European defence and I have seen the same political trick used time and
again. Indeed, there is an inverse
correlation from which European defence suffers: the more acronyms created the
more military capabilities lost.
Loss of strategic and political cohesion: Europeans either do not agree on what the main defence effort should
be or still do not believe defence is that important
or both. This lack of strategic and
political cohesion and the lack of defence seriousness it engenders has been revealed
over the past week during the latest attempt by the European Commission to
punish Britain for Brexit. The Galileo
satellite positioning system is the one piece of EU security architecture that
matters to the British armed forces, and yet the Commission wants to exclude post-Brexit
Britain from using the highly-encrypted core of the capability. This is even though
British money and expertise has gone into developing Galileo and Britain’s loss of access to it would weaken the defence
of Europeans. Sadly, such misplaced intransigence is all too totemic of the great
European defence crisis. For the European Commission punishing Britain is more
important than the safety of Europeans.
American over-stretch: Over the weekend
the United States Navy conducted a freedom of navigation exercise in contested
waters in the South China Sea. The growing challenge of China is exacerbating
the strategic over-stretch of the United States which remains the world’s only
global, albeit hard-pressed military power. Europeans must share more of
America’s burdens if America is to credibly maintain its security and defence
guarantee to Europe. However, too many European leaders remain in denial about
the challenges faced by Washington and the implications for the defence of
Europe. Indeed, a few see free-riding on
the Americans as a right.
New technologies of war: In 1906 the
Royal Navy commissioned HMS Dreadnought,
the world’s first all-big gun, heavily-armoured, fast battleship. At a stroke, the warships of all navies (including
Britain’s) were rendered obsolete. The emergence and deepening combination of
artificial intelligence, machine-learning, offensive cyber capabilities and
electronic warfare in the battlespace suggests a new ‘Dreadnought’ moment is
fast approaching. However, it could well be illiberal command powers, such as
China and Russia who make the breakthrough, rather than Europe’s
technologically dilatory social market powers.
Populism: Overnight President
Mattarella effectively blocked the formation of a new populist government in
Rome, effectively tipping vulnerable Italy back into political crisis. The rise of populism across Europe is
destroying the ability of European states to credibly defend themselves or
uphold their commitments to allies.
Italy is one of Europe’s major powers and there is now the very real
danger that in effect Rome will be lost to NATO and Europe. There is a profound and dare I say tragic
historical metaphor in this latest Italian crisis.
Europe’s leadership vacuum: There is a
vacuum in the leadership of European defence that an opportunistic Russia is
exploiting. That vacuum is primarily caused by an irresponsible and
increasingly selfish Germany which seems to want the benefits of leading Europe
but refuses its responsibilities. For those of us who respect modern,
democratic Germany this failure of leadership is a profound regret. Two issues reveal the extent of the German
malaise. The Nordstream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany is a
reflection of Berlin’s profound ambivalence when it comes to the defence of
Europe. This weekend the Joint
Investigation Team cited the Russian military as culpable for the July 2014
downing of Malaysian Airline MH17 with the loss of 298 souls. There is a
meeting in Brussels to consider the conclusion.
It is almost certain Berlin will try to water down any action proposed
against Russia. Berlin’s ambivalence is compounded by the appalling state of
the German armed forces. With most
German ships and submarines confined to port for lack of spares and only two of
the Luftwaffe’s fleet of more than 90 Tornado aircraft fitted for night action Germany
is a central cause of the great European defence crisis.
The European military mobility crisis: The European force
generation and mobility crisis is the consequence of the great European defence
crisis. Naturally, all of the above has a profound impact on the ground. Back
in 2014 much was made of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and strategic
reassurance to the Baltic States. And yet, in an emergency NATO forces would
find it extremely difficult to move any force of any size quickly across the
Continent in support of the trigger/trip-wire forces now in situ in the Baltic
States. At a meeting ten days ago I suggested it would thus make more sense to
move the main bulk of forces further east to overcome the crisis in mobility faced
by the defenders of Europe. No, I was told, it would make those forces more
vulnerable. This is nonsense. A senior
officer confided in me that the real reason is that most European states do not
wish to antagonise Russia and/or are simply not prepared to pay the cost of
preparing an effective force to be maintained at a higher-level of readiness beyond
their own borders.
Is there a
way out of the great European crisis? Yes, but it will require political
leadership. Last year, as lead writer, I supported General John Allen, Admiral
di Paola, General Wolf Langheld, Ambassador Tomas Valacek and Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow in preparing the GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Reports (https://www.globsec.org/initiatives/globsec-nato-adaptation-initiative/). In addition, several of the West’s leading
thinkers contributed major papers. For
all the insight and creativity the project generated it faced a simple reality:
unless such efforts are backed up with a mix of political vision and defence
realism at the top of government across Europe the great European defence crisis
will continue. Too many of Europe’s leaders
are still in denial about the dangers Europeans face and will face and I only
hope they will not one day be condemned by history and their citizens for it.
European
defence is in crisis. It must first be faced before it can be resolved. Peace through
legitimate strength!
Julian
Lindley-French
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